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Abstract 
This study aims to explore the role of institutional investors in the improvement of corporate 
governance within the companies in which they invest (investee companies). This aim is 
accomplished by analysing evidence concerning the characteristics of numerous companies’ 
boards of directors, and of their key subcommittees, listed across the globe. These 
characteristics are related to board attributes (composition, activity, entrenchment and 
busyness) and board diversity (gender, age, nationality and education). Furthermore, this study 
also seeks to investigate the behaviour of institutional investors in improving corporate 
governance by considering different settings, including various economic conditions (pre-
crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods), legal systems and ownership structures. 
Using a sample collected from 15 countries for the period of 2006 to 2012, this study finds that 
institutional investors promote more favourable corporate governance outcomes, with foreign 
institutional investors playing a lead role in the improvement and convergence of corporate 
governance practices around the world. This study provides evidence that institutional 
investors promote the enhanced composition of boards and of their audit and compensation 
committees, though not of nomination committees. Furthermore, institutional investors are 
positively associated with the activity of audit committees but not with the activity of boards 
nor of compensation and nomination committees. The results also demonstrate that institutional 
investors reduce board entrenchment though no evidence is found that institutional investors 
reduce board busyness. The findings also suggest that the role of institutional investors in 
corporate governance is determined by a company’s institutional environment including the 
prevalent economic condition, the legal system and the ownership structure of the country in 
which it operates. In particular, the findings show that institutional investors play a stronger 
role in the improvement of governance structures during crisis and post-crisis periods than they 
do during pre-crisis times. This result is also applicable to individual board attributes, such as 
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the independence of audit committees. Additionally, institutional investors improve the 
independence of boards and of their key subcommittees (with the exception of nomination 
committees) in civil law countries and reduce board busyness in common law countries. 
However, there is no evidence that institutional investors reduce board entrenchment in either 
legal system. Furthermore, the results indicate that they improve governance outcomes in non-
family-owned firms but not in family-owned firms.  
Moreover, this study presents no evidence that institutional investors promote board diversity; 
in fact, this study generally finds no association between institutional ownership and various 
board diversity attributes such as gender, age, nationality and education. However, the findings 
do show that institutional investors are positively associated with the education diversity of 
boards during times of crisis and are negatively associated with board age diversity during pre-
crisis and post-crisis periods. Furthermore, while in common law countries institutional 
investors are found to be negatively associated with board age diversity, they have no influence 
over board diversity attributes (i.e., gender, age, nationality and education) in civil law 
countries. The results also suggest that the associations between institutional investors and 
board diversity are mixed and insignificant within different ownership structures, i.e. in family- 
and non-family-owned firms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
All praise to Allah the almighty, who bestowed upon me protection, health and the ability to 
complete my doctoral journey.  
I would also like to convey my profound gratitude to my supervisors, Professor Christine 
Mallin and Dr Francesca Cuomo, for their insightful comments, continuous guidance, 
unlimited support and invaluable encouragement, which enabled me to progress and complete 
this thesis. I also wish to thank them for granting me the opportunity to present my research at 
several national and international conferences and colloquiums. 
I am deeply grateful to my parents for their continual prayers and support, to my wife for her 
unconditional care, unceasing encouragement, unlimited patience and selfless sacrifice and to 
my two small sons, Almukhtar and Albaraa, for being a constant source of a joy. Without the 
support, encouragement and commitment of all involved, this work could not have been 
accomplished. 
I am also grateful to the administrative staff of Norwich Business School and to the Post-
graduate Office for their outstanding support and assistance throughout my doctoral journey. 
Special thanks go to the academic members of NBS for sharing insightful ideas and engaging 
me in informative discussions that allowed me to improve my thesis. I also extend my sincere 
gratitude to my doctoral colleagues at NBS for their support and encouragement throughout 
this journey.  
Last but not least, I would like to thank my sponsor, The Ministry of Higher Education of the 
Sultanate of Oman, for funding my scholarship and for offering me the opportunity to attend 
one of the top universities in the United Kingdom, the University of East Anglia. 
 
 
 
v 
 
Dedication 
 
‘This thesis is dedicated to my family.’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
Presented Papers 
Parts of this thesis were presented at the following conferences and colloquiums: 
Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance (with C. Mallin and F. Cuomo). Paper 
presented at the Second Annual International Corporate Governance Society Conference; 
Boston, US, October 2016. 
Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance (with C. Mallin and F. Cuomo). Paper 
presented at the Portsmouth-Fordham Conference on Banking & Finance; Portsmouth, UK, 
September 2016. 
Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance. Paper presented at the Doctoral Colloquium 
of the European Academy of Management; Warsaw, Poland, June 2015. 
Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance. Paper presented at the Second Young 
Finance Scholars Conference; Sussex, UK, June 2015. 
Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance. Paper presented at the Doctoral Colloquium 
of the British Accounting and Finance Association; Manchester, UK, March 2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ……………………………………………………………………………………....ii 
Acknowledgements …………………………………………………………………………..iv  
Dedication …………………………………………………………………………………....v 
Presented Papers ……………………………………………………………………………..vi 
Table of Contents.....................................................................................................................vii 
List of Figures ..........................................................................................................................x 
List of Tables...........................................................................................................................xii 
List of Abbreviations ……………………………………………………………………......xiv 
Chapter 1 ……………………………………...…………………………………….….........1 
1.1. Overview of the Research …….………………………………………………………….1 
1.2. Research Background and Motivation …….……………………………………………..1 
1.3. Research Objectives and Questions ……………………………….……………………..4 
1.4. Scope of the Study………………………………………………………………………..5 
1.5. Structure of the Study ……………………………………………………………………5 
Chapter 2..…………………………...……………………………………………….………9 
2.0. Theoretical Framework …………………………………………………………………..9 
2.1. Introduction …………………………………………………………………………........9 
2.2. Agency Theory …………………………………………………………………………...9 
2.3. Stewardship Theory ……………………………………………………………………..16 
2.4. Resource Dependence Theory ……………………………………………………..........18 
2.5. Institutional Theory ……………………………………………………………………..20 
2.6. Stakeholder Theory ………………………………………………………………….......22 
2.7. Multiple Theoretical Frameworks………………………………………………………..25 
2.7. Chapter Summary ……………………………………………………………..…….......28 
Chapter 3..…………………………………………………………………………………...29 
3.0. Corporate Governance Background ……………………………………………………..29 
3.1. Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………...29 
3.2. The Importance of Boards of Directors …………………………………………………30 
    3.2.1. Unitary Boards versus Dual Boards ………………………………………...............30 
    3.2.2. Board Key Subcommittees ……………………………………………….…………32 
3.3. The Financial Crisis and Corporate Governance ………………………………………...35 
3.4. Legal Systems and Corporate Governance ………………………………………………37 
3.5. Ownership Structures and Corporate Governance ……………………………………….39 
3.6. Outsider versus Insider Systems …………………………………………………………45 
3.7. Hard versus Soft Law Systems …………………………………………………………..47 
3.8. The Anglo-Saxon Model …………………………………………………………….......49 
    3.8.1. Corporate Governance in Australia …………………………………………………50 
    3.8.2. Corporate Governance in Canada …………………………………………………..53 
    3.8.3. Corporate Governance in India ……………………………………………………..56 
    3.8.4. Corporate Governance in Ireland …………………………………………………...58 
    3.8.5. Corporate Governance in the United Kingdom …………………………………….61 
    3.8.6. Corporate Governance in the United States ……………………………………........71 
3.9. The Germanic Corporate Governance System ……………………………………..........76 
    3.9.1. Corporate Governance in Switzerland ………………………………………………77 
3.10. The Latin Countries System ………………………………………………………........79 
    3.10.1. Corporate Governance in Belgium ………………………………………………..79 
    3.10.2. Corporate Governance in France …………………………………………….........82 
    3.10.3. Corporate Governance in Italy ………………………………………………….....86 
viii 
 
    3.10.4. Corporate Governance in the Netherlands………………………………………….88 
    3.10.5. Corporate Governance in Spain ……………………………………………….......90 
3.11. The Nordic Governance System ……………………………………………………….93 
    3.11.1. Corporate Governance in Denmark ……………………………………………….94 
    3.11.2. Corporate Governance in Finland ……………………………………………........97 
    3.11.3. Corporate Governance in Norway …………………………………………………99 
    3.11.4. Corporate Governance in Sweden ………………………………………………..102 
3.12. Chapter Summary …………………………………………………………………….111 
Chapter 4………………………………………………………….……………………..... 112 
4.0. Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance ………………………......................112 
4.1. Introduction ………………………………………………………………………….....112 
4.2. Types of Institutional Investors…………………………………………………............112 
4.3. Institutional Investors’ Tools of Engagement …………………………………….........115 
    4.3.1. One-to-One Meetings ……………………………………………………………..116 
    4.3.2. Voting ……………………………………………………………………………. 120 
    4.3.3. Shareholder Proposals/Resolutions ……………………………………………….122 
    4.3.4. Focus Lists ……………………………………………………………………….. 123 
    4.3.5. Corporate Governance Rating Systems ………………………………………….. 123 
4.4. Stewardship Codes and Guidelines …………………………………………………... 124 
    4.4.1. Transnational Stewardship Codes and Guidelines ……………………………..... 124 
    4.4.2. National Stewardship Codes and Guidelines ………………………………….......127 
4.5. Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance: Empirical Literature Review ……..132 
4.6. Chapter Summary ………………………………………………………………..…….142 
Chapter 5………………………………………………………………………………….. 143 
5.0. Hypotheses Development …………………………………………………………….. 143 
5.1. Introduction …………………………………………………………………………... 143 
5.2. Institutional Investors and Board Attributes............................................................…... 143 
    5.2.1. Board and Key Subcommittees Composition ……………………………………..146 
    5.2.2. Board and Key Subcommittees Activity ………………………………………… 149 
    5.2.3. Board Entrenchment ………………………………………………………….…...151 
    5.2.4. Board Busyness ………………………………………………………………...... 153 
5.3. Institutional Investors and Board Diversity ……………………………………….…. 155 
    5.3.1. Board Gender Diversity ……………………………………………………...........156 
    5.3.2. Board Age Diversity ……………………………………………………….….......159 
    5.3.3. Board Nationality Diversity ………………………………………………….……160 
    5.3.4. Board Education Diversity ………………………………………………….…… 161 
5.4. Chapter Summary ………………………………………………………………….…. 163 
Chapter 6………………………………………………………………………………….. 164  
6.0. Research Design and Methodology ……………………………………..……………. 164 
6.1. Introduction ………………………………………………………………………....... 164 
6.2. Research Philosophy and Approach……………………………………….….............. 164 
6.3. Sample Selection and Data Collection ……………………………………………..…. 171 
    6.3.1. Sample and Selection Criteria..………………………………………………........ 172 
    6.3.2. Data Source ………………………………………………………………….…… 174 
    6.3.3. Sample Period ………………………………………………................................. 175 
6.4. Variable Definitions ………………………………………………………………...... 176 
    6.4.1. Dependent Variables …….......................................................................................176 
    6.4.2. Independent Variables ……………………………………………………………..181 
    6.4.3. Control Variables …………………………………………………………….......181 
6.5. Panel Data Estimation Method ………………………………………………...............186 
ix 
 
6.6. Empirical Models ……………………………………………………………………....188 
     6.6.1. Models for Institutional Investors and Board Attributes ………………………….189 
     6.6.2. Models for Institutional Investors and Board Diversity …………………………..190 
6.7. Robustness Tests ……………………………………………………………………......192 
    6.7.1. Reverse Causality …………………………………………………………………..192 
    6.7.2. Dynamic Generalised Method of Moments...............................................................193 
    6.7.3. Alternative Measures ………………………………….………………………….. 194 
6.8. Chapter Summary ………………………………………………………………………195 
Chapter 7…………………………………………………………………………………...196 
7.0. Research Results and Analysis: Institutional Investors and Board Attributes …………196 
7.1. Introduction ………………………………………………………………………….....196 
7.2. Summary of the Descriptive Statistics ……………………………………………........196 
7.3. Correlation Analysis …………………………………………………………………...203 
7.4. Institutional Investors and Board Attributes: Panel Data Analysis ………………….....207 
    7.4.1 Board Attributes Index …………………………………………………………......207 
    7.4.2. Board and Key Subcommittees Composition …………………………………..... 215 
    7.4.3. Board and Key Subcommittees Activity ………………………………………......223 
    7.4.4. Board Entrenchment …………………………………………………………....... 228 
    7.4.5. Board Busyness ………………………………………………………………........232 
7.5. Robustness Tests ………………………………………………………………………..236 
7.6. Chapter Summary ………………………………………………………………………241 
Chapter 8…………………………………………………………………………………...242 
8.0. Research Results and Analysis: Institutional Investors and Board Diversity…………..242 
8.1. Introduction ………………………………………………………………………….....242 
8.2. Summary of the Descriptive Statistics ……………………………………………........242 
8.3. Correlation Analysis …………………………………………………………………...247 
8.4. Institutional Investors and Board Diversity: Panel Data Analysis ……………….….....251 
    8.4.1. Board Diversity Index ……………………………………………………………..251 
    8.4.2. Board Gender Diversity…………………………………………………………...257 
    8.4.3. Board Age Diversity ……………………………………………………………....261 
    8.4.4. Board Nationality Diversity……………………………………………………….265 
    8.4.5. Board Education Diversity ………………………….…………………………….268 
8.5. Robustness Tests ……………………………………………………………………….271 
8.6. Chapter Summary ……………………………………………………………... ………275 
Chapter 9……………………………………………………………………………….......276 
9.0. Summary and Conclusion ………….……………………………………......................276 
9.1. Introduction ……………………………………………………………………….........276 
9.2. Restatement of the Research Objectives and Questions……………………..................276 
9.3. Summary of Findings and Research Implications ……………………………………..277 
9.4. Research Contribution ………………………………………………………………….280 
9.5. Research Limitations and Future Research …………………………………………….283 
References………………………………………………………………………………….284 
Appendices…………………………………………………………………………………322 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1.1 The Structure of The Study. ………………………………………………….........8 
Figure 2.1 The Governance Relationship ……………………………………………………10 
Figure 2.2 The Shareholder/Director Relationship …………………………………………..17 
Figure 2.3 The Corporation and its Stakeholders ……………………………………………23 
Figure 3.1 A Comparison of One-Tier and Two-Tier Board Structures …………..................32 
Figure 3.2 The Possible Stages of Family Firms’ Governance ………………………………44 
Figure 3.3 The Development of Major Corporate Governance Codes in Australia ………. ..52 
Figure 3.4 The Development of Major Corporate Governance Codes in Canada ………… ..56 
Figure 3.5 The Development of Major Corporate Governance Codes in India …………… ..58 
Figure 3.6 The Development of Major Corporate Governance Codes in Ireland ……………61 
Figure 3.7 The Development of Major Corporate Governance Codes in the UK ……………70 
Figure 3.8 The Development of Major Corporate Governance Codes/Acts in the US ………76 
Figure 3.9 The Development of Major Corporate Governance Codes in Switzerland……….78 
Figure 3.10 The Development of Major Corporate Governance Codes in Belgium ………….82 
Figure 3.11 The Development of Major Corporate Governance Codes in France …………..86 
Figure 3.12 The Development of Major Corporate Governance Codes in Italy ………………88 
Figure 3.13 The Development of Major Corporate Governance Codes in Netherlands ……..90 
Figure 3.14 The Development of Major Corporate Governance Codes in Spain ……………93 
Figure 3.15 The Development of Major Corporate Governance Codes in Denmark……… ..97 
Figure 3.16 The Development of Major Corporate Governance Codes in Finland………….99 
Figure 3.17 The Development of Major Corporate Governance Codes in Norway………….102 
Figure 3.18 The Development of Major Corporate Governance Codes in Sweden …………104 
Figure 4.1 The Key Principles of the ICGN Global Stewardship Code….…………………126 
Figure 4.2 The Key Principles of the UK Stewardship Code……………………………… 130 
Figure 6.1 The Research Onion ……………………………………………………………..167 
Figure 6.2 The Study’s Research Onion ……………………………………………………170 
Figure 6.3 The Process of Deductive Approach …………………………………………….171 
Figure 7.1 Board Attributes Index (GOV14) by Country and Year (2006–2012)……………198 
Figure 7.2 Weighted Averages of the Board Attributes Index (GOV14)……………………199 
Figure 7.3 Weighted Averages of Corporate Board and Key Subcommittee Composition…199 
Figure 7.4 Weighted Averages of Corporate Board and Key Subcommittee Activity………200 
Figure 7.5 Weighted Averages of the Board Entrenchment Variables……………………...201 
xi 
 
Figure 7.6 Weighted Average of the Average Board Directorships Held by INEDs……….201 
Figure 7.7 Weighted Average of the Percentage of ‘Busy’ INEDs…………………………202 
Figure 7.8 Weighted Averages of Institutional Ownership…………………………………203 
Figure 8.1 Board Diversity Index (BDI16) by Country and Year (2006–2012)……………..244 
Figure 8.2 Weighted Averages of the Board Diversity Index (BDI16)………………………245 
Figure 8.3 Weighted Averages of Board Diversity Attributes………………………………245 
Figure 8.4 Weighted Averages of Institutional Ownership…………………………………246 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xii 
 
List of Tables 
Table 2.1 Summary of Corporate Governance Theories …………………………………….27 
Table 3.1 General Corporate Governance Features of the Sample Countries ……………......108 
Table 3.2 National Statistics and Regulations on Gender Diversity ………………………...109 
Table 4.1 Transnational and National Stewardship Codes………………….…..…………...131 
Table 4.2 Summary of Key Studies …………………………………………………………139 
Table 5.1 Hypotheses Summary ………………………………………………………….....163 
Table 6.1 Sample Selection Criteria ………………………………………………………...172 
Table 6.2 Firm Statistics by Country and Year ………………………………….…….........173 
Table 6.3 Industry Distribution by Number of Firms ………………………………….……174 
Table 6.4 Board Attributes Index (GOV14)………………………………………………….177 
Table 6.5 An Illustrative Example of Constructing Board Diversity Index …………………180 
Table 6.6 List of Variables…………………………………………………………………..185 
Table 7.1 Descriptive Statistics: ………………………………………………………....….197 
Table 7.2 Pearson Correlation Matrix: …………………………………………………..….205 
Table 7.3 VIF Test…………………………………….……………………………….……207 
Table 7.4 Institutional Investors and Board Attributes Index….……………………….........210 
Table 7.5 Institutional Investors and Board Attributes Index: The Role of Legal Origin…..215 
Table 7.6 Institutional Investors and the Composition of Boards and their Subcommittees…219 
Table 7.7 Institutional Investors and the Activity of Boards and their Subcommittees…….226 
Table 7.8 Institutional Investors and Board Entrenchment ………………………………….231 
Table 7.9 Institutional Investors and Board Busyness ………………………………….......235 
Table 7.10 Changes in Institutional Ownership and Changes in Board Attributes…………237  
Table 7.11 Institutional Investors and the Board Attributes Index (System GMM)………..239 
Table 7.12 Institutional Investments and Items of the Board Attributes Index……………..241 
Table 8.1 Descriptive Statistics ……………………………………………………………..243 
Table 8.2 Pearson Correlation Matrix …………………………….………………………...249 
Table 8.3 VIF Test ………………………………………………………………..………...251 
Table 8.4 Institutional Investors and Board Diversity..…………….…………………..…...253 
Table 8.5 Institutional Investors and Board Diversity: The Role of Legal Origin……….…256 
Table 8.6 Institutional Investors and Board Gender Diversity ……………………………..260 
Table 8.7 Institutional Investors and Board Age Diversity ………………………….……..264 
Table 8.8 Institutional Investors and Board Nationality Diversity ……………….………...267 
xiii 
 
Table 8.9 Institutional Investors and Board Education Diversity ………..………………...270 
Table 8.10 Changes in Institutional Ownership and Changes in Board Diversity………….272 
Table 8.11 Institutional Investors and the Board Diversity Index (System GMM)…………274 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xiv 
 
List of Abbreviations 
AFEP Association Française des Enterprises Privées 
AGM Annual General Meeting 
ASX Australian Stock Exchange 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
CNMV Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores 
FE Fixed Effect 
FRC Financial Reporting Council 
GMI Governance Metrics International 
GMM Generalised Methods of Moments 
IAIM Irish Association of Investment Managers 
ICGN International Corporate Governance Network 
INED Independent Non-Executive Director 
ISC Institutional Shareholders Committee 
MEDEF Mouvement des Enterprises de France 
NCGB Norwegian Corporate Governance Board 
OECD The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OLS Ordinary Least Squares 
RE Random Effect 
SEC Securities and Exchange Commission 
S&P Standard and Poor’s 
TSX Toronto Stock Exchange 
VIF Variance Inflation Factor 
1 
 
Chapter 1 
1.0 Overview of the Research 
1.1. Research Background and Motivation 
Institutional investors maintain a notable presence in, and exercise growing influence over, 
global capital markets. The increasing growth of their worldwide investments affords them the 
opportunity to influence the behaviour of investee firms through their monitoring activities 
(Gillan and Starks, 2003; Mallin, 2016). Generally, institutional investors who are dissatisfied 
with company performance or with the governance structure of a company may choose to sell 
their company shares (‘exit’) or opt to engage with their investee firms (‘voice’) (Martin et al., 
2007; Ferreira and Matos, 2008). Since the ‘exit’ option is considered costly, mostly large and 
active institutional investors choose to engage with their investee firms in order to alter 
unfavourable governance structures and to correct undesirable performance (Jin, 2006; 
McCahery et al., 2016). This engagement between institutional investors and their investee 
firms can assume many forms, such as one-to-one meetings, voting, shareholder proposals and 
resolutions, focus lists and corporate governance rating systems (Martin et al., 2007; Mallin, 
2016). More recently, studies show that one-to-one meetings held behind-the-scenes are 
considered   an effective approach that is regularly used by institutional investors to enhance 
the governance structures of their investee firms (see for example; McCahery et al., 2016). 
Moreover, the stewardship codes and guidelines issued by several institutions in various 
countries represent a significant move towards improved interactions between institutional 
investors and their investee firms, as they aim to promote positive governance structures (Haxhi 
et al., 2013; McNulty and Nordberg, 2016).  
A corporate board is considered to be the main governing mechanism that mitigates the agency 
costs that arise from the separation of ownership and control (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Given 
that boards exist as the centre of decision-making policy, much attention has been paid to their 
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attributes (Solomon, 2013; Mallin, 2016). For instance, Useem et al. (1993) provided evidence 
that the composition and functionality of a company’s board are crucial considerations for US-
based institutional investors. Furthermore, following the completion of a global survey of 200 
institutional investors, Coombes and Watson (2000) found that most institutional investors 
consider the attributes of a corporate board to be as important as a company’s financial 
performance. Furthermore, Chung and Zhang (2011) also found that institutional investors 
favour firms with higher board independence, as these firms are associated with lower 
monitoring costs. Accordingly, this study posits that institutional investors will improve board 
characteristics by establishing various engagement channels with their investee firms. These 
characteristics are related to the attributes (composition, activity, entrenchment and busyness) 
and diversity qualities (gender, age, nationality and education) of corporate boards and their 
key subcommittees.  
Several corporate governance studies have highlighted the importance of national institutional 
factors in explaining corporate governance phenomena (Aguilera et al., 2008; Aguilera et al., 
2012; Aslan and Kumar, 2014; Kim and Ozdemir, 2014; Iannotta et al., 2015). One such 
institutional factor is the economic condition of a country (Essen et al., 2013; McNulty et al., 
2013). Interestingly, the weakness of corporate governance in many countries is largely 
considered to have been a main contributor to the onset of the recent financial crisis (Akbar et 
al., 2017). Several studies have suggested that both institutional investors and corporate boards 
are to blame for their inability to prevent that crisis from occurring (Conyon et al., 2011; 
Reisberg, 2015). In response to such a devastating crisis, several countries introduced or 
revised their corporate governance codes in an attempt to strengthen their governance practices 
(Adams; 2012; Cuomo et al., 2016). Moreover, in the wake of the recent financial crisis, several 
countries issued stewardship codes and guidelines (beginning with the UK in 2010) in an effort 
to encourage and enhance engagement between institutional investors and their investee firms 
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(ICGN, 2017). However, we still know little about the role played by institutional investors in 
efforts to improve corporate governance with respect to the recent financial crisis. Therefore, 
this study also aims to examine the role of institutional investors in the improvement of 
corporate board characteristics in light of various economic conditions (pre-crisis, crisis and 
post-crisis periods). 
Additionally, the bundle perspective of comparative corporate governance (Aguilera et al., 
2008; Aguilera et al., 2012; Kim and Ozdemir, 2014) argues that differences between board 
attributes across countries cannot be studied without also considering at least two other 
governance characteristics—legal system and ownership structure—as each of these 
characteristics is contingent upon the strength and prevalence of the other. Previous studies 
have shown that the legal system of a country (i.e., common or civil law) affects its accepted 
levels of investor protection (strong versus weak) (La Porta et al., 1998; La Porta et al., 2000). 
To this end, La Porta et al. (1998) argued that in countries where investor protection rights are 
weak, investors may seek other means of protection. As a board of directors is entrusted with 
the protection of shareholder interests, institutional investors can improve corporate board 
characteristics to a greater degree in countries where shareholder protections are weak. Thus, 
this study complements previous empirical findings (Aggarwal et al., 2011) by investigating 
the capacity of institutional investors to improve a wide range of board characteristics within 
various legal systems (common versus civil law systems). 
Moreover, previous studies on this topic (see, for example, Aggarwal et al., 2011; Ferreira and 
Matos, 2008) have failed to consider a firm’s controlling shareholders when examining the role 
of institutional investors in the improvement of corporate governance. However, ownership 
structures are an important component of the bundle perspective of global corporate 
governance practices (Aguilera et al. 2012). Corporate governance practices and outcomes 
cannot be properly investigated without also considering the pivotal function of a firm’s 
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ownership structure (Aguilera and Crespi-Cladera, 2016; Desender et al., 2013; Judge, 2011; 
Judge, 2012; Sure et al., 2013). Indeed, ownership structures vary across countries; widely-
held firms are more common in the US and the UK, while firms with concentrated ownership 
structures are more common in continental European countries (La Porta et al., 1999). On the 
one hand, the presence of controlling shareholders might be beneficial; this might be because 
they have the incentive to better monitor managers’ actions due to their ownership interests. 
On the other hand, controlling shareholders might expropriate the interests of minority 
shareholders in favour of their own (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In such a context, this research 
aims to examine the role of institutional investors in improving the governance structures of 
companies with various ownership structures (concentrated or dispersed ownership systems). 
1.2. Research Objectives and Questions 
In light of the above discussion, this research aims to examine the role of institutional investors 
in the improvement of corporate governance via the use of an international sample of corporate 
boards and their key subcommittees. In so doing, this study will examine various characteristics 
related to both board attributes (composition, activity, entrenchment and busyness) and board 
diversity (gender, age, nationality and education). This research also aims to investigate 
institutional investors’ role in improving corporate governance in companies across different 
settings, including a variety of economic conditions (pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods), 
legal systems and ownership structures. In order to achieve these objectives, this study seeks 
to answer the following six questions: 
1. Do institutional investors influence corporate board attributes? 
2. Do institutional investors influence the characteristics of a board’s key 
subcommittees? 
3. Do institutional investors influence board diversity? 
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4. Do institutional investors play different roles within different economic environments 
(pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods)? 
5. Do institutional investors play different roles within different legal systems? 
6. Do institutional investors play different roles according to whether they operate 
within concentrated or dispersed ownership structures? 
1.3. Scope of the Study 
The research scope of this study is limited by three specific parameters: (i) location, (ii) unit of 
analysis and (iii) investigation period. First, this research has an international scope and 
therefore considers an international sample. This sample includes firms listed on the major 
stock exchanges of 15 countries, namely Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, India, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. 
Second, the unit of analysis is related to two particular components: institutional investors from 
around the world and boards of directors in the sample countries. Third, this study covers the 
years between 2006 and 2012; this period was chosen in order to fully capture the role of 
institutional investors in improving corporate governance within various economic 
environments (pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods).  
1.4. Structure of the Study 
This thesis consists of nine chapters, which are described as follows. Chapter 1 provides a brief 
overview of the research background and motivation; additionally, this chapter highlights the 
research objectives, questions and scope. Chapter 2 reviews the theoretical aspects of this 
study, beginning with a review of agency theory, which is considered to be the predominant 
theory in the field of corporate governance. Chapter 2 also reviews several other relevant 
theories, such as the stewardship, resource dependence, institutional and stakeholder theories. 
Finally, chapter 2 discusses the multiple theoretical frameworks of the study. Chapter 3 
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discusses the features of international corporate governance, in the process describing the 
importance of a corporate board and its key subcommittees and explaining the various 
corporate board structures that are used around the world. This chapter also highlights the role 
of financial crises, legal systems and ownership structures in corporate governance and 
illustrates the different approaches that are most often adopted, such as insider versus outsider 
structures and hard versus soft law systems. Finally, Chapter 3 highlights the development 
history and main features of corporate governance for each country included in the sample. 
Chapter 4 reviews existing literature on the role of institutional investors in the improvement 
of corporate governance. The chapter begins with a definition of the various types of 
institutional investors and then moves on to an illustration of the tools used by institutional 
investors to influence the governance structures of their investee firms. This chapter also 
discusses the various national and transnational stewardship codes and guidelines that have 
been established across the globe. Finally, Chapter 4 concludes with a review of the major 
empirical studies that have been published on this topic. 
Chapter 5 presents the hypothesis development; notably, this discussion is divided into two 
sections. The first section reviews the hypotheses that concern the role of institutional investors 
in improving various attributes related to a corporate board and its key subcommittees 
(composition, activity, entrenchment and busyness). The second section reviews the 
hypotheses that involve institutional investors’ influence over board diversity (gender, age, 
nationality and education). 
Chapter 6 describes the methodology that was adopted in order to test the hypotheses that were 
developed for this research study. The chapter begins by clarifying the research philosophy and 
approach. Then, the sample selection, period and data sources are explained. Additionally, 
Chapter 6 outlines the variables used in this study and describes and justifies the selection of 
firm fixed effect panels as the primary estimation technique. This chapter also illustrates the 
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main models used in the study and concludes with a description of the various robustness 
checks utilised to verify the main results. 
Chapter 7 presents the results of the role of institutional investors in improving board attributes. 
It illustrates the results of the descriptive statistics and of the correlation matrix and describes 
the empirical analysis, study findings, and robustness test results.  
Chapter 8 presents the results of the role of institutional investors in improving board diversity. 
It provides the results of the descriptive statistics and of the correlation matrix and describes 
the empirical analysis, study findings, and robustness test results.  
Finally, Chapter 9 summarises this study by first restating the research questions and 
objectives. This chapter then explains the main findings and research implications which can 
be directed towards policy-makers and regulators who seek to enhance the role of institutional 
investors in the improvement of global corporate governance. This chapter also clarifies and 
justifies this study’s contribution to the field. Ultimately, Chapter 9 concludes by identifying 
the research limitations and discussing potential directions for further research. 
The structure of this thesis is illustrated below in Figure 1.1. 
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Chapter 2 
2.0 Theoretical Framework 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework of this research; to that end, five main theories 
are considered, each of which is well-known within the corporate governance discipline. These 
theories include agency theory, stewardship theory, resource dependence theory, institutional 
theory and stakeholder theory1. This chapter is outlined as follows: section 2.2 discusses agency 
theory, section 2.3 covers stewardship theory, section 2.4 reviews resource dependence theory, 
section 2.5 explains institutional theory, section 2.6 examines stakeholder theory, section 2.7 
discusses the multiple theoretical frameworks of the study and section 2.8 provides a chapter 
summary. 
2.2. Agency Theory 
Agency theory helps us to understand the relationship that exists between two or more parties 
in situations wherein one party tackles the role of the principal and the other takes on the role 
of the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), ‘most organisations 
are simply legal fictions that serve as [a] nexus for a set of contracting relationships among 
individuals’ (p. 310). The basic implication of this theory is that ‘if both parties to the 
relationship are utility maximisers, there is a good reason to believe that the agent will not 
always act in the best interest of the principal’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 308).  
Agency theory is derived from the disciplines of finance and economics, and its main aim is to 
alleviate conflicts between a firm’s management and its shareholders (Mallin, 2016; Solomon, 
2013). In their work on this issue, Berle and Means (1932) suggested that the separation of 
                                                          
1 More recent corporate governance studies considered several theories, to include contingency theory and 
strategic leadership theory (see Durisin and Durisin, 2009). However, those were deemed inappropriate for use in 
this study. 
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ownership and control creates an ‘agency problem’; such a separation enables corporate 
directors to act in their own interests rather than in the interests of shareholders. Similarly, 
Tricker (2015) argued that on occasion, corporate directors make decisions that lead to the 
maximisation of their own benefits, even if the repercussions of those decisions are 
disadvantageous to shareholders. This is not an easy problem to solve, as these two parties 
often have differing interests. Figure 2.1 illustrates the governance relationship between 
principals (shareholders) and agents (directors). 
 
Interestingly, there are two facets of agency theory that have the power to adversely affect a 
principal. First, Mallin (2016) argued that an agent might choose to act, at least in part, in the 
best interests of the principal. For example, directors might dedicate corporate funds to risky 
projects that are neither desired nor expected by the shareholders (Tricker, 2015). However, 
potential investors are able to judge and evaluate the quality of directors’ decisions by 
screening various reports published by the company. Second, information asymmetry is 
another issue that can arise from the agency problem. This situation occurs when an agent and 
a principal have varying levels of information about a company (Gillan and Starks, 2003). In 
reality, an agent typically has more information than does a principal, as that agent is 
responsible for the daily functions of the firm. This creates a situation wherein an agent might 
exploit private information in order to meet their personal goals (Gomez and Wiseman, 2007). 
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The more information the managers possess as compared to their shareholders, the more 
difficult it becomes to solve the agency problem.  
According to Grossman and Hart (1983) and Mintz (2005), managing the agency costs that 
arise between managers and shareholders is the key to ensuring that a firm is operating 
efficiently and increasing shareholder value. Scholars have suggested various mechanisms and 
actions that can be implemented during efforts to reduce potential agency problems between 
managers and investors. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), one feasible means of 
alleviating agency costs is to concentrate a firm’s shareholdings. It is also important to note 
that an examination of the role of blockholders in corporate governance systems has attracted 
academic attention for two reasons. First, large-block shareholders have the ability to resolve 
the free riding problem (Grossman and Hart, 1983). Second, large-block shareholders are more 
strongly motivated to monitor the actions of management due to the power and volume of their 
votes (Demsetz, 1983). However, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argued that the presence of larger 
shareholders may not always efficiently alleviate the agency problem, as such parties might 
expropriate private benefits at the expense of minority investors. If large-block shareholders 
maintain their interests to the detriment of minority shareholders, additional conflicts between 
shareholders may arise (e.g., the Principal-Principal conflict). 
Importantly, institutional investors have the potential to reduce agency costs in the firms in 
which they invest. Given the recent growth of institutional investor activity across the globe, 
such investors have the ability to be good monitors of their investee firms—and they can do so 
at a lower cost as compared to other investors (Gillan and Starks, 2003). Furthermore, 
institutional investors face continuous pressure to improve governance practices from several 
sources, including government agencies, stock markets and a firm’s ultimate beneficiaries 
(Mallin, 2016). Additionally, the stewardship codes and guidelines published by several 
countries are seen as effective tools that institutional investors can use to engage with their 
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investee firms during efforts to discuss corporate governance-related issues (Haxhi et al., 2013; 
McNulty and Nordberg, 2016). This engagement can assume various forms, such as one-to-
one meetings, voting, shareholder proposals and resolutions, focus lists and corporate 
governance rating systems (Martin et al., 2007; Goranova and Ryan, 2014; Mallin, 2016). 
Indeed, institutional investors have regularly been found to engage in behind-the-scenes 
discussions of corporate governance issues (Holland, 1998; McCahery et al., 2016). 
An efficient means of reducing information asymmetry concerns is to allow outsiders to collect 
information about a firm (Huddart and Ke, 2010). In comparison to individual investors, 
institutional investors are often in a more suitable position to collect and analyse information 
due to the scope of their holdings and the skills that they possess (Ayers and Freeman, 2003; 
El-Gazzar, 1997). Because of the high monitoring costs associated with the collection and 
analysis of information, as well as the costs associated with acting on the resultant findings 
(Fich et al., 2015), institutional investors are better able to provide active monitoring of investee 
firms than are their smaller-investing counterparts. This is due to the fact that large-portion 
owners can bear the high costs of monitoring, as the potential returns associated with 
monitoring often exceed the attendant costs (Gillan and Starks, 2000).  
A well-structured corporate board is seen as an important mechanism that can be used to reduce 
agency costs and improve corporate governance systems (Davies and Hopt, 2013; Mallin, 
2016). Solomon (2013) argued that a corporate board is responsible for leading a firm and that 
an effective board leads to firm success. Furthermore, Bertoni et al. (2014) contended that an 
effective corporate board can contribute to firm value in two ways. First, a board of directors 
can protect suppliers of finance from managerial misbehaviour, thus reducing the cost of 
capital. Second, a board of directors can afford a company a competitive advantage by 
enhancing its good reputation, helping it to establish a network of contacts and rendering 
strategic decisions. Moreover, the effectiveness of a corporate board can be measured with 
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regard to several factors; these factors include the ability to attract additional funds, enhance 
firm value, augment share prices and provide consistent returns for shareholders (see Carlsson, 
2001).  
Some empirical research has suggested that board composition must be considered when 
attempting to reduce agency costs. For example, the hiring of additional non-executive 
directors who are independent of firm management can play an important role in balancing the 
interests of managers and shareholders (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990). Furthermore, outside 
directors can play a key role in alleviating the agency problem, as such parties have the ability 
to monitor a firm’s management and defend shareholders’ interests. Moreover, many 
academicians have emphasised the role of outside directors in lessening information 
asymmetry, which in turn enhances firm value (see, for example, Lim et al., 2007; Baysinger 
and Butler, 1985). In order to protect their own reputations, independent directors are often 
inclined to voluntarily disclose additional information about the firm (Lim et al., 2007). In so 
doing, these independent directors safeguard their public standing and are thus shielded in the 
event of future firm failure. Other scholars have indicated that a board’s size can play a role in 
improving the agency problem (see Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Yermack, 1996). The directors 
of smaller boards often have simpler systems of communication and coordination; thus, they 
are often better able to scrutinise the actions of management. 
Also, the establishment of key sub-committees (audit, remuneration and nomination) is 
considered to be an effective means of reducing the agency problem. Such committees play an 
important role in the monitoring of a board, as their monitoring power is derived from the 
authority delegated to them by the corporate board (see Beasley, 1996; Carcello and Neal, 
2000; Kaczmarek et al., 2012). Forming such committees can also increase directors’ 
commitment to a company, as each director is allocated specific tasks that they are required to 
fulfil. Harrison (1987) argued that board sub-committees can also be used to mitigate the issue 
14 
 
of poor board attendance; to this end, directors are assigned specific responsibilities and tasks 
that are delegated to them during committee meetings. Furthermore, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) 
noted that as a board’s size increases, the efficiency of its directors is expected to decrease. 
This issue can be addressed by allocating specific responsibilities to each committee, which in 
turn increases the efficiency and accountability of each director. Given the importance of board 
sub-committees in monitoring a firm’s management and in increasing board efficiency, 
institutional investors are expected to improve the structure of key sub-committees. 
According to Vafeas (1999b), board activity, as measured by the number and frequency of 
meetings, is an important aspect of the agency cost issue. He argued that boards respond to 
poor performance by holding more meetings, which enhances the monitoring role of the 
corporate board. The author also emphasised that board monitoring contributes to the 
identification of valuable projects, which in turn improves shareholder value (Vafeas, 1999b). 
Furthermore, Brick and Chidambaran (2010) argued that regulatory institutions play a role in 
increasing the pressure placed upon firms to establish more independent and active boards. For 
example, in recent years, the level of board activity has increased significantly, especially 
following the issuance of Sarbanes-Oxley, which called for greater board monitoring of 
management’s actions. 
Another issue that is often discussed in the relevant literature is board busyness. For example, 
Ferris et al. (2003) argued that the possession of multiple directorships can bring about 
favourable outcomes. An individual director who holds a high number of posts is often viewed 
as having a positive reputation, which often contributes to improved firm performance. This 
contention is consistent with the findings of Fama and Jennsen (1983), who argued that a 
director’s good reputation is linked to a positive effect in the marketplace. Conversely, Fich 
and Shivdasani (2006) maintained that if the majority of outside directors are busy, firm 
performance is adversely affected. This argument suggests that a busy board will lead to a more 
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significant agency cost problem, as a busy board does not have the ability to efficiently monitor 
firm management.  
According to Davies and Hopt (2013), ownership structure is a major factor that impacts the 
role of corporate boards in publicly traded firms. The ownership structure of a firm can 
influence what the board does and to whom it is accountable. In firms where the ownership 
structure is dispersed, the corporate board plays an active role in the decision-making process. 
Conversely, in firms where the ownership structure is concentrated, large-block shareholders 
are in a better position to affect the decisions made by the corporate board. In this context, the 
second agency problem (Principal-Principal conflicts)—which occurs between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders—can arise, as large-block shareholders are more likely 
to advocate for their own interests over the interests of minority shareholders. Thus, this finding 
may inspire institutional investors to establish mechanisms whereby the influence of 
shareholders can be reduced; these mechanisms may include efforts to establish lobby groups 
that work to protect the interests of minority shareholders (Davies and Hopt, 2013). 
Considering the implications of agency theory as discussed above, it is clear that there are 
various limitations associated with this concept. One ongoing concern in corporate governance 
is the potential for ‘Principal-Principal’ conflicts between controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders. Young et al. (2008) argued that Principal-Principal conflicts may arise 
as a result of many factors, including concentrated ownership and weak legal protections for 
minority shareholders. Furthermore, agency theory fails to consider the various other 
stakeholders of a company (see Hill and Jones, 1992), including suppliers, customers, creditors 
and employees. For instance, employees play an important role in corporate governance reform 
in countries such as Germany and Japan (see Jackson, 2005). Moreover, Donaldson and Davis 
(1991) determined that the Model of Man is a significant limitation; this model suggests that 
self-interested actors will rationally maximise their own personal economic gain. Notably, this 
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model is individualistic and addresses conflict between managers and owners. However, Davis 
et al. (1997) also argued that the utilisation of self-benefits may not be applicable to all 
managers. They therefore introduced the stewardship theory, which suggests that managers do 
not work to achieve their own goals—rather, they attempt to meet the needs of shareholders. 
The following section explains this theory. 
2.3. Stewardship Theory  
Stewardship theory was derived from the disciplines of sociology and psychology and was 
introduced by Donaldson and Davis in 1991. The stewardship theory focuses on the behaviour 
of a firm and its management, to include corporate boards of directors in Anglo-Saxon 
countries and supervisory boards in Germany. This concept is considered to be an alternative 
to agency theory; according to stewardship theory, directors are elected by shareholders and 
are believed to be self-motivated to meet shareholders’ needs and interests (see Figure 2.2) 
(Davis et al., 1997). Such directors should be eager to perform well and be seen as good 
stewards of a firms’ assets. If true, the efforts of directors will lead to positive outcomes that 
benefit all shareholders. Furthermore, as per stewardship theory, the behaviour of stewards is 
collective; a steward aims to achieve the objectives laid out by the firm, which in turn leads to 
potential benefits for shareholders as profits, dividends and share prices are positively affected 
(Davis et al., 1997). 
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According to stewardship theory, conflicts of interest between management and shareholders 
do not exist, and there is no inherent potential problem associated with executives’ motivation 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Therefore, shareholders can expect higher returns, as senior 
management is able to exercise effective control over the company (Muth and Donaldson, 
1998). However, this explanation does not mean that a steward does not consider his own 
survival needs; indeed, a steward should realise that his personal needs can be met by achieving 
organisational objectives and goals. Hence, a proper steward will recognise that the benefits to 
be gained by attaining company goals are greater than the benefits that might be obtained 
through individualistic behaviours (Davis et al., 1997). 
There are various dimensions to consider when analysing the differences between agency 
theory and stewardship theory. For example, the aim of stewardship theory is to empower the 
upper managers of a firm rather than to monitor and control them (see Donaldson and Davis, 
1991; Fox and Hamilton, 1994). For instance, the actions of CEOs who are considered to be 
stewards are best facilitated when the governance structure of a firm provides them with greater 
levels of authority, especially if those CEOs also serve as board chairs (Donaldson and Davis, 
1991). This structure is deemed functional under stewardship theory, as CEOs are viewed as 
utility maximisers who serve organisational goals rather than their own ends. However, such a 
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structure is not preferred under the agency theory’s Model of Man; according to this theory, 
CEOs are in danger of becoming entrenched. This can affect the decisions made by the board, 
potentially leading them to pursue such tactics as corporate policy pay-out schemes (see Hu 
and Kumar, 2004). 
According to Muth and Donaldson (1998), directors are more committed to firm performance 
and success than are shareholders who may simply be seeking short-term benefits. 
Furthermore, the researchers argued that executives who run the daily operations of a firm have 
a wider knowledge of the firm’s goals than do outside directors. From the stewardship 
perspective, higher levels of interest alignment between managers and shareholders lead to 
superior firm performance. 
However, there are various limitations associated with stewardship theory. For example, Davis 
et al. (1997) argued that stewardship theory is affected by the cultural environment in which a 
company operates. For instance, if a firm exists within an individualistic culture, its directors 
may look after their own interests rather than the interests of shareholders. Furthermore, the 
theory fails to consider the varied interests of various stakeholders within a company. For 
example, some institutional investors (i.e., investment fund managers) may seek short-term 
returns, while others (i.e., pension funds) may favour long-term results (see Johnson and 
Greening, 1999). Given the implications of stewardship theory, a corporate board is expected 
to adopt strategies to improve a firm’s governance structure; importantly, these steps must align 
with shareholder interests. 
2.4. Resource Dependence Theory  
This theory was initially introduced by Salancik and Pfeffer (1978), who emphasised that a 
company’s survival is dependent on its ability to secure resources that are necessary for the 
enhancement of shareholder wealth. According to Tricker (2016), these resources might 
include potential customers, competitors, access to capital and other sources of financing, 
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relationships with other businesses and political or social networks. For a firm to achieve 
success, its corporate board must build connections with other external companies in order to 
reduce dependency and obtain needed resources (Hillman et al., 2007).  
According to Bazerman and Schoorman (1983), there are four benefits to be gained by linking 
a firm to its external environment: network connections between directors, horizontal 
coordination, vertical coordination and expertise and reputation. Muth and Donaldson (1998) 
further argued that horizontal links between directors can increase communication 
opportunities, which contributes to the efficient exchange of information regarding topics of 
concern. Furthermore, vertical links between directors and a firm’s customers and suppliers 
play an important role in increasing awareness of the external environment. Such information 
can be employed by a firm’s directors, thus allowing them to make appropriate decisions that 
will lead to the firm’s success. This concept is consistent with the work of Pfeffer (1972), who 
argued that control over external stakeholders can be achieved by utilising the network of board 
members. 
Furthermore, Hillman and Dalziel (2003) maintained that board capital (a combination of 
directors’ human capital and social capital) is a valuable resource that enables a board to more 
effectively monitor management’s actions. These board resources provide a firm with the 
ability to understand the environment in which it operates. Additionally, directors with diverse 
characteristics (in terms of gender, age, nationality, ethnicity and education) can facilitate 
various functions of the corporate board; indeed, the presence of diverse directors can enhance 
decision-making practices (Hillman et al., 2000; Anderson et al., 2011), improve managerial 
monitoring (Kim et al., 2013), satisfy the needs of stakeholders (Harjoto et al., 2015) and draw 
additional attention to the ethical aspects of firm activities (Hafsi and Turgut, 2013). 
Taking into account the implications of resource dependence theory, Salancik and Pfeffer 
(1978) argued that success depends on proper coordination between all involved organisations. 
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Any failure to coordinate while attempting to acquire needed resources can limit the amount of 
resources obtained from the surrounding environment. In the context of this study, institutional 
investors are expected to utilise the resources available to a firm by striving to improve 
diversity attributes within the boards of their investee firms (including gender, age, nationality 
and educational diversity). 
2.5. Institutional Theory  
The institutional theory was drawn from the fields of economics and sociology and refers to 
the process by which structures—such as norms, rules and routines—are established as 
authoritative guidelines for social activities (Scott, 2004). This theory also describes how these 
elements are issued and adopted over time. In other words, institutionalisation refers to those 
repeated processes that have acquired similar meanings over a given period of time (Bondy et 
al., 2008). According to Selznick (1957), an organisation is an adaptive entity that is shaped by 
participants’ characteristics, influences, constraints and commitments. Furthermore, Scott 
(2004) noted that an organisation’s processes are shaped by its external environment. 
According to institutional theory, companies seek legitimacy and pursue their ultimate survival 
by adapting their structure to institutional norms (Li and Harrison, 2008). Moreover, companies 
are influenced by the social norms that exist within their external social environment 
(Granovetter, 1985). In the context of corporate governance practices, several scholars have 
argued that corporate governance structures are shaped by their institutional environments; 
thus, companies are influenced by the legal systems (Kim and Ozdemir, 2014), ownership 
structures (Aguilera and Crespi-Cladera, 2016; Desender et al., 2013; Judge, 2011; Judge, 
2012; Sure et al., 2013), economic conditions (Essen et al., 2013) and national cultures (Li and 
Harrison, 2008; Grosvold and Brammer, 2011; Volonte, 2015) of the countries in which they 
operate. 
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Furthermore, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argued that a firm’s institutional environment can 
lead to the development of formal structures within the company. Furthermore, pressure from 
various institutions can, in turn, lead to the homogeneity of organisational structures. 
Therefore, in the context of this research, institutional investors are in a solid position to exert 
pressure over their investee firms to adopt healthy governance structures. This position is 
supported by national corporate governance and stewardship codes, which are often developed 
and revised over time. From an international perspective, several corporate governance codes 
and guidelines have been published in an attempt to motivate firms to develop and implement 
effective governance structures. For example, the OECD issued a set of corporate governance 
principles in 1999, which were later revised in 2004. The OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance provide guidance for policy-makers, regulators and market participants who seek 
to enhance the legal, institutional and regulatory frameworks that underpin corporate 
governance practices across the globe (Jesover and Kirkpatrick, 2005). These OECD principles 
have served as guidelines for companies seeking to establish corporate governance codes in 
some countries (Mallin, 2016). Indeed, Jesover and Kirkpatrick (2005) contended that 
international principles govern the relationships that exist between managers and shareholders 
as well as those that occur among stakeholders who serve as employees and creditors; 
ultimately, healthy relationships drive economic efficiency and contribute substantially to 
market confidence. 
The International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) was founded in 1995 and is 
comprised of members who hail from every region across the world; as such, the ICGN covers 
major institutional investors, investor representative groups, companies, financial 
intermediaries, academics and others (Mallin, 2016). The main objective of the ICGN is to 
facilitate an international dialogue on matters related to corporate governance. To this end, the 
ICGN issued its Statement on Global Corporate Governance Principles in 1999, which were 
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revised and updated in 2009 (Mallin, 2016). These revised principles addressed various 
governance issues, including corporate board practices, corporate culture, risk management 
policies, remuneration plans, audit systems, disclosure and transparency procedures, 
shareholder rights and shareholder responsibilities. More recently, the ICGN published its first 
stewardship code in 2016; this code aims to offer a global framework regarding good practices 
as they relate to the stewardship of institutional investors. 
Additionally, Kostova et al. (2008) maintained that multinational companies are able to operate 
within wider institutional landscapes, as exposure to diverse practices allows them to pursue 
appropriate patterns and practices. Therefore, the corporate governance and stewardship codes 
that are issued at the national and international levels can place additional pressure on 
companies to adopt the best possible governance practices. Furthermore, institutional investors 
are expected to play a significant role in efforts to motivate their investee firms to implement 
favourable governance structures. 
2.6. Stakeholder Theory 
Freeman’s (1984) seminal book on stakeholder theory suggested that efficient managers must 
consider the interests of a firm’s various stakeholders. As such, stakeholder theory goes beyond 
the relationships between agents and principals and includes other parties within the 
corporation as well (Freeman, 1984). Furthermore, this theory challenges the notion that the 
primary goal of a firm is the maximisation of shareholder wealth; rather, stakeholder theory 
argues that a company’s main objective is to satisfy all stakeholders who are associated with 
the firm (Wall et al., 2009). This belief is consistent with the work of Hasnas (1998), who 
argued that the fundamental obligation of a firm’s management is to consider the claims of 
various stakeholders in order to ensure the company’s survival. 
According to Mallin (2016), stakeholders are classified according to their relationship to the 
company; stakeholders have either direct relationships (e.g., employees, providers of credit, 
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suppliers and customers) or indirect relationships (e.g., local communities, environmental 
groups and governmental bodies) (see Figure 2.3). For example, a firm has a fiduciary 
responsibility to its providers of credit to be solvent and to repay debts (Boatright, 1994). It is 
in the company’s interest to pay off its debts on time in order to build stable relationships with 
financial providers. Furthermore, suppliers provide a firm with unique goods and services; if a 
company lacks cash, suppliers can be adversely affected (Mallin, 2016). Similarly, employees 
have a vested interest in their company as well, as it is the source of their income. Moreover, 
employees may be particularly concerned with a company’s pension fund scheme, which they 
will need to access in the future and which is dependent on the company’s sustainability and 
success within the marketplace. With regard to the corporate governance systems of German 
and French companies, for instance, employees take part in electing representatives to 
corporate boards. Furthermore, banks (the providers of credit) may also place directors who 
represent their interests on such supervisory boards (see Mallin, 2016).  
 
There are numerous codes and guidelines that highlight the roles of shareholders and 
stakeholders and that explain how the interests of these parties can be accommodated within a 
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company’s corporate governance structure. For example, in the OECD’s Principles of 
Corporate Governance (2004) one tenet is dedicated to an explanation of the role of 
stakeholders in corporate governance. According to this principle, ‘the corporate governance 
framework should recognise the rights of stakeholders established by law or through mutual 
agreements and encourage active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders in 
creating wealth, jobs and the sustainability of financially sound enterprises’ (OECD, 2004). As 
per Mallin (2016), this principle emphasised two issues: first, stakeholder rights are dependent 
on the legal provisions concerning stakeholders that exist within a particular country; and 
second, stakeholders do not play a role in corporate governance unless they have access to 
relevant information that will allow them to participate effectively in the process. 
According to Johnson and Greening (1999), institutional investors are considered to be major 
stakeholders of countless firms; indeed, their holdings have increased dramatically in recent 
years. Gilson and Kraakman (1991) argued that institutional investors do not only consider the 
financial performance of their firms, they are also interested in various other aspects of 
organisational life, including the corporate governance structure of their firms. As such, 
investee firms are expected to consider the views of institutional investors with regard to 
corporate governance structure. 
In light of this stakeholder theory, Mallin (2016) argued that the involvement of shareholders 
and stakeholders is dependent on national laws and customs and on the individual approach 
adopted by a particular company. Furthermore, boards are confronted with the significant 
challenge of considering a diverse set of stakeholder interests. For example, the presence of 
employee representatives on a supervisory board might affect decision-making, potentially 
leading to outcomes that are favourable for employees but not for the firm as a whole. 
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2.7. Multiple Theoretical Frameworks 
According to Kumar and Zattoni (2015), the need to consider multiple theoretical frameworks 
in corporate governance research has become essential. Adopting multiple theories enables 
scholars to broaden the understanding of global governance phenomena, and also interpret the 
findings from different lenses (Zattoni and Van Ees, 2012). Zattoni and Van Ees (2012) 
reviewed the papers published in the Corporate Governance: An International Review journal 
between 2008 and 2010; one of their main findings was that most of the corporate governance 
studies are derived from the theoretical framework of the agency theory. Therefore, they 
encourage scholars to broaden the theoretical scope of corporate governance research by 
adopting alternative theories to the agency theory. Hence, in this research, five main theories 
were utilised: agency theory, stewardship theory, resource dependence theory, institutional 
theory and stakeholder theory. These theories were integrated into a model to capture the role 
of institutional investors in improving corporate governance in their investee firms and to 
ascertain whether institutional settings (economic conditions, legal system and ownership 
structure) determine the association between institutional investors and corporate governance 
structure. 
In the context of this study, the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) was used to explain 
the extent to which the characteristics of a corporate board can mitigate the agency costs that 
exist between the principal (shareholders) and the agent (managers). In addition, the theory was 
used to investigate to what extent institutional investors can enhance the corporate governance 
structure in their investee firms, which contributes to the reduction of agency costs (Gillan and 
Starks, 2003). This can be achieved by adopting several engagement tools, such as one-to-one 
meetings, voting, shareholder proposals, shareholder resolutions, focus lists and corporate 
governance-rating systems (Martin et al., 2007; Goranova and Ryan, 2014; Mallin, 2016). In 
addition, the stewardship theory (Donaldson and Davis, 1991) was also considered to provide 
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the theoretical framework of the institutional investors acting as stewards and maintaining the 
interest of their beneficiaries. Therefore, the monitoring role of institutional investors was 
expected to enhance the governance structure in their investee firms. Given their presence 
globally, the institutional investors were considered as key stakeholders of the company in light 
of the stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984). Therefore, their views regarding the corporate 
governance structure was expected to be recognised and taken into account. The resource 
dependence theory (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978) was utilised in this research to explain the 
tendency of the firm to secure resources by building connections with other companies. In 
particular, this theory was employed to investigate to what extent the company adopts a diverse 
board under the monitoring role of the institutional investors. Finally, the institutional theory 
was also employed in this research to explain whether institutional settings, such as economic 
conditions, legal systems and ownership structure, can influence the role of institutional 
investors in improving corporate governance structure in their investee firms. Several studies 
argue that it is essential to consider the institutional settings when studying the global 
phenomena of corporate governance (see Aguilera et al., 2008; Aguilera et al., 2012; Desender 
et al., 2013, Kim and Ozdemir, 2014).  
Table 2.1 provides a summary of the theories discussed in this chapter. This summary 
highlights several aspects of each of the discussed theories, to include their main principles, 
predominant perspectives, prevailing perceptions of corporate management, established 
discipline practices, emergence histories and relevant criticisms. 
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Table 2.1. Summary of Corporate Governance Theories 
Issues Agency Theory Stewardship 
Theory 
Resource 
Dependence 
Theory 
Institutional 
Theory 
Stakeholder 
Theory 
Principles Describes a 
relationship 
wherein one 
party delegates 
work to another 
party. In terms 
of a corporation, 
owners are the 
principals and 
directors are the 
agents. 
Directors are 
regarded as the 
stewards of a 
company’s assets 
and are expected 
to act in the best 
interests of 
shareholders. 
Directors are able 
to connect the 
company with the 
resources 
required to 
achieve corporate 
objectives. 
The institutional 
environment 
influences those 
social beliefs and 
practices that 
impact various 
actors within a 
society.  
Takes into account 
a wide range of 
constituents rather 
than placing all 
focus on the 
shareholders. 
Perspective Outside Inside Outside Outside Outside 
Perception of 
Corporate 
Management 
Managers are 
self-interested.  
Corporate 
managers are 
loyal and work 
towards the best 
interests of 
shareholders. 
Corporate 
managers seek to 
secure valuable 
resources. 
Corporate 
managers are 
influenced by 
external norms 
and regulations. 
Corporate 
managers have a 
different view of 
each stakeholder. 
Discipline Finance and 
Economics 
Sociology and 
Psychology 
Sociology Economics and 
Sociology 
Economics and 
Organisational 
Theory 
Emergence 1970s 1990s 1980s 1980s 1980s 
 
Critics 
 
- Principal-
Principal 
conflict. 
- Other 
stakeholders are 
not considered 
- The Model of 
Man. 
- Dependent on 
cultural norms. 
- Achieving 
balance between 
the various 
stakeholders’ 
interests is not 
explored. 
- A lack of 
coordination 
between firms, 
which can limit 
an organisation’s 
ability to acquire 
needed resources. 
- Some 
institutional 
practices are 
mandatory. 
- The involvement 
of stakeholders is 
dependent on 
national laws and 
customs. 
- Achieving 
balance between 
the interests of all 
stakeholders seems 
unfeasible. 
 Authors Jensen and 
Meckling 
(1976); Fama 
and Jensen 
(1983) 
Donaldson and 
Davis (1991); 
Donaldson and 
Davis (1994) 
Pfeffer (1972); 
Salancik and 
Pfeffer (1978) 
Scott (2004); 
DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) 
Freeman (1984) 
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2.8. Chapter Summary 
This chapter illustrates the theoretical framework associated with the role of institutional 
investors in corporate governance. The theories discussed in this chapter include agency theory, 
stewardship theory, resource dependence theory, institutional theory and stakeholder theory. 
Each of these theories provides a set of concepts and principles that together serve to shape this 
work’s research questions and hypotheses. The chapter also provides a discussion of the 
multiple theoretical frameworks. 
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Chapter 3 
3.0 Corporate Governance Background 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the primary features of global corporate governance. First, the 
importance of corporate boards is highlighted, and the various potential board structures are 
illustrated; this is followed by an illustration of the significance of key subcommittees (audit, 
compensation and nomination). Then, this chapter discusses the role that the institutional 
setting—whether a financial crisis exists, what legal system is in place and which ownership 
structure has been adopted—plays in corporate governance. The comparative features of 
corporate governance are then discussed, to include insider versus outsider systems and hard 
versus soft law systems. Finally, the chapter examines the main features of corporate 
governance in the sample countries (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
India, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK), and 
relates the history of corporate governance development to date. The countries under study are 
classified as having adopted either an Anglo-Saxon model, a Germanic model, a Latin countries 
system or a Nordic governance system.  
Accordingly, the chapter is organised as follows: section 3.2 illustrates the importance of 
corporate boards and their key subcommittees and highlights the various board structures 
(unitary versus dual boards, for example) in place around the world. Section 3.3 highlights the 
importance of financial crises in corporate governance, while section 3.4 examines the 
significance of legal systems in corporate governance. Section 3.5 discusses the issue and 
import of ownership structure; more specifically, section 3.6 further examines insider versus 
outsider systems, while section 3.7 discusses hard versus soft law models. Section 3.8 considers 
the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance system (in place in Australia, Canada, Ireland, India, 
the UK and the US), section 3.9 illustrates the Germanic model (at play in Switzerland), section 
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3.10 describes the Latin countries system (adopted by companies in Belgium, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Spain) and section 3.11 discusses the Nordic model (embraced in Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden). Finally, section 3.12 concludes the chapter. 
3.2. The Importance of the Board of Directors  
Given the direct link it enjoys with two important participants—managers and shareholders—
the corporate board is considered to be the main internal governance mechanism that 
determines and shapes the governance practices of a particular firm (Aguilera et al., 2012; 
Mallin, 2016). According to Zahra and Pearce (1989), a corporate board has two main roles, to 
control and to advise. The controlling role is primarily related to the responsibility of directors 
to monitor and oversee management’s behaviour and to ensure that management and 
shareholder interests align. This responsibility is rooted in agency theory, according to which 
the main objective of a corporate board is to eliminate the self-serving behaviours of top 
managers who may not always be working in the best interests of shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). The advising role describes a corporate board’s potential to provide executive 
members with valuable advice, knowledge and insight regarding the firm’s external 
environment. This role is rooted in the resource dependence theory, which submits that 
corporate boards should provide top managers with needed guidance and support by linking a 
firm to its external environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  
3.2.1. Unitary Boards versus Dual Boards  
One of the most significant corporate governance differences that exists among countries is 
board structure, which can be classified into two types: unitary (one-tier) boards and dual (two-
tiered) boards. The unitary board structure is the most common form in countries such as the 
UK, the US and EU member states. However, in countries like Austria, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Denmark, the dual board structure is predominant (Mallin, 2016). In some 
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countries (such as France) both corporate board systems are common. The implications of each 
corporate board structure are explained below. 
Unitary boards are characterised as single boards that include both executive and non-executive 
directors who tend to make decisions as a unified group. According to this structure, a board is 
responsible for all aspects of company affairs, and all directors are responsible for achieving 
company goals. Directors are nominated by shareholders during a company’s annual general 
meeting (see Mallin, 2016; Solomon, 2013). In countries where unitary boards are 
predominant, importance is attached to independent directors who are responsible for 
monitoring the actions of management (Conyon and Peck, 1998). 
In a dual board system, a company has two distinct boards: a supervisory board and a 
management board. The supervisory board supervises, directs and monitors the management 
board, while the management board runs the business’s day-to-day activities (Mallin, 2016). 
Importantly, individuals cannot be members of both boards. In dual board systems, supervisory 
board members are elected by the shareholders, with the exception of employee representative 
members; these individuals are elected by the employees themselves. The management board 
is, in turn, elected by the supervisory board. 
Despite the structural differences that exist between the unitary and dual board systems, both 
share some common approaches (see Krivogorsky, 2006). For example, both systems recognise 
that boards should adopt a supervisory function and a managerial function. However, the dual 
board system, wherein a separate executive body is appointed, is more formal. Additionally, in 
both systems, a managerial body is appointed, either by the unitary board itself or by the 
supervisory board; this group of executive directors is delegated authority by the single board 
in a unitary system or by the management board in a dual system (Mallin, 2016). Furthermore, 
shareholders elect the unitary board and the dual system’s supervisory board. However, in 
countries where a dual system is predominant, such as Germany, employees are given the right 
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to elect certain board members. Moreover, the unitary board and the supervisory board are 
responsible for ensuring the implementation of financial reporting standards as per the 
regulations and laws of the country in which they operate. According to Mallin (2016), 
regardless of a board’s structure, global corporate governance codes seem to offer similar 
recommendations regarding board functions, key subcommittees and shareholder rights. Figure 
3.1 compares the one-tier and two-tiered systems. 
 
3.2.2. Board Key Subcommittees  
Corporate boards typically delegate some key tasks to subcommittees (i.e., audit, compensation 
and nomination committees). The delegation of particular tasks to key committees provides for 
better monitoring and allows skilled directors to assess specific organisational needs. Hence, 
the composition of these committees is essential, as it determines their contribution to 
companies’ governance systems (Brennan and McDermott, 2004). These committees should 
regularly report their work to the board to enhance decision-making processes (Mallin, 2016). 
Lorsch and MacIver (1989) argued that although boards of directors meet regularly to discuss 
and vote on key issues, the majority of decisions are made by board subcommittees. Tricker 
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(2015) found that corporate boards typically establish subcommittees for two reasons: (i) to 
enable independent directors to meet separately from the board so that they may be able to 
fulfil their oversight duties and (ii) to reduce the burden placed on the board by delegating 
specific duties to subcommittees. Essentially, almost all corporate governance codes for listed 
firms recommend that a board create audit, compensation and nomination committees. For 
instance, the Cadbury Report recommends the formation of an audit committee and a 
remuneration committee, as well as a nomination committee to ensure that the nomination 
process is transparent and reliable (Cadbury Report, 1992). In addition to these three main 
committees, other subcommittees, such as risk and ethics committees, may be formed to deal 
with specific issues (Mallin, 2016). The importance and role of the most common types of 
subcommittees are discussed below. 
Audit committees are considered the most important form of subcommittee, as their role is to 
review audit scopes and outcomes (Mallin, 2016). Furthermore, their duties involve reviewing 
the audit fees and the independence of companies’ external auditors. An audit committee is 
considered a bridge between the internal and external auditors and the corporate board (Mallin, 
2016). Furthermore, Du Plessis (2015) stated that the audit committee plays a central financial 
reporting role, as it monitors the top management’s and the auditors’ participation in the 
financial reporting process. The audit committee also selects the financial reporting standards. 
This can be done in coordination with the internal and external company auditors and can thus 
influence companies’ financial reporting credibility. Given the importance of the audit 
committee, corporate governance codes in many countries recommend that it be comprised 
only of independent directors. For example, the UK Corporate Governance Code (2012) states 
that a board should establish an audit committee of at least three independent directors (two 
independent directors in the case of smaller companies).  
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Remuneration committees, or compensation committees as they are known in the US, 
determine board member compensation packages. The financial crises and the continuing 
financial scandals that have occurred across the globe have cast a spotlight on the remuneration 
packages of top executives and board members (Tricker, 2015). Mallin (2016) stated that the 
remuneration committee process should provide formal and transparent procedures to 
determine compensation schemes for executive directors. Given the level of shareholder 
attention towards excessive executive director remuneration, policy-makers have continually 
revised corporate governance codes to align manager and shareholder interests. For instance, 
the UK Corporate Governance Code was revised in 2014 to highlight changes related to 
remuneration recommendations (Mallin, 2016). The revision contained alterations to the design 
of remuneration packages intended to promote firms’ long-term success. Furthermore, the UK 
government, represented by the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, 
recently published the Green Paper, which considers the appropriate changes that must be 
addressed with regard to three main issues: executive pay; enhancing stakeholder voices, 
including those of employees, customers and suppliers; and corporate governance practices in 
large, privately-held businesses (Green Paper, 2016). 
Lastly, nomination committees are responsible for selecting appropriate directors to sit on a 
board. According to Vafeas (1999a), the existence of nomination committees can enhance a 
board’s effectiveness in many ways. First, the appointment of quality directors can enhance the 
monitoring role of outside directors. Second, the formation of a nomination committee can 
reduce individual bias in firms where the nomination process is delegated to individual board 
members. Third, a nomination committee can prevent CEO intervention in the nomination 
process, as it is more likely to make decisions that are consistent with the interests of 
shareholders. It follows that since it plays an integral part in board composition and succession 
planning, a nomination committee will ensure that a board is appropriately composed in order 
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to effectively fulfil its duties and functions (Kaczmarek et al., 2012). Given their importance 
with regard to board success, Mallin (2016) stated that nomination committees should evaluate 
a board’s existing skills, knowledge and experience, focusing on filling gaps when selecting 
new candidates. Furthermore, nomination committees should be involved in firms’ succession 
planning so that they may identify what skills and knowledge should be considered when 
identifying potential board candidates.  
3.3. Financial Crises and Corporate Governance 
Considered the worst period of economic distress since the Great Depression, the recent 
financial crisis of 2008–2009 resulted in enormous costs to several economies (Conyon et al., 
2011; Adams, 2012). The crisis began in the US and spread to other countries, resulting in the 
freezing of the global credit market, which required global governmental intervention (Erkens 
et al., 2012). For instance, the US and UK governments spent $700 billion and £500 billion, 
respectively, on rescue packages aimed at supporting financial markets (Akbar et al., 2017).  
It has been argued that the weakness of corporate governance practices is one factor that 
contributed to the onset of this recent financial crisis (Strouhal et al., 2012). Several scholars 
have argued that both institutional investors and firms’ corporate boards are also to blame for 
their inability to mitigate the crisis (Conyon et al., 2011; Reisberg, 2015). Erkens et al. (2012) 
studied a sample taken from financial firms in 30 countries around the world and found that 
firms with greater levels of institutional investment demonstrated poorer stock returns during 
the crisis; this may be due to the fact that institutional investors took on more risk prior to the 
financial crisis of 2007–2008 than did other investors. The authors also discovered that boards 
with higher numbers of independent directors were more heavily criticised, as they raised more 
equity capital during the crisis in an effort to ensure that their investee firms would have 
adequate capital and in an attempt to minimise the risk of bankruptcy (Erkens et al., 2012). 
However, this action was not seen as benefitting firms in the long run. Additionally, in 
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examining a sample drawn from southern Europe (Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece), Díez-
Esteban et al. (2016) demonstrated that the financial deregulation processes that were in place 
in those countries prior to the recent financial crisis provided an incentive for institutional 
investors to be proactive in their monitoring; this then encouraged firms to overinvest in risky 
projects. In such a context, our study attempts to investigate the role of institutional investors 
in the improvement of corporate governance practices when various economic conditions are 
at play (pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods). 
Several studies have documented that corporate board characteristics are contingent on the 
economic condition of a country. For instance, using a sample taken from 26 European 
countries, Essen et al. (2013) found that the prescription of good governance practices—
including the independence of a board, the separation of CEO and chairmanship positions, and 
incentive-based compensation packages—were considered harmful to firm performance during 
times of crisis (Essen et al., 2013). However, some governance prescriptions at the country 
level—including the equality of cash flow, creditor protections, voting rights and the rule of 
law—were found to benefit firms during crisis periods (Essen et al., 2013). These results imply 
that governance policies should be loosened during times of crisis so that a corporate board can 
allow the management team the opportunity to respond effectively. Sun et al. (2015) found that 
the corporate boards of Chinese-listed firms were more likely to appoint women to sit on their 
corporate boards during times of crisis than they were during periods of economic prosperity. 
The authors also found that the presence of women in Chinese-listed firms led to improved 
performance during periods of market stress, thus indicating that a higher presence of female 
directors on a board results in the support of strict and appropriate investment decisions during 
difficult economic cycles. 
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3.4. Legal Systems and Corporate Governance 
The bundle perspective of comparative corporate governance argues that differences in the 
attributes of board members across countries cannot be studied without also considering the 
legal systems of the country in question (Aguilera et al., 2008; Aguilera et al., 2012; Kim and 
Ozdemir, 2014). A country’s legal system is considered a crucial determinant of the corporate 
governance efficacy of that country (La Porta et al., 1998). One legal approach to corporate 
governance holds that enacting and enforcing laws is essential to the protection of minority 
shareholders and creditors. In countries where shareholders enjoy strong protections, investors 
are more likely to hold minority positions rather than to serve as the dominant shareholder of 
a firm. However, in countries where shareholder protections are weak, investors are more likely 
to be controlling shareholders so as to compensate for deficiencies in legal protections (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997).  
La Porta et al. (1998) compared the external financial environments of roughly 49 countries by 
considering the functions and origins of their laws, the quality of legal investor protections and 
the quality of legal enforcement measures. They found that those countries that have common 
law systems in place provided greater protection from the expropriation of insiders for both 
shareholders and creditors; this protection, however, was found to be low in French civil law 
countries, while German and Scandinavian civil law countries typically resided in the middle 
of the spectrum. As a result, the protection of minority shareholders has played a relatively 
more significant role in expanding and developing capital markets in common law countries 
than in those countries with civil law systems. In a subsequent paper, La Porta et al. (2000) 
showed that, on average, there was a greater tendency for firms to be widely held in countries 
with common law systems than in those with civil law systems. A third paper by La Porta et 
al. (2002) provided evidence of a positive association between firm valuation and a country’s 
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legal system, finding that company performance was higher in common law countries than in 
civil law countries.  
A country’s legal system has also been found to influence investors’ portfolio allocation. For 
instance, Leuz et al. (2009) conducted an international study in an effort to determine what 
factors influence the portfolio allocation of US-based institutional investors who do business 
around the globe. Their results emphasised that American institutional investors invested less 
in countries that lacked investor protection rights and disclosure rules and in countries where 
insider controls were high (Leuz et al., 2009). Their results were particularly applicable to firms 
with higher earning management, given that the monitoring costs and information asymmetry 
faced by US-based institutional investors are the main drivers of results. This view is consistent 
with the work of Giofré (2013), who also demonstrated that investor protections were the main 
determinants of foreign investment activity around the world; in particular, they chose to invest 
in countries with strong legal systems in order to eliminate the riskiness of projects. 
Importantly, several researches have drawn similar conclusions (see Fox and Weber, 2002; 
Giannetti and Koskinen, 2010). 
Additionally, many scholars have argued that the composition and characteristics of a corporate 
board can be attributed to the legal system of the country in which it operates. For instance, 
using data from 23 countries around the world, Kim and Ozdemir (2014) investigated which 
national institutional characteristics influenced a corporate board’s role as monitor (boards as 
wealth protectors) or advisor (boards as wealth creators)2. Their results demonstrated that in 
countries with higher investor protections, stronger rules of law and open market institutions, 
corporate boards were structured to serve as monitors rather than advisors, which indicates that 
these national characteristics and the monitoring role of corporate boards are complementary 
                                                          
2 Two different scores have been used to proxy the structure of a board (monitoring versus advising structure). The monitoring score involves 
three items: the independence of the board, CEO duality and the ratio of outsider director tenure to CEO tenure in the firm. The advising score 
also involves three items: gender diversity, nationality diversity and whether the firm has a strategy-related committee (see Kim and Ozdemir, 
2014). 
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mechanisms of corporate governance (Kim and Ozdemir, 2014). This view is consistent with 
the findings of Grosvold and Brammer (2011), who examined how national institutional 
settings shaped the gender diversity of corporate boards in 38 countries between 2001 and 
2007. According to their results, legal and cultural institutions appeared to play a significant 
role in the prevalence of female directors on corporate boards across the globe. 
To alleviate the effects of weak investor protection rights, several scholars have suggested that 
the existence of multiple large shareholders may increase shareholder protection efforts. 
Among them, Casado et al. (2016) examined the listed firms of Switzerland and found that the 
existence of multiple large shareholders enhanced the shareholder protections of a firm. Their 
results emphasised that conflict between several large shareholders (‘Principal-Principal 
conflicts’) helped to monitor not only the actions of a firm’s managers, but also the behaviour 
of large shareholders who might have otherwise tried to obtain rent at the expense of other 
shareholders. Moreover, the results of this study implied that the weakness of corporate 
governance (protection rights) can be reconciled by having multiple shareholders invest in a 
firm.  
3.5. Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance  
Ownership structure is generally viewed as a major component of corporate governance 
bundles (Aguilera et al., 2012; Desender et al., 2013; Judge, 2011; Judge, 2012; Sure et al., 
2013). Ownership structures vary across countries; widely-held firms are more common in the 
US and the UK, while firms with concentrated ownership structures are the norm in continental 
European countries (La Porta et al., 1999). Notably, Berle and Mean (1932) argued that modern 
corporations were becoming diffused in their ownership; in their seminal study, they 
maintained that modern corporations were rapidly adopting dispersed ownership schemes. 
However, more recent empirical studies conducted around the world have revealed little 
evidence supporting this contention. For instance, La Porta et al. (1999) found that most 
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corporations around the world, with the exception of those in the US and the UK, are controlled 
by families or by the state, which is categorised as concentrated ownership. This finding was 
also supported by their prior study, in which they examined up to 10 of the largest companies 
(by market capitalisation) in 49 countries across the globe. They collected data on each 
company’s top three shareholders by combining their ownership stakes and found that, on 
average, their shareholdings represented roughly 46% of a firm’s holdings (see La Porta et al., 
1998).  
To alleviate agency costs in widely-held firms, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) suggested that 
shareholders concentrate their shareholdings in order to better shoulder the costs of monitoring. 
According to Aguilera et al. (2012), ownership concentration might be beneficial, as 
controlling shareholders have more power and incentive to monitor the actions of managers 
than do minority shareholders; thus, the ‘Principal-Agent’ problem may be eliminated 
(Yoshikawa et al., 2014). However, ownership concentration might lead to ‘Principal-Principal 
conflicts’ if controlling shareholders take advantage of minority shareholders. Such 
expropriation is likely to occur when the ‘one share-one vote’ system is breached by dominant 
shareholders who strive to employ instruments of control, such as pyramidal ownership or the 
collection of dual-class shares; in such cases, their voting rights might exceed their cash flow 
rights (Faccio and Lang, 2002).  
Several scholars have argued that corporate board characteristics are contingent on the 
ownership structure of a firm. Among them, Desender et al. (2013) analysed French- and 
Spanish-listed firms in 2007 and reported that different ownership structures influenced the 
monitoring level of a corporate board in different ways. Their results showed that board 
independence in widely-held firms was more likely to result in additional audit services, thus 
indicating that board independence and external audit fees are complementary in such firms 
(Desender et al., 2013). However, this result did not hold for firms with concentrated ownership 
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systems, which suggests that board independence and ownership concentration becomes 
substituted when monitoring the management of a firm (Desender et al., 2013). Their results 
also indicated that the association between board composition and audit fees was contingent 
on the controlling shareholders’ type (i.e., whether firms were controlled by families, 
corporations, banks or whether they were widely held). Examining the listed firms of 12 Sub-
Saharan African countries from 2006 to 2009, Munisi et al., (2014) found that firms with 
concentrated ownership systems and firms with foreign and managerial ownership structures 
were negatively associated with board size. The study also showed that state ownership was 
positively associated with the proportion of outside directors; however, the relationship was 
found to be negative in firms with concentrated ownership structures, thus indicating that board 
composition and ownership structure are used as substitutes in mitigating agency costs (Munisi 
et al., 2014).  
Several scholars have called for a distinction to be made between the various types of 
controlling shareholders when discussing the ownership structure of a firm (Aguilera et al., 
2012; Mallin; 2016). Different types of investors aim to achieve different objectives and pursue 
various strategies when investing in their investee firms; furthermore, they might demand 
different governance environments. Therefore, the following forms of controlling shareholders 
will be identified and distinguished: institutional investors, family owners and state owners.  
Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance 
As international capital markets continue to liberalise, the growth of institutional investments 
across the globe is becoming a key factor in the world economy (Ferreira and Matos, 2008; 
Aggarwal et al., 2011). According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the value of 
worldwide assets managed via institutional investments has risen to approximately $100 
trillion, a sevenfold increase over 1990 levels (Kim et al., 2016). Given their global investment 
footprint, institutional investors face increasing pressure from policymakers and governments 
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to play a meaningful role in the enhancement of governance structures within their investee 
firms (Mallin, 2016). Institutional investors’ duties in monitoring their investee firms extend 
beyond their financial incentives to include stewardship responsibilities, which leads to the 
maximisation of beneficiaries’ interests (see Mallin, 2016; Solomon, 2013).  
Institutional investors can adopt several channels of engagement with their investee firms in 
order to improve a firm’s corporate governance structure. These channels include one-to-one 
meetings, voting, shareholder proposals and resolutions, focus lists and corporate governance 
rating systems (Martin et al., 2007; Mallin, 2016). In addition to these methods, private 
negotiation is another effective approach that is regularly used by institutional investors to 
enhance the governance structure of their investee firms (Holland, 1998; McCahery et al., 
2016). The stewardship codes and guidelines that have been published by several countries are 
also considered to be essential tools that may be used to enhance the dialogue between 
institutional investors and their investee firms (Haxhi et al., 2013; McNulty and Nordberg, 
2016). The next chapter will further elaborate on the role of institutional investors in corporate 
governance. 
Family-Owned Firms and Corporate Governance 
Nordqvist (2012) argued that members of a company-controlling family play an important role 
in improving the strategies adopted by their businesses. This is likely due to the nature of the 
interaction that occurs between family members, which often results in the development of 
unique and united skills that are used to push a business forward (Chrisman et al., 2003). 
Eddleston et al. (2008) claimed that an increased level of participation by family members in 
decision-making processes can eliminate conflict and improve a company’s productivity. 
Furthermore, Mallin (2016) pointed out that the main advantage of a family business is the 
disappearance of the agency problem, as control and ownership are exercised by the same 
parties. Therefore, less monitoring of management’s actions within the company is required. 
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According to Bammens et al. (2011), however, family control can increase the danger of four 
main hazards that are known to contribute to the agency problem. First, the controlling family 
might expropriate the economic wealth of their investee firms, which can harm the interests of 
minority shareholders (Bammens et al., 2011). The second hazard refers to situations wherein 
a controlling family pursues non-economic objectives to the detriment of minority shareholders 
(Bammens et al., 2011). The third threat is related to the interpersonal relationships that may 
be damaged when a certain job is secured for close relatives of the controlling family 
(Bammens et al., 2011). The fourth criticism involves a possible divergence of objectives 
between the members of a family that controls a firm (Bammens et al., 2011). All of these 
attitudes might affect a company’s efficiency and lead to poor performance. This theory is 
consistent with the work of Sorenson (1999), who claimed that one of the undesirable outcomes 
of the presence of a controlling family within a firm is their neglect of the company’s 
performance in favour of the maintenance of their own interests. Furthermore, Herrero (2011) 
argued that an agency conflict can exist when a firm is widely owned by many families. He 
added that the likelihood of such a conflict is increased when each family has its own interests, 
objectives and involvement plan (Herrero, 2011). 
Mallin (2016) described different mechanisms whereby conflicts within family businesses may 
be solved. Each of these mechanisms is advisable in certain situations. For example, at the 
earliest stage of a family business, it is advisable that the family organise regular meetings or 
assemblies in order to facilitate the expression and exchange of family members’ views 
(Mallin, 2016). Later, when the family has expanded due to marriage, the establishment of a 
family council is advisable (Mallin, 2016). This is consistent with the findings of Neubauer 
and Lank (1998), who suggested that the formation of a family council is suitable if the number 
of family members exceeds 30 or 40. When and if the relationships between family members 
begin to affect the operation and efficiency of the business, it is desirable that the family be 
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advised and directed by an advisory board that is tasked with helping the family to establish a 
more formal governance structure (Neubauer and Lank, 1998). However, such an advisory 
board may not provide the same advantage to a family firm as would a defined board that is 
dominated by independent non-executive directors. To this end, Bammens et al. (2011) argued 
that independent board members have the ability to question and challenge managers and thus 
protect not only the interests of lenders and investors but also those of the controlling family 
itself. Figure 3.2 outlines the possible stages of a family firm’s governance.  
 
  
State-Owned Firms and Corporate Governance 
It is believed that governments and institutional investors have similar features in terms of their 
significant resources and the power they can wield over their investee firms (Borisova et al., 
2012). However, governments and institutions might have different objectives when it comes 
to the implementation of corporate governance. Governments are much wealthier than are 
institutional investors, and thus they have the ability to leverage themselves by adopting 
various strategies (such as securing debt financing for the firms under their control). However, 
these kinds of facilities might hinder their ability to monitor the management of their investee 
firms, which may cause the agency problem to inflate. Furthermore, governments have the 
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ability and the power to craft regulations that may positively or negatively affect a company—
some regulations may even force their investee firms to shut down. With regard to information 
gathering, governments have their own means of extracting required information about their 
investee firms—for example, they can utilise regulations or employ other legal means. 
However, this information may not always be used to improve the governance structures of 
their investee firms, particularly if this goal contradicts a superior objective, such as 
unemployment reduction or the increase of tax collection, that might lead to the stability of the 
financial system as a whole (see Borisova et al., 2012). 
To encourage state-owned firms to enhance their corporate governance structures, the OECD 
issued its first set of guidelines regarding the corporate governance of state-owned enterprises 
in 2005. These guidelines highlight many aspects of governance, such as developing an 
effective legal and regulatory framework, acting as owner, treating shareholders equitably, 
developing positive relations with stakeholders, pursuing transparency and disclosure and 
taking responsibility of the boards of state-owned companies (OECD, 2005). 
3.6. Outsider versus Insider Systems 
Comparative corporate governance research has identified two contrasting models of corporate 
governance; outsider and insider systems (Franks and Mayer, 1994). The term ‘outsider 
system’ (or ‘shareholder-oriented system’) refers to a corporate governance system in which a 
company is controlled by a management team but is owned by outside shareholders (Solomon, 
2013). The concept of an outsider-dominated system of corporate governance was first 
suggested by Berle and Means in 1932. Under this system, the ownership structure is dispersed, 
and agency costs are significant due to the separation of ownership and control (Solomon, 
2013). However, institutional investors (such as those in the UK and the US) have gained 
influence over the management of many companies, which reduces the severity of agency 
costs. This is consistent with the findings of Mallin (2016), who pointed out that the growth of 
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institutional investors indicates that they hold an important and increasingly significant role in 
the affairs of companies wherein they act as owners rather than merely as shareholders. 
Additionally, under this system of corporate governance, hostile takeovers are frequent and are 
typically used to discipline the management of a firm for not achieving shareholders’ objectives 
(Solomon, 2013). 
Conversely, ‘insider systems’ (or ‘stakeholder-oriented systems’) are corporate governance 
systems in which most listed firms are controlled and owned by a small number of shareholders 
(Solomon, 2013). Franks and Mayer (2001) indicated that companies in Germany and Japan 
are good examples of such a system. In Germany, for instance, roughly 85% of the largest 
listed companies have a single shareholder who owns more than 25% of the voting shares 
(Franks and Mayer, 2001). The same pattern of ownership is found in the firms of East Asia 
(Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and 
Thailand); in fact, Claessens et al. (2000) reported that more than two-thirds of the firms in this 
region are basically owned by a single shareholder. Moreover, insider-dominated systems may 
suffer from a lack of transparency, which may adversely affect minority shareholders, as such 
shareholders may not be able to gain access to essential information regarding company 
functions; additionally, minority shareholders may have a reduced incentive to provide a firm 
with equity finance if the law fails to offer them sufficient protection (Solomon, 2013). 
Compared to outsider systems, insider systems are characterised as having little separation 
between ownership and control; therefore, the agency problem is rare. However, a second type 
of agency conflict (the ‘Principal-Principal conflict’) may arise if controlling shareholders 
expropriate private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). 
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3.7. Hard Law versus Soft Law Systems 
An important aspect of global corporate governance involves whether a country abides by a 
hard law system, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002, or a soft code approach, such 
as the principles of ‘good governance’. In hard law systems, the code of corporate governance 
is implemented via legislation. In the US, the federal SOX resulted in mandatory rules to which 
companies are required to adhere (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). Soft law systems, 
however, are represented by codes of corporate governance and largely utilise a ‘comply or 
explain’ approach; this approach requires firms to either comply with code recommendations 
or explain and justify their noncompliance (Luo and Salterio, 2014). These codes of corporate 
governance contain recommendations for best practices and mainly concern the function and 
composition of corporate boards; they also tend to touch on other governance practices (Zattoni 
and Cuomo, 2008). 
The voluntary ‘comply or explain’ approach to UK corporate governance is generally 
considered to be a benchmark for other countries (Arcot et al., 2010). According to a recent 
international review of corporate governance codes conducted by Cuomo et al. (2016), figures 
show that since the publication of the Cadbury Report, a total of 354 corporate governance 
codes3 had been issued by 91 countries around the world by the end of 2014. There are various 
factors at play behind the development of corporate governance codes in a particular county. 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) argued that these factors include weak shareholder 
protections, elevated levels of government liberalisation and the increased presence of 
institutional investors. They also added that institutional and market pressures are the two main 
drivers behind the global spread of ‘good corporate governance’ codes. Furthermore, they 
                                                          
3 The development of corporate governance codes in the sample countries is discussed later in this chapter. 
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argued that the need for corporate governance codes arose from an increase in the number of 
public firms and from the ensuing agency problems that began to appear between dispersed 
owners and managers or between minority and majority shareholders (Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2009). According to Cuomo et al. (2016), the financial crisis and the various high 
profile corporate collapses that have occurred around the world over the past two decades led 
to the diffusion of corporate governance codes. The first wave of corporate governance codes 
began in the late 1990s in parallel with the Asian and Russian stock crises—and with the 
collapses of high-profile firms such as Enron, Worldcom and Parmalat (Cuomo et al., 2016). 
The second wave, however, started after the recent financial crisis of 2007–2008 (Cuomo et 
al., 2016). Furthermore, international organisations such as OECD, Pan-European and ICGN 
have played their part in encouraging the global diffusion of national codes (Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Cuomo et al., 2016). These institutions have actively promoted 
governance practices and have provided guidance to developing countries regarding how best 
to cultivate corporate governance practices within their borders. Zattoni and Cuomo (2008) 
argued that legal systems (common versus civil) influence the diffusion of corporate 
governance codes. Their study aimed to examine whether the proliferation of corporate 
governance codes in civil law countries is driven by legitimation reasoning (without an eye 
towards improving governance practices) or by determination reasoning (to enhance 
governance practices). With respect to the determination aspect, their results showed that civil 
law countries were more likely to extend code recommendations to non-listed firms than were 
their common law counterparts (Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). Regarding the legitimacy facet, 
however, their findings showed that civil law countries adopted governance codes later, issued 
fewer codes and included more ambiguous and lenient recommendations as compared to 
common law countries (Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). 
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This voluntary approach to corporate governance has some proven advantages over the 
adoption of a hard set of regulations. For instance, Arcot et al. (2010) conducted a study to 
examine the effectiveness of the ‘comply or explain’ approach in non-financial UK companies 
between 1998 and 2004; their results revealed that the introduction of a voluntary code 
accelerated compliance, especially regarding those practices that were not covered by a 
forerunner (i.e., the Cadbury Report). Their results also revealed that, on average, for each 
particular provision, only 10% of the total sample was noncompliant (Arcot et al., 2010). More 
recently, using a sample of Canadian-listed firms in operation in 2006, Lou and Salterio (2014) 
found that a voluntary governance disclosure approach allowed companies to choose those 
governance practices that best suited their unique circumstances and settings; on average, these 
practices were found to be positively associated with firm performance. 
3.8. The Anglo-Saxon Model 
Followed by countries such as Australia, Canada, India, the US and the UK, the Anglo-Saxon 
model of corporate governance is based on the fiduciary relationship that exists between 
shareholders and management. Listed firms in these countries are expected to maximise the 
wealth of their shareholders; thus, there is need for a robust system whereby shareholder 
interests may be maintained (Franks and Mayer, 1990). Weimer and Pape (1999) stated that 
companies in Anglo-Saxon countries are generally controlled by a single board of directors 
that is comprised of insider and outsider directors. The outside directors are responsible for 
advising and monitoring the management team, and they are expected to be loyal, honest and 
to act in the best interests of the shareholders (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989). In these countries, 
boards of directors are supported by three key subcommittees: the audit, remuneration and 
nomination committees. In addition to these key subcommittees, other committees might be 
formed to deal with certain issues (such as risk and ethics). 
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3.8.1. Corporate Governance in Australia  
The Australian system of corporate governance is traditionally described as employing an 
outsider approach, though it does share some basic similarities with the UK model (Stapledon, 
1996). While the two systems are generally similar, differences exist with regard to ownership 
structures and the extent to which shareholders are involved in their companies (Solomon, 
2013). Australian-listed firms have mixed structures in terms of ownership; companies range 
from widely-held firms to firms with controlling shareholders (normally-founded firms or 
those retaining intercompany ownership) (Mallin, 2016; Solomon, 2013). Given that block 
holders enjoy significant levels of ownership, the Australian corporate governance system can 
also be characterised as an insider system (Mallin, 2016). This point is emphasised by 
Stapledon (2006), who argued that one of the main features that distinguishes the Australian 
system of corporate governance from other Anglo-Saxon models is the existence of large 
blockholders in some of the listed firms. Furthermore, until the mid-1990s, the activism of 
institutional investors in Australia was less evident as compared to the activism of UK investors 
(Stapledon, 1996). In fact, the activism of shareholders in Australia increased following the 
introduction of the Australian Investment Managers’ Group in the early 1990s, which 
introduced mechanisms to regulate the collective actions of shareholders (Solomon, 2013). 
Paving the way for the development of corporate governance in Australia, dishonesty and abuse 
on the part of the directors of Australian firms caused the collapse of many companies in the 
1980s. This led some leading business organisations4 to form a working group in 1991; this 
group was tasked with developing Australia’s first corporate governance code (Bosch, 2002). 
This working group published its first report, The Bosch Report on Corporate Practice and 
Conduct, in 1991; additional issues were published in 1993 and 1995 (Mallin, 2016). This 
                                                          
4
 Such organisations included the Business Council, the Australian Stock Exchange, the Australian Institute of 
Company Directors and various professional accounting bodies (Bosch, 2002). 
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report highlighted a wide range of corporate governance issues, such as corporate board 
structuring, the appointment of non-executive directors, directors’ compensation, risk 
management, auditing and financial reporting, conflicts of interests and the role of the company 
secretary (Mallin, 2016). Several codes and guidelines on corporate governance practices have 
been issued since the formation of this working group; for example, 1998’s Hilmer Report 
highlighted several issues, including board composition, the remuneration of the executive 
team and matters relating to the quality of disclosures (Mallin, 2016). In 2003, The Australian 
Stock Exchange (ASX) issued the first edition of its Principles of Good Corporate Governance 
and Best Practices Recommendations, which outlined ten principles according to a ‘comply or 
explain’ model (Tricker, 2015). These ten core principles collectively highlighted the 
importance of a board’s structure and identified the board’s responsibility to, along with the 
management team, promote ethical decision-making, maintain proper financial reporting, 
instantly disclose company-related matters, respect shareholders’ rights, identify risk, properly 
manage that risk, consider the interests of the firm’s stakeholders and encourage the enhanced 
performance of the board and management team, with an emphasis on fair compensation (ASX 
Corporate Governance Council, 2003). This code further recommended that the majority of the 
corporate board be comprised of independent directors. The code also proposed that corporate 
boards establish audit, compensation and nomination committees, the majority of whose 
members should be independent. In 2007, the ASX revised these principles for the first time, 
renaming the result the Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations. Though this 
revision included some changes to wording, the ten principles remained essentially the same 
(Mallin, 2016). Following that revision, the ASX published its second modification to these 
principles in 2010, this time including various recommendations concerning the promotion of 
gender diversity; this revision described a measurable objective and outlined a clear policy on 
gender diversity. Furthermore, this revision pronounced that firms listed in the ASX should be 
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required to establish a compensation committee comprised of a majority of independent 
directors. However, this proposal was presented as guidance rather than as a recommendation, 
as was the case with the previous version (Mallin, 2016). Additionally, this revision required 
that ASX-listed firms adopt and disclose an organisational trading policy. Finally, in order to 
enhance shareholders’ rights, this code called on ASX-listed firms to arrange for widely-
accessible shareholder briefings; this accessibility could be accomplished by utilising 
communication technologies such as web-casts and conference calls (Mallin, 2016). The ASX 
further updated its principles and recommendations in 2014. According to Mallin (2016), this 
revision reflected the global developments in corporate governance that were made following 
the issuance of the ASX’s second revision in 2007. Furthermore, this revision granted 
companies more flexibility in terms of disclosure. Figure 3.3 demonstrates the development of 
Australia’s major corporate governance codes and guidelines.  
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3.8.2. Corporate Governance in Canada 
Broadly speaking, corporate governance in Canada is based on a voluntary adoption approach 
and is similar to the systems of the UK and Australia (Du Plessis et al., 2015). In general, 
Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom have similar guidelines for board composition, 
disclosure requirements and the establishment of key subcommittees (audit, remuneration and 
nomination) (Du Plessis et al., 2015). In contrast to the makeup of firms in other countries 
(such as the US and the UK), the ownership structures of Canadian-listed firms are more 
concentrated, and companies are controlled by wealthy families, firms and institutional 
investors (Du Plessis et al., 2015). Focusing on the Canadian securities regulatory framework, 
it is worth noting that Canada is the only developed country without a national securities 
regulator. Rather than establishing a national regulator, such as the one in operation in the US, 
each of Canada’s 13 provinces has its own securities regulator that is in charge of formulating 
its own regulation policies. However, the Canadian Securities Administrator (CSA) does 
attempt to harmonise and coordinate the regulation of the various provinces (Du Plessis et al., 
2015). 
An examination of Canada’s corporate governance development reveals that the first corporate 
governance guideline issued in Canada was Where Were the Directors? Guidelines for 
Improved Corporate Governance in Canada, which was popularly known as the Dey Report 
(Solomon, 2013). This report was published by the Committee on Corporate Governance, 
which was established by the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) in 1993 (Kleffner et al., 2003). 
The Dey Report outlined the 14 principles that were considered to encompass the best corporate 
governance practices of the time. The report described the ideal composition of a corporate 
board and its key subcommittees and emphasised the stewardship responsibility of a corporate 
board, describing its role in long-term planning, internal control and risk management (TSX, 
1994). Five years later in 1999, a follow-up survey was conducted in an attempt to evaluate the 
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overall development of corporate governance in Canada; the resulting document was cleverly 
titled Five Years to the Dey (Kleffner et al., 2003). This report revealed that the guidelines 
published in the Dey Report were taken into wide consideration by Canadian-listed firms. 
However, the report also highlighted various concerns in terms of the stewardship role of a 
corporate board; such concerns related to board evaluation, risk management, the disclosure of 
corporate governance practices and the training of new directors (Rousseau, 2003). In response, 
the TSX formed the Saucier Committee in 2000 in an effort to review the process of decision-
making as it related to corporate boards. After one year of deliberation, the committee proposed 
a total of 15 recommendations aimed at enhancing the stewardship role of corporate boards; 
this document is commonly known as the Saucier Report (Rousseau, 2003).  
Due to the US passage of the SOX in 2002 and a financial scandal involving several Canadian 
corporations5, the TSX developed guidelines for better disclosure in 2003. The resulting 
publication, entitled Corporate Governance: A Guide to Good Disclosure, was issued in order 
to enhance the level and quality of the country’s disclosure policies (Du Plessis et al., 2015). 
According to this guide, firms were required to disclose their governance practices and explain 
their level of compliance with the recommendations outlined in the report; if a company chose 
not to conform to a specific guideline, they were required to clearly state the reason for such 
noncompliance. Furthermore, the guide also provided an example of disclosure for each of the 
14 guidelines (TSX, 2003). In 2006, the TSX elaborated on the previously-issued disclosure 
code by including a number of templates to be used as examples of good disclosure. These 
templates required listed firms to disclose their governance aspects according to subject (TSX, 
2006). Figure 3.4 illustrates the development of Canada’s major corporate governance codes 
and guidelines. 
                                                          
5 Such companies included Nortel, Livent and the Cinar Corporation (Du Plessis et al., 2015). 
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In an attempt to promote gender diversity in Canada, the province of Quebec prescribed that 
50% of a firm’s board seats should be occupied by female directors (Deloitte, 2015); this quota 
applied to state-owned firms, and full compliance was achieved in 2011. Additionally, in 2014, 
the Senate of Canada proposed a gender quota of 40% for listed firms, financial institutions 
and state-owned firms. Boards with eight or fewer members were required to have a maximum 
two-member gender differential. Following the passage of this quota, each gender was required 
to have at least 20% representation on a firm’s board after three shareholder meetings and 40% 
representation after the sixth shareholder meeting (Deloitte, 2015). 
It is also worth noting that in 2014, the Canadian Securities Administrator began to require 
firms to disclose several aspects related to gender diversity. For example, firms were expected 
to release policy information concerning the representation of female directors and the 
appointment of women to executive positions; firms were also required to disclose the number 
of female board directors and the number of women in executive positions. Furthermore, firms 
were obliged to establish targets with regard to the appointment of women to their boards and 
to executive positions (see Deloitte, 2015).  
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3.8.3. Corporate Governance in India 
As a former colony of Britain, India has the same legal system as the UK; as such, India offers 
a considerable level of protection to minority shareholders as compared to other East Asian 
countries (Solomon, 2013). Equity shares in India are traded in two stock exchanges—the 
Bombay Stock Exchange and the National Stock Exchange of India. To a certain extent, the 
ownership structures of most Indian firms are characterised as widely-held; however, in certain 
cases, firms are controlled by families or by the state6 (Chakrabarti et al., 2008). 
                                                          
6 Roughly 60% of the 500 largest listed firms are controlled by families, and 11% are controlled by the state of 
India (Chakrabarti et al., 2008). 
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To facilitate the reform of corporate governance practices in India7, the Confederation of Indian 
Industry published its first code in 1998, entitled the Desirable Corporate Governance in India: 
A Code, which was based upon the voluntary compliance system (Mallin, 2016; Solomon, 
2013). This code presented 17 recommendations and covered several governance areas, 
including board composition, external directorship limits, the responsibilities of non-executive 
directors, the recording of attendance during board meetings and disclosure enhancements 
(Confederation of Indian Industry, 1999). The code further decreed that at least 30% of a 
corporate board’s seats should be occupied by non-executive directors, provided that the board 
chair was also considered a non-executive director; if a firm’s CEO maintained a duality 
position on the board, however, the proportion of required non-executive directors rose to 50% 
(Dahiya and Rathee, 2001). Following the publication of this code, another initiative was 
undertaken by the Securities and Exchange Board of India in 1999; to accomplish its goals, the 
board formed a committee chaired by Shri Kumar Mangalam Birla. The aim of this committee 
was to design a corporate governance code that took into consideration the views of those who 
invested in the listed firms of India (Dahiya and Rathee, 2001). One year later, the committee 
published its report under the title The Report of the Kumar Mangalam Birla on Corporate 
Governance (Mallin, 2016). Additionally, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs introduced The 
Corporate Governance Voluntary Guidelines in 2009 in an attempt to further enhance and 
improve India’s corporate governance practices (Ministry of Corporate Affairs, 2009). These 
guidelines were divided into six main topics: boards of directors, the responsibility of a board, 
the responsibility of a board’s audit committee, the establishment of auditors, the rules of the 
secretarial audit and the institution of mechanisms regarding whistleblowing (Mallin, 2016). 
                                                          
7 This initiative was developed in response to public concerns regarding investor protections, the legal level of 
disclosure for listed firms and the need to adopt international governance standards (Dahiya and Rathee, 2001). 
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Figure 3.5 demonstrates the development of India’s major corporate governance codes and 
guidelines. 
In an attempt to promote the diversity of the country’s corporate boards, India’s Institute of 
Company Secretaries took the initiative to bring female representation on corporate boards 
more in line with the levels of other countries. To this end, The Companies Act of 2013 required 
that Indian firms have at least one woman on their corporate boards (Deloitte, 2015). This 
requirement was mandatory for all listed firms, public firms with a paid-up share capital of 1 
billion Indian Rupee (INR) and firms with a turnover of 3 billion INR or more (Deloitte, 2015).  
 
 
3.8.4. Corporate Governance in Ireland 
The Irish corporate governance system is a special case; while Ireland’s legal and institutional 
environment mirrors that of the UK, the Irish business environment is considerably influenced 
by the US (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Solomon, 2013). According to Donnelly and 
Mulcahy (2008), due to the historical links between the UK and Ireland, the Irish corporate 
governance system parallels the approach established by the UK. For instance, the Irish Stock 
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Exchange requires that public and limited firms operating in Ireland comply with the corporate 
governance codes published by the UK; thus, firms must explain how they comply with the 
codes’ principles or otherwise provide justification for their noncompliance. However, Ireland 
is also tightly linked to the US due to the direct investment of US companies in Ireland, a 
practice that has influenced the country’s institutional and managerial practices (Donnelly and 
Mulcahy, 2008). It is important to note that Ireland has a relatively small stock exchange as 
compared to those of the US and the UK8 (O’Connell and Carmer, 2010). With a one-tier board 
structure, the corporate governance system in Ireland follows the Anglo-Saxon style.  
Given the historical links and the similarities of accounting practices and ownership structures 
within companies in the UK and Ireland, it is not surprising that Ireland mirrors the corporate 
governance practices followed in the UK (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Ward et al., 2013). In 
1973, the Irish Stock Exchange merged with the British Stock Exchange, forming the 
International Stock Exchange of Great Britain and Ireland (currently known as London Stock 
Exchange). However, the Irish Stock Exchange became independent in 1995, and annexed the 
provisions of the Combined Code in the UK to its listing requirements in 1999 (Ward et al., 
2013).  
 
In addition to this, investors’ associations and the central bank in Ireland published several 
governance guidelines in an effort to promote the practices in some specific areas. Among 
them, the Irish Association of Investment Managers (IAIM) issued one such set of 
recommendations, Corporate Governance, Share Option and Other Incentive Schemes, in 
1999. This document recommended that listed firms offer their directors share options and 
other incentive schemes as part of a remuneration package in order to increase a director’s 
                                                          
8 In 2008, the market capitalisation of the Irish stock exchange represented only 3.2% of the market capitalisation 
of the UK (O’Connell and Carmer, 2010). 
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commitment to the firm and align the interests of a particular firm’s shareholders and 
management teams (IAIM, 1999).  
In 2007, the Central Bank of Ireland published a set of corporate governance guidelines 
pertaining to insurance companies in response to the publication of Council Directive 
2005/68/EC. The document was titled the ‘Corporate Governance for Reinsurance 
Undertakings’ and covered six main recommendations for Irish insurance companies, namely 
involving corporate boards and their key subcommittees, internal controls, audit functions, 
compliance and the roles of INEDs and senior management officials (Central Bank of Ireland, 
2007). Another code, this time targeting credit institutions as well as insurance companies, was 
issued by the Central Bank of Ireland in 2010. This particular code was titled the ‘Corporate 
Governance Code for Credit Institutions and Insurance Undertakings’ and aimed to ensure that 
corporate governance frameworks be established to reflect the nature of these institutions as 
well as their associated risks (Central Bank of Ireland, 2010). A subsequent revision of the code 
was issued in 2013; this revision included additional recommendations related to the number 
of directorships that should be held by members of the corporate boards of credit and insurance 
firms and suggestions regarding the composition of risk, compensation and nomination 
committees (Central Bank of Ireland, 2013). Figure 3.6 demonstrates the development of 
Ireland’s major corporate governance codes and guidelines. 
As in the UK, Ireland has no mandatory quota to promote gender diversity on corporate boards; 
however, an initiative has been introduced that would require firms owned by the state to have 
40% female representation on their boards and committees (European Commission, 2016). 
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3.8.5. Corporate Governance in the United Kingdom 
The UK has a well-developed market, and companies in the UK are listed in the London Stock 
Exchange. In the UK, ownership structures are based on a system of diversified shareholders 
and include institutional investors, financial institutions and individuals; importantly, the 
various institutional investors (pension funds, insurance companies and mutual funds) have 
become much more influential over the last few decades (Mallin, 2016). The most noteworthy 
point about UK ownership structures involves the increased expansion of foreign investors in 
the listed firms of the UK9 (Fleckner and Hopt, 2013). The UK has a unitary board structure, 
and corporate governance codes require that at least half of a company’s board members, 
excluding the chairman, be non-executive directors who have been determined to be 
independent (Fleckner and Hopt, 2013).  
                                                          
9 Recent statistics show that roughly 53.8% of UK-listed firms are owned by overseas investors (Office for 
National Statistics, 2015). 
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 As in other countries, financial scandals and the collapse of various firms were the main drivers 
of corporate governance development in the UK. According to Mallin (2011), the failure of 
Coloroll and Polly Peck led to the establishment of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance in May of 1991. After the committee was formed, scandals involving 
Maxwell and the Bank of Credit and Commerce International occurred, which led the 
committee to look beyond financial aspects and consider corporate governance issues as a 
whole (Mallin, 2016). The committee published its findings in 1992; the resulting report is 
commonly known as the Cadbury Report in honour of Sir Adrian Cadbury, the committee chair 
(Mallin, 2016). While the Cadbury Report was not considered a compulsory set of rules to be 
adopted by public companies quoted in the stock exchange (Solomon, 2013), such companies 
were required to conform to the report’s guidelines or provide justification for their 
noncompliance. The recommendations of this report focused on three main areas: boards of 
directors, auditing practices and shareholder responsibilities (Cadbury Report, 1992). The 
Cadbury Report considered boards of directors to be important governance mechanisms that 
should constantly monitor and assess the management of their firms. Thus, the report called for 
the wider use of independent non-executive directors and recommended that boards establish 
three key subcommittees (audit, remuneration and nomination) comprised wholly or mainly of 
non-executive directors. The report also endorsed a division of responsibility between the 
chairman of the board and the chief executive (these two positions are sometimes held by the 
same figure). Furthermore, auditing functions were seen as essential procedures that possessed 
the ability to enhance corporate governance by emphasising the importance of transparency in 
all firm activities. Lastly, the Cadbury Report highlighted the vital role of institutional 
investors, the largest and most influential group of shareholders, in enhancing the corporate 
governance of their investee firms. In particular, the report recommended that institutional 
investors regularly engage with their investee firms concerning firm performance, strategies, 
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board composition and management quality. Additionally, the report also encouraged 
institutional investors to engage with their firms, to use their voting power to ensure that an 
appropriate governance structure be established and to fulfil their fiduciary responsibility 
towards their ultimate beneficiaries. The report inspired institutional investors to focus on 
board composition and to promote the recruitment of experienced non-executive directors who 
were independent of the management team. To date, there have been numerous revisions to 
and developments on various aspects of the Cadbury Report. These revisions and amendments 
are discussed below. 
Following the publication of the Cadbury Report, another committee (led by Sir Richard 
Greenbury) was formed in 1995 in an attempt to address shareholders’ concerns regarding 
directors’ remuneration packages and the lack of disclosure regarding such matters in firms’ 
annual reports (Solomon, 2013). The ensuing Greenbury Report was published in 1995, and it 
provided a means of establishing a balance between directors’ compensation schemes and firm 
performance (Solomon, 2013). According to Mallin (2016), the Greenbury Report aimed to 
enhance the accountability and performance of firms’ directors by (i) requiring firms to provide 
detailed annual reports of directors’ compensation packages, to be prepared by a remuneration 
committee comprised of independent non-executive directors and (ii) linking compensation 
packages to the performance of both the firm and individual directors, thus aligning the 
interests of directors and shareholders (see Mallin, 2016). 
The Hampel Committee was formed in 1995, and the resulting Hampel Report was published 
in 1998. The main role of this committee was to review the implementation of both Cadbury 
and Greenbury Report recommendations (Solomon, 2013). Per Mallin (2016), much of the 
Hampel Report focused on the extent to which firms maintained good relationships with their 
stakeholders (employees, customers, suppliers and providers of credit) and protected the 
interests of their shareholders. Furthermore, the report highlighted the important role of 
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institutional investors in their investee firms. To this end, the Hampel Report highly 
recommended that rather than engaging in ‘box ticking’, institutional investors should enter 
into a dialogue with their investee firms in an effort to discuss issues of concern (Hampel, 
1998). 
Following the issuance of these three reports, the Combined Code was published in 1998; this 
code aimed to merge the recommendations of the previous reports (Cadbury, Greenbury and 
Hampel), thus consolidating the main points and presenting the basic principles (Ward et al., 
2013). According to Mallin (2016), this code was divided into two main parts. The first section 
dealt with companies and covered the following topics: (i) directors, (ii) directors’ 
remuneration, (iii) relations with shareholders and (iv) accountability and auditing. The second 
section discussed institutional investors and discussed the following three issues: (i) 
shareholder voting, (ii) dialogue with companies and (iii) the evaluation of governance 
disclosures. 
Following the publication of the Combined Code, the Turnbull Committee was formed by the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) in 1999 and chaired by 
Nigel Turnbull (Mallin, 2016). The main aim of the resulting Turnbull Report was to provide 
guidance on the implementation of the internal control provisions put forth in the Combined 
Code (Turnbull, 1999). The report provided clear recommendations for the enhancement of 
internal control systems in UK companies (Solomon, 2013). The report also highlighted the 
significance the corporate board’s role in ensuring that a company possesses a reliable internal 
control system (Mallin, 2016).  
Another committee chaired by Derek Higgs was formed, and the subsequent Higgs Report was 
published in January of 2003. According to Ward et al. (2013), the collapse of Enron led most 
countries, including the UK, to assess their corporate governance codes, particularly those 
concerning the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors. This report focused on the 
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role and responsibility of non-executive directors and recommended that annual reports should 
disclose the number of meetings held at the board and subcommittee levels as well as the 
attendance records of each board member (Higgs, 2003). The report also highlighted the 
importance of succession planning, arguing that the chairman and CEO should implement 
executive development programmes to prepare individuals within the firm to take on 
directorship roles in the future. The review further stated that the performance of a board, its 
subcommittees and its members should be evaluated at least once per year, the outcome of 
which should appear in the annual report. Concerning the practice of holding directorships in 
multiple firms, the review recommended that full-time executive directors hold no more than 
one additional directorship in another firm, provided that the second position is not the 
chairmanship of another major company; furthermore, the report stated that a non-executive 
director cannot sit on all key subcommittees of a board (audit, remuneration and nomination) 
(see Higgs, 2003). 
Another committee was formed following the publication of the Higgs Report in an effort to 
address the role of audit committees in the wake of the Enron collapse. Thus, the Smith 
Committee was appointed by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in January of 2003 
(Smith, 2003). The main issues raised in the Smith Report concerned the relationship between 
external auditors and the firms they were auditing as well as the duties of the audit committee 
within a company (Solomon, 2013). The report also recommended that the audit committee be 
tasked with ensuring that an appropriate system of control take effect, though it would not 
monitor the process itself (Mallin, 2016).  
A revised Combined Code was published in July of 2003 and included the recommendations 
highlighted in both the Higgs and Smith reviews. This code emphasised the role of the 
chairperson and the senior independent director; according to this code, a chairperson is 
responsible for providing leadership to non-executive directors, communicating shareholders’ 
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views to the corporate board, highlighting the annual evaluation for the board and its 
subcommittees and calling attention to the performance of each individual director. 
Furthermore, the Combined Code called for the independence of the board, arguing that in 
larger firms, half of the board should be comprised of independent non-executive directors 
(FRC, 2003). 
In June of 2006, the FRC published a new edition of the Combined Code that highlighted three 
major changes. As per Mallin (2016), these changes were made (i) to allow the chairman of a 
firm to serve as a member of the remuneration committee, where he would be considered an 
independent chairman on appointment, (ii) to provide a ‘vote withheld’ option on proxy 
appointment forms, which would allow shareholders to withhold their votes and (iii) to 
encourage firms to disclose on their websites all details concerning general meeting proxies, 
where votes would be taken via a show of hands. 
In June of 2008, the FRC issued another new edition of the Combined Code, this time 
highlighting two main changes. These changes would (i) permit an individual to chair more 
than one firm operating in the FTSE 100 and (ii) allow the chairperson of a company to sit on 
the audit committee, if on appointment he or she was considered to be independent (this applied 
to all firms listed outside the FTSE 350) (Mallin, 2016). 
In response to the financial crisis of 2007–2008, Sir David Walker carried out an independent 
review of the governance practices of the banks and other financial institutions of the UK 
(Walker, 2009). The ensuing Walker Review was published in November of 2009 and contained 
39 recommendations concerning various aspects of corporate governance, including the 
composition and qualifications of corporate board members, the functioning and performance 
assessment of the board, communication with institutional investors and their engagement with 
investee firms, the governance of risk, recommendations related to the role of the remuneration 
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committee and the disclosure of the remuneration packages of executive directors (Mallin, 
2016).  
In 2010, the FRC published the UK Corporate Governance Code (formerly known as the 
Combined Code). This updated code demonstrated a wider understanding of the UK’s 
corporate governance evolution and incorporated some of the recommendations made by the 
Walker Review (Mallin, 2016). According to Mallin (2016), the UK Corporate Governance 
Code retained the ‘comply or explain’ approach and comprised the following six changes. (i) 
In an effort to enhance a firm’s risk management practices, a company’s business model should 
be explained, and a corporate board should be held responsible for any risk it is willing to 
undertake. (ii) Performance-related pay should be aligned with the long-term interests of a firm 
and with its risk system. (iii) To increase the accountability of the directors sitting on the boards 
of FTSE 350 firms, such directors should be re-elected each year. (iv) New principles related 
to the leadership of the chairman of a board should be established, and the responsibility of 
non-executive directors to provide constructive debate in the boardroom should be defined. (v) 
New principles related to the composition and appointment of board directors should be 
created, and firms should consider appointing directors with diverse characteristics (for 
example, members of both genders). And finally, (vi) a chairman should hold regular 
development reviews for each director, and firms listed in the FTSE 350 should conduct 
external evaluations every three years in an effort to enhance board performance and to identify 
a board’s strengths and weaknesses. 
It is important to note that this code included one schedule to explain various principles related 
to the engagement of institutional investors within their investee firms (see FRC, 2012a). This 
schedule has since been deleted and incorporated into the UK Stewardship Code, which was 
published in 2010. The Stewardship Code aimed to enhance engagement between institutional 
investors and their investee firms and attempted to explain the best methods of engagement. 
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The FRC revised the Stewardship Code in 2012, the result of which is discussed in detail in the 
following chapter. 
The FRC published a revised version of the UK Corporate Governance Code in 2012; among 
the included changes were the recommendations that (i) firms listed in the FTSE 350 should 
put out external audits for tender at least once every ten years in an effort to ensure high quality 
standards, (ii) audit committees must disclose to shareholders how they have fulfilled their 
responsibilities and must release their assessments of external audits, (iii) boards must ensure 
that annual reports and accounts are understandable and reflective of the company’s 
performance, (iv) companies must disclose their policies regarding board diversity and (v) 
companies are required to disclose the reason for any noncompliance with certain provisions 
of the code (see Mallin, 2016). In 2014, the FRC issued further revisions to the UK Corporate 
Governance Code; such changes were related to the three main topics of risk management, 
remuneration and shareholder engagement (see Mallin, 2016). 
Due to the lack of representation of female directors in UK-listed firms, the UK’s Coalition 
Government invited Lord Davies to assess the situation, calling on him to identify the barriers 
that prevented female directors from joining UK-listed firms and to issue recommendations 
aimed at enhancing the representation of women on corporate boards (Mallin, 2016). The 
ensuing Women on Boards report, also known as the Davies Report, was published in February 
of 2011 and provided several recommendations. The report called on the chairmen of FTSE 
350 companies to disclose how many women would be targeted to join their boards in 2013 
and 2015. Furthermore, the Davies Report argued that the boards of FTSE 100 companies 
should aim for a board composition that was, at a minimum, 25% female. The quoted 
companies were also requested to disclose in their annual reports the percentage of females 
sitting on their boards, the number of females holding senior executive positions and the 
number of female employees serving within the company (Davies, 2011). Following the 
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publication of the original report’s recommendations in 2011, an annual review was conducted 
to assess the compliance of UK-listed firms. The latest review was completed in 2015 and 
showed that the number of female directors in FTSE 350 companies has almost doubled over 
the figure that was recorded when the report was initially issued in 2011 (Davies, 2015). This 
new figure of 23.5% is considered to mark good progress towards the recommended target of 
25% female representation by 2015 (Mallin, 2016). 
It is also worth noting that in order to increase the representation of women in UK-listed firms, 
the government appointed Sir Philip Hampton (chairman of GlaxoSmithKline plc) to lead an 
independent review in February of 2016; this review aimed to promote greater female 
representation among the executive positions of FTSE 350 companies (see GlaxoSmithKline, 
2016). Figure 3.7 illustrates the development of corporate governance in the UK. 
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3.8.6. Corporate Governance in the US 
In the US, the development of a corporate governance system has included reforms that are 
different from those pursued by other countries. As per Mallin (2016), in contrast to the national 
codes of many other countries, the US lacks a definitive set of corporate governance codes, as 
each state has the authority to establish its own laws and regulations. Additionally, the 
corporate governance regime is oriented towards a hard law system that is regulated by 
inflexible legal statutes and mandatory regulations; this system stands in contrast to the 
voluntary British approach (Tricker, 2015). As a common law country, the US federal 
government10 is responsible for issuing corporate laws regarding auditing and disclosure 
requirements as they apply to public firms (Fleckner and Hopt 2013; Tricker, 2015). The US 
corporate governance system subscribes to a unitary board structure that is subject to the 
dominance of independent outside directors. Furthermore, the listing requirements of the US 
Stock Exchange also mandate the establishment of audit, remuneration and nomination 
subcommittees of a corporate board (Tricker, 2015).  
The US has a well-developed market with a diversified shareholder base that includes 
institutional investors, financial institutions and individuals (Mallin, 2016). Due to the large 
number of publicly traded firms and the widely-held ownership structures of many US 
companies, the American financing system has been described as outside- or market-based 
(Fleckner and Hopt, 2013). Furthermore, many sources of private and public financing are 
available in the US for both debt and equity purposes, and public markets drive many of the 
regulations concerning corporate governance issues. According to Fleckner and Hopt (2013), 
US firms have significant influence over the corporate governance system of the country, 
which can be summarised as encompassing the following three features: the separation of 
                                                          
10 In the US, such matters are predominantly the responsibility of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
(see Tricker, 2015). 
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ownership and control, the heightened role of institutional investors and the political 
significance of ownership structures (Fleckner and Hopt, 2013). First, in firms wherein the 
ownership structure is dispersed, there is no large shareholder population to monitor the actions 
of management. In these cases, if managers misuse a firm’s resources, shareholders may suffer 
losses and receive insufficient gains. Therefore, many of the US’s corporate governance 
regulations are formatted in such a way that balances the costs and benefits of such a system, 
and monitoring techniques are developed to protect shareholders from this separation (Fleckner 
and Hopt, 2013). The second aspect of the US corporate governance system involves the 
ownership structures of US-based public firms. As per Fleckner and Hopt (2013), for most of 
the twentieth century, the ownership of listed firms was dominated by individuals. However, 
in the last few decades, such ownership has shifted, with more firms being controlled by 
institutional investors such as pension funds, insurance companies, private equity firms and 
hedge funds (Fleckner and Hopt, 2013). In the past, shareholders preferred to sell their shares 
rather than attempt to influence their investee firms, thus exercising the exit option rather than 
the voice option. However, due to the advent of larger institutional investors (especially 
pension and hedge funds), the voice option has become preferred and is more often exercised 
by modern shareholders (Fleckner and Hopt, 2013). The third facet of the US system concerns 
the political voice of shareholders, in particular following the corporate scandals of 2001. In 
response to these scandals, a quick federal response was issued in the form of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002. This swift response also highlighted the importance of shareholder 
protections. 
As mentioned above, the US has no definitive corporate governance code like those issued by 
various other countries. However, prior to the issuance of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the 
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Business Round Table11 introduced several corporate governance codes beginning in the 
1970s. According to Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004), the US’s first corporate governance 
code was published in 1978 by this organisation. This code was named The Role and 
Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation and was 
based on the voluntary approach (The Business Round Table, 1997). Following the publication 
of this code, the Business Round Table published several other protocols, including the 
‘Statement on Corporate Responsibility’ in 1981, the ‘Statement on Corporate Governance 
and American Competitiveness’ in 1990, and the ‘Statement on Corporate Governance’ in 
1997 (The Business Round Table, 1997). The latter statement highlighted three main topics: 
the function of a board, the structure and operation of a board and stockholder meetings (The 
Business Round Table, 1997). 
The passage of both the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) and the New York Stock Exchange’s 
(NYSE) Corporate Governance Rules (2003) served to improve the structure of national 
corporate governance in the US (Mallin, 2016). In response to the financial scandals of Enron, 
Worldcom and Global Crossing—which occurred due to the existence of close relationships 
between companies and their external auditors (Mallin, 2016)—the US Congress agreed to 
amend some of the NYSE Listing Rules in what became known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
This act described many practices that US-listed companies should be compelled to implement. 
Importantly, the act required that chief executive officers and chief financial officers certify 
that quarterly and annual reports, which are filed using the 10-Q, 10-K and 20-F forms, are (i) 
in compliance with securities law and (ii) present a clear picture of a firm’s financial position. 
Furthermore, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act aimed to strengthen the independence of auditors and of 
a corporate board’s audit subcommittee. To this end, the act stated that listed companies must 
                                                          
11 The Business Round Table is a national organisation that expresses its authoritative voice on matters related to 
large corporations in the US; this group is keenly interested in increasing awareness of corporate governance 
practices (The Business Round Table, 1997). 
74 
 
establish audit committees comprised solely of independent directors; additionally, the act 
required that at least one member be a financial expert. The act also decreed that all relevant 
information must be disclosed. Additionally, the act requested that all auditors of both US-
based and overseas firms register with the appropriate regulatory body, the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) (Mallin, 2016). 
In November of 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) agreed to approve new 
rules on corporate governance. These new rules aimed to strengthen corporate governance 
standards for listed firms and were intended to enable directors, officers and employees to 
operate more effectively (Mallin, 2016). Moreover, the new rules enabled shareholders to 
monitor their companies’ performance and alleviate any incidences of corporate collapse. The 
NYSE rules further required that a majority of directors be independent and provided details 
regarding the type of figure that could be considered as such. Non-management directors were 
required to meet regularly and without the executive directors being present. Furthermore, the 
rules mandated the formation of the three key subcommittees and stated that each should be 
comprised only of independent directors. Additionally, the SEC recommended that the purpose 
and annual evaluations of each committee be disclosed. According to these new rules, 
companies should implement these corporate governance guidelines and disclose their 
practices on the company website, along with the makeup of each committee (Mallin, 2016). 
Furthermore, the US system boasts various distinctive features, including the Delaware 
General Corporation Law, which provides companies incorporated in Delaware with various 
benefits, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which mandates 
the activism of pension funds to vote their shares (see Mallin, 2016; Solomon, 2013). Over the 
years, the Delaware Law has become the most predominant system in the US. Mallin (2016) 
stated that the Delaware approach is considered to be ‘company friendly’; thus, the majority of 
companies listed in the NYSE are enticed to register in Delaware in order to take advantage of 
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the state’s flexible approach. The main goal of the Delaware Law was to provide boards of 
directors with the authority to establish corporate policies and objectives whilst operating 
within the context of fiduciary duty (Mallin, 2016). Furthermore, this law demanded that 
various requirements be abided, to include the protection of minority interests. Because the 
Delaware Law has fewer procedural requirements as compared to other state laws on the books 
in the US, the state attracts many US-listed companies (Mallin, 2016). Another notable facet 
of the US corporate governance system involves the ERISA. According to this act, private 
pension funds are compelled to vote the shares that they hold domestically as well as those that 
they hold internationally. Furthermore, this act decreed that if a pension fund intends to 
purchase overseas shares, a cost-benefit analysis must be conducted in order to assess the 
viability of voting those shares (see Mallin, 2016). Figure 3.8 demonstrates the development 
of US’s major corporate governance codes and acts guidelines. 
Regarding the gender diversity of corporate boards, the US—like the UK—has no mandatory 
quota system. However, several organisations across the country have established various 
targets regarding the representation of females on corporate boards. For example, the Thirty 
Percent Coalition recommended that by 2015, 30% of corporate board directors should be 
female. Furthermore, The 30% Club has advocated that 30% of corporate board seats should 
be held by female directors (Deloitte, 2015). Additionally, the Organisation of 2020 Women 
has focused on achieving a target of 20% female representation on the boards of US-listed 
firms (see Deloitte, 2015). 
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3.9. The Germanic Corporate Governance System 
The German model is characterised by the involvement of numerous participants, including 
shareholders, management teams, banks, employees, suppliers of goods and customers 
(Moerland, 1995). Most of the countries that employ this model—including Germany, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland and Austria—have adopted a two-tiered system compromised of a 
supervisory and a management board (Weimer and Pape, 1999). The role of the supervisory 
board is to advise and direct the management board, though it also has the authority to appoint 
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and dismiss members of that board. According to the German model, employees are allocated 
seats on the supervisory board; companies with more than a certain number of employees 
(typically 500 or 2000) are recommended to allocate one-third or one-half of the supervisory 
board seats to representatives of the employees. 
3.9.1. Corporate Governance in Switzerland 
Swiss firms generally follow a unitary board model. However, due to the flexibility of Swiss 
corporate law, companies also have the right to adopt a two-tiered board structure (Fleckner 
and Hopt, 2013). According to Ruigrok et al. (2007), a large number of Swiss-listed firms are 
owned and controlled by their founders or their founders’ family members. Similar to the 
models adopted by other European countries, the transparency level of Switzerland’s corporate 
governance system is relatively low. Prior to 2003, Swiss-listed firms were not required to 
publicly disclose their corporate governance practices, with the exception of those companies 
owned by parties whose ownership levels exceeded 5%; in such instances, the names and 
details of the company’s officers had to be released (Ruigrok et al., 2006). Ruigrok et al. (2006) 
also argued that despite Switzerland’s higher market capitalisation, the market has little 
influence over firms’ management systems, which could be justified as follows. First, most 
Swiss-listed firms are, on average, under the control of family owners (Ruigrok et al., 2006). 
Second, Swiss firms have the flexibility to pursue one of several means of achieving anti-
takeover objectives, such as the issuance of different types of shares (Ruigrok et al., 2006). 
Third, as large creditors, Swiss banks can influence firms in various ways; for example, they 
can promote their own representation on corporate boards or utilise the voting rights associated 
with depositary shares (Ruigrok et al., 2006). Fourth, the passivity of Swiss pension funds 
allows them to own small amounts of shares; this is due to their minor levels of ownership 
within individual firms (Ruigrok et al., 2006). 
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Switzerland’s first corporate governance code, the Swiss Code of Best Practice for Corporate 
Governance, was initiated by economiesuisse12 in 2002 in collaboration with the Swiss Stock 
Exchange (Economiesuisse, 2002). The code was based on a system of voluntary compliance 
and was designed specifically for Swiss-listed firms. This Swiss code provided several 
recommendations with regard to shareholders, boards of directors, executive management 
teams, auditing practices and disclosure requirements (Economiesuisse, 2002). Five years later, 
in response to further discussion about the remuneration of directors and executive team 
members, economiesuisse decided to revise the previous code and publish ten 
recommendations related to the remuneration of directors and senior managers 
(Economiesuisse, 2008). The most recent version of this code was published in 2014 and 
incorporated changes to the guidelines with regard to risk management and the social 
responsibility of firms. This revised code also recommended various changes to the 
composition of corporate boards, suggesting, for example, that both genders be represented on 
such boards (Economiesuisse, 2014). It is worth noting that the corporate governance code of 
Switzerland has retained the same name since its 2004 initiation. Figure 3.9 demonstrates the 
development of Switzerland’s major corporate governance codes guidelines. 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 The Swiss Business Federation. 
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3.10. The Latin Countries Model 
Predominantly practiced in France and Italy, the Latin governance model lies somewhere 
between the Anglo-Saxon and Germanic systems (Weimer and Pape, 1999). Shareholders in 
Latin systems are much more influential than are those in German systems, but not as powerful 
as those operating in Anglo-Saxon countries. With regard to ownership structure, Latin 
countries typically embrace financial holding, cross shareholding, and governmental and 
family control (Moerland, 1995). As compared to Italy, France enjoys somewhat diverse 
schemes in terms of ownership; for instance, Italian banks are not allowed to hold securities on 
behalf of a business, while in France, corporations and their subsidiaries may hold one 
another’s voting rights (De Jong, 1989). France’s banking system was initialised in 1981, 
which resulted in the government taking ownership of a majority of shares in a variety of 
corporations; however, the privatisation measures implemented in France since that time have 
served to reduce government ownership in many companies (Weimer and Pape, 1999). 
3.10.1. Corporate Governance in Belgium 
Belgian firms traditionally adopt a unitary board structure, though a two-tiered system is also 
allowed (Fleckner and Hopt, 2013; Mallin, 2016). According to Fleckner and Hopt (2013), the 
ownership structures of Belgian-listed firms are characterised as concentrated in comparison 
to those of US firms. Belgium’s ownership concentration is a result of the presence of 
individual shareholders and holding companies who hold a large number of shares in various 
companies; this enables these players to influence management’s strategic decisions in the 
firms that they own. Moreover, family ownership is also present and is often exercised via 
holding companies. Furthermore, institutional investors have recently cut their investments in 
Belgian firms; thus, the state exercises ownership only in the short-term and rarely holds equity 
for long periods (Fleckner and Hopt, 2013). 
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Belgium’s first corporate governance code was issued in 1998; this code, entitled Corporate 
Governance for Belgian-Listed Companies (Solomon, 2013), was established by the Belgian 
Commission on Corporate Governance under the chairmanship of Daniel Cordon13. The code 
contained two sets of recommendations for Belgian-listed firms, though it did not discuss the 
enforcement of these rules. These recommendations highlighted the role of the corporate board 
and its key subcommittees and discussed their responsibilities and desired composition. This 
code further recommended that companies provide information about their members, activities 
and relationships with dominant shareholders. Moreover, this code suggested that companies 
should disclose information regarding the subcommittees that were formed to assist the board 
in fulfilling its duties; additionally, companies should release materials concerning the duties 
and composition of these committees (Commission on Corporate Governance, 1998). Due to 
demand for the development of governance guidelines that aligned with European and 
international recommendations, the Banking, Finance and Insurance Commission, Euronext 
Brussels and the Federation of Belgian Enterprises formed a committee—the ‘Belgian 
Corporate Governance Committee’—to accomplish this task. The committee developed a new 
version of the code, titled the Belgian Corporate Governance Code, which was published in 
2004. As with other issued codes, these guidelines were flexible and applied a voluntary 
compliance approach. This updated code outlined nine main principles and included 
recommendations on the adoption of clear governance structures, the function and 
responsibility of the corporate board, the formation of specialised committees and the 
disclosure of corporate governance practices (Belgian Corporate Governance Committee, 
2004). Following the publication of this update, the Corporate Governance Committee received 
suggestions and comments from several individuals and institutions in light of the recent 
financial crisis; therefore, in 2009, the Committee published a new version of the code, entitled 
                                                          
13 This code is well known as the Cardon Report (Solomon, 2013). 
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The 2009 Belgian Code on Corporate Governance. This revision retained the same nine 
principles, though it included various changes pertaining to the separation of the roles of the 
CEO, the board chairperson and the corporate board; furthermore, this revision emphasised 
executive remuneration. It is also important to note that this code provided recommendations 
regarding female representation on Belgium’s corporate boards; while it was recommended 
that companies consider women when nominating members to their corporate boards, specific 
targets were not established (Belgian Corporate Governance Committee, 2009). Notably, the 
chairman of the Belgian Corporate Governance Committee recently announced that another 
revision of the code will be published in 2017 in order to accommodate new regulations that 
have been issued since 2009 at the national and European levels (Belgian Corporate 
Governance Committee, 2017). Figure 3.10 demonstrates the development of Belgium’s major 
corporate governance codes and guidelines. 
With regard to gender quota recommendations, Belgium passed legislation in 2011 that was 
aimed at promoting the increased representation of women on the corporate boards of firms 
regulated by the capital market. According to this quota legislation, one-third of a firm’s board 
members must be of a gender that is different from that of the other two-thirds; large firms 
must reach this quota by 2017, while medium and small firms have until 2019 to accomplish 
this goal (Deloitte, 2015). 
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3.10.2. Corporate Governance in France 
The French legal system is based on a model of civil law and provides relatively low levels of 
protection to minority shareholders (Mallin, 2016). France’s corporate governance system 
adopts an approach that may be best characterised as being closer to the insider than the 
outsider, as the ownership structures of French firms are controlled by the state, institutional 
investors and individuals (Mallin, 2016; Solomon, 2013). As far as board structure is 
concerned, French companies typically utilise a unitary board system, although some may 
choose to adopt a two-tiered system (Mallin, 2016). 
The most important corporate governance codes in France were issued by two French business 
organisations, the Association Française des Entreprises Privées (AFEP) and the Mouvement 
des Entreprises de France (MEDEF). France initially issued two corporate codes of best 
practice in order to promote the country’s corporate governance system: the Vienot Report I, 
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issued in 1995, and the Vienot Report II, published in 1999 (see Mallin, 2016; Fleckner and 
Hopt, 2013). 
Following the Enron collapse, another corporate governance code was issued: the Bouton 
Report, named after the chair of the working group, Daniel Bouton, president of the Société 
Genéralé. The report was published in October of 2002 and consisted of three parts (Mallin, 
2016). The first part outlined further improvements to corporate governance practices and 
highlighted the desired role and characteristics of a corporate board; the second part presented 
various recommendations aimed at strengthening the independence of statutory auditors; and 
the third part was allocated to a discussion of financial standards, accounting standards, 
practices and the means of achieving these benchmarks (Mallin, 2016). 
The first segment of the Bouton Report advocated that in widely-held companies with no 
controlling shareholders, half of all corporate board seats should be held by independent 
directors. The report also recommended that companies establish three key subcommittees: 
audit, compensation and nomination. The report also maintained that two-thirds of an audit 
committee’s members ought to be independent directors, while the majority of a compensation 
committee’s members should be independent directors; furthermore, the nomination committee 
should include the chair of the board as a member. The report also highlighted the importance 
of board evaluation and recommended that a board’s independent directors undertake an 
assessment of its operations, with the assistance of experienced consultants (Bouton, 2002). 
The report also suggested that such evaluation be performed at least once every three years; 
additionally, shareholders should be notified of the evaluation outcomes via the company’s 
annual report (Bouton, 2002).  
In October of 2003, all three previous reports (Vienot I, Vienot II and Bouton) were 
consolidated by the AFEP and the MEDEF into a single report, The Corporate Governance 
Code of Listed Corporations. Providing a set of principles of corporate governance based on 
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the three previous reports, this combined report came to be deemed the most significant set of 
recommendations concerning corporate governance in France (Fleckner and Hopt, 2013). This 
code covered many features related to boards of directors, independent directors, board 
evaluation, meetings of the board and of key subcommittees, director compensation and the 
formation and actions of key board subcommittees (audit, compensation and nomination) 
(Fleckner and Hopt, 2013). This code was formulated according to a ‘comply or explain’ 
approach and thus recommended that companies clarify which recommendations have been 
adopted. Following the publication of this combined report, the AFEP and the MEDEF issued 
two reports in 2007 and 2008 concerning the compensation of the executive directors of listed 
companies. 
In December of 2010, the AFEP and the MEDEF published another joint recommendation, The 
Corporate Governance Code of Listed Corporations, concerning women’s representation on 
corporate boards. This recommendation suggested that French-listed companies attain a 
specified quota in the subsequent years; for instance, companies were required to achieve a 
20% female presence on their boards within three years, with a target of at least 40% female 
representation within a period of six years either from the date of the recommendation’s 
issuance or from the first trading date on the regulated market, whichever was later (AFEP and 
MEDEF, 2010).  
The final amendment of The Corporate Governance Code of Listed Corporation was issued in 
June of 2013. This revised code recommended that companies establish a ‘high committee’ of 
up to seven members. The main responsibility of this committee would be to coordinate with 
a board in order to monitor and assess its compliance with the principles put forth in the code. 
If a company were to fail to adhere to any specific recommendation of the code without 
providing adequate justification, such action—and an explanation—should be disclosed in the 
annual report. The amendment also included a strict recommendation regarding the 
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remuneration of executive directors; the remuneration packages of executive directors were to 
be presented at the shareholders’ annual general meeting (AGM) (AFEP and MEDEF, 2013). 
Furthermore, the code embraced a reinforced ‘comply and explain’ approach, thus requesting 
that companies provide a detailed explanation in the case of noncompliance with the code’s 
recommendations (AFEP and MEDEF, 2013). Figure 3.11 illustrates the development of 
France’s major corporate governance codes and guidelines. 
It is also worth noting that France has issued quota legislation regarding gender diversity in an 
effort to enhance women’s representation on French corporate boards. Issued in 2011 and 
reinforced in 2014, this law stated that both genders must have 40% representation by the 
beginning of 2017. This quota legislation was applicable to (i) listed firms whose shares are 
traded in regulated markets and (ii) listed and unlisted companies whose revenues or total assets 
exceed €50 million and who have retained at least 500 employees for three consecutive years 
(Deloitte, 2015)14.  
                                                          
14 Starting in 2020, this legislation will also apply to firms whose total number of employees exceeds 250 (Deloitte, 
2015). 
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3.10.3. Corporate Governance in Italy 
Italian firms traditionally adopt a one-tier board structure, although a two-tiered arrangement 
is also possible. The Italian governance system is distinctive, insofar as it requires the formation 
of a board of auditors (Mallin, 2016). Italy’s corporate governance system falls into the insider 
system category, as widespread family or cross-company ownership is prevalent (Solomon, 
2013)15. In contrast to other insider corporate governance models—such as that of Germany, 
for example—banks have no major influence over Italy’s non-financial listed firms (Melis and 
Gaia, 2011). In fact, one of the main concerns in Italy involves the power of blockholders. 
These blockholders are able to extract the benefits of their control at the expense of small 
                                                          
15 Roughly two-thirds of Italian-listed firms are family-owned (Bianco et al., 2015). 
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investors, who in Italy enjoy relatively poor protections as compared to those afforded by other 
Anglo-Saxon governance systems (Mengoli et al., 2009). 
Italy’s first corporate governance code was initiated by Borsa Italia and published in 1999 as 
the Preda Code of Conduct. This code provided recommendations concerning several aspects 
of governance, including the composition of corporate boards, the establishment of key 
subcommittees, the independence of board members and the role of the CEO and board chair 
(Mallin, 2016). This report presented a voluntary approach and required listed firms to disclose 
their degree of compliance. In 2002, a second edition of the code was issued. Preda 2 covered 
a wide range of corporate governance issues, including the role and composition of corporate 
boards, the independence of directors and the chairman of the board, the information to be 
provided to the corporate board, the release of confidential information, the remuneration of 
directors, internal controls, transactions with other parties, relations between institutional 
investors and other shareholders, shareholder meetings and the membership of boards of 
auditors (Mallin, 2016).  
In 2006, aiming to take into account changes to international corporate governance practices, 
Borsa Italiana published a new corporate governance code to replace those that were issued in 
1999 and 2002 (Borsa Italia, 2006). According to Mallin (2016), this version contained content 
that was similar to that of the previous codes, though it highlighted new recommendations 
related to external directorship limits, a board’s annual evaluation practices, the introduction 
of a lead independent director, internal control of the firm and the promotion of shareholder 
activism via the exercise of shareholder rights. Various revisions to this code were made in 
2011, 2014 and 2015, with a particular emphasis placed on remuneration policies (Mallin, 
2016). Figure 3.12 demonstrates the development of Italy’s major corporate governance codes 
and guidelines. 
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As far as gender diversity is concerned, Italy mandated a gender quota for listed firms in 2011. 
The regulation, which came into effect in 2012, required that one-third (or one-fifth during the 
first term) of board seats be held by the less represented gender (Bianco et al., 2015). 
 
 
 
3.10.4. Corporate Governance in the Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, the corporate governance system adopts a two-tiered board system (Mallin, 
2016). The corporate governance system of this country allows employees, through the works 
of a council, to be involved in the appointment processes of the supervisory board (Fleckner 
and Hopt, 2013). As compared to that of other European countries, ownership concentration is 
considered to be the lowest, as more than 70% of the country’s total market capital was owned 
by overseas investors in 2007 (Fleckner and Hopt 2013). 
The first report on corporate governance in the Netherlands was published in 1997 by the 
Committee on Corporate Governance. This report, the Recommendations on Corporate 
Governance in the Netherlands, was also known as the Peters Report (Solomon, 2013). The 
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Peters Report included some 40 recommendations that highlighted several main areas of Dutch 
corporate governance, including the composition, duties and remuneration of both the 
supervisory and management boards (Corporate Governance Committee, 1997). Following this 
code, and in an attempt to enhance and inspire transparency and to increase the accountability 
of listed firms in the Netherlands (Akkermans et al., 2007), the Corporate Governance 
Committee, which was drawn from several organisations in the Netherlands,16 developed 
another code in 2003 entitled the Dutch Corporate Governance Code, commonly referred to 
as the Tabaksblat Code. This code was divided into five sections, which concerned (i) 
compliance with and enforcement of the code, (ii) management boards, (iii) supervisory boards, 
(iv) shareholders and the general meeting of shareholders and (v) the auditing of financial 
reporting (Corporate Governance Committee, 2003). In 2008, the code was revised by the 
Corporate Governance Committee based on numerous recommendations (this revision utilised 
the same name, The Dutch Corporate Governance Code). It is important to note that this 
revision called on companies to consider board members with respect to age and gender 
diversity when making new appointments to supervisory boards (Corporate Governance 
Committee, 2008). Another revision to this code was conducted in 2016 in an effort to reflect 
legislative changes made since 2008. Figure 3.13 demonstrates the development of the major 
corporate governance codes and guidelines of the Netherlands. 
With regard to quotas for female representation, the Dutch Management and Supervision Act 
provided a non-mandatory gender diversity quota in 2013, which applied to both listed and 
non-listed firms. According to this act, supervisory and management boards were expected to 
be comprised of a minimum of 30% of each gender by 2016, with the outstanding 40% to be 
determined by the company (Deloitte, 2015).  
                                                          
16 Including Euronext Amsterdam, the Netherlands Centre of Executive and Supervisory Directors, the Foundation 
for Corporate Governance Research for Pension Funds, the Association of Stockholders, the Association of 
Securities-Issuing Companies and the Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers. 
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3.10.5. Corporate Governance in Spain  
The legal system of Spain is based on civil law, and the country has a relatively small number 
of firms as compared to the US and the UK (Fleckner and Hopt 2013). Additionally, the 
Spanish governance system adopts a unitary board structure (Mallin, 2016). According to 
Fleckner and Hopt (2013), the ownership structure of Spanish-listed firms is highly 
concentrated and controlled by non-financial companies, financial institutions and family 
owners.  
The first self-regulation recommendation on corporate governance in Spain was published in 
1996 by the Managers’ Circle of Madrid and the Association of Spanish Businessmen. This 
report, The Report of the Managers’ Circle of Madrid, recommended that several ideas and 
proposals be adopted in order to allow corporate boards to function more effectively (Lopez-
Iturriaga and Tejerina-Gaite 2014). In 1997, the Ministers Council of the Spanish government 
established another commission in order to develop an ethical code that the corporate boards 
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of listed firms were to voluntarily follow (Lopez-Iturriaga and Tejerina-Gaite 2014). In 1998, 
the commission issued its report, known as the Olivencia Report; this report considered the 
ownership structure of Spanish firms and presented various recommendations concerning the 
protection of minority shareholders. Overall, the recommendations of the Olivencia Report 
appeared similar to those of the Cadbury Report published in the UK (Lopez-Iturriaga and 
Tejerina-Gaite 2014).  
With 23 recommendations in total, the Olivencia Report highlighted the importance of 
corporate board composition (arguing that non-executive directors should be in the majority) 
and the establishment of key subcommittees (such as audit, compensation and nomination 
committees) to assist the board in fulfilling its duties. The report also stated that a board should 
include between five and fifteen directors; it further suggested an age limit with regard to 
corporate board directors(Lopez-Iturriaga and Tejerina-Gaite 2014). Roughly two years after 
the publication of the Olivencia Report, the Council of Minsters approved the establishment of 
another commission, formed to focus specifically on the enhancement of transparency and 
security in Spanish capital markets (Lopez-Iturriaga and Tejerina-Gaite 2014). Issued in 2003, 
the resulting Aldama Report was largely in line with its predecessor, though it placed a 
particular emphasis on the obligation of companies to provide full records of their corporate 
governance systems, which were to be disclosed annually. Furthermore, as indicated by Lopez-
Iturriaga and Tejerina-Gaite (2014), both reports reflected certain issues that were of concern 
to the Spanish legislature at the time of their issuance. Following the publication of the Aldama 
Report, the Ministry of Economics called on the National Securities Market Commission 
(CNMV) to form a template that listed firms could use as a benchmark when reporting 
compliance with corporate governance recommendations (up to 2003). To this end, the 
government established another group to assist the CNMV and also to consider the principles 
issued by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the 
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recommendations of the European Commission and the Recommendations on Corporate 
Governance for Banking Organisations, which were approved by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision.  
The group completed its work in May of 2006 and published a report entitled The Unified Code 
on Good Corporate Governance, which consisted of 58 voluntary recommendations for 
Spanish-listed firms. This code primarily focused on the composition of corporate boards (size 
and directors’ independence), annual disclosures of board remuneration policies and the 
auditing of financial statements. The code also considered various new topics, such as the 
promotion of gender diversity on corporate boards and their key subcommittees and the 
promotion of transparency with respect to board compensation. Furthermore, the code 
recommended that firms justify their level of compliance within their annual reports (Lopez-
Iturriaga and Tejerina-Gaite 2014). The code was later amended in 2013, though Spain’s most 
recent corporate governance code, issued in 2015, contained several changes to the updated 
(2013) Unified Code, including recommendations concerning corporate social responsibility 
(CNMV, 2015). Figure 3.14 illustrates the development of Spain’s major corporate governance 
codes and guidelines. 
Moreover, in 2007, Spain passed a voluntary law related to the representation of women on the 
corporate boards of its listed firms. This regulation required that each gender enjoy at least 40% 
representation by 2015 (Deloitte, 2015). 
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3.11. The Nordic Governance Model  
Distinct from the Anglo-Saxon and continental (German and Latin) models in various ways, 
the Nordic corporate governance system is essentially regarded as a modified version of the 
German model, with a strong emphasis placed on aligning the interests of the management 
team and the owners of a firm (Piekkari et al., 2015). Fleckner and Hopt (2013) argued that 
Nordic (Scandinavian) countries have two special aspects that should be highlighted. First, 
Nordic firms all regularly update company statutes to include modern corporate governance 
practices, which are regulated via ‘comply or explain’ codes in other countries. Second, Nordic 
capital markets have become increasingly integrated. A high number of cross-border mergers 
in Nordic countries have led several companies to be listed in multiple stock exchanges. This 
also leads to a kind of harmonisation with the various rules and requirements of stock exchange 
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listing practices in these countries. Additionally, as in the German model, the corporate 
governance systems of Nordic countries (excluding Finland) allow employees to be represented 
on corporate boards. This implies that these countries also consider it important to protect the 
rights of other stakeholders of a company. 
3.11.1. Corporate Governance in Denmark  
The corporate governance system in Denmark falls somewhere between an insider and an 
outsider system; controlling shareholders exist to some extent, and shareholder protections are 
enshrined in law via the presence of varying degrees of voting rights for different classes of 
shares (Solomon, 2013). Denmark’s ownership structure is quite different from that of the US 
and the UK, as foundation ownership structures are common17 (Mallin, 2016). In fact, roughly 
19 of the largest 100 firms in Denmark enjoy foundation ownership and control (Solomon, 
2013). Additionally, there is a substantial amount of ownership by institutional investors in 
Denmark; such systems represent approximately 35% of the Danish market capitalisation, thus 
indicating a significant level of corporate governance for institutional investors (Mallin, 2016).  
Moreover, the dual board structure is dominant and, as provided for in the Danish Companies 
Act, the majority of supervisory board members are elected by company shareholders during 
the AGM (Fleckner and Hopt, 2013). Furthermore, the employees of a company also have the 
opportunity to elect supervisory board members; this practice applies to all companies whose 
number of employees exceeds 35. This implies that Denmark’s corporate governance system 
was originally created to protect a wide base of stakeholders, to include employees, society, 
and creditors who are not shareholders (Rose and Mejer, 2003). Moreover, due to the 
predominance of foundation ownership, companies in the Danish system are not subject to 
hostile takeover activities, as are firms located in countries that employ the Anglo-Saxon model 
                                                          
17 A foundation is a legal entity wherein no owners have been established to control a large number of shares in a 
particular company; shares are often donated by the company or family founder (Mallin, 2016; Solomon, 2013). 
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(Solomon, 2013). However, the combination of recent attempts to improve corporate 
governance practices in Denmark and the integration of global capital markets has pushed the 
country’s corporate governance system towards a more outside-oriented model (Solomon, 
2013). 
Turning to an examination of the evolution of corporate governance in Denmark, the Nørby 
Committee (established by the Copenhagen Stock Exchange) published its first guidelines on 
corporate governance, The Nørby Committee’s Report on Corporate Governance in Denmark, 
in 2001 (Mallin, 2016). These voluntary recommendations were divided into seven main 
sections, which concerned: the role of shareholders and the importance of their engagement 
with the managers of a firm, the importance and role of stakeholders within a company, 
openness and transparency, the responsibilities and tasks of a corporate board, the composition 
of a corporate board, the compensation of directors and managers of a company and risk 
management procedures (Mallin, 2016). The publication of these guidelines in 2001 created 
the basis for further development in Danish corporate governance. In 2002, an independent 
corporate governance committee18 was created by the Copenhagen Stock Exchange to further 
develop corporate governance guidelines for Danish-listed firms and to consider any needed 
revisions. According to Mallin (2016), this committee was formed because of the influence of 
international initiatives such as the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), the UK Combined Code 
(2003) and the EU Action Plan (2003), which called for the development of company laws and 
corporate governance in EU countries. In December of 2003, the committee issued its report, 
known as the Nørby Report (Mallin, 2016). A subsequent review of the code was conducted 
by the Copenhagen Stock Exchange Committee on Corporate Governance, which resulted in 
the issuance of the Revised Recommendations for Corporate Governance in Denmark. This 
revision primarily focused on recommendations related to disclosure requirements and 
                                                          
18 Known as the Copenhagen Stock Exchange Committee on Corporate Governance. 
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compelled listed firms in Denmark to voluntarily disclose in their annual reports how they had 
addressed these recommendations (Mallin, 2016). Following this update, two revisions were 
published in 2008. The first revision was issued in February and concerned the remuneration 
of supervisory and executive directors, requiring that the remuneration policy of a firm be 
disclosed on the company website and in its annual report. The second revision was released 
in December and amended two aspects of its predecessor. First, attempting to address issues of 
transparency, the revision called on firms to disclose the details of their non-financial 
information, including the gender and age of members who held positions on a company’s 
supervisory and management boards (Mallin, 2016). Second, in an effort to tackle the 
composition of supervisory boards, the revision recommended that the diversity (in terms of 
gender and age) of a board should be reviewed regularly (Mallin, 2016). 
According to Mallin (2016), the Committee on Corporate Governance revised its 
recommendations on corporate governance in 2010; these revisions were made in light of the 
Companies Act of 2009, new rules established by the Financial Statements Act and the Act on 
Approved Auditors and Audit Firms and because of various EU Commission 
recommendations. The Code was titled the Recommendations on Corporate Governance, and 
included amendments related to the remuneration of directors sitting on supervisory and 
management boards; it also included recommendations aimed at motivating firms to become 
more engaged with their social responsibilities. This same code was revised in 2011, 2013, and 
2014, with the last revision including 47 recommendations that highlighted five main 
governance topics, which were: a company’s communication and interaction with its investors 
and other stakeholders, the tasks and responsibilities of a board of directors, the composition 
and organisation of a board of directors, the remuneration of management, and financial 
reporting, risk management and auditing (see Mallin, 2016). Figure 3.15 demonstrates the 
development of Denmark’s major corporate governance codes and guidelines. 
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In 2013, Denmark issued legislation requiring firms to promote gender equality within their 
corporate boards (Deloitte, 2015). According to this legislation, equality goals can be achieved 
if every company sets its own target and works to ensure that gender equality is taken into 
consideration. This legislation was applicable to all listed companies, large non-listed 
companies and state-owned companies (Deloitte, 2015). 
 
3.11.2. Corporate Governance in Finland 
Finish-listed firms mainly adopt a one-tier board system, as per Finish governance 
recommendations; however, two-tiered boards also exist and accounted for roughly 22.5% of 
all listed firms in Finland in 2000 (see Liljeblom and Löflund, 2006). The ownership structure 
of Finish firms is concentrated, with state ownership being a significant factor (Liljeblom and 
Löflund, 2006).  
With regard to the corporate governance history of Finland, the first corporate governance code 
was issued in 2003 as a collaboration between the Central Chamber of Commerce, Hex Plc 
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(currently NASDAQ OMX Helsinki Ltd) and the Confederation of Finnish Industry and 
Employers (currently the Confederation of Finnish Industries) (see Solomon, 2013). This code, 
titled the Corporate Governance Recommendations for Listed Companies, consisted of 57 
voluntary recommendations that covered 12 aspects of governance, including the role and 
composition of corporate boards, communication and disclosure practices, the compensation 
of directors and external auditing systems. Five years later19, the Securities Market 
Association20 was formed in an effort to update the existing code; the resulting Finnish 
Corporate Governance Code was published in 2008 and consisted of 52 voluntary 
recommendations that were largely similar to those published in 2003 (The Securities Market 
Association, 2008). Furthermore, it is worth noting that this version of the code called for board 
diversity in terms of gender, arguing that in listed firms, both genders should be represented on 
corporate boards. 
In 2009, due to the freshness of the recent financial crisis as well as a need to develop 
regulations related to the compensation of corporate board members, the Securities Market 
Association appointed a committee to revise Finish corporate governance recommendations 
(The Securities Market Association, 2010). The committee issued its revised code in 2010, 
which retained many of the same recommendations that were issued in 2008. The main aim of 
this code was to meet international governance recommendations in order to attract foreign 
investors to the Finish market (The Securities Market Association, 2010). Following this 
revision, the Finnish code was again revised in 2015 in order to accommodate national and 
international regulatory frameworks that had been developed over the previous five years. This 
code included 28 recommendations that covered several issues related to corporate governance 
                                                          
19 Another code was issued in 2006 for non-listed firms. That code was issued by a working group that was formed by 
the Central Chamber of Commerce of Finland (Finland Central Chamber of Commerce, 2006). 
20 Established by the Confederation of Finnish Industries EK, the Central Chamber of Commerce of Finland and 
NASDAQ OMX Helsinki Ltd. 
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(The Securities Market Association, 2015). Figure 3.16 demonstrates the development of the 
major corporate governance codes and guidelines of Finland. 
In Finland, state-owned firms are required by law to consider gender equality when comprising 
their corporate boards, unless there are adequate reasons for acting otherwise (Deloitte, 2015). 
 
3.11.3. Corporate Governance in Norway  
With regard to an examination of Norway’s corporate governance system, Rasmussen and 
Huse (2011) argued that several important aspects must be understood, such as the history of 
the country and its major players. This mainly refers to the fact that Norway has relatively few 
large companies that represent a large percentage of the country’s market capitalisation; 
similarly, Norway has relatively few very wealthy people. Furthermore, the government and 
public organisations are seen as important actors in the development of the country’s corporate 
governance system. The government of Norway is considered the largest single shareholder, 
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as it holds roughly 40% of the total number of shares that are traded in the country (Rasmussen 
and Huse, 2011). 
Norway also follows a codetermination tradition in corporate governance whereby employees 
are allowed to elect representatives to serve on corporate boards (Rasmussen and Huse, 2011). 
These employee-elected directors do not represent workers’ unions and are not elected by such 
unions. Thus, the Norwegian governance system differs from the Swedish model, wherein 
employee representative directors are elected by unions, and the German model, whereby 
unions can elect board members who are not employees (Rasmussen and Huse, 2011). 
Turning to the development of corporate governance in Norway, the first corporate governance 
code, the Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance, was published in 2004 by 
the Norwegian Corporate Governance Board (NCGB)21. This code was based on a provisional 
code that was published in 2003 and was issued following consultation and suggestions from 
various companies and interested parties in Norway (NCGB, 2004). Containing 14 voluntary 
recommendations regarding several aspects of governance, this code aimed to ensure that all 
listed firms in Norway implement healthy governance practices by outlining the potential roles 
of shareholders, corporate boards and executive teams (NCGB, 2004). Additionally, the code 
sought to guarantee that companies continue to create value for all stakeholders (NCGB, 2004). 
These recommendations were largely related to the implementation and reporting of 
governance practices, the role and composition of corporate boards, nomination processes, 
directors’ compensation packages and general meetings. Since the publication of the first 
Norwegian code in 2004, there have been eight additional publications concerning corporate 
governance best practices, the most recent of which was issued in 2014 (NCGB, 2014). 
                                                          
21 The Norwegian Corporate Governance Board consists of nine organisations: the Norwegian Shareholders 
Association, the Norwegian Institute of Public Accountants, the Institutional Investor Forum, the Norwegian 
Financial Services Association, the Norwegian Society of Financial Analysts, the Confederation of Norwegian 
Business and Industry, the Norwegian Association of Private Pension Funds, the Oslo Børs and the Norwegian 
Mutual Fund Association (Fleckner and Hopt, 2013). 
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Following the issuance of the first code, the NCGB published revisions in 2005 to 
accommodate recommendations made by the EU to enhance the quality of director 
remuneration schemes (NCGB, 2005). Further revision of the code took place in 2006 when 
the NCGB introduced a number of changes to various recommendations related to risk 
management and internal controls, take-over procedures, director nomination policies and 
external auditor selection practices (NCGB, 2006). In the following year, the NCGB again 
updated the code to bring it in line with recent legislation and regulations. These changes 
contained various clarifications related to specific recommendations and dealt with the 
implementation and reporting of governance practices, general meetings, the composition of a 
corporate board and its key subcommittees and shareholder communications (NCGB, 2007). 
The NCGB revised the code again in 2009 in light of consultations conducted in 2008 and 
changes to Norwegian legislation made earlier that year. The resulting code retained the same 
name and included various changes related to voting policies and the composition of audit 
committees (NCGB, 2009). The NCGB circulated another proposal in mid-2010 aimed at 
altering various aspects of the code. Subsequently, a new revision was published; this revision 
recommended that companies provide guidelines concerning the duties of a nomination 
committee and concerning a company’s corporate social responsibilities and also suggested 
that an absolute limit be identified with respect to the performance-related remuneration of 
corporate directors (NCGB, 2010). In 2011, the NCGB was compelled to make minor 
adjustments to the code, and thus another edition was issued in 2012. This version included 
various new rules regarding the independence of corporate boards and emphasised the creation 
of audit committees in firms that are not Norwegian-listed public companies; this revision also 
underscored the importance of reporting on governance practices in a company’s annual reports 
(NCGB, 2012). The most recent revision to this code was conducted in 2014; major changes 
included new procedures of dividend payment approval and calls for shareholder engagement 
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with the nomination committee in the selection of new candidates to a corporate board (NCGB, 
2014). It is worth noting that the name of Norway’s corporate governance code has remained 
the same since its first publication until its latest revision. Figure 3.17 demonstrates the 
development of Norway’s major corporate governance codes guidelines. 
Notably, in 2005, Norway became the first country to legally require the presence of female 
directors on corporate boards. The legislation mandating this action specified that 40% of a 
company’s board members should be female. Listed firms were given until the beginning of 
2008 to comply with this legislation; if a company did not comply, it would be subject to 
dissolution by court order (Deloitte, 2015). By the end of 2015, all Norwegian-listed firms were 
in compliance with this requirement (Deloitte, 2015). 
 
 
3.11.4. Corporate Governance in Sweden  
Sweden’s corporate governance system somewhat resembles the Anglo-Saxon model in terms 
of its transparency requirements (Poulsen et al., 2010); nevertheless, Solomon (2013) argued 
that Sweden has a corporate governance system that is best characterised as an insider-oriented 
model. In Sweden, corporations are traditionally under the control of a small group of 
shareholders; this is achieved via pyramidal ownership and dual-class ownership (in fact, 
family ownership is common). Furthermore, the Swedish system also employs a unitary system 
of board structuring and is considered to be stakeholder-oriented (Mallin, 2016; Solomon, 
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2013). Thus, employee representation at the board level is highly encouraged. As mentioned 
in the previous section, in Sweden—unlike in Norway—employee representatives are elected 
by unions (Rasmussen and Huse, 2011). 
Regarding the development of Sweden’s system of corporate governance, it was in 2001 that 
the Swedish Shareholders Association published its first set of corporate governance 
guidelines, titled the ‘Corporate Governance Policy’. This code featured eight guidelines that 
were related to various aspects of governance; the code aimed to enhance confidence among 
investors in the Swedish stock market, improve transparency and increase confidence in the 
corporate boards and management teams of nationally listed companies (The Swedish 
Shareholders Association, 2001). Three years later, the Swedish government established a 
committee called the Code Group22 that was tasked with proposing corporate governance codes 
to be circulated to Sweden’s various organisations for their feedback and suggestions. The 
proposed code was circulated in April 2004 after taking into consideration the opinions and 
comments of several concerned organisations; the final version of the code, the Swedish Code 
of Corporate Governance: A Proposal by the Code Group, was published in December of 
2004. This code was based on the ‘comply or explain’ approach and discussed several issues 
relating to corporate boards and the responsibilities of shareholders (The Swedish Code Group, 
2004). Following the issuance of this code in 2004, which was applicable to Sweden’s largest 
listed firms23, the code was revised so that it could be applied to all Swedish-listed firms. The 
new code was revised by the Swedish Corporate Governance Board24 and published in 2008 
(Swedish Corporate Governance Board, 2008). In 2010, the Swedish Corporate Governance 
                                                          
22 The Code Group is comprised of three members from the Commission on Business Confidence and six members 
from the corporate sector; it is currently chaired by Erik Åsbrink, a former Finance Minister and present chair of 
the Commission on Business Confidence. 
23 Whose capital exceeds 3 billion Sweden Krona. 
24 This board consists of a chair, a deputy chair and a maximum of 12 members who represent the following three 
categories: (i) institutional, private and state ownership, (ii) the Swedish and international capital markets and (iii) 
executive management and directorship (Swedish Corporate Governance Board, 2017). 
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Code was again modified to include new recommendations regarding management 
compensation (based on suggestions from the EU), board independence, audit committees and 
the release of required information (Swedish Corporate Governance Board, 2010). The latest 
version of the code was published in 2015 following comprehensive revisions by the Swedish 
Corporate Governance Board in 2013. The purpose of this revision was to accommodate recent 
recommendations made by the European Commissions concerning corporate governance 
reporting, shareholder rights, non-financial information release and regulations related to 
auditors and auditing procedures (Swedish Corporate Governance Board, 2015). Figure 3.18 
illustrates the development of Sweden’s major corporate governance codes and guidelines. 
With regard to the promotion of gender diversity on the boards of listed firms in Finland, 
Finnish legislation recommends that both genders be equally represented on the boards of state-
owned firms (Deloitte, 2015). 
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Table 3.1 below provides a summary of the main corporate governance features of each country 
included in the sample. The table mainly highlights several aspects of corporate governance 
features in the sample countries, including the first corporate governance code issued in each 
country, the issuer name, the year of issuance, and board structure (unitary or two-tier). As far 
as the corporate governance codes are concerned, it is clear that the financial scandals and 
financial crisis were the causes underlying corporate governance diffusion in many countries. 
As described by Cuomo et al. (2016), two main waves of corporate governance codes diffusion 
occurred throughout the world. The first wave began in the late 1990s in parallel with the Asian 
and Russian stock crises and with the collapse of high-profile firms, such as Enron, WorldCom, 
and Parmalat (Cuomo et al., 2016). The second wave of corporate governance codes diffusion 
began after the financial crisis of 2007–2008 (Cuomo et al., 2016). Table 3.1 also illustrates 
the issuer of the first corporate governance code in each country. According to Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra (2004), the issuers of corporate governance codes across the globe included 
the stock exchange, governments, directors’ associations, managers’ associations, professional 
associations, and investors’ associations.  
Further, Table 3.1 reveals that common law countries issued their corporate governance codes 
earlier than their civil law counterparts. This finding is consistent with Zattoni and Cuomo 
(2008), who reported that civil law countries adopted codes later, issued fewer codes, and 
involved more ambiguous and lenient recommendations as compared to common law 
countries. Finally, Table 3.1 reports the structure of the corporate boards (unitary or two-tier) 
in the sample countries. It is apparent that the unitary board structure is dominant in Australia, 
Canada, India, Ireland, the UK, and the US, whereas the two-tier board structure is dominant 
in countries including Denmark and the Netherlands. In addition, both structures are common 
in other countries: Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, and Switzerland (Mallin, 2016). Despite 
the structural differences between the two structures (unitary and two-tier), they both share 
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some common aspects (Krivogorsky, 2016). For instance, both the unitary board and the dual 
board (two-tier structure) are both responsible for appointing the members of the managerial 
body, with the unitary board delegating authority to the group of managers and the dual board 
delegating authority to the board of management (Mallin, 2016). In addition, both structures 
are also responsible for maintaining financial reporting, maintaining control systems and 
ensuring that the control systems are operating properly, as well as ensuring the compliance 
with the law (Mallin, 2016). While the shareholders typically elect the members of both the 
unitary board and the supervisory board (in the two-tier structure), employees may also elect 
members of the supervisory board in some countries, such as Germany (Mallin, 2016). 
Table 3.2 summarises the various national statistics and regulations regarding gender diversity. 
The table shows the share of women sitting on boards as of 2015 in the sample countries, the 
quota regulation in place (hard law), and the self-regulation gender quota in place (soft law). 
In terms of the share of women on corporate boards, Table 3.2 shows that countries with the 
highest share of women serving on corporate boards are Norway (36.7%), France (29.9%), 
Sweden (24.4%), Italy (22.3%), and Finland (22.1%). Conversely, the countries with the lowest 
share of women serving on corporate boards are India (7.7%), Switzerland (10.0%), the United 
States (12.2%), Spain (12.5%), and Canada (13.1%).   
Table 3.2 also demonstrates that the highest percentages of female directors are found in 
countries that initiated legislation of board gender quotas, whilst the lowest percentage is most 
apparent in countries that have only initiated self-regulated gender quotas. According to 
Terjesen et al. (2015a), several institutional factors may influence the enactment of gender 
quota legislation. These include the country’s family policy welfare provision for females in 
the labour market, left-leaning government coalitions, and the legacy of initiatives to achieve 
gender equality. In addition, Terjesen and Singh (2008) found that women’s representation on 
corporate boards may be shaped by social, political and economic structures in a particular 
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country. Grosvold and Brammer (2011) also demonstrated that the culture and the legal system 
are the main determinants of the presence of women on corporate boards in each country. 
Debate is ongoing with regard to adopting corporate board gender quota legislation (Ferreira, 
2015). The primary debate relates to the costs and benefits of imposing regulations, as firms 
affected by gender quota legislation are forced to hire female directors to comply with the law, 
whilst there is no presumption that the newly-appointed directors will be as qualified as the 
incumbents. For instance, Ahern and Dittmar (2012) pointed out that, when a new law took 
effect in 2003 in Norway, it imposed a 40% quota of female directors for Norwegian firms, 
whilst, at the time, only 9% of directors were female. Their study found that, upon the 
announcement of the new law in Norway, a significant drop in stock prices occurred, along 
with a large decline in performance measures (Tobin’s Q) in the ensuing years. In addition, the 
findings revealed that the imposed quota led to younger and less experienced directors joining 
the board, which contributed to increases in leverage and acquisitions and deterioration of 
operating performance. Further, Bøhren and Staubo (2014) found that, as a consequence of the 
Norwegian law mandating 40% female board representation, half of firms chose to exit into an 
organisational form that was not subject to the law, as the regulation shrank the pool of 
competent directors and reduced shareholder value.  
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Table 3.1 General Corporate Governance Features of the Sample Countries 
SN Country First Code Issued Issuer 
Year of 
issuance  
Board Structure 
Civil Law Countries 
1 Belgium  
Corporate Governance for 
Belgian-Listed Companies. 
 
The Belgian Commission on Corporate 
Governance. 
1998 Unitary* 
2 Denmark 
Nørby Committee’s Report on 
Corporate Governance in 
Denmark. 
The Nørby Committee. 2000 Two-Tier 
3 Finland 
Corporate Governance 
Recommendations for Listed 
Companies. 
Hex plc, the Central Chamber of Commerce 
of Finland and the Confederation of Finnish 
Industry and Employers. 
2003 Unitary* 
4 France Vienot Report I. AFEP and MEDEF. 1995 Unitary* 
5 Italy The Preda Code of Conduct. Italia Borsa. 1999 Unitary* 
6 The Netherlands Peters Report. The Corporate Governance Committee. 1997 Two-Tier 
7 Norway 
The Norwegian Code of 
Practice for Corporate 
Governance. 
The Norwegian Corporate Governance 
Board. 
2004 Unitary 
8 Spain 
The Report Managers’ Circle 
of Madrid. 
The Managers’ Circle of Madrid and the 
Association of Spanish Businessmen. 
1996 Unitary 
9 Sweden Corporate Governance Policy. The Swedish Shareholders Association. 2001 Unitary 
10 Switzerland 
Swiss Code of Best Practice for 
Corporate Governance. 
The economiesuisse. 2002 Unitary* 
Common Law Countries 
11 Australia The Bosch Report. 
The Business Council, the Australian Stock 
Exchange, the Australian Institute of 
Company Directors, and the professional 
accounting bodies. 
1995 Unitary 
12 Canada The Dey Report. The Toronto Stock Exchange. 1994 Unitary 
13 India 
Desirable Corporate 
Governance in India: A Code. 
The Confederation of Indian Industry. 1998 Unitary 
14 Ireland 
Corporate Governance, Share 
Options and Other Incentive 
Schemes. 
The Irish Association of Investment 
Managers. 
1999 Unitary 
15 
The United 
Kingdom 
The Cadbury Report. The Financial Reporting Council. 1992 Unitary 
16 The United States 
The Role and Composition of 
the Board of Directors of the 
Large Publicly Owned 
Corporation. 
The Business Roundtable. 1978 Unitary 
*Other structures also available. 
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Table 3.2 National Statistics and Regulations on Gender Diversity 
SN Country Share of 
Women on 
Boards* 
Quota Regulations in Place Other National Measures in Place (Self-
Regulation) 
Civil Law Countries 
1 Belgium  
 
18.3% 
 
By 2017 for large listed companies and by 2019 for 
listed SMEs, 33% of executives and non-executives 
must be women. 
The Corporate Governance Code of 2009 
recommends that the composition of a board be 
determined on the basis of gender diversity. 
2 Denmark 21.8% 
Legislation passed in Denmark in 2013 requires that 
all listed companies, large non-listed companies and 
state-owned companies consider the gender equality 
of their corporate boards. Specific quotas are not 
stated. 
 
 
No 
3 Finland 22.1% 
State-owned firms are required by law to consider the 
gender equality of their corporate boards. Specific 
quotas are not stated. 
 
No 
4 France 
 
29.9% 
 
There must be 40% representation of both genders by 
January of 2017; this applies to listed firms in 
regulated markets, firms whose revenues or total 
assets exceed 50 million and firms whose total 
number of employees exceeds 500 for three 
consecutive years. For firms with 250 employees, this 
legislation will be applicable in 2020.  
The Corporate Governance Code for Listed Firms, 
published in 2010, recommends that listed firms 
have 20% female representation by 2013 and 40% 
by 2016.  
5 Italy 
 
22.3% 
 
By 2015, listed companies and state-owned 
companies must achieve 33% representation. 
Applicable to management boards and supervisory 
boards (i.e., executives and non-executives).  
 
No 
6 
The 
Netherlands 
 
17.3% 
 
A target of 30% representation for the executive 
boards and supervisory boards of large companies is 
mandated; this target is enforced according to a 
‘comply or explain’ mechanism. No sanctions are in 
place. Measure is to expire in 2016.  
Diversity clauses in the Dutch Corporate 
Governance Code of 2008 recommend that the 
nomination of female directors must be considered 
when making appointments to a supervisory 
board. 
7 Norway 36.7% 
By the beginning of 2008, 40% of a corporate board’s 
seats should be allocated to female directors; 
applicable to all listed firms. 
 
No 
8 Spain 
 
12.5% 
 
By 2015, state-owned companies with 250 or more 
employees should achieve 40% representation for 
both executives and non-executives. No sanctions are 
in place, thus this policy is rather like a 
recommendation in nature. 
 
The Corporate Governance Code of 2006 
recommends adequate gender diversity on 
corporate boards (for all board members, both 
executives and non-executives). 
9 Sweden 24.4% 
State-owned firms are required by law to consider the 
gender equality of their corporate boards. A specific 
quota is not stated. 
 
No 
10 Switzerland 
 
10.0% 
 
 
No 
The Swiss Code of Best Practice for Corporate 
Governance, issued in 2014, recommends that 
corporate boards be comprised of members of both 
genders. 
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Table 3.2 Continued 
Common Law Countries 
SN Country Share of 
Women on 
Boards* 
Quota Regulations in Place Other National Measures in Place (Self-
Regulation) 
11 Australia 
 
 
15.1% 
 
 
No 
The Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations, issued in 2010, recommend that 
listed firms annually disclose the proportion of 
women on their boards and in management 
positions. 
12 Canada 
 
 
 
13.1% 
 
The province of Quebec in Canada issued a quota 
whereby 50% of board member positions should 
be occupied by female directors; this quota applies 
to state-owned firms, and full compliance is 
expected by 2011. 
The Canadian Securities Administration requires 
firms to disclose several aspects of gender diversity, 
including firm policy relating to the representation 
of female directors, the number of women 
considered for executive position appointments, the 
number of female directors on a board and in 
executive positions and target figures with regard to 
their appointment to boards and executive positions. 
13 India 
 
 
7.7% 
 
The Companies Act of 2013 requires firms to 
appoint at least one female director to their board; 
this requirement is applicable to listed firms, 
public firms with paid-up share capitals of 1 
billion Indian Rupees and firms with turnovers of 
3 billion INR or more. 
 
 
No 
14 Ireland 
14.4% 
 
No A policy target of 40% female participation on all 
state boards and committees is in place.  
15 
The United 
Kingdom 
 
 
15.6% 
 
 
 
No 
Beginning in 2012, based on the Principles of UK 
Corporate Governance (following Lord Davies’ 
recommendation), the recommended target for listed 
companies in the FTSE 100 is 25% female 
representation by 2015 (applicable to all board 
members). FTSE 350 companies are recommended 
to establish their own aspirational targets, to be 
achieved by 2013 and 2015.  
16 
 
The United 
States 
 
12.2% 
 
 
No 
The Thirty Percent Coalition, the 30% Club and the 
Organisation of Women 2020 recommend that 30%, 
30% and 20%, respectively, of the board seats of 
listed firms be held by female directors. 
*As of 2015 (Deloitte, 2015). 
Source: European Commission (2016) and Deloitte (2015). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
111 
 
3.12. Chapter Summary 
This chapter has highlighted the international features of global corporate governance. First, it 
discussed the importance of corporate boards, illustrated possible board structures that listed 
firms around the world can adopt and indicated the importance of key subcommittees (audit, 
compensation and nomination). The chapter then moved on to a discussion of the role and 
importance of financial crises, legal systems and ownership structures in corporate governance. 
Next, various comparative features related to the global governance system were highlighted; 
to this end, the chapter compared insider versus outsider systems and hard law versus soft law 
models. The last portion of this chapter reviewed the main corporate governance features of 
the various countries under study, providing a brief outline of the history of corporate 
governance development in each country. 
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Chapter 4 
4.0 Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance 
4.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an understanding of the role of institutional investors 
in corporate governance. This chapter opens with an identification of the various types of 
institutional investors, followed by a discussion of the tools used by institutional investors to 
engage with their investee firms. This chapter then examines the transnational and national 
stewardship codes and guidelines that are issued around the world, ultimately concluding with 
a discussion of the empirical literature review. Therefore, this chapter is organised as follows: 
section 4.2 illustrates the types of institutional investors, section 4.3 outlines the tools that are 
adopted by institutional investors in order to enhance corporate governance within their investee 
firms, section 4.4 discusses the key transnational and national stewardship codes published 
across the globe, section 4.5 reviews several empirical studies that examine the role of 
institutional investors in the improvement of corporate governance and section 4.6 offers a 
chapter summary. 
4.2. Types of Institutional Investors 
This section identifies the main varieties of institutional investors. These investors may operate 
in the form of pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, hedge funds, private equity 
firms or sovereign wealth funds. 
Pension Funds  
Pension funds are a major player in the world of institutional investment, and such funds have 
a legal obligation to provide retirement income to participants. Pension funds are typically 
associated with a long-term perspective, as they hold their portfolios within their investee firms 
(Tilba and McNulty, 2013). The assets of pension funds operating in OECD countries have 
increased over the past six consecutive years, in particular following the recent financial crisis 
113 
 
of 2008–2009 (OECD, 2015). Since the end of 2008, these funds have grown by 8.1% annually, 
ultimately reaching a total of 25.2 trillion dollars by the end of 2014. To exercise influence 
over their investee firms, pension funds may utilise various representative bodies that act as 
professional groups (Mallin, 2016). For instance, in the UK, large pension funds typically 
belong to the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF).  
Mutual Funds  
Mutual funds are common investment vehicles designed for investors who seek to enter and 
exit a market or company within a short period; these investors are entitled to withdraw their 
investments at any time (Monks and Minow, 2011). In many countries, mutual funds are 
considered to be one of the primary investment vehicles. In 2012, for instance, roughly 46% of 
American households invested in a mutual funds scheme; as such, this industry is worth 
approximately $13 billion in the US (Brown and Wu, 2016).  
Insurance Companies  
The core objective of insurance companies is to eliminate the financial risk associated with a 
customer (a business or individual); this is accomplished by transferring that risk from the 
customer to the insurance company (Newton, 2015). Insurance companies manage complex 
portfolios involving a variety of risks and finance their operations using several methods, 
including the issuance of underwritten premiums that are paid by policyholders, the collection 
of subordinated debts from debt holders and the gathering of equity capital from shareholders 
(Milidonis and Stathopoulos, 2011). Insurance companies are largely governed by the 
regulations of a particular country; as such, they are required to comply with the regulations of 
the country in which they operate (Newton, 2015). As with listed firms, insurance companies 
are likely to adopt investment strategies that enable them to maintain growth and profitability 
in order to maximise the surpluses of their policyholders (Newton, 2015). Similar to pension 
funds, insurance companies typically belong to associations that allow them to gain influence 
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in the marketplace. In the UK, for example, the Association of British Insurers (ABI) was 
formed in 1985 and now counts approximately 250 companies as members, which represents 
90% of the British insurance market (ABI, 2017).  
Hedge Funds 
Unlike pension funds and mutual funds, hedge funds have the ability to exert significant 
pressure over the boards of directors and management teams of their investee firms due to the 
key differences that arise as a result of their unique organisational form and the distinct stresses 
that they encounter (Brav et al., 2008). Hedge funds employ highly skilled managers to handle 
a large and unregulated pool of money. As hedge funds are not governed by the same 
regulations as are pension funds and mutual funds, they can concentrate their shareholdings in 
a small number of firms, and they can exercise control over those firms via the use of leveraging 
and derivatives. In sum, hedge funds are better qualified to act as informed monitors of their 
investee firms than are other types of institutional investors. 
Private Equity Firms 
Private equity firms invest large amounts of money in the acquisition of limited liability 
companies, to include listed firms (Mallin, 2016). Furthermore, these funds may also contribute 
venture capital in order to expand existing businesses or to kick-start new start-up companies; 
some even seek out unique investment opportunities and choose to buy distressed companies 
(Tricker, 2015). The investment choices of private equity firms are mainly associated with high 
levels of risk and the expectation of high returns. Private equity firms obtain their funds mainly 
via institutional investors or from wealthy individuals (Tricker, 2015). Private equity funds 
typically operate in a secretive environment and are required to disclose little about their 
activities; thus, information on their ownership, investment strategy and partners is often 
difficult to come by (see Tricker, 2015). For this reason, several guidelines have been published 
in an attempt to enhance the commitment of these private equity firms and to promote the 
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disclosure of their activities within investee firms. Among these recommendations are the 
Walker Guidelines for Disclosure and Transparency in Private Equity, which were drawn up 
by the British Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (Mallin, 2016). These guidelines 
highlight the necessity for private equity firms to provide financial performance information 
on the companies that they have acquired (Mallin, 2016). Furthermore, the guidelines also 
argue that private equity firms should be required to disclose the accounts of the large 
companies that they control within six months of the close of the financial year (Mallin, 2016). 
Sovereign Wealth Funds  
Sovereign wealth funds are government-owned funds that are influential and very large in size25 
(Mallin, 2016). As with private equity firms, the corporate governance systems of sovereign 
wealth funds are often criticised for their secrecy and lack of transparency; such funds neither 
issue their objectives nor publish information on their portfolio allocations (Mallin, 2016; 
Tricker, 2015). To this end, an international working group of sovereign wealth funds26 
published a list of generally accepted principles and practices, titled the Santiago Principles 
and Practices, in 2008. The purpose of these principles was to identify frameworks for 
sovereign wealth funds that would reflect their objectives and investment practices (Mallin, 
2016). Additionally, as one of the largest sovereign wealth funds in the world, Norway’s oil 
fund has approved efforts aimed at encouraging the fund to play a greater role in the corporate 
governance of its investee firms; one such effort involves the ability of the fund to exercise 
influence over the appointment of directors (Tricker, 2015).  
4.3. Institutional Investors’ Tools of Engagement  
The worldwide growth of institutional investment practices has provided investors with a 
comparative advantage by granting them the opportunity to act as good monitors of their 
                                                          
25 Globally, sovereign wealth funds account for more than $6 trillion (Tricker, 2015). 
26 The group consisted of 26 countries and met three times to formulate the Santiago Principles and Practices 
(Mallin, 2016). 
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investee firms (Gillan and Starks, 2003; Ferreira and Matos, 2008). Institutional investors face 
continuous pressure to improve their governance practices; this pressure comes from many 
sources, including government agencies, stock markets and the investors’ ultimate 
beneficiaries (Mallin, 2016).  According to Hirschman’s (1970) framework, institutional 
investors may pursue one of two options if and when they become dissatisfied with the 
governance practices of their investee firms. They can choose to exercise their voting rights in 
order to promote change, or they can elect to leave the company by selling their shares; this is 
known as the ‘Vote or Exit Concept’. Since the selling option may not be viable, as it is often 
considered costly, most institutional investors opt to engage with their investee firms in an 
attempt to alter any unfavourable governance structures (Jin, 2006; McCahery et al., 2016). 
Institutional investors can adopt many tools in order to facilitate a dialogue with their investee 
firms, such as one-to-one meetings, voting, shareholder proposals and resolutions, focus lists 
and corporate governance rating systems (Martin et al., 2007; Goranova and Ryan, 2014; 
Mallin, 2016). Behind-the-scenes engagement is also considered important, as private 
negotiation is a favoured tactic of many institutional investors (McCahery et al., 2016). All of 
these tools are discussed below.  
4.3.1. One-to-One Meetings 
Meetings between institutional investors and their investee firms are considered an essential 
means of communication (Mallin, 2016). As such, the Cadbury Report emphasised that 
institutional investors should hold regular one-to-one meetings with the corporate boards of 
their investee firms (Solomon, 2013). According to the Cadbury Report, ‘institutional investors 
should encourage regular, systematic contact at [the] senior executive level to exchange views 
and information on strategy, performance, board membership [and] quality of management’ 
(Solomon, 2013). This type of meeting is considered to be an advantage for the institutional 
investor as compared to other investors, as companies normally reserve such meetings for those 
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institutional investors who hold larger stakes in the company (Mallin, 2016). In the context of 
the UK, firms usually arrange to meet with large-scale institutional investors on a one-to-one 
basis over the course of a year; such meetings typically involve key members of the corporate 
board. In these meetings, the targeted audience of institutional investors includes large-scale 
shareholders, brokers’ analysts and any significant investors who are seeking to underwrite or 
sell their shares. Furthermore, investee firms typically reach out to those institutional investors 
who have been absent for longer than one year, and any institutional investors who attend these 
meetings are contacted to ensure that all concerns have been discussed (Mallin, 2016). 
Marston (2008) conducted a comparison study of investor relations meetings held by the top 
500 UK firms between 1991 and 2002. He reported that the one-to-one meeting was the most 
important communication tool that existed between institutional investors and their investee 
firms; he also noted that the demands of institutional investors for this type of communication 
increased during the period under study (Marston, 2008). Furthermore, he pointed out that a 
higher number of meetings was associated with the number of institutional investors and 
analysts present (Marston, 2008). Moreover, the results revealed that companies kept records 
of previous meetings in order to better prepare for future meetings, which reveals the 
importance of these meetings (Marston, 2008).  
Additionally, companies sometimes initiate new investor relations programs whereby they may 
increase the number of meetings with investors in an attempt to attract institutional 
investments. Using a sample of small and mid-cap firms that were either listed in the Nasdaq 
or that operated over the counter (OTC) between 1998 and 2004, Bushee and Miller (2012) 
reported that companies that initiated investor relations programs that included face-to-face 
meetings with investors were found to attract more institutional investments and greater analyst 
followings. This indicates that institutional investors also value those firms that initiate investor 
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relations programs and encourage one-to-one meetings. The introduction of such activities by 
a company was also found to attract media coverage and increase market value.  
It is also important to note that institutional investors may engage with their investee firms 
through private negotiations, ‘widely known as behind the scene[s] engagement’ (McCahery 
et al., 2016). This type of intervention is seen as an effective tool that can encourage efficient 
corrective actions within an investee firm. Carleton et al. (1998) investigated the extent to 
which the TIAA-CREF27, using behind-the-scenes tactics, influenced governance issues within 
its 45 investee firms between 1992 and 1996. Their results suggested that the TIAA-CREF 
facilitated agreement with investee firms on several governance issues more than 95% of the 
time (Carleton et al., 1998). Furthermore, it was found that in 70% of these cases, agreement 
was reached through private negotiations, thus indicating the effectiveness of this tool in 
altering the governance practices of a particular investee firm (Carleton et al., 1998).  
More recently, McCahery et al. (2016) conducted a study to examine the extent to which 
institutional investors exercise behind-the-scenes engagement; to this end, he distributed a 
survey to ICGN members for two subsequent years, 2012 and 2013. The study surveyed the 
143 largest institutional investors in the world, 36% being from continental Europe, 24% from 
the United States, 16% from the United Kingdom, and the remainder from other parts of the 
world. The results of this study revealed that behind-the-scenes engagement is considered to 
be a common channel that exists between institutional investors and their investee firms 
(McCahery et al., 2016). For example, they found that 63% of respondents engaged in direct 
discussions with the management team in the preceding ﬁve years, whilst 45% had private 
discussions with a company’s board without the attendance of the management team.  
                                                          
27 TIAA-CREF is one of the largest pension funds in the US, and it holds approximately 1% of the total US equity market 
(Carleton et al., 1998). 
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McCahery et al. (2016) also reported that the investor’s horizon (long-term versus short-term) 
had an impact on the intervention. For instance, long-term institutional investors intervened 
more intensively than their short-term counterparts, discussing issues such as corporate 
governance structure and firm strategy. The institutional investors involved in the study 
emphasised that the exit option could be a viable strategy, 49% of respondents stating that they 
had chosen the exit option as a result of performance dissatisfaction. Another 39% of 
respondents reported that the exit was due to dissatisfaction with governance structure. The 
investors emphasised that they considered the exit option complementary to, rather than a 
substitute for, the voice, as institutional investors typically engaged with their investee firms 
prior to the potential exit. 
McCahery et al. (2016) further illustrated that institutional investors face multiple hurdles, the 
major difficulty being the free rider problem. In addition, the study demonstrated that 63% of 
the respondents used proxy advisors, about half of them using the services of more than one 
proxy advisor. Furthermore, institutional investors using proxy advisors indicated that they 
engaged more intensively with their investee firms rather than substituting proxy advice for 
their own voice, which indicates that the presence of proxy advisors does not necessarily mean 
that institutional investors take a passive governance role.  
McCahery et al. (2016) also found that institutional investors who hold more liquid stocks 
report more engagement with their investee firms, as they might find the exit is the most viable 
option in these firms. This finding is consistent with Edmans et al. (2013), who argued that 
stock liquidity determines whether institutional investors choose to voice or exit. Examining 
the activist hedge funds that engaged in block acquisitions between 1995 and 2010, Edmans et 
al. (2013) reported that liquidity attracted hedge funds to acquire a block, especially in ﬁrms 
with high managerial incentives. Once the block was formed, the blockholder was more likely 
to choose the exit option over the voice option, as demonstrated by a lower propensity for active 
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investment (ﬁling Schedule 13D) than passive investment (ﬁling Schedule 13G). The results 
also indicate that 13D filing is associated with positive announcement returns and 
improvements in operating performance, especially in liquid ﬁrms. 
4.3.2. Voting  
The right to vote is considered to be an influential tool used by institutional investors to weigh 
in on all issues raised during the annual general meeting (Mallin, 2016). In an effort to enhance 
the activism of institutional investors, the Cadbury Report (1992) encouraged institutional 
investors to make positive use of their voting rights. Furthermore, there have been clear 
statements from various international organisations regarding voting rights and the 
responsibilities of share-owners. For instance, OECD has dedicated one of its six principles to 
the rights of shareholders and key ownership functions. This principle stated that ‘shareholders 
should be able to vote in person or in absentia, and equal effect should be given to votes whether 
cast in person or in absentia’ (OECD, 2004). Furthermore, in its global corporate governance 
principles, which were revised in 2009, the International Corporate Governance Network 
(ICGN) stated that ‘shareholders should actively vote at annual and extraordinary general 
meetings, and votes should always be cast in a considered manner’ (ICGN, 2009).  
In the context of institutional investor voting in the UK, institutional investors used to register 
their views of a vote by using the postal service; however, nowadays this process can be 
completed electronically where such a service is available (Mallin, 2016). Generally, 
institutional investors attempt to sort out any conflicting views prior to a vote date, even 
pursuing private negotiations with the management in an effort to do so. However, if these 
private negotiations fail, institutional investors may abstain or vote against a particular 
resolution (Mallin, 2016). The dissatisfaction of shareholders is taken into consideration by a 
corporate board during attempts to alter the governance structure of a firm. It is also important 
to note that, for the voting process to be effective, the regulations and laws of the country must 
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support the casting of meaningful votes. Examining the activism of US institutional investors 
by investigating their vote casting in 43 countries outside of the US between 2003 and 2009, 
Iliev et al. (2015) found that the laws and regulations governing shareholder voting in non-US 
countries allowed for meaningful votes to be cast. In addition, the study revealed that voter 
dissent was more frequently reported when the institutional investors feared expropriations. In 
addition, greater voter dissent was associated with higher director turnover and increased 
mergers and acquisitions. 
Del Guercio et al. (2008) studied the extent to which a campaign of ‘just vote no’ could 
influence a corporate board’s decision to improve corporate governance structures; to this end, 
the team examined 112 US-listed companies in operation between 1999 and 2003. They found 
that activist institutional investors often convinced their fellow investors to also withhold their 
votes when it came time to elect directors during a general meeting, which frequently led to 
the embarrassment of the corporate board (Del Guercio et al., 2008). As a result of such 
campaigns, several improvements were noted in terms of governance structure and the 
performance of investee firms, including abnormal discipline related to CEO turnover and the 
improved performance of the firm. More recently, Aggarwal et al. (2015) examined the US 
securities lending market in an attempt to investigate the behaviours and attitudes of 
institutional investors towards any shares that were on loan prior to the record date. In the 
securities lending market, shares cannot be voted upon if they are on loan on the day of voting. 
This study emphasised that the supply of lendable shares was very low prior to the proxy record 
date, as institutional investors began to recall their loaned shares before the voting date 
(Aggarwal et al., 2015). The study also showed that the corporate governance practices of 
investee firms was one of the major reasons behind the recalling of shares, as institutional 
investors recalled shares from weak governance firms (Aggarwal et al., 2015). More 
significantly, the types of proposals listed in the voting agenda determined which shares needed 
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to be recalled; additionally, the level of recalled shares was noted to be high when antitakeover 
or compensation proposals were listed in the voting agenda (Aggarwal et al., 2015). 
4.3.3. Shareholder Proposals/Resolutions 
Shareholder proposals, or shareholder resolutions, are quite common in the US as compared to 
the UK (Mallin, 2016). On average, between 800 and 900 shareholder proposals are introduced 
in the US per year, most of which are related to the social environment and ethical issues; there 
is an expectation that this number will increase in the future due to widespread dissatisfaction 
with regard to executive remuneration packages (Mallin, 2016). In the UK, however, the 
relatively low number of shareholder proposals presented in the AGM is the result of a process 
in which a resolution must be requested by (i) members who own at least 5% of the company’s 
voting power, or (ii) 100 or more shareholders whose paid-up capital averages at least £100 
each. Given the difficulty of meeting these two conditions, the number of shareholder proposals 
tends to be low in the UK, normally not exceeding 10 per year (Mallin, 2016). Although, the 
number increased following the financial crisis. 
As far as the US is considered, private negotiations between institutional investors and their 
investee firms may cause many shareholder proposals to be withdrawn prior to the AGM date. 
For instance, Bauer et al. (2015) examined the determinants of proposal withdrawals by 
considering 1,200 proposals filed by institutional investors in S&P1500 firms between 1997 
and 2009. The results demonstrated that shareholder proposals were often withdrawn prior to 
the AGM because institutional investors were able to reach an agreement with their investee 
firms through private dialogues (Bauer et al., 2015). Their results also showed that the 
withdrawal cases were mainly initiated by influential institutional investors rather than their 
private investor counterparts (Bauer et al., 2015). Furthermore, long-term and passively 
investing institutions were positively associated with proposal withdrawals if the withdrawal 
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was initiated by institutional investors; however, negative relationships between CEO 
ownership and withdrawal cases were documented (Bauer et al., 2015). 
4.3.4. Focus Lists 
A number of institutional investors have established ‘focus lists’ with regard to 
underperforming companies (Mallin, 2016). These types of indices also identify those firms 
that do not respond to the queries of institutional investors. Examining a sample of 93 firms 
appearing on the focus list of the Council of Institutional Investors from 2000 to 2005, Ward 
et al. (2009), reported that institutional investors reduced their holdings in firms that appeared 
on the focus list; this was seen as a signal for underperforming firms to improve their 
performance. However, this relationship was moderated by the composition of a corporate 
board. In particular, a board’s level of independence was found to mediate the reduction of 
institutional holdings in these types of firms, thus indicating that institutional investors pay 
particular attention to the composition of corporate boards within these firms (Ward et al., 
2009). The study also reported that firms with higher levels of independence tend to be more 
responsive to institutional concerns than their counterparts; consequently, these firms adopt 
various reactive measures, such as scrutinising the incentives given to the company’s CEO 
(Ward et al., 2009).  
4.3.5. Corporate Governance Rating Systems  
For several years, many parties around the world have assessed and scored governance quality 
at the firm and country levels. According to Mallin (2016), the most well-known firms to have 
initiated corporate governance rating systems are Deminor, Standard and Poor’s (S&P), and 
Governance Metrics International (GMI). Deminor focuses on European countries, while S&P 
concentrates on other countries including Russia. The GMI rating covers a range of countries 
and regions, including the US, Europe and various countries in Asia-Pacific (Mallin, 2016). 
These rating systems adopt various approaches and methodologies to assess the level and 
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quality of corporate governance. However, corporate board structures and processes are of the 
main categories involved in most corporate governance rating systems (Van den Berghe and 
Levrau, 2004).  
Corporate governance rating systems are beneficial for the investor as well as for the country. 
For instance, such systems enable investors to assess the governance quality of their investee 
firms and of the companies in which they intend to invest in the future. Additionally, such 
systems allow governments to assess their governance quality in comparison to that of other 
countries; thus, they may be able to enhance the overall governance structure of their country 
in order to attract foreign investors (Mallin, 2016). 
4.4. Stewardship Codes and Guidelines 
In the context of improving the engagement between institutional investors and their investee 
firms, several stewardship codes and guidelines have been published on the international and 
national levels. This section discusses both the transnational and national stewardship codes 
and guidelines that have been published to date. 
4.4.1. Transnational Stewardship Codes and Guidelines 
Aside from the stewardship codes developed at the country level, several international 
organisations concerned with the improvement of international corporate governance practices 
across the globe have published stewardship codes. Among them, the International Corporate 
Governance Network (ICGN) published its first Global Stewardship Code in 2016 in an attempt 
to develop a global framework aimed at achieving good practices with regard to the 
stewardship of institutional investors. This Code was divided into two parts; the first section 
summarised the principles, while the second segment discussed how best to implement these 
principles in practice (ICGN, 2016). The Code included seven principles that covered various 
topics aimed at enhancing engagement between institutional investors and their investee firms 
(see Figure 4.1). These principles provided guidance for institutional investors on several 
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matters, including the establishment of a solid foundation of stewardship practices that are in 
line with national and transnational stewardship codes, the implementation of stewardship 
practices, the undertaking of regular assessments to measure investee firms’ performance, the 
establishment of engagement dialogues with investee firms in order to enhance the value of 
beneficiaries, the exercise of voting rights, the promotion of long-term value creation, the 
maintenance of environmental and social governance attributes during all stewardship 
activities and the enhancement of transparency, which is achieved by disclosing all stewardship 
activities to the beneficiaries.
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4.4.2. National Stewardship Codes and Guidelines 
The UK Stewardship Code was generally heralded as the first of its kind when it was initiated 
by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in 201028; it was later revised in 2012. Considered to 
complement the UK’s Corporate Governance Code, its main aim was to enhance engagement 
between institutional investors and their investee firms in an effort to improve corporate 
governance practices (Roach, 2011; Mallin, 2016). According to Mallin (2016), the Stewardship 
Code, as published in 2010, was rooted in previous recommendations issued by several parties 
that were concerned with the level of institutional investor activism in the UK. For example, the 
Myners Report on Institutional Investment was issued in 2001 by HM Treasury (Myners, 2001). 
This report focused more on the trusteeship of institutional investors and on trustees’ legal 
requirements and aimed to promote the activism of institutional investors, especially within 
underperforming investee firms. Moreover, the Institutional Shareholders Committee (ISC)29 
published their Statement of Principles on the Responsibilities of Institutional Shareholders in 
2002. This statement addressed several topics that institutional investors needed to consider 
when attempting to fulfil their fiduciary obligations; such topics included possible means of 
monitoring investee firms, various policy explanations regarding investee firms’ compliance 
with the Combined Code, the implementation of policies for meeting with the directors and 
senior management of investee firms, methods of handling conflicts between institutional 
investors and their investee firms, the adoption of intervention strategies, descriptions of various 
concerns for which further action should be taken (as well as the type of action that might be 
taken) and statements concerning voting policy. The ISC conducted an assessment of this 
statement in 2005, ultimately reporting an increase in the level of engagement between 
                                                          
28 The Code was revised in 2012. 
29 The ISC is a group of associations that represents institutional investors in the UK; the group comprises the 
Association of British Insurers (ABI), the Investment Management Association (IMA), the National Association 
of Pension Funds (NAPF) and the Association of Investment Trust Companies (AITC). The name of the 
association was altered in 2011 and is now the Institutional Investors Committee (IIC); members include the IMA, 
the NAPF and the ABI (Mallin, 2016). 
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institutional investors and their investee firms. Another review was undertaken in 2007, which 
resulted in recommendations for institutional investors to better disclose their voting policies. 
In November of 2009, the Code of Responsibilities of Institutional Investors was issued by the 
ISC, which was built upon the previous statement regarding the responsibilities of institutional 
investors. This code mainly aimed to enhance the dialogue between institutional investors and 
their investee firms in order to improve various governance practices; as such, this code strove 
to improve decision-making processes in an effort to reduce associated risk and to increase 
shareholders’ value within investee firms. Following the recent financial crisis, Sir David 
Walker published a review of the governance policies of UK banks in late 2009. The review 
included nine recommendations and discussed the engagement between institutional investors 
and their investee firms. When the UK Corporate Governance Code was issued in 2010, the UK 
Stewardship Code was also published in tandem.  
The UK Stewardship Code was designed according to a ‘comply or explain’ basis and included 
seven main principles (See Figure 4.2). The first principle involved the disclosure and discharge 
of stewardship responsibilities, while the second focused on managing conflicts of interest in 
relation to stewardship. The third principle highlighted the importance of monitoring investee 
firms. To this end, the Code explained the process of monitoring by emphasising three vital 
procedures: checking the effectiveness of the corporate board and its subcommittees, 
maintaining a clear audit trail and attending the general meetings of companies in which 
institutional investors own the majority of shares. The fourth principle illustrated the activities 
of escalation wherein institutional investors are required to lay out the circumstances of 
intervention. In the fifth principle, the importance of acting collectively with other investors 
where appropriate was highlighted, and the need to disclose the policies related to these 
procedures was stressed. The sixth principle recommended that institutional investors have clear 
voting policies and methods by which they may disclose their voting activities, and the seventh 
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principle placed considerable emphasis on the periodic reporting of their stewardship and voting 
activities (FRC, 2012b). 
 Following the issuance of the UK Stewardship Code, a significant number of stewardship codes 
and guidelines were published in several countries. Table 4.2 provides a list of the key 
stewardship codes and guidelines issued at the international and national levels.
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Table 4.1 Transnational and National Stewardship Codes  
Country/Organisation Code Name Year of 
issuance 
Issuer 
Transnational Codes and Guidelines 
ICGN ICGN Global Stewardship Principles 2016 ICGN 
National Codes and guidelines 
Australia FSC Standard 23: Principles of Internal Governance and Asset Stewardship 2015 Financial Services Council 
Canada Principles for Governance Monitoring, Voting and Shareholder Engagement 2010 Canadian Coalition for Good Governance 
Hong Kong Consultation Paper on the Principles of Responsible Stewardship 2015 Securities and Futures Commission 
Italy Stewardship Principles for the Exercise of Administrative and Voting Rights in Listed Companies 2013 Assogestionil (The Italian Association of Asset 
Management) 
Japan Principles for Responsible Institutional Investors 2014 Financial Services Agency 
Kenya Draft Stewardship Code for Institutional Investors 2015 Capital Markets Authority 
Malaysia Code for Institutional Investors 2014 Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group 
Netherlands Best Practices for Engaged Share-Ownership 2011 EUMEDION Corporate Governance Forum 
Singapore Singapore Stewardship Code Forthcoming Monetary Authority of Singapore 
South Africa  Code for Responsible Investing 2011 Institute of Directors of Southern Africa 
Switzerland Guidelines for Institutional Investors, Governing the Exercising of Participation Rights in Public 
Limited Companies 
2013 Ethos Foundation 
Taiwan Stewardship Principles for Institutional Investors 2016 Taiwan Stock Exchange 
United Kingdom The UK Stewardship Code 2010 
 
Financial Reporting Council 
Source: ICGN (2017). 
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4.5. Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance: An Empirical Literature Review 
To date, several studies have examined the activism of institutional investors with respect to 
the improvement of corporate governance within investee firms (Goranova and Ryan, 2014). 
These studies vary in their scope of coverage, though most focus on one country and are largely 
based on US data (Chung et al. 2002; Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Parriino et al., 2003; Velury 
et al., 2003; Kane and Velury, 2004; Almazan et al., 2005; Brav et al., 2008; Wang, 2014; 
Hadani et al., 2011; Ruiz-Mallorquí and Santana-Martín, 2011; Chhaochharia et al., 2012; 
Helwege et al., 2012; Muniandy et al., 2016). It is important to note that a limited number of 
studies have considered international samples (Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Aggarwal et al., 
2011; De-la-Hoz and Pombo, 2016; Kim et al., 2016). This section reviews the key empirical 
studies dedicated to this topic based on their scope, whether they are international studies or 
studies based on a single country. 
In the context of international studies, Ferreira and Matos (2008) examined the role of 
institutional investors in the improvement of firm performance by examining listed firms in 27 
countries between 2000 and 2005. They found that across the globe, foreign and independent 
institutional investors promoted greater firm value and operating performance (Ferreira and 
Matos, 2008). Their results also revealed that investors with fewer business ties were better 
monitors than were their counterparts who maintained close relationships with their investee 
firms (Ferreira and Matos, 2008). Consistent with this view, Aggarwal et al. (2011) examined 
the role of institutional investors in the improvement of corporate governance; to this end, the 
team scrutinised the activities of businesses in 23 countries from 2003 to 2008 using a 
governance index that included 41 attributes. Adopting OLS and fixed effects estimations, they 
found that non-local institutional investors were the main promoters of governance outcomes 
around the world (Aggarwal et al., 2011). In particular, foreign institutions and institutions 
originating in countries with strong shareholder protections took the lead in promoting better 
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governance structures outside the US (Aggarwal et al., 2011). Their results indicated that the 
activism and monitoring of institutional investors extended beyond borders, yielded better 
governance outcomes and increased the performance of investee firms outside the US 
(Aggarwal et al., 2011). Additionally, their results illustrated that firms with greater numbers 
of institutional investors were more likely to terminate the services of poorly performing CEOs 
(Aggarwal et al., 2011). Furthermore, they also found that foreign institutional investors tended 
to be associated with a more shareholder-friendly board structure; this was typically 
accomplished by considering board size, board independence and CEO duality (Aggarwal et 
al., 2011).  
De-la-Hoz and Pombo (2016) investigated a sample of listed firms in Latin-American countries 
between 1997 and 2011 and reported that the greater the presence of institutional investors as 
dominant shareholders, the higher the firm value. Moreover, they reported that different types 
of institutional investors had different effects on firm valuation (De-la-Hoz and Pombo, 2016). 
While independent institutional investors were found to enhance firm value, grey institutional 
investors were found to reduce value (De-la-Hoz and Pombo, 2016). Kim et al. (2016) 
consulted a sample of listed firms from 29 countries during the period of 2001 to 2013 in order 
to investigate the role of institutional investors in mitigating earning management. Their results 
revealed that domestic institutional investors were better able to lessen earning management as 
compared to their foreign counterparts, likely benefiting from the proximity of their monitoring 
practices (Kim et al., 2016). However, their results also described the effectiveness of foreign 
institutional investors in monitoring earning management; essentially, their ability improved 
when they became familiar with the host country’s accounting practices and culture (Kim et 
al., 2016). Furthermore, they found that foreign institutional investors from common law 
countries reduced earning management in firms located in civil law countries (Kim et al., 
2016). 
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With regard to single country studies, Chhaochharia et al. (2012) examined all firms associated 
with 13(f) institutions, as compiled by Thomson Reuters, between 1980 and 2007. They 
reported that local institutional investors were good monitors of their investee firms and that 
these firms were profitable and less likely to engage in management earning (Chhaochharia et 
al., 2012). Furthermore, they observed that local institutions were more likely to introduce 
shareholder proposals, increase CEO turnover and monitor CEO compensation schemes 
(Chhaochharia et al., 2012). Additionally, Muniandy et al. (2016) investigated the impact of 
institutional investors on firm performance via an examination of all Australian-listed firms in 
operation from 2000 to 2012. Their findings emphasised that institutional investors, as a 
homogenous group, improved firm performance (Muniandy et al., 2016). However, this result 
did not stand when the researchers separated institutional investors into two groups: pressure-
resistant and pressure-sensitive investors. They found that while pressure-resistant investors 
had the ability to improve the short-term performance of investee firms, this result was not true 
for the pressure-sensitive group (Muniandy et al., 2016). Moreover, their results suggested that 
nominee or trustee shareholders were positively associated with the long-term performance of 
firms (Muniandy et al., 2016).  
Based on a sample of Spanish-listed firms in practice between 1996 and 2009, Ruiz-Mallorquí 
and Santana-Martín (2011) examined whether more dominant institutional investors (banks 
versus investment funds) could influence firm valuation. Using GMM estimation methods, the 
authors found that the relationship between institutional investors and firm valuation was 
dependent on whether the dominant owner was a bank or an investment fund (Ruiz-Mallorquí 
and Santana-Martín, 2011). The authors also discovered that this relationship was negative 
where banks were concerned, thus indicating that banks are able to maintain private 
relationships with their investee firms, which enables them to more easily extract benefits 
(Ruiz-Mallorquí and Santana-Martín, 2011). This result was also found to be consistent when 
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the second- and third-dominant owners were banks, which suggests that banks create self-
dealing coalitions from among a firm’s other shareholders (Ruiz-Mallorquí and Santana-
Martín, 2011). Conversely, the relationship was found to be positive when the dominant 
shareholder was an investment fund, thus indicating that this type of investor is likely to 
properly monitor the management team in order to increase value for the ultimate beneficiaries; 
furthermore, such investors were found to be unlikely to engage in expropriation practices due 
to the nature of their activities (Ruiz-Mallorquí and Santana-Martín, 2011). When the second- 
and third-dominant investors were investment funds, this result was deemed consistent; this 
suggests that these dominant investors engage in lobbying to enhance the value of their investee 
firms (Ruiz-Mallorquí and Santana-Martín, 2011). 
Various other studies have focused on the role of institutional investors in influencing 
managerial compensation schemes. For instance, using a sample of 1,914 US-listed firms in 
practice from 1992 to 1997, Hartzell and Starks (2003) investigated whether institutional 
investor concentrations influenced executive compensation packages. Ultimately, they found 
that institutional investors did, in fact, influence managerial compensation: the higher the 
concentration of institutional investors, the more likely the compensation scheme was to be 
sensitive to the performance of the company (Hartzell and Starks, 2003). Furthermore, their 
results revealed that institutional investors were negatively associated with compensation 
incentives. Almazan et al. (2005) consulted the same dataset as was used in the study performed 
by Hartzell and Starks (2003) and found that the role of an institutional investor in influencing 
a compensation scheme was determined by the institutional investor’s type (active versus 
passive). Their results indicated that active institutional investors (i.e., investment advisors and 
investment companies) provided better monitoring of compensation schemes as compared to 
their passive counterparts (banks, insurance companies and other institutions) (Almazan et al., 
2005). Pay-for-performance packages were found to be positively associated with active 
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institutional investors, and changes to the concentration of active institutional investors drove 
future changes in pay-for-performance sensitivity (Almazan et al., 2005). The study also 
uncovered a negative relationship between both types of institutions and the level of 
compensation, thus indicating that while all institutions monitor compensation schemes, only 
active institutions have a significant effect on pay-for-performance packages. 
Other researchers have investigated the role of institutional investors in influencing earning 
management. Among them, Wang (2014) examined a sample of all UK-listed firms in 
operation between 1997 and 2010. Her study revealed that institutional investors with a 10–
20% threshold of ownership, an active investment strategy and a moderate investment duration 
were negatively associated with the probability of income-inflating abnormal accruals; 
conversely, they were positively associated with the likelihood of income-deflating abnormal 
accruals (Wang, 2014). The results also showed that passive institutional investors were 
positively associated with the probability of increasing accruals management during times of 
financial crisis (Wang, 2014). Analysing a sample of US-listed firms taken from 2001 to 2004, 
Hadani et al. (2011) reported that institutional investors, as large owners, had the ability to curb 
the earning management of their investee firms. Furthermore, the researchers reported that 
higher numbers of shareholder proposals were found to be associated with subsequent earning 
management, thus indicating that institutional investors use the ‘shareholder proposals’ tool to 
inhibit earning management (Hadani et al., 2011).  
Moreover, further studies have focused on the role of institutional investors in improving the 
auditing quality of their audit firms. Velury et al. (2003), for instance, examined the influence 
of institutional investors on the selection of auditing firms using a sample taken from the 
Compustat database of firms in practice from 1992 to 1996. Their 2SLS estimation revealed 
that the higher the number of institutional investors, the greater the likelihood that an industry-
specialist auditor would be appointed to perform auditing services for the investee firm (Velury 
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et al., 2003). Their results indicated that institutional investors were likely to employ higher 
quality auditors in an attempt to enhance the financial reporting of their investee firms (Velury 
et al., 2003). Using the same sample, Kane and Velury (2004) examined whether the presence 
of institutional investors served to provide better monitoring of management via the use of 
large auditing firms tasked with carrying out annual audit responsibilities. They reported that 
the higher the number of institutional investors, the greater the likelihood that the investee firm 
would be audited by a large, global auditing firm (Kane and Velury, 2004). 
The review of the key empirical studies conducted within this field demonstrates that the 
majority of these studies were conducted in the context of one country (see Table 4.2). 
Furthermore, most of these studies were based largely on US data, which implies a need to 
investigate the topic using an international sample. Unfortunately, few studies have yet to 
utilise such global samples (see, for example, Ferreira and Matos 2008; Aggarwal et al., 2011; 
De-la-Hoz and Pombo, 2016; Kim et al., 2016). However, it is important to note that these 
previous global studies considered a limited number of corporate board characteristics (see 
Aggarwal et al., 2011; Chhaochharia et al., 2012). Therefore, this study aims to fill the gap by 
investigating the role of institutional investors in the improvement of corporate governance via 
the consideration of a wide range of corporate board characteristics, namely the various 
corporate board attributes (composition, activity, entrenchment and busyness) and board 
diversity characteristics (gender, age, nationality and education) at play in 15 countries around 
the world. These countries include Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
India, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. 
Additionally, this study sheds additional light on the role of institutional investors in efforts to 
improve the composition and activity of a board’s key subcommittees (audit, compensation 
and nomination). Furthermore, previous studies have failed to consider the institutional 
environments that surround investee firms—such as a nation’s economic condition, legal 
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system and ownership structure—with the exception of Aggarwal et al. (2011), who 
investigated this relationship within different legal systems using a corporate governance 
index. Therefore, this study instead considers the use of the board attributes index in 
conjunction with an investigation of individual attributes during this effort to understand which 
board characteristics are most significantly influenced by institutional investors within 
different legal systems.  
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Table 4.2 Summary of Key Studies 
SN Author (Year 
and Journal) 
Period Key Variables Sample and Methodology Primary Findings 
International Studies 
1 Ferreira and 
Matos (2008, 
JFE) 
2000–2005 DV: Tobin Q, ROA, NPM & CAPEX 
 
IV: Institutional ownership 
Listed firms in 27 countries 
(FE & RE) 
1. The presence of foreign and independent institutional investors 
promotes better firm value and increases operating performance within 
their investee firms. 
2. Institutional investors with fewer potential business ties to their 
investee firms exhibit better monitoring as compared to their 
counterparts who maintain close relationships with their investee 
firms. 
2 Aggarwal et al.  
(2011, JFE) 
2003–2008 DV: Corporate governance index 
 
IV: Institutional ownership 
Listed firms in 23 countries 
(OLS, FE & Probit) 
 
1. Foreign institutional investors are the main drivers of corporate 
governance around the world. 
2. Foreign institutions and institutions from countries with strong 
shareholder protections take the lead in promoting healthy governance 
structures within their investee firms. 
3. Firms with higher levels of institutional ownership exhibit greater 
valuation and are more likely to terminate CEOs who demonstrate poor 
performance. 
3 De-la-Hoz and 
Pombo 
(2016, EMR) 
 
 
1997–2011 
 
 
DV: Tobin Q and ROA 
 
IV: Institutional ownership 
562 non-financial listed firms 
in six Latin-American 
countries (FE) 
 
1. The greater the presence of institutional investors as dominant 
shareholders in a firm, the higher the firm valuation in Latin-American 
countries. 
2. Firm values in Latin-American countries are enhanced by 
independent institutional investors and are reduced by grey 
institutional investors. 
4 Kim et al. (2016, 
JCF) 
2001–2013 DV: Earning management 
 
IV: Institutional ownership 
Listed firms in 29 countries 
(OLS & FE) 
1. Domestic institutional investors are better able to constrain earning 
management as compared to their foreign counterparts, likely due to 
the proximity of monitoring information. 
2. As institutional investors become more familiar with the accounting 
practices and culture of the host country, they grow to be as effective 
as their domestic counterparts. 
3. Foreign institutions from countries with strong shareholder 
protections (common law countries) are the main monitors of earning 
management in countries with weak shareholder protections (civil law 
countries). 
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Single-Country Studies 
5 Chhaochharia et 
al. (2012, JAE) 
1980–2007 DV: ROA, shareholder proposals, CEO 
turnover, CEO compensation 
 
IV: Institutional ownership and distance 
from investee firms 
All common stock holdings of 
13(f) institutions, as compiled 
by Thomson Reuters (Logit, 
OLS) 
1. Local institutional investors are good monitors of their investee 
firms; these firms are profitable and less likely to engage in earning 
management activities. 
2. Local institutional investors are more likely to introduce shareholder 
proposals, increase CEO turnover and monitor CEO compensation 
schemes. 
6 Muniandy et al. 
(2016, PBFJ) 
2000–2012 DV: Tobin Q and ROA 
 
IV: Institutional ownership 
All Australian-listed firms 
(GMM) 
1. Institutional investors, as a homogenous group, promote better firm 
performance. 
2. Pressure-resistant institutional investors have the ability to improve 
short-term performance; this is not true for pressure-sensitive 
institutional investors. 
3. Nominee and trustee institutional investors have the ability to 
improve long-term firm value.  
7 Ruiz-Mallorquí 
and Santana-
Martín (2011, 
JBF) 
1996–2009 DV: Tobin Q  
 
IV: Bank and investment fund investors 
111 Spanish-listed firms 
(GMM) 
1. Bank dominant shareholders are negatively associated with firm 
value. 
2. Investment fund dominant shareholders are positively associated 
with firm value. 
3. The existence of other large shareholders in the firm influences firm 
valuation when institutional investors are the first-dominant investor. 
8 Hartzell and 
Starks (2003, JF) 
1992–1997 DV: Salary and total direct 
compensation; the sensitivity of value 
of option grants to changes in stock 
price; cash compensation and total 
direct compensation 
 
IV: Institutional ownership 
concentration 
Firms listed in the S&P index 
(OLS) 
1. The greater the concentration of institutional investors, the more 
likely compensation schemes are to be measured by company 
performance. 
2. Institutional investors are negatively associated with compensation 
incentives. 
9 Almazan et al. 
(2005, FM) 
1992–1997 DV: Pay level; pay-for-performance 
sensitivity (the sensitivity of option 
grants to changes in stock price; the 
sensitivity of option grants; stock 
grants’ sensitivity to changes in stock 
price) 
IV: Active institutional investors 
concentration; passive institutional 
investors concentration; total 
institutional investors concentration 
Firms listed in the S&P index 
(OLS, Tobin, and change-on-
change regressions) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Active institutional investors (i.e., investment advisers and 
investment companies) provide better monitoring of compensation 
schemes as compared to their passive counterparts (banks, insurance 
companies and other institutions). 
2. Pay-for-performance is positively associated with the presence of 
active institutional investors, but not with the existence of passive 
institutional investors. 
3. Both types of institutional investors (active and passive) monitor the 
level of compensation. 
141 
 
 
 
10 Wang (2014, 
CGIR) 
 
1997–2010 DV: Total current accruals 
 
IV: The presence of institutional 
investors, as classified based on block-
holding levels; investment strategies 
and investment durations 
All UK-listed firms (change-
on-change and probit) 
1. Institutional investors with a 10–20% threshold of ownership, an 
active investment strategy and a moderate investment duration are 
negatively associated with the probability of income-inflating 
abnormal accruals and positively associated with the likelihood of 
income-deflating abnormal accruals.  
2. Passive institutional investors are positively associated with the 
probability of increasing accruals management during times of 
financial crisis. 
11 Hadani et al. 
(2011, JBR) 
2001–2004 DV: Earning management 
 
IV: Largest percentage of institutional 
investors  
Firms listed in the S&P (RE) 1. Large institutional investors lessen earning management in their 
investee firms. 
2. A higher number of shareholder proposals are found to be related to 
earning management. 
12  Velury et al. 
(2003, RQFA) 
1992–1996 DV: Proportion of industry sales 
audited by an auditor 
 
IV: Percentage of institutional investors 
US-listed firms available in 
Compustat tapes and in the 
Compact Disclosure database 
(2SLS) 
1. The higher the number of institutional investors, the more likely the 
firm is to demand a high quality external auditor. 
13 Kane and Velury 
(2004, JBR) 
1992–1996 DV: Dummy variable equals one if the 
firm is audited by a Big 6 audit firm; 
otherwise, dummy variable is zero. 
 
IV: Percentage of institutional investors 
US-listed firms available in 
Compustat tapes and in the 
Compact Disclosure database 
(Logit) 
1. The higher the number of institutional investors, the higher the 
likelihood that the firm will be audited by a large audit firm. 
142 
 
4.6. Chapter Summary 
This chapter provides an understanding of the role of institutional investors in the improvement 
of corporate governance. This chapter began by identifying the various types of institutional 
investors, followed by an explanation of the many tools that are adopted by those investors to 
engage with their investee firms. Next, the chapter discussed the key transnational and national 
stewardship codes that have been published around the world in an effort to enhance 
engagement between institutional investors and their investee firms. Lastly, the chapter 
reviewed a number of key studies that have been conducted in this field to date. 
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Chapter 5 
5.0 Hypotheses Development 
5.1. Introduction 
Previous chapters have discussed corporate governance theories, the corporate governance 
background, the nature of institutional investors and various related issues in an attempt to 
explain the underlying framework of this research and to develop the hypotheses for this study. 
These hypotheses can be divided into two categories. The first set concerns the role of 
institutional investors in the improvement of various corporate board and key subcommittee 
attributes related to composition, activity, entrenchment and busyness. The second series, 
alternatively, discusses the role of institutional investors in improving board diversity attributes 
related to gender, age, nationality and education diversity. 
Accordingly, this chapter is organised as follows: section 5.2 presents the hypotheses related 
to the attributes of a corporate board and its key subcommittees (composition, activity, 
entrenchment and busyness), section 5.3 explains the hypotheses related to board diversity 
(gender, age, nationality and education diversity), and section 5.4 offers a chapter summary. 
5.2. Institutional Investors and Board Attributes 
The increasing trend towards cross-border investment, as well as the recent financial crisis that 
occurred in many parts of the world, has led institutional investors to look more carefully at 
the corporate governance structures of their investee firms (Mallin, 2016). Highly-skilled 
institutional investors have increased investment growth over the past few decades and have 
created the expectation that good corporate governance practices should be established within 
their investee firms (OECD30, 2011). Furthermore, there has been increasing pressure from 
governments and various global stockholders for institutional investors to engage with their 
investee firms (Mallin, 2016). Due to the high monitoring costs associated with the collection 
                                                          
30 Refers to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
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and analysis of information, as well as the costs associated with acting on the resulting findings 
(Fich et al. , 2015), institutional investors are better able to provide for the active monitoring 
of their investee firms than are their smaller-investing counterparts. This is attributable to the 
fact that large owners can bear the high costs of monitoring because the potential returns 
associated with monitoring exceed the attendant costs (Gillan and Starks, 2000).  
As the corporate board is considered the main internal governance mechanism and the centre 
of decision-making in the company (Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010; Solomon, 2013; Mallin, 
2016), it is not surprising that institutional investors focus on enhancing the characteristics of 
the corporate board in their investee firms. McCahery et al. (2016) reported that corporate 
governance is a significant factor for institutional investors who are seeking to establish a 
healthy portfolio; indeed, a number of such investors are willing to enter into a dialogue with 
their investee firms in order to improve their governance structures. In their studies, which 
involve the 143 largest institutional investors across the globe, they reported that 63% of the 
surveyed sample have direct discussions with the management team, while 43% have private 
discussions with the corporate board without the involvement of the management team. The 
study also reported corporate governance structure is one of the main discussions of the 
institutional investors with long-term investment horizons. In addition, Coombes and Watson 
(2000), following the completion of an international survey of 200 institutional investors, found 
that institutional investors consider the corporate board as important as the financial indicators. 
This is consistent with several studies that reported that institutional investors are attracted to 
well-composed corporate boards (for examples, see Useem et al., 1993; Chung and Zhang, 
2011; Schnatterly and Johnson, 2014). 
The agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) stems from the separation between ownership 
(shareholders) and control (managers). This separation provides a chance for the managers 
(agents) to act in their own interests rather than the interests of the stockholders (principals). 
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The agency literature recognises that the corporate board is considered to be a primary 
monitoring mechanism that protects shareholders’ interests and helps to align the interests of 
managers and shareholders (Mallin, 2016; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Bebchuk and Weisbach, 
2010). Institutional investors can therefore efficiently contribute in reducing the agency 
problem by monitoring the managerial behaviour in their investee firms (Bushee, 1998). 
Drawing from the assumptions of the stewardship theory, Hernandez (2012; 174) defines 
stewardship as the ‘extent to which an individual willingly subjugates his or her personal 
interests to act in protection of others’ long-term welfare’. Institutional investors as stewards 
are encouraged to engage with their investee firms and to look at the long-term value of their 
beneficiaries (McNulty and Nordberg, 2016). The issuance of the stewardship codes in the UK 
(FRC, 2010, revised 2012) is considered a significant move towards encouraging institutional 
investors to engage with their investee firms and enhance the governance structure. Upon the 
first issuance of the first UK stewardship code in 2010, several countries have issued their own 
stewardship codes and guidelines (see Table 4.1 in chapter 4). 
The institutional theory notes that the external environment surrounding the entities and 
organizations may affect the way they behave (Scott, 2004). In this context, both institutional 
investors and their investee firms are also influenced by the stewardship codes and corporate 
governance codes respectively. The stewardship codes that have been published at 
transnational and national levels (see Table 4.1) also contribute to the way the institutional 
investors monitor their investee firms. According to recent reports, upon the issuance of the 
UK stewardship code, the majority of the institutional investor signatories have committed to 
the statement of the stewardship codes and improved their reporting as well as their 
engagement with their investee firms (FRC, 2018). In addition, ICGN published its first 
stewardship code, ‘ICGN Global Stewardship Principles’, in 2016 in order to enhance the 
engagement of international institutional investors and their investee firms across the globe 
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(ICGN, 2016). Schnatterly and Johnson (2014) found that, due to the institutional pressure, 
institutional investors prefer companies with a good governance structure (i.e. higher board 
independence). 
The stakeholder theory suggests that a firm is required to take into account the interests of all 
the stockholders to maximise its value (Freeman, 1984). The main assumption of the theory 
states that the survival of the firm is largely dependent on its stakeholders (Hill and Jones, 
1992). According to Freeman (1984), stakeholders can be defined as any groups or individuals 
who can affect or be affected by the firm. In this case, given the activism and the size of 
institutional investor groups around the globe, their investee firms are expected to maintain 
their views and suggestions with regard to the structure of the corporate governance. 
Integrating the above empirical evidence and the theoretical assumptions drawn from the 
agency, stewardship, institutional and stakeholder theories, I posit that institutional investors, 
through their engagement with investee firms, will improve the attributes of a corporate board 
and its key subcommittees. 
H1. The higher the presence of institutional investors, the better the corporate governance in 
their investee firms. 
‘Better corporate governance’ is measured by the Board Attributes Index (GOV14) as explained 
in Table 6.4. 
5.2.1. Board and Key Subcommittees Composition 
As one function of board monitoring is the reduction of agency costs, great attention has been 
paid to the composition of corporate boards (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Eisenhardt (1989), from 
the perspective of the agency theory, stated that the role of the corporate board is to monitor 
the managers on behalf of the shareholders and ensure that shareholders’ interests are aligned 
with those of the managers. The monitoring role of the board relies on the independent directors 
who can play an important role in mitigating agency costs and balance the interests of managers 
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and shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990).It is argued by Adams 
and Ferreira (2007), that the monitoring quality of a corporate board is determined by the 
effectiveness of its independent directors. From the perspective of agency theory, a board and 
its key subcommittees (audit, compensation and nomination) should possess a majority 
composition of independent directors, as these members are considered to be the key figures 
of a corporate board and are responsible for monitoring the actions of firm managers (Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 2003).Board composition is also regarded as a central issue related to corporate 
governance codes around the world. According to Mallin (2016), national and international 
corporate governance bodies across the globe recommend that a board be largely composed of 
independent directors and that key subcommittees (audit, compensation and nomination) be 
primarily (or even entirely) comprised of independent directors. Using a sample of US-based 
insurance companies in operation between 1992 and 1993, Beasley and Petroni (2001) found 
that the greater a board’s independence, the higher the likelihood that the firm would be audited 
by one of the Big 6 accounting firms; this indicates that an auditing company that is 
independent from a company’s management system is more likely to be hired if the board 
demonstrates greater independence. Furthermore, Osma (2008) discovered that independent 
directors reduced the likelihood of accounting accrual manipulation; an examination of all UK-
based non-financial firms between 1989 and 2002 led Osma to conclude that independent 
directors had the expertise and competence to efficiently monitor earnings management. Using 
a sample taken from the S&P 1500 in 2006, Sharma (2011) found that the higher a board’s 
independence, the higher the dividends paid to shareholders. This result illustrates that 
independent directors are more likely to protect shareholder interests. Additionally, Ben-Amar 
and Zeghal (2011) reported that board independence was associated with improved information 
disclosure concerning the compensation of executives in Canadian-listed firms. 
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Considering the composition of a board’s key subcommittees (audit, compensation and 
nomination), academic studies have shown that independence can contribute to the 
effectiveness of decisions issued by the corporate board as a whole (Anderson and Reeb, 2004). 
In line with the agency theory, the establishment of the board’s key subcommittees allows more 
involvement of the independent directors to monitor and represent the interest of the 
shareholders (Brennan and McDermott, 2004). Previous research on board committees’ 
structures revealed that independent directors can only perform effective monitoring if they are 
involved in the appropriate subcommittees (see Klein, 1998). Empirical evidence showed the 
fruitful outcome of the subcommittees’ compositions. For instance, examining a sample of US-
listed firms in operation between 1999 and 2003, Persons (2009) found that firms with a greater 
number of independent directors on their audit committees were associated with earlier 
voluntary ethics disclosures and were less likely to be engaged in financial reporting fraud. 
Investigating a selection of 500 firms listed in the major US stock exchanges, Abbott and 
Parker (2000) found that firms with a greater level of independence among their audit 
committee members were more likely to select large auditing firms to carry out their annual 
audits. A study of 492 US firms in 2001 by Abbott et al. (2003) uncovered an inverse 
relationship between audit committee independence and financial restatement. Additionally, 
Klein (2002) found that a higher level of independence among boards and audit committees 
resulted in decreased earnings management in US-based firms; this illustrates the argument 
that independent directors play a significant role in scrutinising the process of financial 
reporting. Using US Fortune firms as a sample, Newman and Mozes (1999) reported that CEOs 
were likely to receive excessive compensation packages when insiders dominated 
compensation committees at the expense of shareholders; this result calls for a greater number 
of independent directors to sit on compensation committees in order to facilitate the proper 
monitoring of compensation schemes. It is also the case that when a nomination committee is 
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dominated by independent directors, a board is more likely to appoint more skilful independent 
directors who are better able to monitor managers and enhance the decisions issued by the 
board (Vafeas, 1999a). Therefore, given the role of institutional investors in mitigating agency 
cost and the importance of independent directors in corporate boards and their key 
subcommittees, I posit the following hypotheses:  
H2a. The higher the presence of institutional investors, the higher the independence of the 
board. 
H2b. The higher the presence of institutional investors, the higher the independence of the 
board’s key subcommittees. 
‘The independence of the board’ is measured by the proportion of independent directors on the 
board. 
‘The independence of the board’s key subcommittees’ is measured by the proportion of 
independent directors on the board’s key subcommittees. 
5.2.2. Board and Key Subcommittees Activity 
Board activity is another key factor of corporate governance that is used to measure a director’s 
level of diligence and commitment to a firm. From the theoretical lens of the agency theory, 
the activity of the corporate board and its key subcommittees highlights the directors’ 
commitments towards the shareholders’ interests, which contributes to the reduction of agency 
costs (Vafeas, 1999b). Lipton and Lorsch (1992) investigated the relationship between board 
meeting frequency and the effectiveness of board monitoring and found that boards who held 
frequent meetings were more active and thus ensured that a firm was operated according to the 
best interests of its shareholders; this indicates that improved monitoring reduces agency costs.  
Bebchuk and Weisbach (2010) argue that board meetings help outside directors to obtain the 
required information about company activities, which in turn influences the quality of 
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monitoring and decision-making. An increased number of meetings has been shown to lead to 
the sharing of information among directors, which in turn leads to better decision-making 
(Bianco et al., 2015). Moreover, increased meeting frequency on the part of a corporate board 
and its key subcommittees enables that board to better monitor managers and thus to increase 
firm performance (Brick and Chidambaran, 2010). Furthermore, Vafeas (1999b) found that 
firms that engaged in frequent board meetings witnessed improvements to their operating 
performance. Lin et al. (2014) further found that the board attendance rate was positively 
associated with firm performance; this suggests that such an attendance rate signals a high 
quality of supervision, which in turn improves the performance of a firm. 
At the key subcommittee level, the increased meeting frequency of various monitoring 
committees of a board enables them to efficiently fulfil their duties. Xie et al. (2003) found that 
active audit committees were associated with weaker earnings management, thus indicating 
that audit committees who hold frequent meetings are able to better monitor the financial 
reporting process, which in turn prevents earnings management. Cheung et al. (2010) found 
that frequent committee meetings were positively associated with both higher stock returns and 
lower levels of risk. Additionally, Hoque et al. (2013) reported a positive association between 
financial performance and the frequency of meetings held by audit and remuneration 
committees. Furthermore, it has been shown that audit committees who hold more frequent 
meetings are able to proactively allocate additional external audit resources towards a particular 
auditing issue in a timely fashion (Abbott et al., 2003). Hence, as the increased frequency of 
corporate board and key subcommittee meetings results in improved governance outcomes, I 
posit that institutional investors will play a role in the improvement of board activities as well 
as those of its key subcommittees. 
H3a. The higher the presence of institutional investors, the higher the activity of the board. 
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H3b. The higher the presence of institutional investors, the higher the activity of the board’s 
key subcommittees. 
‘The activity of the board’ is measured by the total number of meetings held by the board. 
‘The activity of the board’s key subcommittees’ is measured by the total number of meetings 
held by the board’s key subcommittees. 
5.2.3. Board Entrenchment (Tenure) 
The period of time during which a director serves on a board has received significant attention 
from academic scholars; thus far, the study of director tenure has resulted in mixed evidence 
in terms of board effectiveness and functionality. Given the experience perspective, for 
instance, Vafeas (2003) proposed that directors who enjoy a long period of service on a board 
are better informed about the firm and the environment in which the company operates, 
resulting in greater levels of commitment and allowing the board members to become more 
effective monitors of management figures. This view is consistent with the findings of Dou et 
al. (2015), who discovered that long-serving directors were associated with improved board 
meeting attendance, greater committee membership and lower CEO pay in US firms. 
Furthermore, Beasley’s (1996) study of 150 public US firms found that as the tenure of an 
outside director increased, the occurrence of financial statement fraud decreased; this 
demonstrates that long-serving directors possess a greater ability to scrutinise the actions of top 
management than do their newer counterparts. 
In contrast to this view, other scholars have revealed that long-serving directors are more likely 
to have established friendships with managers; this may limit their ability to properly monitor 
the actions of management and to protect shareholder interests. From the theoretical framework 
of agency theory, lengthy tenured directors may shift the director’s allegiance from 
shareholders to the executives, contributing to lower monitoring and increased agency costs 
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(Miller, 1991). This is consistent with Hillman et al. (2011), who argue that directors who serve 
on boards for long periods reduce their degree of independence and their ability to monitor the 
management.  For example, Boone et al. (2002) examined a sample, taken over 25 years, of 
the five largest newspaper companies in the Netherlands and found that long-tenured directors 
restricted the appointment of new directors to a board, which resulted in a lack of diversity and 
ineffective decision-making. Based on a study of various S&P 1500 firms, Berberich and Niu 
(2011) found that director tenure was positively associated with governance problems in 
overseen firms, thus indicating a need to limit directors’ length of service. Barroso et al. (2011) 
further discovered that a long-tenured board did not support firm diversification in Spanish 
companies, thus suggesting that long-serving directors are likely to operate according to 
routines that are formed over time; thus, such directors are limited to specific environments, 
which makes their knowledge less valuable as the years progress. Consulting a sample of US-
listed firms taken from 2001 to 2006, Jia (2016) found that companies with a higher percentage 
of directors with extended tenures were associated with lower innovation productivity. She also 
argued that when the proportion of long-tenured directors decreased due to director deaths, 
higher innovation performance ensued. 
Aside from board tenure, CEO tenure has also received much attention from scholars, which 
suggests that it plays an important role in influencing the decisions delivered by a board 
(Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991). Entrenched managers may establish certain strategies that 
enable them to increase their own benefits while neglecting the interests of shareholders. To 
this end, Miller (1991) claimed that CEO tenure may lead to deviation from the firm 
environment, which adversely affects organisational performance. Furthermore, a long-serving 
CEO may influence the director selection process, as such figures are more likely to have 
established close relationships with other directors on the board (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 
1996; Cook and Burress, 2013). Based on their analysis of a sample of US firms drawn from 
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1993 to 2004, Bebchuk et al. (2011) reported that the exercise of CEO power led to lower firm 
performance, which in turn contributed to increased agency costs. Following a study of US 
public firm performance between 1993 and 1999, Grinstein and Hribar (2004) found that CEOs 
who held greater power tended to negotiate larger merger deals; thus, their acquisition 
announcements sent negative signals to the market. In the context of imposing term limits on 
the members of a board of directors, a growing number of countries have adopted tenure-related 
guidelines. In the UK, for instance, the Corporate Governance Code requires that firms 
annually illustrate their rationale for determining that a director who has served more than nine 
years still qualifies as an independent director (see FRC, 2014). Given the above argument on 
long-tenured directors, I posit that institutional investors play a role in reducing directors’ 
entrenchment. 
H4. The higher the presence of institutional investors, the lower the board entrenchment. 
‘Board entrenchment’ is measured by the average tenure of board members and the CEO’s 
tenure. 
5.2.4. Board Busyness 
Board busyness refers to a situation in which a director holds multiple appointments to several 
boards. A common view among governance regulators is that directors who serve on a high 
number of boards are over-committed and have a limited ability to adequately monitor 
members of the management (Jiraporn et al., 2009). Thus, according to agency theory, director 
over-commitment and a lack of monitoring results in a weak governance structure and greater 
agency costs (Andres et al., 2013). Supporting this view, Lin et al. (2014) argued that 
overcommitted directors have less time to support the management team in developing 
business plans; their limited availability adversely affects their ability to detect managerial self-
interest motives, contributing to the increase of agency costs. Fama and Jensen (1983) stated 
that service on high number of boards is a sign of director reputation and quality. They further 
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argued that directors who hold multiple appointments may be better advisors and can monitor 
management more efficiently than their counterparts. These characteristics also enable them to 
build their reputations and acquire additional directorships in the future (Shivdasani and 
Yermack, 1999). A number of studies have supported the idea that there are significant benefits 
associated with the holding of multiple directorships (Rosenstein and Wayatt, 1994; Ferris et 
al., 2003; Field et al., 2013).  
Conversely, other scholars have argued that board busyness brings unfavourable results that 
negatively affect the performance and governance structure of a firm. For instance, Jiraporn et 
al. (2009) studied the relationship between board busyness and board meeting attendance in 
US-listed firms from 1998 to 2003 and found that directors with multiple board appointments 
were more likely to be absent from board meetings. These results are also supported by the 
work of Masulis and Mobbs (2014), who studied a sample of S&P 1500 firms from 1997 to 
2006 and found that busy directors chose to spend their time and energy inequitably, granting 
unequal attention to each firm for whom they sat on a board. They found that busy directors 
attended more meetings and offered better monitoring for the firm that carried greater prestige 
and thus captured their time and energy. Using a sample of the largest firms listed in the Forbes 
500 between 1989 and 2005, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) examined the effect of board busyness 
on firm performance and found that busy boards resulted in poor governance, weaker 
profitability and a lower sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance. They also reported 
that when busy outside directors departed from a board, positive abnormal returns were noted. 
Core et al. (1999) found that busy outside board directors were positively associated with 
greater CEO compensation in US public firms, thus resulting in higher agency costs. Hence, 
given the implication of the directors being overcommitted, institutional investors as active 
monitors are expected to decrease the number of directorships in their investee firms. Thus, I 
hypothesise that: 
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H5. The higher the presence of institutional investors, the lower the board busyness. 
‘Board busyness’ is measured by the average directorship held by independent directors and 
the proportion of independent directors who hold three or more directorships in public firms. 
5.3. Institutional Investors and Board Diversity 
A diverse board is one wherein members have heterogeneous characteristics in terms of gender, 
age, ethnicity, experience and professional background (Anderson et al., 2011). Diverse boards 
are commonly recognised as being more likely to provide a wide range of experience, 
knowledge and competence as compared to homogeneous boards (Buse et al., 2016). Board 
diversity is an effective tool in corporate governance, as it creates value for a corporate board 
by enhancing the decision-making process (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Anderson et al., 2011), 
improving managerial monitoring (Kim et al., 2013), satisfying the needs of stakeholders 
(Harjoto et al., 2015) and drawing additional attention to the ethical aspects of firm activities 
(Hafsi and Turgut, 2013). The increasing importance of corporate governance codes and 
government agencies, in conjunction with insistence from social activists, imposes greater 
pressure on firms to promote the improved diversity of their boards (Anderson et al., 2011; 
Farag and Mallin, 2016a). 
Board diversity is traditionally underpinned by two main theories: resource dependence theory 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). These two 
theories are related to the service and control task of the board, respectively (Forbes and 
Milliken, 1999). Drawing on the agency theory, Hillman and Dalziel (2003) and Adams and 
Ferreira (2009) stated that corporate boards with an appropriate mix of experience and 
background have a better ability to monitor managerial behaviour and assess business 
strategies. This is consistent with Carter et al. (2003), who argue that directors with different 
genders, ethnicities, or cultural backgrounds might ask questions that might not come from 
directors with traditional backgrounds. This indicates that boards with diverse directors might 
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be more active and have better monitoring roles compared to non-diverse boards. Consistent 
with Farag and Mallin (2017), the resource dependence theory provides the theoretical 
foundation for board diversity and suggests that boards with diverse directors have a broader 
range of skills and more talented and well-connected directors. 
Using the Russell index31, Anderson et al. (2011) analysed the impact of board diversity on 
firm performance between 2003 and 2005. Their results revealed that diverse boards enhanced 
firm performance, and firms that operated in complex environments exhibited greater demand 
for heterogeneous directors. Furthermore, using a sample of US-listed firms in operation from 
1999 to 2011, Harjoto et al. (2015) found that boards whose members had varied characteristics 
were positively associated with corporate social responsibility, thus indicating that 
heterogeneous board members enhance a firm’s ability to satisfy stakeholders. More recently, 
Mallin and Farag (2017) examined the relationship between board diversity and firm 
performance using FTSE all-shares from 2004 to 2013; their results revealed that diverse 
boards drove improved firm performance in UK-listed firms.  
Given the level of fiduciary responsibility held by institutional investors, I posit that such 
parties will view board diversity as an issue to be improved when considering the composition 
of their investee firms’ corporate boards. Hence, the next hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
H6. The higher the presence of institutional investors, the higher the diversity of the board. 
‘Diversity of the board’ is measured by the Board Diversity Index (BDI16) as explained in Table 
6.5. 
5.3.1. Board Gender Diversity 
The gender diversity of corporate boards has received special attention and is one of the most 
studied topics in the field of demography diversity (Terjesen et al., 2009). Recognition of the 
                                                          
31 Represents the 1,000 largest US-listed firms with higher market capitalisation levels (Servaes and Tamayo, 
2013). 
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importance of gender diversity has driven a number of countries to introduce compulsory 
legislation mandating the adoption of gender quotas for the boards of public firms (Terjesen et 
al., 2015a)32. In accordance with the agency theory, the presence of female directors on a 
corporate board may improve the board’s monitoring ability, which in turn will trim down 
agency costs (Carter et al., 2003; Farag and Mallin, 2016b). From the perspective of the 
resource dependence theory, women directors may bring different resources and benefits to the 
company (Carter et al., 2010). This is consistent with Mateos de Cabo et al. (2012), who argue 
that women directors are likely to bring new opinions and perspectives which may improve 
and enhance firm performance. The enactment of gender-quota legislation in several countries 
has created pressure on corporate boards to employ more women on their boards (Grosvold 
and Brammer, 2011; Terjesen et al., 2015b), thus exemplifying the institutional theory (Scott, 
2004). For instance, ten countries33 have enacted quotas for female representatives on the 
corporate boards of public firms and state-owned businesses ranging from thirty-three to fifty 
percent with various sanctions, while fifteen countries34 have introduced gender quotas under 
a system of ‘comply or explain’ (Terjesen et al., 2015b). The growing significance of 
government agencies and corporate governance codes and the demands of social activists puts 
additional pressure on firms to promote board diversity (Anderson et al., 2011; Farag and 
Mallin, 2016a). 
 It has been argued that women are more committed to their board responsibilities; this claim 
is supported by their higher rates of attendance (Adams and Ferreira, 2009), their greater risk 
aversion (Byrnes et al., 1999) and their increased conservatism when making investment 
decisions (Bernasek and Shwiff, 2001) as compared to their male counterparts. Carter et al. 
                                                          
 
33 Norway, Spain, Finland, Quebec (Canada), Israel, Iceland, Kenya, France, Italy and Belgium. 
34 Australia, Austria, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Netherlands, 
Nigeria, Poland, South Africa, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States. 
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(2003) examined Fortune 1000 firms in 1997 and reported a positive association between the 
gender diversity of a board and that firm’s financial performance. Srinidhi et al. (2011) 
examined a sample of US-listed firms between 2001 and 2007 and reported that gender-diverse 
boards were associated with higher-quality earnings. This indicates that female participation in 
corporate boards leads to the improved oversight of manager reporting. 
Torchia et al. (2011) examined a sample of Norwegian-listed firms and reported that a greater 
presence of female directors on a board led to a higher level of innovation within the firm. 
After investigating a sample of Chinese-listed firms in operation between 2001 and 2010, 
Cumming et al. (2015) found that a greater presence of female directors on a corporate board 
correlated with a reduced likelihood that a company would commit fraud or violate securities 
regulations. Their results also indicated that the presence of women on a board reduced the 
severity of fraud; this effect was even stronger in male-dominated industries. Francoeur et al. 
(2008) analysed a sample of the 500 largest Canadian firms between 2001 and 2003 and 
reported that a female board presence had a positive association with abnormal returns, 
especially for firms operating within a complex environment. Lucas-Pérez et al. (2015) 
examined a sample of Spanish-listed firms in operation between 2004 and 2009 and reported 
that a greater presence of female directors on a board correlated with a higher likelihood that 
manager compensation schemes would be properly designed and linked to firm performance. 
Given the need for female directors to join the ranks of corporate boards, I posit that 
institutional investors play a role in the improvement of board gender diversity. 
H7. The higher the presence of institutional investors, the higher the gender diversity of the 
board. 
‘Gender diversity of the board’ is measured by the proportion of female directors serving on 
the board. 
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5.3.2. Board Age Diversity 
Heterogeneity of board directors’ ages may prevent groupthink and improve monitoring by 
balancing the energy and enthusiasm of younger directors with the experience and risk aversion 
of older directors (Ararat et al., 2015). According to the resource dependence theory, a firm 
with a homogenous board may display poor performance because it lacks the required mixture 
of skills and expertise. Age diversity is seen as one of the important characteristics that provides 
a greater range of opinions and expertise to the corporate board (Ali et al., 2014). Supporting 
this view, Hafsi and Turgut (2013) argued that age diversity in the corporate board is likely to 
bring more balanced decision-making that considers the interests of the firm’s various 
stakeholders. Companies who target customers of various ages should hire directors of multiple 
age groups; such an age diverse board will provide a firm with a variety of perspectives that 
will positively impact the company’s reputation and financial outcomes (Fombrun, 1996; Kang 
et al., 2007). This is consistent with Jhunjhunwala and Mishra (2012), who argue that a board 
that is dominated by older directors may lack knowledge of current technologies.  
Several studies have reported that age diversity in corporate boards improves governance 
outcomes. For instance, Goergen et al. (2015) examined a sample of the largest German-listed 
firms in operation between 2005 and 2010 and found that the greater the age difference between 
the CEO and company chair, the better the monitoring and performance of the firm. Consistent 
with this view, Ararat et al. (2010) examined Turkey’s largest firms and reported that greater 
age diversity was positively associated with firm valuation, thus indicating that board age 
diversity increases the monitoring of managers’ actions and therefore alleviates agency 
problems. Furthermore, upon examining Mauritanian-listed firms in 2007, Mahadeo et al. 
(2012) found that firms with directors of diverse ages were positively associated with enhanced 
short-term performance. Analysing Korean-listed firms from 1999 to 2006, Kim and Lim 
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(2010) reported that firms whose independent directors were of diverse ages were associated 
with higher levels of firm performance. Hence, the next hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
H8. The higher the presence of institutional investors, the higher the diversity of directors’ 
ages. 
‘The diversity of directors’ ages’ is measured by the standard deviation of directors’ ages 
divided by the mean age of all members of the board. 
5.3.3. Board Nationality Diversity 
The internationalisation of firms, whereby organisations operate across multiple countries, has 
led to a need to hire foreign directors who have the necessary knowledge and competence to 
link a firm to the environment in which it operates (Carpenter et al., 2001). The resource 
dependence theory considers the presence of international human resources as the most 
valuable and unique resources of a firm (Kaczmarek, 2009). With the increase of business 
diversification, firms demand dynamic resources that help to achieve a competitive advantage 
in the global capital markets (Katmon et al., 2017). Supporting this view, foreign directors can 
contribute valuable advice and bring foreign contacts to a company, thus allowing it to better 
understand the foreign market. This is especially beneficial to companies that engage in foreign 
operations or have plans for future international expansion (Adams et al., 2010). When 
companies expand their operations to other countries, they are likely to encounter a different 
legal, regulatory and cultural environment. For these firms, foreign directors who are native to 
the target country can be beneficial assets, as they are able to utilise their advantageous working 
knowledge of the local environment and of local customers’ preferences (Masulis et al., 2012). 
Estelyi and Nisar (2016) examined sample of FTSE all-shares from 2001 to 2011 and found 
that UK-based firms whose boards had directors of diverse nationalities demonstrated 
improved operating performance. Their results also revealed that foreign directors were more 
likely to sit on a board’s key subcommittees (on the compensation committee in particular), 
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which indicates that firms benefit from the experience of foreign directors when crafting 
compensation packages. Investigating a large sample of non-US firms, Miletkov et al. (2013) 
found that foreign directors were positively associated with firm performance, provided that 
they originated from a country with strong legal protections for investor rights. Thus, the next 
hypothesis is presented as follows: 
H9. The higher the presence of institutional investors, the higher the nationality diversity of 
the board. 
‘Nationality diversity of the board’ is measured by the proportion of foreign directors serving 
on the board. 
5.3.4. Board Education Diversity 
Board members with diverse educational backgrounds can bring multiple perspectives to a 
boardroom (Anderson et al., 2011). According to the resource dependence theory, an 
education-diverse board (level of education, e.g. postgraduate studies) may supply the 
corporate board with different viewpoints, cognitive paradigms and professional development 
(Anderson et al., 2011; Farag and Mallin, 2016b).The presence of heterogeneous education 
levels provides directors with different perspectives and insights that can be utilised to advance 
their career development and improve their social contacts (Anderson et al., 2011). Independent 
directors with advanced academic degrees and considerable work experience can convey 
insights to a board and thus contribute to the overall success of a firm (Terjesen et al., 2015b). 
Most corporate governance codes recommend that a company’s board establish committees to 
handle specific issues (i.e., audit, compensation, nomination and strategy committees). 
Therefore, a board should consider appointing directors with various educational backgrounds 
to its key subcommittees in order to facilitate the completion of specific tasks (Mahadeo et al., 
2012). 
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Bell et al. (2010) conducted a meta-analysis and found that the inclusion of members with a 
variety of educational backgrounds tended to enhance the creativity, innovation and 
performance of a firm’s top management team. Using a sample of non-financial Chinese-listed 
firms that initiated their IPOs between 1999 and 2012, Farag and Mallin (2016a) examined the 
relationship between board education diversity (as measured by the percentage of directors 
with postgraduate degrees) and firm performance. Their results revealed that boards with 
higher levels of education diversity were associated with better financial performance. Their 
results also indicated that directors with high levels of education brought different backgrounds 
and perspectives to their corporate boards. In addition, using a sample of twenty-five high-tech 
firms in the Fortune 500, Midavaine et al. (2016) investigated the effect to which board 
diversity (education, gender and tenure) influences firms to invest in research and development. 
The findings revealed that education and gender diversity are positively related to the 
investments in research and development, while tenure diversity is not. The study indicates that 
education-diverse boards tend to be more innovative and competitive. Therefore, the next 
hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
H10. The higher the presence of institutional investors, the higher the education diversity of 
the board. 
‘Education diversity of the board’ is measured by the proportion of directors with postgraduate 
degrees. 
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5.4. Chapter Summary 
This chapter explained and developed the hypotheses used in this study. These hypotheses were 
divided into two groups: the first set focused on the role of institutional investors in the 
improvement of board attributes, while the second cluster concerned their role in improving 
board diversity. It is worth noting that these hypotheses will also be examined in light of 
different institutional environments, to include various economic conditions (pre-crisis, crisis 
and post-crisis periods), legal systems and ownership structures. Table 5.1 provides a summary 
of the various hypotheses developed for this study. 
 
Table 5.1 Hypotheses Summary 
Institutional Investors and Board Attributes 
H1. The higher the presence of institutional investors, the better the corporate governance in their investee firms. 
H2a. The higher the presence of institutional investors, the higher the independence of the board. 
H2b. The higher the presence of institutional investors, the higher the independence of the board’s key subcommittees. 
H3a. The higher the presence of institutional investors, the higher the activity of the board.      
H3b. The higher the presence of institutional investors, the higher the activity of the board’s key subcommittees.                                                                                          
H4. The higher the presence of institutional investors, the lower the board entrenchment. 
H5. The higher the presence of institutional investors, the lower the board busyness. 
Institutional Investors and Board Diversity 
H6. The higher the presence of institutional investors, the higher the diversity of the board. 
H7. The higher the presence of institutional investors, the higher the gender diversity of the board. 
H8. The higher the presence of institutional investors, the higher the diversity of directors’ ages. 
H9. The higher the presence of institutional investors, the higher the nationality diversity of the board. 
H10. The higher the presence of institutional investors, the higher the education diversity of the board. 
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Chapter 6 
6.0 Research Design and Methodology 
6.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter presented and developed the hypotheses to be investigated in this research 
study. Subsequently, this chapter is designed to provide a clear explanation of the research 
methodology that will be used to investigate the role of institutional investors in the 
improvement of a board’s governance structure (with regard to board attributes and board 
diversity). Additionally, this chapter also illustrates the methodology that will be used to test 
how this relationship presents within various institutional settings, to include multiple 
economic conditions (pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods), legal systems and ownership 
structures. First, the study’s research philosophy and approach are illustrated, then the sample 
selection procedures, data source and research period are identified. Next, this chapter explains 
the variables (dependent, independent and control variables) used in this study. The main 
estimation method is then explained, followed by an examination of the empirical models used 
in this research. Finally, this chapter demonstrates the techniques used to confirm the main 
results of the study. 
Thus, the chapter is structured as follows: section 6.2 discusses the research philosophy and 
approach, section 6.3 describes the sample selection processes and data sources, section 6.4 
illustrates the utilised variables, section 6.5 explains the study’s main estimation method, 
section 6.6 illustrates the models used in the study, section 6.7 presents the techniques used for 
the study’s robustness tests, and section 6.8 concludes the chapter. 
6.2. Research Philosophy and Approach 
According to Saunders et al. (2016), research philosophy refers to ‘a system of beliefs and 
assumptions about the development of knowledge’. It is beneficial to understand the different 
types of research philosophy, as the assumptions contained in such philosophy can influence the 
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research process of investigating ideas, collecting data, selecting research methods and 
analysing findings (Crotty, 1998; Bryman, 2012; Saunders et al., 2016). This is consistent with 
Johnson and Clark (2006), who claim that in business and management-oriented research we 
need to have philosophical commitments toward research strategy, as this will have significant 
influence not only on what we do, but also on how we understand what we are examining and 
investigating. In this section, research philosophies and research approaches will be illustrated.  
Saunders et al. (2016) believe that most researchers, when they start the research, mainly focus 
on the required data and the technique of collection, which is the centre of the research onion 
(see Figure 6.1). However, in order for research to be taken seriously, a researcher needs to 
justify why he or she selected a particular method of data collection and research analysis 
(Crotty, 1998). Therefore, there are some important outer layers of the onion that a researcher 
needs to understand and justify rather than peel and throw away. 
Saunders et al. (2016) claim that the researcher, while conducting his or her research, will make 
a number of assumptions at every stage of the research process. These include assumptions 
about human knowledge (epistemological assumptions), about the realities encountered while 
doing research (ontological assumptions) and the extent and ways values influence the research 
process (axiological assumptions). The choice of which research philosophy is more relevant 
depends on the epistemological, ontological and axiological assumptions of the research. 
Understanding these philosophical assumptions helps the researcher to clarify issues related to 
the research design, including what types of data or evidence are required, collected and 
interpreted. They also help the researcher to understand and answer the research questions 
(Bryman, 2012). Furthermore, according to Saunders et al. (2016), these philosophical 
assumptions can also help to constitute a credible research philosophy that underpins the 
methodological choice, research strategy, data collection techniques and analysis procedures, 
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which in turn help the researcher to design a coherent research project in which all the elements 
fit together. 
Ontology is concerned with the nature of reality. Blaikie (2000, p.8) defines ontology as ‘claims 
and assumptions that are made about the nature of social reality, what exists, what it looks like, 
what units make it up and how these units interact with each other. In short, ontological 
assumptions are concerned with what we believe constitutes social reality’. Gill and Johnson 
(2010, p.100) define ontology as the ‘branch of philosophy dealing with the essence of 
phenomena and the nature of their existence’. According to Burrell and Morgan (1979), the 
ontological assumption describes views on the nature of reality and asks specifically whether 
this is an objective reality that exists or is only created subjectively in our minds. Thus, ontology 
assists in finding out whether certain phenomena are real or illusive. 
The second assumption is epistemology, which considers what constitutes acceptable 
knowledge in the field (Saunders et al., 2016). Epistemology answers the following question: 
how do we know whether or not a particular claim can be deemed acceptable? ‘That is, what do 
we mean by the concept “truth” and how do we know whether or not some claim is true or 
false?’ (Gill and Johnson, 2010 p.191). In order to best answer such questions, the researcher 
should look for evidence that enables him or her to validate the claim or reject it. In 
epistemological studies, the researcher may justify what they believe in their own way, which 
might be different from the justifications other researchers have (Saunders et al., 2016). 
The third assumption is axiology, which refers to the role of values and ethics shaping the 
research process (Saunders et al., 2016). This incorporates questions about how the researcher 
treats his own values or those of the participants. Heron (1996) notes that all human actions are 
guided by values. For instance, choosing one topic over the other suggests that you think a 
particular topic is more important than the other. The same occurs when you place greater 
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importance on the data obtained through an interview, suggesting that you value personal-
interaction data more than the data obtained through questionnaires. 
 
 
Saunders et al. (2016) note that research philosophy in business and management can be 
classified into five types: positivism, interpretivism, critical realism, post-moderation and 
pragmatism (Figure 6.1). 
Positivism considers the utilisation of the experimental, scientific observations to justify and 
test the causal effect relationship (Creswell, 2003). This is consistent with Saunders et al. (2016), 
who note that positivists believe that people and societies can be investigated in a natural, 
scientific manner, and they prefer to collect the data about an observable reality to investigate 
causal relationships. Neuman (1997) posits that positivist research discovers causal laws that 
can be used to predict general patterns of human activity. Therefore, the need for the formulation 
of hypotheses is emphasised when conducting empirical testing to search for persuasive 
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explanations of the causal relationships (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002), which can then be 
generalised to the wider population. In contrast, interpretivism is more subjective in terms of 
understanding differences between humans as social actors (Saunders et al., 2009). An 
interpretivist researcher will observe, look or listen and then interpret what he or she sees. The 
research approach or strategy applied under such assumptions will constitute the study of the 
social world, the people and their institutions, as opposed to that of positivism and natural 
sciences (Bryman and Bell, 2007). 
Critical realism focuses on explaining what we see and experience in terms of the underlying 
structures of reality that shape observable events. For critical realists, the reality is seen as 
external and independent but not directly accessible through research observations and 
knowledge. According to Reed (2005), critical realism claims that there are two steps to 
understand the world. First, there are sensations and events that we experience. Second, there is 
mental processing that functions after the experience that helps the researcher to justify the 
reason associated with the underlying reality that caused the experience. 
Post-moderation emphasises the role of language and of power relations, seeking to question 
accepted ways of thinking and giving voice to alternative, marginalised views (Saunders et al., 
2016). Chia (2003) posits that the postmodernists believe that any sense of order is provisional 
and foundationless and can be only brought about through our language with its categories and 
classifications. 
According to Kelemen and Rumens (2008), pragmatism asserts that concepts are relevant and 
acceptable only when they support actions. Reality matters for the pragmatists as practical 
effects of ideas, and knowledge is valued for enabling actions to be carried out successfully 
(Saunders et al., 2016). Pragmatists also believe that there are several ways to interpret the world 
and undertake research, and they emphasise that no single point can solve or explain the whole 
picture, as there are several realities linked to it (Saunders et al., 2016). 
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Given the above discussion of the research assumptions and the associated philosophies, this 
empirical study relies on an epistemological-positivist position. In this study the main question 
is about the role of institutional investors in the improvement of corporate governance and 
whether this relationship is determined by the institutional settings, including economic 
conditions (pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods), legal systems and ownership structures. 
Therefore, in order to investigate such questions, the researcher needs to collect archival data 
in order to investigate the causal relationship between institutional investors and corporate 
governance. This is consistent under the epistemology assumption.  
Positivists argue that knowledge can be predicted and justified by observing the regularities of 
actions and the causal relationships between elements in the populations (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979). This can be done by adopting the theories to construct a testable hypothesis which is then 
investigated to further develop these theories (Bryman, 2012). Therefore, accepting or rejecting 
these hypotheses is expected to contribute to the development of the examined theories 
(Bryman, 2012). In this research, several theories have been determined (i.e. agency theory, 
stewardship theory, resource-dependence theory, institutional theory and stakeholder theory) 
that are used to develop a set of hypotheses, as illustrated in the previous chapter. Furthermore, 
this research adopts the quantitative-research approach, and the archival data (secondary data) 
is collected to fulfil the research objectives (Creswell, 2009). Figure 6.2 illustrates the onion of 
this research. The data collection methods, the variables and the statistical methods that are used 
in a spirit of positivism in this study are discussed in the following sections. 
170 
 
 
Determining the research approach is also a crucial step. Saunders et al. (2016) emphasise that 
there are three approaches of research: deductive, inductive and abduction. If you start with the 
theory/ies which normally develop from reading the academic literature, and you design your 
research to test the theory/ies, then you are following the deductive approach. Conversely, if 
you follow the opposite path by collecting the data to explore a particular phenomenon, and then 
you try to generate a new theory/ies, then you are following the inductive approach. However, 
if you collect data to explore phenomena, to generate or modify an existing theory/ies which 
subsequently is tested by additional data collection, then you are adopting the abductive 
approach. The deductive approach was adopted in this study. This is consistent with Ticehurst 
and Veal (1999), who argue that positivists typically adopt the deductive approach in their 
studies. The researcher started by reviewing the literature and then determined which theories 
explain the causal relationship between institutional investors and corporate governance (i.e. 
agency theory, stewardship theory, resource-dependence theory, institutional theory and 
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stakeholder theory). Then a set of hypotheses was developed, and appropriate archival data 
(secondary data) were collected to conduct the appropriate research. Based on the findings, the 
researcher decided whether to accept or reject the hypothesis, and the theory/ies were reviewed 
accordingly. Figure 6.3 explains the process of the deductive approach. 
 
 
6.3. Sample Selection and Data Collection  
The scope of this research is international, involving companies listed in the major stock indices 
of 15 countries between 2006 and 2012. The main units of analysis are institutional ownership 
(total, domestic, foreign, common and civil) and the corporate boards of investee firms in the 
sample countries. 
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6.3.1. Sample and Selection Criteria 
This research considers firms listed in the major stock indices of 15 countries around the world 
(see Table 6.2). The research sample comprises 10 civil law countries and 5 common law 
countries. The indices encompass firms with the highest levels of market capitalisation in each 
country. Accordingly, various selection criteria were imposed, which are as follows: 
(1) Financial firms (6000–6999) were excluded from the sample, as they abide by different 
regulations and reporting rules than do other types of listed firms. 
(2) Firms/years with missing data were excluded from the sample. 
(3) Firms with outlier observations were excluded. 
The sample selection and exclusion criteria are summarised in Table 6.1. After taking into 
account all exclusion criteria, the final dataset was comprised of an unbalanced panel of 517 
firms in operation from 2006 to 2012 (the list of firms considered in the study are provided in 
Appendix one)35.  
 
Table 6.2 describes firm statistics per country, index and year as well as the percentage of 
observations out of the total number of observations used in the study. It is clear that larger 
numbers of observations derive from the firms of the UK, Canada, France and Australia, while 
lesser numbers of observations originate from companies in Belgium, Denmark, Switzerland 
and Ireland. 
                                                          
35 For this study, data from the US (S&P100) were also collected. After considering the sample selection criteria 
detailed in Table 6.1, a total of 105 US firms were considered in the study. However, following previous studies 
(see, for example, Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Aggarwal et al., 2011), only non-US observations were included in 
the main analysis. 
Table 6.1 Sample Selection Criteria 
Criteria Number of firms 
Total unique number of firms listed in the major stock indices 760 
Exclude financial firms 172 
Exclude firms with missing data 64 
Exclude firms with outlier observations 7 
Final number of firms considered in the study 517 
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Table 6.3 depicts the distribution of the sample according to industry type. The table indicates 
that the sample data can be classified as belonging to nine different industries36. It is evident 
that the sample comprises a higher number of firms from the industrials, basic materials and 
consumer services industries (the percentages of firms belonging to the aforementioned 
industries are 21%, 16% and 16%, respectively). All other industries (consumer goods, health 
care, oil and gas, technology, telecommunications and utilities) represent 5% to 12% of the 
total sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
36 This industry classification was obtained from the DataStream database. 
6.2. Firms Statistics by Country and Year 
 SN Country Index Name 
Number of firms per year Total 
Firms 
Total 
Observations 
Percentage 
(%) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Civil Law Countries 
1 Belgium  BEL 20 12 12 13 13 13 12 13 16 88 3 
2 Denmark OMX 20 13 12 13 12 13 13 13 18 89 3 
3 Finland OMX 25 19 21 20 20 23 22 21 26 146 6 
4 France CAC 40 32 31 31 30 31 33 34 38 222 9 
5 Italy FTSE MIB 19 20 20 19 18 19 18 25 133 5 
6 Netherland AEX 17 18 18 19 19 20 20 26 131 5 
7 Norway OBX 17 19 21 21 20 22 23 32 143 5 
8 Spain IBEX 35 22 23 24 24 24 26 24 34 167 6 
9 Sweden OMX 30 19 20 22 23 23 22 21 25 150 6 
10 Switzerland SMI 17 13 13 13 14 12 13 20 95 4 
Common Law Countries 
11 Australia S&P/ASX 50 24 25 30 35 30 29 29 42 202 8 
12 Canada S&P/TSX 60 42 45 44 44 45 49 48 61 317 12 
13 India BSE 30 6 13 19 22 22 23 22 31 127 5 
14 Ireland ISEQ 10 10 10 14 15 16 17 20 92 4 
15 United Kingdom FTSE100 63 66 67 68 74 70 76 103 484 19 
Total 332 348 365 377 384 388 392 517 2586 100 
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6.3.2. Data Source 
This research utilises secondary data for several reasons. First, according to Walliman (2011), 
secondary data is often produced by well-known databases in which expert researchers are 
employed to build up this type of data. Second, secondary data are cost effective, as it reduces 
the amount of time required to complete a study, especially a study that utilises an international 
sample. Third, secondary data has the advantage of leading to a wide range of information that 
has been collected over a significant period of time, which enables a researcher to track the 
behaviour of firms over a long period.  
For this study, several sources to extract the required data were used. First, data related to 
corporate board characteristics were obtained from the BoardEX database. Second, the 
Thomson One database was consulted in order to extract ownership data. Third, the 
Worldscope database was used to collect financial data; and finally, firms’ annual corporate 
governance reports were examined to extract any missing data that was not available in the 
aforementioned databases37. Access to all of these databases was granted by the University of 
East Anglia. 
                                                          
37 Various other sources were also consulted in order to obtain specific data. These include the World Bank 
Database (to obtain the GDP figures and rule of law indices for each country), the Major Depositary Institutes, 
the U.S. Stock Exchange (to obtain ADR listings) and the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES) (to obtain 
numbers with respect to how many analysts follow a given firm). 
Table 6.3 Industry Distribution by Number of Firms 
SN Industry name Number of firms Percentage (%) 
1 Basic Materials 84 16 
2 Consumer Goods 63 12 
3 Consumer Services 82 16 
4 Health Care 34 7 
5 Industrials 109 21 
6 Oil & Gas 63 12 
7 Technology 24 5 
8 Telecommunications 24 5 
9 Utilities 34 7 
Total 517 100 
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6.3.3. Sample Period 
This study adopted panel data estimation methods in an effort to examine information that 
spans seven consecutive years (2006–2012), (Greene, 2012; Mertens et al., 2017). This period 
was chosen for several reasons; first, considerable international growth in terms of institutional 
investor activity occurred during this period (Kim et al., 2016; Mallin, 2016). Second, this 
period was chosen in order to fully capture the role of institutional investors in the improvement 
of corporate governance within various economic conditions (pre-crisis, crisis and non-crisis 
periods). Following in the manner of previous studies, this study used the decline of GDP as 
an indicator of crisis within each country (Dimitras et al., 2015). This process resulted in a total 
of 959 firm observations during pre-crisis periods, 1,156 firm observations during periods of 
crisis, and 471 firm observations during post-crisis periods. Likewise, in order to investigate 
the role of institutional investors in the promotion of governance structures within various 
shareholder rights environments, the sample was divided into two groups; following the 
example of La Porta et al. (2000), these classifications were made based on the legal regimes 
of the countries in question. This process resulted in a total of 1,364 firm observations in civil 
law countries and 1,222 firm observations in common law countries. To test whether ownership 
structures affected the roles of institutional investors in the improvement of governance 
outcomes, we classified our sample into two categories, family- and non-family-owned firms, 
as per Croci et al. (2012). The researcher also applied interaction variables between institutional 
investors and controlling shareholders (for both family- and non-family-owned firms) to 
account for the influence of institutional investors in the promotion of governance structures 
under different ownership structures (i.e., Croci et al., 2012). 
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6.4. Variable Definitions 
This section describes the variable definitions used in this study. Table 6.6 provides a detailed 
description of all variables (dependent, independent and control variables) as well as the data 
source of each of the variables. It is also worth noting that this study applied individual 
variables in conjunction with corporate governance indices to proxy the governance levels of 
the sample firms.  
6.4.1. Dependent Variables  
The dependent variables used in this study were divided into two groups, board attributes and 
board diversity variables, which are discussed below. Notably, this study’s dependent variables 
were mainly represented by two corporate governance indices, the Board Attributes Index and 
the Board Diversity Index. However, following in the tradition of other studies that have 
criticised the corporate governance index (see, for example, Daines et al., 2010), this study also 
considered individual attributes when attempting to proxy the corporate governance levels of 
the sample firms. These attributes were related to board composition, activity, entrenchment 
and busyness (corporate board attributes) as well as gender, age, nationality and educational 
diversity (board diversity attributes). 
The Board Attributes Index (GOV14) was first used to proxy the governance structure of a 
board and its key subcommittees. This index covers the main attributes related to the structure 
and function of a corporate board and its key subcommittees. The Board Attributes Index 
(GOV14) assigns a value of one to each of 14 selected attributes, provided that the company 
meets the criteria for each attribute; a value of zero is given if these criteria are not met (see 
Table 6.4). These attributes were mainly adopted from the index used by Aggarwal et al. 
(2011).  
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Board Composition was calculated using two different measures. The first measure concerns 
the percentage of independent directors sitting on a corporate board (Osma, 2008; Sharma, 
2011), while the second measure involves the percentage of independent directors appointed 
to key subcommittees (audit, compensation and nomination) (as per Eminet and Guedri, 2010). 
Board Activity was measured by determining the meeting frequency of a board and its key 
subcommittees (audit, compensation and nomination) (following the example of Brick and 
Chidambaran; 2010; Hoque et al., 2013). 
Board Entrenchment was measured by calculating and combining two proxies: CEO tenure 
(Cook and Burress, 2013) and average board tenure (Barroso et al., 2011). 
Board Busyness was measured using two proxies: the average number of directorships held 
by independent non-executive directors (INEDs) and the percentage of INEDs who are busy 
(as per Cashman et al., 2012). 
The Board Diversity Index (BDI16) was constructed as a proxy of the diversity of a board in 
general. Table 6.5 explains the methodology used to construct the index (as per the work of 
Anderson et al., 2011 and Mallin and Farag, 2017). The Board Diversity Index consists of four 
main attributes: gender, age, nationality, and education. Each of these attributes was calculated 
Table 6.4 Board Attributes Index (GOV14) 
1. Board size is greater than five but less than 16.  
2. Board is controlled by more than 50% independent outside directors. 
3. Board-approved succession plan in place for the CEO. 
4. Board performance is reviewed annually.  
5. Audit committee composed solely of independent directors.  
6. Compensation committee composed solely of independent directors.  
7. The majority members of nomination committee are independent directors.  
8. All directors attended 75% of board meetings. 
9. Chair and CEO positions are separated or there is lead director.  
10. CEO is not serving on nomination committee.  
11. Chair is INED. 
12. Board is not busy (at least half of the INEDs hold ≤ two directorships in public companies).  
13. CEO is not busy (CEO holds ≤ two directorships in public companies).  
14. Chair is not busy (Chair holds ≤ two directorships in public companies).  
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for each company for every year and then compared with the average attributes of the entire 
sample. Attributes were then classified and ranked into four quartiles, with scores ranging from 
one to four, with one representing least diversity and four representing maximum diversity. 
The final step was to calculate the score of each of the four board diversity index attributes. 
Data from 2012 for National Grid plc was used for illustration purposes in Table 6.5.  
The first attribute, gender diversity, is measured according to the percentage of female 
members on the board. Of a total of 13 directors, National Grid’s board had three female 
directors in 2012. Therefore, the percentage of female directors was 23%. After classifying the 
proportion of females for the whole study sample into four quartiles, National Grid’s gender 
diversity fell into the fourth quartile, and, therefore, National Grid scored 4 out of 4 for gender 
diversity.  
The second attribute, age diversity, is measured by the coefficient variation of age of all board 
members in each year. In the case of National Grid, the directors’ average age in 2012 was 
57.3, and the standard deviation was 7.5 Therefore, the coefficient variation of age was 0.13. 
After the classification of the entire sample into four quartiles, the coefficient variation of age 
diversity fell into the third quartile, meaning that National Grid scored 3 out of 4 for the age 
diversity attribute.  
Nationality diversity, the third attribute, is measured by the percentage of foreign directors 
across the full board. National Grid had four foreign directors, and, therefore, the percentage 
of nationality diversity was 0.31. After the classification of the entire sample into four quartiles, 
the nationality diversity of National Grid in 2012 fell into the third quartile. Therefore, National 
Grid scored 3 out of 4 for the nationality diversity attribute.  
To measure the fourth attribute, education diversity, the directors’ level of education was taken 
into consideration. The Herfindahl index was used to calculate the education diversity based 
on the percentage of directors with no college degree, with a bachelor’s degree, and with a 
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master’s degree or higher. National Grid had one director with no college degree, eight with 
bachelor’s degrees, and four with master’s degrees or higher. Therefore, the Herfindahl index 
for education diversity is (1/13)2+ (8/13)2+ (4/13)2=0.48, which fell into the third quartile. As 
a result, National Grid scored 3 out of 4 for education diversity.  
The final step is to sum the scores for all diversity attributes (gender = 4, age = 3, nationality = 
3, and education = 3). Thus, National Grid’s final diversity index score for the year 2012 was 
13 (see Table 6.5). 
Gender Diversity was measured by calculating the proportion of female directors sitting on a 
corporate board (following the example of Carter et al., 2003; Cumming et al., 2015). 
Age Diversity was measured by determining the standard deviation of directors’ ages divided 
by the across-the-board mean (Ali et al., 2014). 
Nationality Diversity was measured by calculating the number of foreign directors divided by 
the total number of directors sitting on a board (Gracia-Meca, 2015). 
Education Diversity was measured by assessing the percentage of directors who hold 
postgraduate degrees (Farag and Mallin, 2016a). 
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Table 6.5 An Illustrative Example of Constructing Board Diversity Index – National Grid plc in 2012 
Name Role Gender Age Nationality No Degree Bachelor Master or above 
Master 
 
 
Andrew Bonfield GFD M 49 British No Yes No 
 
 
Steve Holliday CEO M 55 British No Yes No 
 
 
Tom King RP M 50 American No Yes No 
 
Nick Winser DP M 51 British No Yes No 
 
Linda Adamany INED F 60 American Yes No No 
 
Phil Aiken INED M 63 Australian No Yes No 
 
Sir Peter Gershon Chairman  M 65 British No Yes No 
 
Doctor Paul Golby INED M 61 British No No Yes 
 
Ken Harvey Senior INED M 71 British No Yes No 
 
The Rt. Hon. Ruth 
Kelly 
INED F 43 British No No Yes 
 
Stephen Pettit INED M 60 British No No Yes 
 
Maria Richter INED F 57 American No No Yes 
 
George Rose INED M 60 British No Yes No 
 
GFD: General Financial director; CEO: Chief Executive Officer; RP: Regional President; DP: Division President; INED: Independent Non-Executive Director. 
1. Gender Diversity: is measured by the percentage of female members setting on the board. There are three female directors sitting on National Grid’s board in 2012 out of 13 
directors. Therefore, the proportion of female directors is 23%. After classifying the proportion of females for the whole sample in the study into four quartiles, National Grid’s 
gender diversity falls into the fourth quartile and therefore scores 4 out 4. 
First Quartile                                                  Second Quartile                                                   Third Quartile                                                 Fourth Quartile                                                   
NG’s gender diversity score 
CV gender ˂ .06                                           0.06 ≤ CV gender ˂ .13                                          .13 ≤ CV gender ˂ .21                                              CV gender ≥ .21                                                                         
4 
2. Age Diversity: is measured by the coefficient variation of age across board members in each year. For National Grid, the directors’ average age in 2012 is 57.3 and the standard 
deviation is 7.5 Therefore, the CV of age = .13. After the classification of the entire sample into four quartiles, CV of age diversity falls into the third quartile, and therefore scores 
3 out 4. 
 
First Quartile                                                  Second Quartile                                                   Third Quartile                                                  Fourth Quartile                                                     
NG’s  age diversity score 
CV age ˂ .11                                                0.11 ≤ CV age ˂ .13                                               .13 ≤ CV age  ˂.16                                                  CV age ≥.16                                                                                
3 
3. Nationality Diversity: is measured by the percentage of foreign directors across the full board. For National Grid, there are four foreign directors and therefore, the percentage 
of nationality diversity is .31. After the classification of the entire sample into four quartiles, the national diversity of National Grid in 2012 falls into the third quartile. 
First Quartile                                                  Second Quartile                                                   Third Quartile                                                  Fourth Quartile                                                
NG’s  Nationality diversity score 
CV Nat ˂ .07                                                      0.07≤ Nat ˂ .18                                                    .18 ≤Nat ˂.38                                                     CV Nat ≥.38                                                                               
3 
4. Education Diversity: is measured using directors’ level of education. I adopt Herfindahl index directors to calculate education diversity based on percentage of directors with 
no college degree, bachelor degree and master or above degree. For National Grid, there is one director with no college degree, 8 with bachelor degrees and 4 with master or above 
degree. Therefore, the Herfindahl index for education diversity is (1/13)2+ (8/13)2+ (4/13)2=.48, which falls into the third quartile. (Note: Herfindahl index is an inverse measure 
which indicate smaller values have greater diversity). 
 
 
First Quartile                                                  Second Quartile                                                     Third Quartile                                                Fourth Quartile                                                     
NG’s Edu. diversity score 
  Edu. ≥ .57                                                  0.50 ≤ Edu. ˂ .57                                                          .41 ≤ Edu. ˂. 0.50                                              CV Edu. ˂ .41                                                                            
3 
Aggregating the four diversity scores: the final step is to sum the diversity measures for all the attributes (gender, age, nationality, education and experience). For National Grid, 
the final diversity index score in 2012 is as follows: 
 
Diversity Index                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                Final 
Score 
Gender                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       4  
Age                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            3  
Nationality                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 3  
Education                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   3  
Total diversity index score                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 13 
out of 16 
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6.4.2. Independent Variables 
The independent variable used in this study, institutional ownership, was classified into five 
types in the tradition of Aggarwal et al. (2011): total, foreign, domestic, common law and 
civil law. 
6.4.3. Control Variables 
In addition to the main explanatory variables, this study considered several control variables 
that might also have the ability to influence corporate governance levels (board attributes and 
board diversity variables). Omitting control variables may lead to biased results regarding the 
role of institutional investors in corporate governance. Therefore, as per Aggarwal et al. (2011), 
this study considered several control variables38, which are as follows: 
Firm Size has been documented by several studies to be one of the main factors that influences 
governance structure. For instance, several studies have reported that corporate board 
characteristics are influenced by firm size. For instance, Boone et al. (2007) and Baker and 
Gompers (2003) found that board composition (i.e., size and independence) was positively 
associated with firm size. Other scholars found that large firms were less likely to be associated 
with weak governance practices (i.e., earning management) as compared to their smaller 
counterparts (Kim et al., 2016; Chaney et al., 2011). In this study, firm size was measured as 
the natural logarithm of total assets. 
Sales Growth is normally used to proxy the growth opportunities of a firm. Several studies 
have reported that sales growth is one of the main drivers of board characteristics. For instance, 
Knyazeva et al. (2013) uncovered a negative relationship between board independence and 
sales growth. Additionally, Vafeas (1999b) found that sales growth was positively associated 
                                                          
38 For reasons of consistency, all financial control variables were directly extracted in US dollars. 
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with the meeting frequency of a corporate board. In this study, sales growth was measured by 
calculating the annual changes in net sales divided by the previous year’s net sales. 
Leverage is typically used to proxy a firm’s financial risk (Hahn and Lasfer, 2016). A 
considerable number of studies have shown that a firm’s leverage is associated with its 
governance structure. For example, Denis and Sarin (1999) reported that the higher a firm’s 
leverage, the higher its board size and independence. Additionally, Hahn and Lasfer (2016) 
reported that the meeting frequency of a corporate board was significantly associated with the 
firm’s financial risk (i.e., leverage). In this study, leverage was measured by calculating a firm’s 
total debt divided by its total assets. 
With regard to Cash, it has been argued that weakly-governed firms are more likely to waste 
their cash reserves than are their well-governed counterparts (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith; 2007; 
Harford, 2012). Aggarwal et al. (2011) found that the lower a company’s cash holdings, the 
lower the firm’s governance level. In this study, cash ratio was calculated by determining the 
total amounts of cash and short-term investments divided by a firm’s total assets. 
Capital Expenditure measures the extent to which a firm has the potential for growth; it is 
normally used to proxy the costs of monitoring (Boone et al., 2007). Firms with higher levels 
of capital expenditure require more monitoring from outside directors. Boone et al., (2007) 
found that board size and board independence had negative and positive associations, 
respectively, with capital expenditure. Aggarwal et al. (2011) found that the higher a firm’s 
capital expenditure, the lower its governance level. In this study, capital expenditure was 
determined by calculating a company’s total capital expenditures divided by its total assets. 
Market-to-Book Value is one measure of firm valuation. Indeed, Aggarwal et al. (2011) found 
that the higher the ratio of market-to-book value, the more favourable were a company’s 
governance outcomes. In this study, market-to-book value was measured by calculating a 
company’s total market value of equity divided by its book value of equity. 
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Return on Assets is considered to be one of the main proxies of company profitability. For 
instance, Aggarwal et al. (2011) found that the higher a firm’s profitability (as measured by 
return on assets), the better its governance structure. In this study, return on assets was 
calculated by determining the total net income before extraordinary items plus interest 
expenses divided by total assets. 
Property, Plants and Equipment measures the asset tangibility of a firm. Previous studies 
have documented the importance of a firm’s tangibility in determining the quality of its 
governance structure. Knyazeva et al. (2013) found that firms with high levels of tangible assets 
were negatively associated with CEO turnover. However, Aggarwal et al. (2011) found no 
relationship between asset tangibility and the corporate governance index. In this study, asset 
tangibility was measured by calculating the total amount of property, plants, and equipment 
divided by total assets. 
Analyst Coverage, or analyst following, is another key factor that has been shown to influence 
the governance structure of a firm. For instance, Yu (2008) argued that analyst following plays 
an indirect role in the monitoring of managers who might otherwise misbehave with regard to 
their actions within a firm; therefore, such coverage serves to align the interests of both the 
shareholders and the managers of a firm. Kim et al. (2016) found that higher levels of analyst 
following were negatively associated with earning management. In the context of this research, 
analyst following may influence how the corporate board of a firm is structured. In this study, 
analyst coverage was measured by determining the number of analysts who follow a firm.  
Cross-Listing Dummies is another potential determinant of a firm’s governance level; this 
variable describes a company’s access to foreign stock exchanges. One common means of 
cross-listing is for a company to be listed on the American Depositary Receipt (ADR)39. 
                                                          
39 Firms listed on the ADR (levels II and III) are required to comply with SEC disclosure requirements and with 
the listing rules of the stock exchange on which they are listed (Doidge et al., 2007). 
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Aggarwal et al. (2011) found that firms with second and third ADR listings were positively 
and significantly associated with better governance structures. 
The Rule of Law is an index that measures the extent to which a company’s agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society (Essen et al., 2013). Several studies have argued 
that the rule of law shapes the quality of corporate governance in a given country. To this end, 
Kim and Ozdemir (2014) found that the composition of a corporate board can be determined 
by assessing the strength of the rule of law in a particular country.  
The Identity of Ultimate Owners (or controlling shareholders), several scholars have argued, 
must be considered when studying corporate governance, as each type of investor has its own 
strategies for and perceptions of the governance structures of investee firms (Aguilera et al., 
2012; Adams et al., 2010). Following the methods laid out by Faccio and Lang (2002), this 
study adopted a 20% cut-off policy to identify the controlling shareholders of an investee firm, 
and dummy variables were used to represent whether a firm is controlled by institutional 
investors (IO 20%), the state (State 20%), a family (Family 20%), or whether it is widely held 
(Widely Held 20%). 
Economic Conditions, and their effects, must be accounted for; thus, this study used dummy 
variables to control for several economic conditions (pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods). 
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Table 6.6 List of Variables  
Variables Variable Definition Data Source 
Dependent Variables: Board Attributes 
Board attributes index (GOV14) Firm level governance measured by the main attributes related to the structure and function of the corporate board and key subcommittees (see Table 6.4). BoardEX 
Board independence (BOARD INED) The proportion of independent directors on the board. BoardEX 
Audit committee independence (AC INED) The proportion of independent directors on the audit committee. BoardEX 
Compensation committee independence (CC 
INED) 
The proportion of independent directors on the compensation committee. BoardEX 
Nomination committee independence (NC 
INED) 
The proportion of independent directors on the nomination committee. BoardEX 
Board meeting frequency (BOARD MF) Total number of meetings held by the board during the fiscal year. Annual Reports 
Attendance rate (ATTEND RATE) Average attendance of board of directors’ meetings. Annual Reports 
Audit committee meeting frequency (AC MF) Total number of meetings held by the audit committee during the fiscal year. Annual Reports 
Compensation committee  meeting frequency 
(CC MF) 
Total number of meetings held by the compensation committee during the fiscal year. Annual Reports 
Nomination committee  meeting frequency 
(NC MF) 
Total number of meetings held by the nomination committee during the fiscal year. Annual Reports 
CEO tenure (CEO TENURE) Total number of years that CEO has served on the board. BoardEX 
Board tenure (BOARD TENURE) Total number of years that board members have served on the board divided by total number of board members. BoardEX 
Busy board (BUSY BOARD) Average directorships held by INEDs. BoardEX 
Busy board % (BUSY BOARD %) Proportion of the INEDs who hold three or more directorship in public firms. BoardEX 
Dependent Variables: Board Diversity 
Board diversity index (BDI16) Firm diversity level measured by board diversity dimensions; gender, age, nationality and education (see Table 6.5). BoardEX 
Board Gender Diversity (GENDER DIV) The proportion of female directors across the board. BoardEX 
Board Age Diversity (AGE DIV) The standard deviation of directors’ ages divided by the mean across the board. BoardEX 
Board Nationality Diversity (NATION DIV) The percentage of foreign directors across the board. BoardEX 
Board Education Diversity (EDU DIV) The percentage of directors with postgraduate degrees across the board. BoardEX 
Independent Variables: Institutional Ownership 
Total IO (IO TOTAL) Holdings by all institutions as a fraction of market capitalization. ThomsonOne 
Foreign IO (IO FOR) Holdings by institutions located in a different country from where the stock is listed as a fraction of market capitalization. ThomsonOne 
Domestic IO (IO DOM) Holdings by institutions located in the same country where the stock is listed as a fraction of market capitalization. ThomsonOne 
Common-law IO (IO COMMON) Holdings by institutions located in common-law countries as a fraction of market capitalization. ThomsonOne 
Civil-law IO (IO CIVIL) Holdings by institutions located in civil-law countries as a fraction of market capitalization. ThomsonOne 
Control Variables: Firm and Country Characteristics 
Firm size (SIZE) Log of total assets in thousands of U.S. dollars (WS02999). Worldscope 
Sales growth (SGROWTH) Two-year geometric average of annual growth rate in net sales in U.S. dollars (WS01001). Worldscope 
Leverage (LEV) Total debt (WS03255) divided by total assets (WS02999). Worldscope 
Cash ( CASH) 
 
Cash and short-term investments (World scope item 02001) divided by total assets (WS02999). Worldscope 
Capital expenditures (CAPEX) Capital expenditures (WS 04601) divided by total assets (WS02999). Worldscope 
Market-to-book (MB) Market value of equity (WS item 08001) divided by book value of equity (WS03501). Worldscope 
Return on assets (ROA) Ratio of net income before extraordinary items (WS01551) plus interest expenses (WS01151) to total assets (WS02999). Worldscope 
Property, plant and equipment (PPE) Property, plant, and equipment (WS02501) divided by total assets (WS02999). Worldscope 
Analyst coverage(ANALYST) Number of analysts following a firm (IBES). IBES 
Cross-listing dummy (ADR) Dummy that equals one if a firm is cross-listed on a U.S. exchange through a level 2–3 ADR or direct listing of ordinary share, and zero otherwise. Major Depositary institutions 
Rule of law (RULE) Index measures the extent to which the agent has confidence in and abide by the rules of the society in a particular country. World Bank 
Pre-crisis dummy (PRE-CRISIS) Dummy that equals one if the observation falls into pre- crisis period, and zero otherwise. World Bank 
crisis dummy (CRISIS) Dummy that equals one if the observation falls into crisis period, and zero otherwise. World Bank 
Post-crisis dummy (POST-CRISIS) Dummy that equals one if the observation falls into post- crisis period, and zero otherwise. World Bank 
Institutional owner controlling 20% (IO) Dummy that equals one if the ultimate owner is institutional investor and owns greater than 20%, and zero otherwise. ThomsonOne and Annual Reports 
State controlling 20% (STATE) Dummy that equals one if the ultimate owner is state and owns greater than 20%, and zero otherwise. ThomsonOne and Annual Reports 
Family controlling 20% (FAMILY) Dummy that equals one if the ultimate owner is family and owns greater than 20%, and zero otherwise. ThomsonOne and Annual Reports 
Widely held at 20% (WIDLEY) Dummy that equals one if the firm is widely held at 20%, and zero otherwise. ThomsonOne and Annual Reports 
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6.5. Panel Data Estimation Method  
In order to examine the relationship that exists between institutional investors and corporate 
board characteristics, this study employed an unbalanced panel dataset (Aggarwal et al, 2011; 
Kim et al, 2016). Panel data describes a dataset in which entities (i.e., companies, states, 
individuals, countries, etc.) are observed over a period of time. Hence, panel data observations 
have at least two dimensions: a cross-sectional dimension, as indicated by the subscript ‘i’, and 
a time-series dimension, as denoted by the subscript ‘t’. 
Panel data analysis has become a common tool of quantitative studies due to the fact that its 
use largely eliminates various concerns that are generally tied to traditional techniques. 
According to Baltagi (2001), the use of panel data provides several advantages over more 
conventional time-series and cross-sectional datasets. First, panel data account for firm 
heterogeneity, as such data assume that the entities in a sample are heterogeneous; time-series 
and cross-sectional regressions, however, do not account for such heterogeneity and hence 
might lead to biased results. Second, by combining time-series and cross-sectional 
observations, panel data provide ‘more informative data, more variability, less collinearity 
among the variables, more degree[s] of freedom and more efficiency’ (Baltagi, 2001, p. 8). 
Third, panel data can handle more complicated models than can time-series and cross-sectional 
models. A fourth important advantage of panel data is that such data are better able to 
investigate dynamics of change. A cross-sectional distribution, though it may appear relatively 
stable, cannot capture changes over a period of time. Panel data, however, are well-suited to 
capture changes over a given timespan that might otherwise go undetected by cross-sectional 
or time-series techniques.  
There are two common techniques of estimation associated with panel data: fixed effect (FE) 
and random effect (RE). FE examines the relationship between the dependent and explanatory 
variables within an entity (i.e., a company). The assumption of FE is that there is something 
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within an entity that may influence or bias the predictors or the outcome variables and that 
therefore must be controlled for. Thus, FE control over unobservable time-invariant 
observations (i.e., observations that do not change over time) is achieved by eliminating their 
effects so that the net effect of the predictor can be assessed (Mertens et al., 2017). In contrast 
to the FE supposition, the RE model carries the assumption that variations across entities are 
random and do not correlate with the model’s predictors; therefore, time-invariant variables are 
considered to act as explanatory variables in RE models (Mertens et al., 2017). Furthermore, 
in RE models, both within-unit and between-unit variabilities are exploited by weighting and 
partitioning the relevance of these two sources of variability. The advantage of using RE is that 
a researcher can consider variables that are time-invariant within a model; this indicates that 
RE can employ richer data as compared to FE (Mertens et al., 2017). 
Many researchers utilise the Hausman specification test when attempting to choose between 
these two models. According to Mertens et al. (2017), the Hausman specification test is used 
to examine whether the coefficients of the two models (FE and RE) are different. The null 
hypothesis of the Hausman test is that there are no systematic differences. If the results lead to 
a significant p-value (Prob>chi2 less than 0.05), the FE model should be applied. Alternatively, 
an RE model should be chosen if the results illustrate otherwise. After conducting the Hausman 
test, the results of this study revealed that an FE model should be applied. 
Serial Correlation and Heteroscedasticity Tests 
 
Baltagi (2001) emphasised the importance of testing for serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity in panel data. The presence of serial correlation may bias standard errors and 
therefore provide results that lack efficiency (Wooldridge, 2009). The existence of serial 
correlation in panel data yields smaller coefficients of standard error and higher R-squared 
values. In this study, the Wooldridge test was applied to investigate whether serial correlation 
exists within the FE model (Wooldridge, 2009). Stata 14 command ‘xtserial’ was applied to 
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investigate this issue of serial correlation. The null hypotheses (H0) of the Wooldridge test 
assumes that serial correlation does not exist. Therefore, in order to reject the null hypotheses, 
the Wooldridge value should be less than 5%.  
The presence of heteroscedasticity in the panel data is another issue that must be considered. 
In panel data regressions, the standard errors component of the model assumes that regression 
disturbance is homoscedastic and thus has the same variance across time and entities (Baltagi, 
2001). However, this might be a restrictive assumption when using panel data, as cross-
sectional units may vary in size, thus leading to variation (Baltagi, 2001). As a result, the 
standard errors of the panel estimations will be biased unless a researcher corrects for the 
possible presence of heteroscedasticity. According to Baltagi (2001), large panels with longer 
time-spans have more opportunity to become overwhelmed with heteroscedasticity (Baltagi, 
2001). In this study, the Breusch-Pagan estimator was applied in an effort to investigate the 
presence of heteroscedasticity. The null hypothesis of the Breusch-Pagan test assumes that FE 
models of study have constant variance levels. Therefore, in order to reject the null hypothesis 
of this test, the finding should have a value of less than 5%.  
The results of both tests were less than 5%, which indicates that serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity exist in the study’s panel data. In response, a ‘cluster’ command was applied 
to resolve the serial correlation concern, and a ‘robust’ command was applied to settle the 
heteroscedasticity issue; thus, standard errors were normalised in all models, as per the 
examples of Aggarwal et al. (2011) and Ferreira and Matos (2008). 
6.6. Empirical Models 
 
The empirical models used in this research study were divided into two groups. The first group 
was used to investigate the role of institutional investors in the improvement of corporate board 
attributes, while the second group was utilised to examine the role of institutional investors in 
the improvement of board diversity. All the independent variables were lagged by one period 
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so that the relationship between the explanatory variables and the future board attributes could 
be tested. All models are described below in the following two sections.  
6.6.1. Models for Institutional Investors and Board Attributes 
Five main models were constructed to investigate the role of institutional investors in the 
improvement of corporate board attributes: the Board Attributes Index, the composition of a 
board and its key subcommittees, the activity of a board and its key subcommittees, board 
entrenchment and board busyness. These models are as follows: 
Model 1is used to test the association between institutional investors and Board Attributes 
Index (GOV14), and it considers the following hypothesis: 
H1. The higher the presence of institutional investors, the better the corporate governance in 
their investee firms. 
(𝐺𝑂𝑉14) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1
(
  
 
𝐼𝑂 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿(𝑡−1)
𝐼𝑂 𝐹𝑂𝑅(𝑡−1)
𝐼𝑂 𝐷𝑂𝑀(𝑡−1)
𝐼𝑂 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑀𝑂(𝑡−1)
𝐼𝑂 𝐶𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐿(𝑡−1) )
  
 
+
(
 
 
𝛽2 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸(𝑡−1) + 𝛽3 𝑆𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻(𝑡−1) + 𝛽4 𝐿𝐸𝑉(𝑡−1) + 𝛽5 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻(𝑡−1) + 𝛽6 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋(𝑡−1)
+𝛽7 𝑀𝐵(𝑡−1) +  𝛽8 𝑅𝑂𝐴(𝑡−1) + 𝛽9 𝑃𝑃𝐸(𝑡−1) + 𝛽10 𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑌𝑆𝑇(𝑡−1) + 𝛽11𝐴𝐷𝑅(𝑡−1) +
𝛽12 𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸(𝑡−1)𝛽13 𝑃𝑅𝐸 − 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆(𝑡−1) +  𝛽14 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆(𝑡−1) +  𝛽15 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 − 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆(𝑡−1)
+𝛽16 𝐼𝑂(𝑡−1) + 𝛽17 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸(𝑡−1) +  𝛽18 𝐹𝐴𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑌(𝑡−1) +  𝛽19 𝑊𝐼𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑌(𝑡−1) +  𝜀 )
 
 
    
                                                                                                                              (Equation 1) 
 
Model 2 is used to test the association between institutional investors and the independence of 
the board and its key subcommittees, and it considers the following two hypotheses: 
H2a. The higher the presence of institutional investors, the higher the independence of the 
board. 
H2b. The higher the presence of institutional investors, the higher the independence of the 
board’s key subcommittees. 
(
𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐷
𝐴𝐶 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐷
𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐷
𝑁𝐶 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐷
) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(
𝐼𝑂 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿(𝑡−1)
𝐼𝑂 𝐹𝑂𝑅(𝑡−1)
𝐼𝑂 𝐷𝑂𝑀(𝑡−1)
)+
(
 
 
𝛽2 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸(𝑡−1) + 𝛽3 𝑆𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻(𝑡−1) + 𝛽4 𝐿𝐸𝑉(𝑡−1) + 𝛽5 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻(𝑡−1) + 𝛽6 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋(𝑡−1)
+𝛽7 𝑀𝐵(𝑡−1) +  𝛽8 𝑅𝑂𝐴(𝑡−1) + 𝛽9 𝑃𝑃𝐸(𝑡−1) + 𝛽10 𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑌𝑆𝑇(𝑡−1) + 𝛽11𝐴𝐷𝑅(𝑡−1) +
𝛽12 𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸(𝑡−1)𝛽13 𝑃𝑅𝐸 − 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆(𝑡−1) +  𝛽14 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆(𝑡−1) +  𝛽15 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 − 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆(𝑡−1)
+𝛽16 𝐼𝑂(𝑡−1) + 𝛽17 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸(𝑡−1) +  𝛽18 𝐹𝐴𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑌(𝑡−1) +  𝛽19 𝑊𝐼𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑌(𝑡−1) +  𝜀 )
 
 
                          
                                                                                                                   (Equation 2) 
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Model 3 is used to test the association between institutional investors and the activity of the 
board and its key subcommittees, and it considers the following two hypotheses: 
H3a. The higher the presence of institutional investors, the higher the activity of the board.      
H3b. The higher the presence of institutional investors, the higher the activity of the board’s 
key subcommittees.  
(
𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷 𝑀𝐹
𝐴𝐶 𝑀𝐹
𝐶𝐶 𝑀𝐹
𝑁𝐶 𝑀𝐹
) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(
𝐼𝑂 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿(𝑡−1)
𝐼𝑂 𝐹𝑂𝑅(𝑡−1)
𝐼𝑂 𝐷𝑂𝑀(𝑡−1)
)+
(
 
 
𝛽2 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸(𝑡−1) + 𝛽3 𝑆𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻(𝑡−1) + 𝛽4 𝐿𝐸𝑉(𝑡−1) + 𝛽5 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻(𝑡−1) + 𝛽6 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋(𝑡−1)
+𝛽7 𝑀𝐵(𝑡−1) +  𝛽8 𝑅𝑂𝐴(𝑡−1) + 𝛽9 𝑃𝑃𝐸(𝑡−1) + 𝛽10 𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑌𝑆𝑇(𝑡−1) + 𝛽11𝐴𝐷𝑅(𝑡−1) +
𝛽12 𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸(𝑡−1)𝛽13 𝑃𝑅𝐸 − 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆(𝑡−1) +  𝛽14 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆(𝑡−1) +  𝛽15 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 − 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆(𝑡−1)
+𝛽16 𝐼𝑂(𝑡−1) + 𝛽17 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸(𝑡−1) +  𝛽18 𝐹𝐴𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑌(𝑡−1) +  𝛽19 𝑊𝐼𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑌(𝑡−1) +  𝜀 )
 
 
    
                                                                                                                             (Equation 3) 
Model 4 is used to test the association between institutional investors and board entrenchment, 
and it considers the following hypothesis: 
H4. The higher the presence of institutional investors, the lower the board entrenchment. 
(
CEO TENURE
BOARD TENURE
) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(
𝐼𝑂 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿(𝑡−1)
𝐼𝑂 𝐹𝑂𝑅(𝑡−1)
𝐼𝑂 𝐷𝑂𝑀(𝑡−1)
)+
(
 
 
𝛽2 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸(𝑡−1) + 𝛽3 𝑆𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻(𝑡−1) + 𝛽4 𝐿𝐸𝑉(𝑡−1) + 𝛽5 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻(𝑡−1) + 𝛽6 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋(𝑡−1)
+𝛽7 𝑀𝐵(𝑡−1) +  𝛽8 𝑅𝑂𝐴(𝑡−1) + 𝛽9 𝑃𝑃𝐸(𝑡−1) + 𝛽10 𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑌𝑆𝑇(𝑡−1) + 𝛽11𝐴𝐷𝑅(𝑡−1) +
𝛽12 𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸(𝑡−1)𝛽13 𝑃𝑅𝐸 − 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆(𝑡−1) +  𝛽14 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆(𝑡−1) +  𝛽15 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 − 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆(𝑡−1)
+𝛽16 𝐼𝑂(𝑡−1) + 𝛽17 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸(𝑡−1) +  𝛽18 𝐹𝐴𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑌(𝑡−1) +  𝛽19 𝑊𝐼𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑌(𝑡−1) +  𝜀 )
 
 
    
                                                                                                                             (Equation 4) 
 
Model 5 is used to test the association between institutional investors and board busyness, and 
it considers the following hypothesis: 
H5. The higher the presence of institutional investors, the lower the board busyness. 
(
BUSY BOARD
BUSY BOARD %
) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(
𝐼𝑂 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿(𝑡−1)
𝐼𝑂 𝐹𝑂𝑅(𝑡−1)
𝐼𝑂 𝐷𝑂𝑀(𝑡−1)
)+
(
 
 
𝛽2 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸(𝑡−1) + 𝛽3 𝑆𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻(𝑡−1) + 𝛽4 𝐿𝐸𝑉(𝑡−1) + 𝛽5 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻(𝑡−1) + 𝛽6 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋(𝑡−1)
+𝛽7 𝑀𝐵(𝑡−1) +  𝛽8 𝑅𝑂𝐴(𝑡−1) + 𝛽9 𝑃𝑃𝐸(𝑡−1) + 𝛽10 𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑌𝑆𝑇(𝑡−1) + 𝛽11𝐴𝐷𝑅(𝑡−1) +
𝛽12 𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸(𝑡−1)𝛽13 𝑃𝑅𝐸 − 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆(𝑡−1) +  𝛽14 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆(𝑡−1) +  𝛽15 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 − 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆(𝑡−1)
+𝛽16 𝐼𝑂(𝑡−1) + 𝛽17 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸(𝑡−1) +  𝛽18 𝐹𝐴𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑌(𝑡−1) +  𝛽19 𝑊𝐼𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑌(𝑡−1) +  𝜀 )
 
 
    
                                                                                                                  (Equation 5) 
 
6.6.2. Models for Institutional Investors and Board Diversity 
 
Five main models were constructed to investigate the role of institutional investors in the 
improvement of corporate board diversity: the Board Diversity Index, board gender diversity, 
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board age diversity, board nationality diversity, and board education diversity. These models 
are as follows: 
Model 6 is used to test the association between institutional investors and the Board Diversity 
Index (BDI16), and it considers the following hypothesis: 
H6. The higher the presence of institutional investors, the higher the diversity of the board. 
(𝐵𝐷𝐼16) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1
(
  
 
𝐼𝑂 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿(𝑡−1)
𝐼𝑂 𝐹𝑂𝑅(𝑡−1)
𝐼𝑂 𝐷𝑂𝑀(𝑡−1)
𝐼𝑂 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑀𝑂(𝑡−1)
𝐼𝑂 𝐶𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐿(𝑡−1) )
  
 
+
(
 
 
𝛽2 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸(𝑡−1) + 𝛽3 𝑆𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻(𝑡−1) + 𝛽4 𝐿𝐸𝑉(𝑡−1) + 𝛽5 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻(𝑡−1) + 𝛽6 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋(𝑡−1)
+𝛽7 𝑀𝐵(𝑡−1) +  𝛽8 𝑅𝑂𝐴(𝑡−1) + 𝛽9 𝑃𝑃𝐸(𝑡−1) + 𝛽10 𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑌𝑆𝑇(𝑡−1) + 𝛽11𝐴𝐷𝑅(𝑡−1) +
𝛽12 𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸(𝑡−1)𝛽13 𝑃𝑅𝐸 − 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆(𝑡−1) +  𝛽14 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆(𝑡−1) +  𝛽15 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 − 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆(𝑡−1)
+𝛽16 𝐼𝑂(𝑡−1) + 𝛽17 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸(𝑡−1) +  𝛽18 𝐹𝐴𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑌(𝑡−1) +  𝛽19 𝑊𝐼𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑌(𝑡−1) +  𝜀 )
 
 
    
                                                                                                                  (Equation 6) 
 
Model 7 is used to test the association between institutional investors and board gender 
diversity, and it considers the following hypothesis: 
H7. The higher the presence of institutional investors, the higher the gender diversity of the 
board. 
(𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅 𝐷𝐼𝑉) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(
𝐼𝑂 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿(𝑡−1)
𝐼𝑂 𝐹𝑂𝑅(𝑡−1)
𝐼𝑂 𝐷𝑂𝑀(𝑡−1)
)+
(
 
 
𝛽2 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸(𝑡−1) + 𝛽3 𝑆𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻(𝑡−1) + 𝛽4 𝐿𝐸𝑉(𝑡−1) + 𝛽5 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻(𝑡−1) + 𝛽6 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋(𝑡−1)
+𝛽7 𝑀𝐵(𝑡−1) +  𝛽8 𝑅𝑂𝐴(𝑡−1) + 𝛽9 𝑃𝑃𝐸(𝑡−1) + 𝛽10 𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑌𝑆𝑇(𝑡−1) + 𝛽11𝐴𝐷𝑅(𝑡−1) +
𝛽12 𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸(𝑡−1)𝛽13 𝑃𝑅𝐸 − 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆(𝑡−1) +  𝛽14 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆(𝑡−1) +  𝛽15 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 − 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆(𝑡−1)
+𝛽16 𝐼𝑂(𝑡−1) + 𝛽17 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸(𝑡−1) +  𝛽18 𝐹𝐴𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑌(𝑡−1) +  𝛽19 𝑊𝐼𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑌(𝑡−1) +  𝜀 )
 
 
    
       (Equation 7) 
Model 8 is used to test the association between institutional investors and board age diversity, 
and it considers the following hypothesis: 
H8. The higher the presence of institutional investors, the higher the diversity of directors’ 
ages. 
 
(𝐴𝐺𝐸 𝐷𝐼𝑉) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(
𝐼𝑂 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿(𝑡−1)
𝐼𝑂 𝐹𝑂𝑅(𝑡−1)
𝐼𝑂 𝐷𝑂𝑀(𝑡−1)
)+
(
 
 
𝛽2 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸(𝑡−1) + 𝛽3 𝑆𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻(𝑡−1) + 𝛽4 𝐿𝐸𝑉(𝑡−1) + 𝛽5 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻(𝑡−1) + 𝛽6 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋(𝑡−1)
+𝛽7 𝑀𝐵(𝑡−1) +  𝛽8 𝑅𝑂𝐴(𝑡−1) + 𝛽9 𝑃𝑃𝐸(𝑡−1) + 𝛽10 𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑌𝑆𝑇(𝑡−1) + 𝛽11𝐴𝐷𝑅(𝑡−1) +
𝛽12 𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸(𝑡−1)𝛽13 𝑃𝑅𝐸 − 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆(𝑡−1) +  𝛽14 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆(𝑡−1) +  𝛽15 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 − 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆(𝑡−1)
+𝛽16 𝐼𝑂(𝑡−1) + 𝛽17 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸(𝑡−1) +  𝛽18 𝐹𝐴𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑌(𝑡−1) +  𝛽19 𝑊𝐼𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑌(𝑡−1) +  𝜀 )
 
 
     
                                  (Equation 8) 
 
Model 9 is used to test the association between institutional investors and board nationality 
diversity, and it considers the following hypothesis: 
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H9. The higher the presence of institutional investors, the higher the nationality diversity of 
the board. 
(𝑁𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 𝐷𝐼𝑉) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(
𝐼𝑂 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿(𝑡−1)
𝐼𝑂 𝐹𝑂𝑅(𝑡−1)
𝐼𝑂 𝐷𝑂𝑀(𝑡−1)
)+
(
 
 
𝛽2 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸(𝑡−1) + 𝛽3 𝑆𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻(𝑡−1) + 𝛽4 𝐿𝐸𝑉(𝑡−1) + 𝛽5 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻(𝑡−1) + 𝛽6 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋(𝑡−1)
+𝛽7 𝑀𝐵(𝑡−1) +  𝛽8 𝑅𝑂𝐴(𝑡−1) + 𝛽9 𝑃𝑃𝐸(𝑡−1) + 𝛽10 𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑌𝑆𝑇(𝑡−1) + 𝛽11𝐴𝐷𝑅(𝑡−1) +
𝛽12 𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸(𝑡−1)𝛽13 𝑃𝑅𝐸 − 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆(𝑡−1) +  𝛽14 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆(𝑡−1) +  𝛽15 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 − 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆(𝑡−1)
+𝛽16 𝐼𝑂(𝑡−1) + 𝛽17 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸(𝑡−1) +  𝛽18 𝐹𝐴𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑌(𝑡−1) +  𝛽19 𝑊𝐼𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑌(𝑡−1) +  𝜀 )
 
 
    
                                 (Equation 9) 
Model 10 is used to test the association between institutional investors and board education 
diversity, and it considers the following hypothesis: 
H10. The higher the presence of institutional investors, the higher the education diversity of 
the board. 
(𝐸𝐷𝑈 𝐷𝐼𝑉) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(
𝐼𝑂 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿(𝑡−1)
𝐼𝑂 𝐹𝑂𝑅(𝑡−1)
𝐼𝑂 𝐷𝑂𝑀(𝑡−1)
)+
(
 
 
𝛽2 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸(𝑡−1) + 𝛽3 𝑆𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻(𝑡−1) + 𝛽4 𝐿𝐸𝑉(𝑡−1) + 𝛽5 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻(𝑡−1) + 𝛽6 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋(𝑡−1)
+𝛽7 𝑀𝐵(𝑡−1) +  𝛽8 𝑅𝑂𝐴(𝑡−1) + 𝛽9 𝑃𝑃𝐸(𝑡−1) + 𝛽10 𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑌𝑆𝑇(𝑡−1) + 𝛽11𝐴𝐷𝑅(𝑡−1) +
𝛽12 𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸(𝑡−1)𝛽13 𝑃𝑅𝐸 − 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆(𝑡−1) +  𝛽14 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆(𝑡−1) +  𝛽15 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 − 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆(𝑡−1)
+𝛽16 𝐼𝑂(𝑡−1) + 𝛽17 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸(𝑡−1) +  𝛽18 𝐹𝐴𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑌(𝑡−1) +  𝛽19 𝑊𝐼𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑌(𝑡−1) +  𝜀 )
 
 
                   
                               (Equation 10) 
 
6.7. Robustness Tests 
Endogeneity concerns are the most-often-encountered challenge in studies of corporate 
governance (Boyd et al., 2017; Wintoki et al., 2012). The presence of endogeneity in a research 
models can lead to ineffective results. In order to alleviate endogeneity concerns within the 
scope of this study, the study adopted various techniques, such as testing for reverse causality, 
applying a system GMM and adopting alternative means of measuring the dependent variables 
of the main models (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Greene, 2012; Wintoki et al., 2012) . All of 
these techniques are discussed and illustrated below, as are the specific endogeneity concerns 
they were meant to address. 
6.7.1. Reverse Causality 
According to Wintoki et al. (2012), simultaneity is one of the main sources of endogeneity. 
Simultaneity arises when the dependent variable and one or more of the independent variables 
are determined to be in equilibrium. Thus, it can be said that independent variables can 
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occasionally cause dependent variables; however, the reverse is also true, as sometimes a 
dependent variable can bring about the independent variable (Roberts and Whited, 2012). In 
the context of this study, the relationship between institutional investors and board attributes 
might not necessarily be driven by the activism of institutional investors to improve these 
attributes; there is also the possibility that institutional investors may be attracted to firms with 
good board structures (see Aggarwal et al., 2011).  
Furthermore, unobserved heterogeneity is another source of endogeneity; the presence of such 
heterogeneity may imply that the relationship between one or more variables in a model is 
driven by another variable that the researcher has not observed (Wintoki et al., 2012). The main 
concern associated with this type of endogeneity is that such unobserved variables can 
influence error terms even if they are not placed as independent variables. In the context of this 
study, institutional investors might be associated with various unobserved firm characteristics 
that may influence the corporate board structures of their investee firm (see Aggarwal et al., 
2011). 
To address these issues of reverse causality and unobserved heterogeneity, change score 
regressions were used to examine whether changes to institutional ownership drive changes in 
corporate board characteristics or whether the opposite holds true (see Lewis-Beck et al., 2004). 
Additionally, this technique has the advantage of reducing any measurement errors that may 
arise from the presence of unobserved or omitted variables (Lewis-Beck et al., 2004). 
Furthermore, this study also utilised FE regression models to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity (Greene, 2012). 
6.7.2. Dynamic Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
Another concern related to endogeneity involves the issue of dynamic endogeneity (Wintoki et 
al., 2012). This type of endogeneity refers to the possibility that a firm’s current actions will 
affect its control environment and future performance, which will in turn affect its future 
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control environment (see Wintoki et al., 2012). In the context of this study, due to the dynamic 
relationship between institutional investors and board attributes—and because of the potential 
for reverse causality between institutional ownership and board attributes as well as the 
possibility of other underlying and unobservable board attribute factors—the GMM was used 
to estimate the panel data parameters with endogenous explanatory variables (Roodman, 2006; 
Blundell and Bond, 1998; Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
According to Roodman (2009), this type of estimation is particularly suitable for panels with 
small T and large N values, which is the case in this study. The study therefore applied a two-
step dynamic panel GMM estimator, which is also widely-known as a system GMM (Arellano 
and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
According to Wintoki et al. (2012), the validity of a system GMM application is conditional 
on two specification tests, which are: testing the autocorrelation of the differenced residuals 
and testing for the exogenism of instrumental variables. The autocorrelation of the differenced 
residuals is typically investigated using the Arellano-Bond test, or AR (2), which has a null 
hypothesis of ‘no serial correlation’. By default, STATA reports two values of the Arellano-
Bond test, AR (1) and AR (2). AR (1) tests for first-order differences in residuals and normally 
rejects the null hypothesis, whereas AR (2) tests for second-order serial correlations between 
the residuals. The other specification test, the Hansen test, investigates whether instrumental 
variables are exogenous; this test has a null hypothesis of ‘the instruments as a group are 
exogenous’. Therefore, the validity of the GMM results are not efficient unless these two tests 
are satisfied. 
6.7.3. Alternative Measures 
Several scholars criticised studies that depended solely on corporate governance indices to 
draw conclusions (see as an example Daines et al., 2010). Instead, they recommended 
considering alternative measures to verify the results. Hence, this study utilizes the individual 
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attributes of the Board Attributes Index (GOV14) as alternative measures. As these individual 
attributes are binary variables, the study applied probit regression models40 to investigate the 
role of institutional investors in the improvement of various index attributes. These attributes 
which represent the dependent variables, are related to board and its key subcommittees 
composition (items 2, 5, 6 and 7), board activity (item 8), board entrenchment (item 9), and 
board busyness (item 12).  
6.8. Chapter Summary 
This chapter provided a detailed description of the research methodology considered in this 
study. The chapter first described the sample criteria, data sources and the research period. As 
explained, the sample covers all firms listed in the major indices of the 15 countries under study 
for the period of 2006 to 2012. Furthermore, the chapter explained that this study employed 
the use of secondary data, which were extracted from several sources available to the 
University of East Anglia, namely the BoardEX, ThomsonOne, Worldscope and Worldbank 
databases, as well as various corporate governance annual reports. Additionally, this chapter 
detailed the dependent, independent and control variables considered in the utilised models. 
Then, the chapter detailed the selection of the major estimation method, the ‘fixed effect 
regressions’ model, used in this study. Next, the empirical models, which were classified into 
two groups (the board attributes model and the board diversity model), were illustrated. The 
chapter concluded with an identification of the robustness tests used to confirm the results of 
the study. These tests were, primarily, the change score model, system GMM, and various 
alternative measures. 
 
 
                                                          
40 According to Gujarati (2011), the probit model is recommended over the logit model when the error term has a 
normal distribution, which is the case with the models used in this study. 
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Chapter 7 
7.0 Research Results and Analysis: Institutional Investors and Board Attributes 
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides an analysis of the results of the institutional investors’ role in the 
improvement of board attributes. This chapter begins by outlining the descriptive statistics of 
the variables used in this study. This is followed by an examination of the measures used to 
test the correlations between variables. The empirical results of these measures are then 
described and discussed, and finally, the results of the robustness tests are illustrated. 
Accordingly, this chapter is organised as follows: section 7.2 provides a summary of the 
descriptive statistics, section 7.3 describes the correlation analysis, section 7.4 outlines the 
empirical results of an examination of the role of institutional investors in the improvement of 
board attributes, section 7.5 discusses the robustness tests and section 7.6 offers a chapter 
summary. 
7.2. Summary of the Descriptive Statistics 
This section highlights the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables (board attributes), 
independent variables (institutional investors) and control variables (firm and country 
characteristics). Table 7.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study’s 
empirical models. These descriptive statistics were applied to explore the means, standard 
deviations, minimum and maximum data points and total observations. 
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Table 7.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean SD MIN MAX No. of Observations 
Dependent Variables: Board Attributes 
GOV14 10 2 3 14 2,586 
INED BOARD 64% 22% 0% 100% 2,586 
INED AC 85% 27% 0% 100% 2,586 
INED CC 80% 30% 0% 100% 2,586 
INED NC 71% 34% 0% 100% 2,586 
BOARD MF 10 4 4 31 2,586 
AC MF 5 3 0 20 2,586 
CC MF 4 2 0 14 2,586 
NC MF 4 3 0 14 2,586 
CEO TENURE  5.0 4.8 0 28.9 2,586 
Board TENURE 6.0 2.7 0 15.8 2,586 
BUSY BOARD 2.6 0.9 0 7 2,586 
BUSY BOARD % 43% 25% 0% 100% 2,586 
Independent Variables: Institutional Ownership 
IO TOTAL 36% 23% 1% 99% 2,586 
IO FOR 20% 16% 1% 99% 2,586 
IO DOM 16% 17% 1% 99% 2,586 
IO COMMON 28% 23% 1% 99% 2,586 
IO CIVIL 8% 11% 1% 68% 2,586 
Control Variables: Firm and Country Characteristics 
FSIZE 7.0 0.6 5 8.6 2,586 
SGROWTH 12% 24% -43% 116% 2,586 
LEV 26% 15% 0% 67% 2,586 
CASH 11% 10% 0% 62% 2,586 
CAPEX 6% 5% 0% 26% 2,586 
MB 3.2 3.0 0.30 20.2 2,586 
ROA 11% 7% -9% 36% 2,586 
PPE 35% 24% 1% 90% 2,586 
ANALYST 18 9 0 55 2,586 
ADR 0.19 0.39 0 1 2,586 
RULE 91% 12% 52% 100% 2,586 
Pre-Crisis 0.37 0.48 0 1 2,586 
Crisis 0.45 0.50 0 1 2,586 
Post-Crisis 0.18 0.39 0 1 2,586 
FAMILY 20% 40% 0 1 2,586 
STATE 9% 27% 0 1 2,586 
IO 3% 17% 0 1 2,586 
WIDELY 68% 46% 0 1 2,586 
GOV14= Board attributes index, INED BOARD = Board independence, INED AC = Audit committee Independence, INED CC= 
Compensation committee independence, INED NC = Nomination committee independence, BOARD MF = Board meeting frequency, AC 
MF = Audit committee meeting frequency, CC MF = Compensation committee meeting frequency, NC MF = Nomination committee meeting 
frequency, CEO TENURE = CEO tenure,  Board TENURE = Board tenure, BUSY BOARD = Busy board,  BUSY BOARD % = 
Busy Board %, , IO TOTAL = Total institutional investors,  IO FOR = Foreign institutional investors, IO DOM = Domestic institutional 
investors, IO COMMON = Common law institutional investors,  IO CIVIL = Civil law institutional investors,  FSIZE = Firm size,  
SGROWTH = Sales growth,  LEV = Leverage, Cash = Cash,  CAPEX = Capital Expenditure,  MB = Market-to-book value,  ROA = Return 
on Asset,  PPE = Property, plant and equipment, ANALYST = Analyst following,  ADR = Cross listing dummy, Rule = Rule of law, CRISIS 
= Crisis dummy,  POST-CRISIS = Post crisis dummy,  FAMILY = Family controlling at 20%,  STATE = State controlling at 20%, IO = 
Institutional investor controlling at 20%, WIDELY = Widely held at 20%. 
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Table 7.1 demonstrates that the Board Attributes Index (GOV14) ranges from a minimum of 3 
to a maximum of 14 for the entire sample. Figure 7.1 shows that on average, the countries with 
the highest GOV14 scores in 2012 were Ireland (90.8%), Canada (90.0%), the UK (88.1%), 
Australia (87.7%) and Finland (84.0%). Conversely, the countries with the lowest GOV14 
scores were India (52.3%), Denmark (62.6%), France (64.7%), Belgium (67.0%) and Italy 
(67.9%).  
Figure 7.1 Board Attributes Index (GOV14) by Country and Year (2006–2012) 
 
Figure 7.2 displays the weighted averages of the Board Attributes Index (GOV14) for firms 
located in both civil law countries and common law countries. Overall, the figure illustrates 
that on average, common law countries had more favourable board attributes than did their 
civil law counterparts.  
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   Figure 7.2 Weighted Averages of the Board Attributes Index (GOV14) 
 
Additionally, Table 7.1 shows that the independence levels of boards and their key 
subcommittees (audit, compensation and nomination) had average values of 64%, 85%, 80% 
and 71%, respectively. The line graph further indicates that board independence steadily 
increased throughout the study period (2006–2012) (see Figure 7.3). The same trend was 
observed with regard to the independence of subcommittees; notably, audit committees 
typically retained high levels of independence and nomination committees demonstrated low 
independence, while the independence of compensation committees lied somewhere in 
between. 
Figure 7.3 Weighted Averages of Corporate Board and Key Subcommittee Composition 
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Table 7.1 also demonstrates that the average number of meetings held at the board and key 
subcommittee levels (audit, compensation and nomination) throughout the study period was 
10, 5, 4 and 4, respectively. Figure 7.4 presents the weighted averages of corporate board and 
key subcommittee activity; as such, the graph indicates that in this sample, the number of 
meetings held decreased slightly to just under nine in 2010, though in 2012, this figure 
reclaimed its previous level of 10 annual meetings. However, meeting frequency at the 
subcommittee level held steady throughout the study period (see Figure 7.4). 
Figure 7.4 Weighted Averages of Corporate Board and Key Subcommittee Activity 
 
 
Table 7.1 further reveals that for the entire sample, the average length of CEO tenure was five 
years, while the average length of board tenure was six years. Figure 7.5 displays the weighted 
averages of the board entrenchment variables. Thus, this graph shows that there was an overall 
slight increase in both CEO tenure and board tenure. CEO tenure rose from roughly 4.6 to 
nearly 5.8 years, while board tenure climbed from approximately 5.8 to 6.2 years. These 
increases in both measures primarily occurred after the year 2008 (see Figure 7.5). 
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Figure 7.5 Weighted Averages of the Board Entrenchment Variables 
 
 
Table 7.1 also demonstrates that the average number of directorships held by each INED in the 
sample was 2.6; furthermore, an average of 43% of the boards in the sample were classified as 
‘busy’. Figures 7.6 and 7.7 show the weighted averages of the average number of directorships 
held by INEDs as well as the percentages of INEDs who were deemed ‘busy’. Both figures 
show that there was an overall slight decline in board busyness in the sample over the course 
of the research period. Figure 7.6 illustrates that the average number of directorships held by 
INEDs declined from 2.7 to roughly 2.5. Furthermore, Figure 7.7 indicates that INED busyness 
decreased from 46% to 41% during the years under study. 
Figure 7.6 Weighted Average of the Average Board Directorships Held by INEDs 
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Figure 7.7 Weighted Average of the Percentage of ‘Busy’ INEDs 
 
 
 
Table 7.1 further demonstrates that the level of institutional investor presence ranged from 1% 
to 99% for all types—with the exception of civil law institutional investors, for whom figures 
ranged from 1% to 68%. The average number of holdings controlled by total, foreign, domestic, 
common law and civil law institutional investors in the sample countries were 36%, 20%, 16%, 
28% and 8%, respectively. Figure 7.8 indicates that on average, the presence of all types of 
institutional investors rose from 2006 to 2008, at which point their presence began to decline 
(until 2010). The onset of the financial crisis could be the cause of this decline. However, this 
graph shows that after 2010, institutional investors of all types began to reclaim their previous 
levels of investment in the stock markets of the sample countries. 
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 Figure 7.8 Weighted Averages of Institutional Ownership 
 
 
Table 7.1 also presents the statistics of the control variables. The average firm size was 7, and 
sales growth ranged from -43% to 116%, with an average of 12%. Figures for leverage, cash, 
and capital expenditures had a mean value of 26%, 11% and 6%, respectively. Table 7.1 also 
demonstrates that market-to-book value had a mean value of 3.2 and return on assets figures 
ranged from -9% to 36%, while property, plant and equipment scores ranged from 1% to 90%. 
The average level of analyst coverage for the entire sample was 18, with a minimum of 0 
analysts following and a maximum of 55. In this sample, the average figure for companies with 
an ADR listing was 19%, and the rule of law index ranged from 52% to 100%. Table 7.1 also 
demonstrates that 37% of the total observations were classified as occurring during pre-crisis 
periods, 45% occurred during times of crisis and 18% occurred during post-crisis periods. With 
regard to the statistics for ultimate ownership, an average of 68% of companies in this sample 
were widely held, 20% were family-owned, 9% were state-owned and 3% were owned by 
institutional investors. 
7.3. Correlation Analysis 
This section describes the Pearson correlation matrix that exists between governance 
characteristics (board attributes), institutional ownership and the control variables. The main 
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aim of the correlation matrix is to investigate the possible presence of high correlation among 
the independent variables. When conducting this test, a researcher allocates a single number 
that measures the extent to which any two variables are related; in so doing, the direction of 
this relationship can be illustrated. The problem of collinearity, however, means that two 
variables have a relatively perfect linear correlation, which in turn renders the model estimation 
meaningless and difficult to interpret. According to Gujarati (2004), if the correlation between 
two variables exceeds 80%, the validity of the results may be threatened. Table 7.2 shows that 
the highest absolute correlation between explanatory variables (IO Total and IO Common) was 
89%—well above the 80% threshold assigned to indicate a multi-collinearity threat (Gujarati, 
2004). However, these two variables were not combined in any of the regressions used in this 
analysis. All correlations between other independent variables fell below this threshold (see 
Table 7.2).  
An alternative measure used to describe the correlation issue between independent variables is 
to compute the variance inflation factor (VIF), which is calculated as follows:  
𝑉𝐼𝐹 =
1
Tolerance
 , where tolerance = 1-R2, and R2 is the coefficient of determinations. 
Studenmund (2001) argued that the VIF value should not exceed 5; a higher value may be an 
indication that multi-collinearity threats exist within the model. In order to calculate the VIF 
value, an OLS model (shown below) was applied using the Board Attributes Index (GOV14) as 
a dependent variable. Table 7.3 illustrates the results of this test and shows that multi-
collinearity threats were not a factor in the utilised models, as all values were less than 5. 
 
(𝐺𝑂𝑉14) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐼𝑂 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿(𝑡−1)) +
(
 
 
𝛽2 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸(𝑡−1) + 𝛽3 𝑆𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻(𝑡−1) + 𝛽4 𝐿𝐸𝑉(𝑡−1) + 𝛽5 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻(𝑡−1) + 𝛽6 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋(𝑡−1)
+𝛽7 𝑀𝐵(𝑡−1) +  𝛽8 𝑅𝑂𝐴(𝑡−1) + 𝛽9 𝑃𝑃𝐸(𝑡−1) + 𝛽10 𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑌𝑆𝑇(𝑡−1) + 𝛽11𝐴𝐷𝑅(𝑡−1) +
𝛽12 𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸(𝑡−1)𝛽13 𝑃𝑅𝐸 − 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆(𝑡−1) +  𝛽14 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆(𝑡−1) +  𝛽15 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 − 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆(𝑡−1)
+𝛽16 𝐼𝑂(𝑡−1) + 𝛽17 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸(𝑡−1) +  𝛽18 𝐹𝐴𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑌(𝑡−1) +  𝛽19 𝑊𝐼𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑌(𝑡−1) +
 𝜀 )
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Table 7.2 Pearson Correlation Matrix 
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GOV14 1.000                            
INED 
BOARD 
0.644 
 
 
1.000                          
INED AC 0.594 0.602 1.000                        
INED CC 0.686 0.621 0.647 1.000                      
INED NC 0.653 0.561 0.475 0.711 1.000                    
BOARD MF 0.117 0.067 -0.004 0.070 0.041 1.000                  
AC MF 0.078 0.051 0.170 0.160 0.123 0.266 1.000                
CC MF 0.325 0.168 0.222 0.328 0.308 0.259 0.430 1.000              
NC MF 0.220 0.115 0.088 0.190 0.366 0.166 0.323 0.663 1.000            
CEO 
TENURE  
-0.013 -0.039 0.033 0.044 0.038 -0.127 -0.081 -0.052 -0.068 1.000          
BOARD 
TENURE 
-0.031 -0.025 -0.009 -0.010 0.004 -0.171 -0.036 -0.049 -0.046 0.376 1.000        
BUSY 
BOARD 
-0.178 0.136 0.201 0.091 0.113 -0.116 0.032 -0.057 -0.041 -0.020 0.063 1.000      
BUSY 
BOARD % 
-0.124 0.158 0.190 0.120 0.152 -0.058 0.021 -0.012 -0.010 -0.047 0.025 0.825 1.000    
IO TOTAL 0.397 0.181 0.277 0.252 0.254 -0.040 -0.143 0.106 -0.016 0.056 0.000 -0.080 -0.027 1.000     
IO FOR 0.241 0.149 0.113 0.119 0.124 -0.053 -0.070 0.010 -0.042 0.047 0.059 -0.137 -0.105 0.702 1.000   
IO DOM 0.323 0.100 0.278 0.238 0.232 -0.005 -0.125 0.144 0.021 0.031 -0.063 0.015 0.057 0.732 0.039 1.000 
IO 
COMMON 
0.437 0.158 0.325 0.309 0.288 -0.050 -0.068 0.178 0.009 0.065 0.030 -0.067 -0.011 0.890 0.626 0.661 
IO CIVIL -0.090 0.040 -0.103 -0.126 -0.080 0.025 -0.154 -0.154 -0.052 -0.021 -0.072 -0.026 -0.033 0.227 0.162 0.152 
SIZE -0.049 0.012 0.045 0.125 0.123 0.069 0.335 0.253 0.242 -0.062 -0.014 0.196 0.203 -0.288 -0.272 -0.139 
SGROWTH -0.021 -0.061 -0.039 -0.030 -0.019 0.011 -0.008 -0.065 -0.060 0.016 -0.023 0.005 -0.006 0.008 0.028 -0.017 
LEV -0.114 -0.101 -0.122 -0.069 -0.073 0.050 -0.003 -0.014 -0.026 0.005 0.012 -0.122 -0.133 -0.027 -0.040 0.002 
CASH 0.002 -0.029 -0.012 -0.036 -0.024 -0.076 0.005 -0.067 -0.045 0.002 0.029 -0.012 -0.017 -0.025 0.062 -0.095 
CAPEX 0.017 0.023 -0.034 -0.016 0.002 -0.007 -0.015 -0.062 -0.024 0.007 -0.035 -0.024 -0.046 -0.073 -0.055 -0.049 
MB -0.030 -0.075 -0.029 -0.062 -0.060 -0.164 -0.123 -0.096 -0.056 0.024 0.012 0.039 0.010 0.057 0.013 0.065 
ROA -0.015 0.003 0.012 -0.037 -0.024 -0.165 -0.069 -0.064 -0.009 0.005 0.026 0.065 0.045 -0.014 -0.030 0.012 
PPE 0.131 0.108 0.058 0.080 0.110 0.087 0.071 0.082 0.029 -0.044 -0.098 -0.040 -0.075 0.000 -0.026 0.031 
ANALYST -0.218 -0.107 -0.071 -0.085 -0.096 -0.073 0.138 0.033 0.090 0.026 0.009 0.156 0.096 -0.204 -0.144 -0.142 
ADR 0.260 0.263 0.232 0.242 0.239 -0.018 0.240 0.187 0.130 0.007 0.105 0.095 0.147 0.183 0.107 0.154 
RULE 0.408 0.284 0.039 0.153 0.276 0.079 -0.282 0.109 0.113 0.006 -0.005 -0.165 -0.032 0.312 0.204 0.233 
PRE-CRISIS -0.111 -0.067 -0.120 -0.079 -0.076 0.053 -0.012 -0.041 -0.034 -0.083 -0.056 0.025 0.046 -0.016 -0.005 -0.020 
CRISIS 0.081 -0.023 0.055 0.055 0.020 -0.048 0.015 0.086 0.049 0.063 -0.019 -0.140 -0.114 0.055 0.054 0.032 
POST-
CRISIS 
0.035 0.114 0.079 0.028 0.069 -0.004 -0.005 -0.058 -0.021 0.023 0.095 0.149 0.088 -0.051 -0.064 -0.016 
FAMILY -0.273 -0.255 -0.177 -0.261 -0.194 -0.063 -0.048 -0.199 -0.107 -0.025 0.127 0.014 -0.031 -0.317 -0.190 -0.257 
STATE -0.167 -0.148 -0.155 -0.106 -0.207 0.181 0.198 0.057 0.021 -0.047 -0.206 -0.093 -0.099 -0.282 -0.193 -0.204 
IO -0.112 -0.163 -0.127 -0.114 -0.080 -0.057 -0.006 0.024 0.039 0.009 -0.023 -0.004 -0.024 0.037 0.022 0.044 
WIDELY 0.376 0.367 0.292 0.330 0.320 -0.034 -0.074 0.129 0.066 0.047 0.023 0.045 0.095 0.430 0.273 0.328 
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Table 7.2 continued 
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IO COMMON 1.000                                       
IO CIVIL -0.236 1.000                                     
SIZE -0.196 -0.190 1.000                                   
SGROWTH 0.031 -0.047 -0.043 1.000                                 
LEV -0.032 0.009 0.116 -0.049 1.000                               
CASH -0.030 0.006 -0.158 0.045 -0.279 1.000                             
CAPEX -0.019 -0.107 -0.021 0.095 0.055 -0.082 1.000                           
MB 0.086 -0.063 -0.308 0.106 0.029 0.186 0.030 1.000                         
ROA 0.012 -0.050 -0.218 0.113 -0.290 0.129 0.180 0.432 1.000                       
PPE 0.083 -0.169 0.137 0.071 0.175 -0.246 0.645 -0.103 0.028 1.000                     
ANALYST -0.224 0.050 0.372 -0.078 -0.076 0.080 -0.078 0.057 0.132 -0.167 1.000                   
ADR 0.264 -0.172 0.259 0.028 -0.057 -0.052 0.081 0.026 0.064 0.184 -0.012 1.000                 
RULE 0.205 0.218 -0.061 -0.043 -0.022 -0.041 -0.065 -0.036 -0.037 0.017 -0.268 0.136 1.000               
PRE-CRISIS -0.028 0.019 -0.048 0.177 0.038 -0.028 0.045 0.098 0.095 0.005 -0.149 0.012 0.058 1.000             
CRISIS 0.048 0.020 0.049 -0.171 0.019 0.028 -0.170 -0.075 -0.120 -0.127 0.105 -0.044 0.037 -0.690 1.000           
POST-CRISIS -0.027 -0.048 -0.003 -0.001 -0.072 -0.002 0.162 -0.026 0.035 0.158 0.050 0.042 -0.121 -0.362 -0.424 1.000         
FAMILY -0.273 -0.088 -0.027 0.020 0.018 0.002 0.005 -0.047 -0.019 -0.036 -0.037 -0.152 -0.171 0.009 0.008 -0.021 1.000       
STATE -0.266 -0.028 0.177 -0.017 0.039 -0.061 0.060 -0.092 -0.007 0.127 0.133 -0.130 -0.168 -0.005 0.005 0.000 -0.152 1.000     
IO -0.030 0.158 0.035 -0.014 0.090 -0.036 -0.053 -0.024 -0.027 0.011 0.045 -0.054 -0.013 0.022 0.023 -0.057 -0.085 -0.052 1.000   
WIDELY 0.406 0.036 -0.096 -0.002 -0.071 0.048 -0.022 0.105 0.030 -0.049 -0.064 0.229 0.253 -0.013 -0.018 0.038 -0.739 -0.451 -0.253 1.000 
The correlation coefficients at 5% are in bold. GOV14= Board attributes index, INED BOARD = Board independence, INED AC = Audit committee Independence, INED CC= Compensation committee independence, INED NC 
= Nomination committee independence, BOARD MF = Board meeting frequency, AC MF = Audit committee meeting frequency, CC MF = Compensation committee meeting frequency, NC MF = Nomination committee meeting 
frequency, CEO TENURE = CEO tenure,  Board TENURE = Board tenure, BUSY BOARD = Busy board,  BUSY BOARD % = Busy Board %, IO TOTAL = Total institutional investors,  IO FOR = Foreign institutional investors, 
IO DOM = Domestic institutional investors, IO COMMON = Common law institutional investors,  IO CIVIL = Civil law institutional investors,  FSIZE = Firm size,  SGROWTH = Sales growth,  LEV = Leverage, Cash = Cash,  
CAPEX = Capital Expenditure,  MB = Market-to-book value,  ROA = Return on Asset,  PPE = Property, plant and equipment, ANALYST = Analyst following,  ADR = Cross listing dummy, Rule = Rule of law, PRE-CRISIS= 
Pre-Crisis Dummy, CRISIS = Crisis dummy,  POST-CRISIS = Post crisis dummy,  FAMILY = Family controlling at 20%,  STATE = State controlling at 20%, IO = Institutional investor controlling at 20%, WIDELY = Widely 
held at 20%. 
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7.4. Institutional Investors and Board Attributes: Panel Data Analysis 
7.4.1. Board Attributes Index 
A firm fixed effects panel regression was applied to investigate the role of institutional 
ownership in corporate governance. The dependent variable was the Board Attributes Index, 
and the independent variable was institutional ownership (see Table 7.4). All independent 
variables were lagged by one period so that the relationship between explanatory variables and 
future board attributes could be tested. The regressions also included the control variables 
mentioned in the previous chapter. These regressions corrected for the standard errors that 
occur when observations are clustered at the firm level, as per the work of Aggarwal et al. 
(2011). 
Model 1 of Table 7.4 indicates that there was a positive and significant association between 
total institutional ownership and the Board Attributes Index (GOV14) at 5% (with coefficient = 
0.006, p-value = 0.033, and R-Squared value = 0.098). The results support those who find that 
Table 7.3 VIF Tests 
 VIF 1/VIF 
WIDELY 3.52 0.28 
FAMILY 2.86 0.35 
PPE 2.17 0.46 
CAPEX 1.93 0.52 
FSIZE 1.86 0.54 
IO TOTAL 1.58 0.63 
ROA 1.52 0.66 
ANALYST 1.48 0.67 
MB 1.47 0.68 
IO 1.36 0.74 
ADR 1.32 0.76 
LEV 1.32 0.76 
Crisis 1.24 0.81 
RULE 1.23 0.82 
Post-Crisis 1.22 0.82 
CASH 1.2 0.83 
SGROWTH 1.08 0.93 
Mean VIF 1.67 
IO TOTAL = Total institutional investors, SIZE = Firm size,  SGROWTH = Sales growth,  LEV = 
Leverage, Cash = Cash,  CAPEX = Capital Expenditure,  MB = Market-to-book value,  ROA = Return on 
Asset,  PPE = Property, plant and equipment, ANALYST = Analyst following,  ADR = Cross listing 
dummy, Rule = Rule of law, PRE-CRISIS= Pre-Crisis Dummy, CRISIS = Crisis dummy,  POST-CRISIS 
= Post crisis dummy,  FAMILY = Family controlling at 20%,  STATE = State controlling at 20%, IO = 
Institutional investor controlling at 20%, WIDELY = Widely held at 20%. 
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institutional investors improve several governance attributes in their investee firms, including 
firm valuation (Ruiz-Mallorquí and Santana-Martín, 2011; Muniandy et al., 2016); 
antitakeover amendments (Brickley et al., 1988); CEO turnover decisions (Parrino et al., 2003; 
Helwege et al., 2012); the selection of auditing firms (Kane and Velury, 2004); managerial 
compensation schemes (Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Almazan et al., 2005); dividend pay-outs, 
operating performance and CEO turnover (Brav et al., 2008); and earnings management 
(Hadani et al., 2011). The results are also consistent with the view that one of the major issues 
discussed behind the scenes between institutional investors and their investee firms is the 
governance structure (McCahery et al., 2016).  
Model 2 of Table 7.4 demonstrates that there was a positive and significant association between 
foreign institutional ownership and the Board Attributes Index (GOV14) at 1% (with coefficient 
= 0.009, p-value = 0.008, and R-Squared value = 0.101), whereas Model 3 demonstrates that 
the coefficient was negative but insignificant for domestic institutions (with coefficient = - 
0.001, p-value = 0.758, and R-Squared value = 0.095). Notably, these results were wholly 
consistent with the findings of Aggarwal et al. (2011), who argued that foreign institutional 
investors promote favourable governance outcomes as compared to their domestic 
counterparts. This also reflects previous studies (e.g. Gillan and Starks, 2003; Ferreira and 
Matos, 2008; Beuselinck et al., 2017; Luong et al., 2017) that contended that foreign 
institutional investors have fewer ties to their investee firms because of their independent 
positions and therefore are expected to exert greater pressure over the management of an 
investee firm in an effort to establish a strong governance structure. Additionally, Models 4 
and 5 show that the coefficient was positive but insignificant for both common law and civil 
law institutions41 (with coefficient = 0.005 and 0.008, p-value = 0.110 and 0.313, and R-
                                                          
41 When the empirical analysis is repeated including the US observations, the study obtained consistent findings.  
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Squared value = 0.097 and 0.096, respectively).  Overall, the results were partially consistent 
with H1 and are consistent with the agency, stewardship, stakeholder and institutional theories. 
The findings particularly contribute to the literature of corporate governance that corporate 
board attributes are important for the institutional investors and that they enhance these 
attributes when they engage with their investee firms, with the foreign institutional investors 
playing a lead role in the improvement of board attributes. The results also imply that attributes 
of the corporate board are deemed to be crucial for the institutional investors, as the attributes 
of the corporate board reflect its effectiveness in the reduction of agency cost and in fulfilling 
its duties (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Aguilera et al., 2012; Mallin, 2016).  
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Table 7.4 Institutional Investors and the Board Attributes Index 
GOV14 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Panel A: Firm Fixed Effects(All Observations) 
IO TOTAL 0.006**     
 (0.033)     
IO FOR  0.009***    
  (0.008)    
IO DOM   -0.001   
   (0.758)   
IO COMMON    0.005  
    (0.110)  
IO CIVIL     0.008 
     (0.313) 
FSIZE -0.665** -0.672** -0.714** -0.686** -0.695** 
 (0.023) (0.021) (0.014) (0.018) (0.018) 
SGROWTH 0.048 0.051 0.052 0.051 0.048 
 (0.668) (0.652) (0.650) (0.655) (0.676) 
LEV 0.500 0.533 0.474 0.516 0.455 
 (0.308) (0.273) (0.334) (0.293) (0.357) 
CASH -1.061** -1.063** -1.048** -1.048* -1.051** 
 (0.047) (0.045) (0.050) (0.050) (0.049) 
CAPEX -2.134** -2.241** -2.312** -2.200** -2.219** 
 (0.039) (0.034) (0.027) (0.036) (0.030) 
MB 0.014 0.014 0.012 0.013 0.013 
 (0.450) (0.436) (0.497) (0.476) (0.470) 
ROA 1.300** 1.297** 1.169* 1.270** 1.196* 
 (0.036) (0.035) (0.055) (0.040) (0.051) 
PPE 0.211 0.240 0.285 0.273 0.220 
 (0.734) (0.702) (0.644) (0.657) (0.728) 
ANALYST 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.599) (0.611) (0.602) (0.608) (0.588) 
ADR 0.399 0.382 0.413 0.402 0.412 
 (0.332) (0.352) (0.315) (0.330) (0.315) 
RULE  -0.043 -0.045 -0.043 -0.045 -0.040 
 (0.190) (0.171) (0.197) (0.172) (0.220) 
CRISIS  0.002 0.026 -0.002 0.001 -0.005 
 (0.984) (0.818) (0.989) (0.991) (0.966) 
POST-CRISIS -0.138 -0.106 -0.139 -0.139 -0.141 
 (0.365) (0.488) (0.360) (0.361) (0.354) 
FAMILY 0.826*** 0.830*** 0.722** 0.764*** 0.816*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) 
STATE 0.249 0.251 0.121 0.150 0.270 
 (0.491) (0.512) (0.746) (0.681) (0.478) 
WIDELY 0.572** 0.578** 0.490** 0.515** 0.581** 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.045) (0.024) (0.023) 
N 2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 
R-Squared 0.098 0.101 0.095 0.097 0.096 
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Table 7.4 continued 
 
 
GOV14 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel B: Firm Fixed Effects  (Pre-Crisis Observations) 
IO TOTAL 0.003     
 (0.738)     
IO FOR  0.002    
  (0.740)    
IO DOM   0.004   
   (0.832)   
IO COMMON    0.002  
    (0.800)  
IO CIVIL     0.009 
     (0.686) 
N 551 551 551 551 551 
R-Squared 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 
Panel C: Firm Fixed Effects(Crisis Observations) 
IO TOTAL 0.004     
 (0.373)     
IO FOR  0.010*    
  (0.072)    
IO DOM   -0.009   
   (0.108)   
IO COMMON    0.001  
    (0.873)  
IO CIVIL     0.013 
     (0.278) 
N 1047 1047 1047 1047 1047 
R-Squared 0.106 0.111 0.107 0.105 0.108 
Panel D: Firm Fixed Effects (Post-Crisis Observations) 
IO TOTAL 0.022***     
 (0.005)     
IO FOR  0.015    
  (0.112)    
IO DOM   0.033**   
   (0.012)   
IO COMMON    0.018*  
    (0.059)  
IO CIVIL     0.070*** 
     (0.000) 
N 430 430 430 430 430 
R-Squared 0.090 0.072 0.083 0.076 0.100 
Panel E: Firm Fixed Effects ( Interaction Effects) 
IO TOTAL * FAMILY -0.002 
 (0.717) 
IO FOR * FAMILY -0.002 
 (0.651) 
IO DOM* FAMILY -0.002 
 (0.887) 
IO TOTAL * Non-FAMILY 0.008*** 
 (0.008) 
IO FOR *  Non-FAMILY 0.013*** 
 (0.000) 
IO DOM*  Non-FAMILY -0.001 
 (0.796) 
Note:  Regressions also include year dummies and standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering. Robust p-values corrected for firm-level clustering are 
reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. GOV14= Board attributes index, IO TOTAL = Total 
institutional investors,  IO FOR = Foreign institutional investors, IO DOM = Domestic institutional investors, IO COMMON = Common law institutional 
investors,  IO CIVIL = Civil law institutional investors,  FSIZE = Firm size,  SGROWTH = Sales growth,  LEV = Leverage, Cash = Cash,  CAPEX = Capital 
Expenditure,  MB = Market-to-book value,  ROA = Return on Asset,  PPE = Property, plant and equipment, ANALYST = Analyst following,  ADR = Cross 
listing dummy, Rule = Rule of law, CRISIS = Crisis dummy,  POST-CRISIS = Post crisis dummy,  FAMILY = Family controlling at 20%,  STATE = State 
controlling at 20%,  WIDELY = Widely held at 20%. 
 
 
212 
 
The investigation then moved to an examination of whether the role of institutional investors 
in the improvement of governance structures was determined by economic conditions (pre-
crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods). The firm fixed effects regression revealed that institutional 
investors had no significant influence over the governance outcomes of their investee firms 
during pre-crisis periods (see Table 7.4, Panel B). This is consistent with previous studies that 
claim that institutional investors took excessive risks before the crisis (Erkens et al., 2012; 
Díez-Esteban et al., 2016). This may also explain why institutional investors did not enhance 
board attributes (GOV14) in their investee firms prior to the financial crisis. Adams (2012) also 
found that the governance structure of non-financial firms is weaker compared to their financial 
counterparts prior to the recent financial crisis. Several scholars have blamed both the 
institutional investors and the corporate boards alike for their inability to mitigate the 
aforementioned crisis (Conyon et al., 2011; Reisberg, 2015). 
The results also showed that in times of crisis, only foreign institutions had a positive and 
significant relationship at 10% (with coefficient = 0.010, p-value = 0.072, and R-Squared value 
= 0.111), (see Table 7.4, Panel C). However, the results further demonstrated that during post-
crisis periods, all types of institutional investors (total, foreign, domestic, common and civil) 
had positive and significant associations with the Board Attributes Index , with the exception 
of foreign institutional investors (with coefficient = 0.022, 0.015, 0.033, 0.018 and 0.070, p-
value = 0.005, 0.112, 0.012, 0.059, 0.000, and R-Squared value = 0.090, 0.072, 0.083, 0.076 
and 0.100, respectively), (see Table 7.4, Panel D). Overall, the results are consistent with the 
institutional theory, and they indicate the institutional investors’ awareness of the importance 
of corporate board attributes after the recent financial crisis. Following the crisis, the OECD 
published a report on governance lessons learned from the recent financial crisis that clearly 
illustrates that the weaknesses of corporate governance was one of the key reasons the crisis 
occurred (Kirkpatrick, 2009). 
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Next, the study examined the role of institutional investors in the improvement of governance 
outcomes in light of various ownership structures; this was accomplished by considering the 
interactions between institutional investors and family- and non-family-controlled firms (see 
Table 7.4, Panel E). The firm fixed effects regression showed that institutional investors (total 
and foreign) had the ability to improve the governance structures of non-family-owned firms 
only (with coefficient = 0.008 and 0.013, and p-value = 0.008 and 0.000, respectively). 
However, this result did not hold true for family-owned firms. Drawing from the institutional 
theory, these results also complement the other studies that emphasised the contingency of 
ownership structure when investigating the adoption of corporate governance mechanisms in a 
particular firm (Desender et al., 2013; Judge, 2011, 2012; Sure et al., 2013) by showing that 
the role of institutional investors in improving board attributes is determined by the ownership 
structure (family vs non-family-controlled firms). The results are also consistent with the 
second type of the agency problem (Principal-Principal conflict), which occurs when minority 
shareholders fear the expropriation by the controlling shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Fernando et al. (2014) argued that institutional investors avoid investing in family-controlled 
firms, as they fear the expropriation of their wealth. 
 The study then examined whether the role of institutional investors in corporate governance 
was derived from the legal system of the country wherein an investee firm operated (civil law 
versus common law countries). Table 7.5 conveys the results of a firm fixed effects regression 
of the Board Attributes Index (GOV14); these results are reported separately according to 
whether the firm was located in a civil law or a common law country. Models 1 and 2 of Table 
7.5 show that total and foreign institutional investors had positive but insignificant associations 
with the Board Attributes Index in civil law countries (with coefficient = 0.005 and 0.005, p-
value = 0.329 and 0.348, and R-Squared value = 0.110 and 0.110, respectively). In contrast, 
Model 3 demonstrates that the coefficient was negative but insignificant for domestic 
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institutions (with coefficient = -0.001, p-value = 0.940, and R-Squared value = 0.109). 
Conversely, in common law countries, total and foreign institutional investors had a positive 
and significant relationship at the 10% and 1% significance level, respectively (with coefficient 
= 0.005 and 0.011, p-value = 0.069 and 0.001, and R-Squared value = 0.146 and 0.154, 
respectively). This result indicates that the role of institutional investors in the improvement of 
governance structures was indeed dependent on the legal system of the country in which a firm 
was listed. The institutional investors’ inability to improve board attributes in civil law 
countries can be understood in light of the ownership concentration in civil law countries (La 
Porta et al., 1999), which results in ‘Principal-Principal conflict’ (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Drawing from the institutional theory, the results complement the other studies that ascertained 
that the legal system should be considered when investigating the adoption of corporate 
governance practices across countries (Aguilera et al., 2008; Aguilera et al., 2012; Kim and 
Ozdemir, 2014). In particular, the findings reveal that the activism of institutional investors 
towards improving board attributes in their investee firms is also attributed to the legal system 
of a particular country.
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7.4.2. Board and Key Subcommittees Composition 
Table 7.6 presents the results of a firm fixed effect panel regression that aimed to examine the 
role of institutional ownership in the improvement of board composition as well as the 
composition of its key subcommittees (audit, compensation and nomination). The 
independence of the board and its key subcommittees was used to investigate this relationship. 
According to the results, institutional investors promoted the improvement of board 
composition as well as the composition of its key subcommittees (with the exception of the 
nomination committee). Drawing from the agency theory, the results are consistent with those 
Table 7.5 Institutional Investors and the Board Attributes Index: The Role of Legal Origin 
GOV14 
 Civil Law Countries Common Law Countries 
 Panel A: Firm Fixed Effects Panel Panel B: Firm Fixed Effects Panel 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
IO TOTAL 0.005   0.005*   
 (0.329)   (0.069)   
IO FOR  0.005   0.011***  
  (0.348)   (0.001)  
IO DOM   -0.001   -0.001 
   (0.940)   (0.718) 
SIZE -0.995* -1.021* -1.041* -0.326 -0.279 -0.366 
 (0.094) (0.083) (0.083) (0.249) (0.321) (0.193) 
SGROWTH -0.128 -0.122 -0.120 0.138 0.129 0.145 
 (0.548) (0.566) (0.578) (0.236) (0.263) (0.216) 
LEV 0.666 0.692 0.686 -0.139 -0.086 -0.227 
 (0.346) (0.324) (0.336) (0.788) (0.865) (0.662) 
CASH -1.354* -1.387* -1.380* -1.046* -1.003* -1.003* 
 (0.100) (0.091) (0.093) (0.073) (0.086) (0.083) 
CAPEX -3.535** -3.619** -3.597** -0.949 -0.992 -1.191 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.345) (0.324) (0.233) 
MB 0.066* 0.065* 0.065* -0.008 -0.005 -0.009 
 (0.071) (0.073) (0.076) (0.591) (0.719) (0.556) 
ROA 1.837* 1.783* 1.751* 0.501 0.643 0.374 
 (0.062) (0.069) (0.069) (0.433) (0.305) (0.554) 
PPE -0.442 -0.430 -0.439 0.662 0.683 0.784 
 (0.649) (0.657) (0.653) (0.303) (0.323) (0.213) 
ANALYST -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 0.017* 0.017* 0.018* 
 (0.432) (0.414) (0.416) (0.085) (0.072) (0.068) 
ADR 1.076* 1.074* 1.102* 0.036 0.012 0.031 
 (0.059) (0.060) (0.050) (0.805) (0.929) (0.823) 
RULE OF LAW -0.078 -0.079 -0.083 -0.036 -0.048 -0.030 
 (0.143) (0.141) (0.122) (0.423) (0.280) (0.510) 
CRISIS  0.428*** 0.429*** 0.415*** 0.167 0.183 0.170 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.148) (0.115) (0.143) 
POST-CRISIS 0.375* 0.373* 0.351* -0.195 -0.157 -0.172 
 (0.056) (0.057) (0.073) (0.249) (0.352) (0.307) 
FAMILY 0.365 0.348 0.267 1.397*** 1.388*** 1.335*** 
 (0.313) (0.344) (0.463) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
STATE -0.274 -0.305 -0.403 1.381** 1.406** 1.318** 
 (0.537) (0.512) (0.359) (0.027) (0.034) (0.049) 
WIDELY 0.130 0.111 0.040 1.065*** 1.087*** 1.028*** 
 (0.686) (0.736) (0.903) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 1089 1089 1089 939 939 939 
R-Squared 0.110 0.110 0.109 0.146 0.154 0.143 
Note:  Regressions also include year dummies and standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering. Robust p-values corrected for 
firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. GOV14= 
Board attributes index, IO TOTAL = Total institutional investors,  IO FOR = Foreign institutional investors, IO DOM = Domestic 
institutional investors,  FSIZE = Firm size,  SGROWTH = Sales growth,  LEV = Leverage, Cash = Cash,  CAPEX = Capital Expenditure,  
MB = Market-to-book value,  ROA = Return on Asset,  PPE = Property, plant and equipment, ANALYST = Analyst following,  ADR 
= Cross listing dummy, Rule = Rule of law, CRISIS = Crisis dummy,  POST-CRISIS = Post crisis dummy,  FAMILY = Family 
controlling at 20%,  STATE = State controlling at 20%,  WIDELY = Widely held at 20%. 
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who ascertained that institutional investors are attracted by firms whose board independence is 
high (Useem et al., 1993; Chung and Zhang, 2011; Miletkov et al., 2014). Several scholars 
emphasised the importance of corporate board independence in the reduction of the agency 
costs (Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010). Table 7.6 indicates a positive 
and significant association between board independence and total institutional ownership at the 
5% significance level (with coefficient = 0.001, p-value = 0.036 and R-Squared value = 0.077). 
In contrast, the coefficient was positive but insignificant for foreign and domestic institutions 
(see Table 7.6, Panel A). 
The results also revealed that total institutional ownership promoted the improved 
independence of audit and compensation committees (with coefficient = 0.001 and 0.001, p-
value = 0.003 and 0.002, and R-Squared value = 0.054 and 0.039, respectively). Given the 
monitoring role of institutional investors, these results reflect other studies that emphasised the 
importance of the composition of audit and compensation committees in mitigating the agency 
costs (Newman and Mozes, 1999; Abbott and Parker, 2000; Klein, 2002; Abbott et al., 2003; 
Zaman et al., 2011). Conversely, total institutional ownership had a negative but insignificant 
relationship with nomination committee independence. Moreover, results indicated that 
domestic and foreign institutions promoted audit committee independence (with coefficient = 
0.001 and 0.001, p-value = 0.082 and 0.027, and R-Squared value = 0.049 and 0.051, 
respectively), while foreign institutions promoted the independence of compensation 
committees (with coefficient = 0.001, p-value = 0.009 and R-Squared = 0.038). The results are 
consistent with the agency theory framework and support the view that the majority of the 
decisions are made by the board subcommittees, which are forwarded later to the corporate 
board for voting (Lorsch MacIver, 1989;  Mahadeo et al., 2012); since the foreign institutional 
investors have a higher monitoring cost because of their remoteness, as well as linguistic and 
cultural differences to the investee compared to their domestic counterparts (Kim et al., 2016), 
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the results could be explained by the fact that foreign institutional investors choose to improve 
the composition of more subcommittees to ensure that the monitoring and the quality of the 
work undertaken by such committees in their investee firms is effective. Both types of 
institutional investors (domestic and foreign) had an insignificant association with the 
independence of the nomination committee, however (see Table 7.6, Panel A). Collectively, 
these results supported the agency theory and were consistent with both H2a and H2b. The 
results contribute to the literature by showing that not only the independence of the corporate 
board is deemed important to the institutional investors when they enter into dialogue with their 
investee firms, but also the independence of board key subcommittees (i.e. audit and 
compensation committees) is also important. The results imply that the activism of institutional 
investors expanded to include not only the corporate board composition but also the structure 
of the board key subcommittees around the globe. 
The study next compared the role of institutional investors in the improvement of board 
composition according to various economic conditions (see Table 7.6, Panels B, C and D). The 
results showed that during pre-crisis periods, institutional investors had mixed but insignificant 
influence over the independence of a board and its key subcommittees. However, during times 
of crisis, total institutional investors had positive and significant relationships with the 
independence of audit committees at 5% (with coefficient = 0.001, p-value = 0.020 and R-
Squared = 0.071), but negative and significant relationships with the independence of 
nomination committees at 1% (with coefficient = -0.001, p-value = 0.068 and R-Squared = 
0.067). Furthermore, foreign institutional investors had positive and significant associations 
with the independence of boards and their audit committees at 10% and 5% respectively (with 
coefficient = 0.001 and 0.002, p-value = 0.054 and 0.014 and R-Squared = 0.080 and 0.075, 
respectively). The results support the institutional theory and are consistent with those who 
found that board independence may bring fruitful governance outcomes during crises. For 
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instance, Francis et al. (2012) and Yeh et al. (2011) found that board independence and audit 
committee independence improved firm performance during the time of the crisis, respectively. 
Finally, the results revealed that during post-crisis periods, only domestic institutional investors 
had positive and significant associations with the independence of audit and nomination 
committees at 5% and 10% respectively (with coefficient = 0.004 and 0.003 p-value = 0.030 
and 0.092 and R-Squared = 0.123 and 0.108, respectively). 
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Table 7.6 Institutional Investors and the Composition of Boards and their Subcommittees 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 INED BOARD INED AC INED CC INED NC 
Panel A:Firm Fixed Effects (All Observations) 
IO TOTAL 0.001**   0.001***   0.001***   -0.000   
 (0.036)   (0.003)   (0.002)   (0.632)   
IO FOR  0.000   0.001**   0.001***   -0.000  
  (0.104)   (0.027)   (0.009)   (0.666)  
IO DOM   0.001   0.001*   0.001   0.000 
   (0.319)   (0.082)   (0.278)   (0.796) 
N 2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 
R-Squared 0.077 0.076 0.075 0.054 0.051 0.049 0.039 0.038 0.034 0.046 0.046 0.046 
Panel B: Firm Fixed Effects (Pre-Crisis Observations) 
IO_TOTAL 0.001   -0.000   0.000   0.000   
 (0.121)   (0.715)   (0.525)   (0.917)   
IO FOR  0.001   -0.000   0.000   0.000  
  (0.209)   (0.728)   (0.629)   (0.803)  
IO DOM   0.001   -0.000   0.001   0.000 
   (0.327)   (1.000)   (0.604)   (0.994) 
N 551 551 551 551 551 551 551 551 551 551 551 551 
R-Squared 0.122 0.119 0.119 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.042 0.042 0.042 
Panel C: Firm Fixed Effects (Crisis Observations) 
IO_TOTAL 0.001   0.001**   0.000   -0.001*   
 (0.300)   (0.020)   (0.871)   (0.068)   
IO FOR  0.001*   0.002**   0.000   -0.001  
  (0.054)   (0.014)   (0.669)   (0.129)  
IO DOM   -0.001   0.000   -0.000   -0.001 
   (0.205)   (0.785)   (0.721)   (0.464) 
N 1047 1047 1047 1047 1047 1047 1047 1047 1047 1047 1047 1047 
R-Squared 0.073 0.080 0.072 0.071 0.075 0.060 0.035 0.036 0.035 0.067 0.066 0.062 
Panel D: Firm Fixed Effects (Post-Crisis  Observations) 
IO_TOTAL -0.000   0.001   0.001   0.002   
 (0.752)   (0.104)   (0.210)   (0.145)   
IO FOR  0.000   0.000   0.001   0.001  
  (0.980)   (0.776)   (0.392)   (0.410)  
IO DOM   -0.000   0.004**   0.002   0.003* 
   (0.865)   (0.030)   (0.149)   (0.092) 
N 430 430 430 430 430 430 430 430 430 430 430 430 
R-Squared 0.145 0.145 0.145 0.108 0.097 0.123 0.083 0.079 0.082 0.108 0.102 0.108 
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Table 7.6 continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 INED BOARD INED AC INED CC INED NC 
Panel E: Firm Fixed Effects (Common Law Observations) 
IO TOTAL -0.000   0.000   0.000   -0.001   
 (0.954)   (0.147)   (0.126)   (0.126)   
IO FOR  0.000   0.000   0.001   -0.001  
  (0.560)   (0.127)   (0.177)   (0.231)  
IO DOM   -0.000   0.000   0.000   -0.000 
   (0.368)   (0.692)   (0.504)   (0.716) 
N 939 939 939 939 939 939 939 939 939 939 939 939 
R-Squared 0.142 0.143 0.143 0.060 0.060 0.057 0.053 0.054 0.051 0.106 0.105 0.103 
Panel F: Firm Fixed Effects (Civil Law Observations) 
IO TOTAL 0.001**   0.002**   0.002**   -0.000   
 (0.020)   (0.016)   (0.016)   (0.882)   
IO FOR  0.001   0.001*   0.002**   -0.000  
  (0.183)   (0.081)   (0.031)   (0.943)  
IO DOM   0.003*   0.003   0.002   0.000 
   (0.088)   (0.184)   (0.393)   (0.976) 
N 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 
R-Squared 0.101 0.095 0.106 0.089 0.085 0.087 0.062 0.060 0.056 0.052 0.052 0.052 
Panel G: Interaction Effects (Firm Fixed Effects) 
IO TOTAL * FAMILY 0.001 0.002** -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.279) (0.045) (0.302) (0.318) 
IO FOR * FAMILY 0.000 0.001* -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.375) (0.074) (0.532) (0.351) 
IO DOM* FAMILY 0.002 0.004 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.360) (0.156) (0.951) (0.993) 
IO TOTAL * Non-FAMILY 0.000* 0.001** 0.001*** -0.000 
 (0.072) (0.010) (0.000) (0.989) 
IO FOR *  Non-FAMILY 0.000 0.001* 0.002*** -0.000 
 (0.213) (0.078) (0.003) (0.975) 
IO DOM*  Non-FAMILY 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (0.528) (0.295) (0.242) (0.786) 
Note:  Regressions also include year dummies and standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering. Robust p-values corrected for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.  All models include the control variables (coefficient not shown) used in Table 7.4. INED BOARD = Board independence, INED AC = Audit committee Independence, INED CC= 
Compensation committee independence, INED NC = Nomination committee independence, IO TOTAL = Total institutional investors, IO FOR = Foreign institutional investors, IO DOM = Domestic institutional 
investors. 
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The study then investigated whether legal systems affected the role of institutional investors in 
the improvement of board composition and that of its key subcommittees (see Table 7.6, Panels 
E and F). Overall, institutional investors are found to promote more favourable board and key 
subcommittee compositions in civil law countries as compared to common law countries; this 
result did not hold true, however, for nomination committees. The results revealed that total 
institutional investors have a positive and significant association with the independence of the 
board and audit and compensation committees at a 5% significance level (with coefficient = 
0.001, 0.002 and 0.002, p-value = 0.020, 0.016 and 0.016, and R-Squared value = 0.101, 0.089 
and 0.062, respectively). 
The findings may be explained by the institutional theory perspective, in that institutional 
investors improve the composition of the board and its key subcommittees in civil law countries 
in order to mitigate the weak shareholder protections in civil law countries compared to their 
common law counterparts (La Porta et al., 1998). Gaitán et al. (2018) showed that board 
independence is among the factors leading to firm productivity in civil law countries. This is 
consistent with Yeh et al. (2011), who argue that the influence of the audit committee’s 
independence on firm performance is greater in civil law countries compared to their common 
law counterparts.  The results also revealed that while domestic institutions encouraged board 
independence (with coefficient = 0.003, p-value = 0.088, and R-Squared value = 0.106), 
foreign institutions promoted the independence of audit and compensation committees (with 
coefficient = 0.001 and 0.002, p-value = 0.081 and 0.031, and R-Squared value = 0.085 and 
0.060, respectively). This could be attributed to the fact that foreign institutional investors are 
more independent monitors of the investee firms and are less prone to local political pressure 
(Gillan and Starks, 2003; Ferreira and Matos, 2008); therefore, they are expected to more 
carefully scrutinise the composition of the subcommittees compared to their domestic 
counterparts. 
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 Next, the study examined whether the ownership structure of investee firms influenced the 
role of institutional investors in the improvement of corporate board composition and that of 
its key subcommittees (see Table 7.6, Panel G). The results indicated that the presence of 
institutional investors did indeed improve the composition of a board and its key 
subcommittees (with the exception of nomination committees) in non-family-owned firms. For 
instance, total institutional investors had a positive and significant relationship with the 
independence of the board and the independence of the audit and compensation committees at 
10%, 5% and 1% respectively (with coefficient = 0.000, 0.001 and 0.001, and p-value = 0.072, 
0.010 and 0.000, respectively). In addition, foreign institutional investors had a positive and 
significant relationship with the independence of audit and compensation committees at 10% 
and 1% respectively (with coefficient = 0.001 and 0.002, and p-value = 0.078 and 0.003, 
respectively).In family-owned firms, however, the results indicated that the activity of 
institutional investors (foreign and total) only improved the independence of audit committees 
(with coefficient = 0.001 and 0.002, and p-value = 0.074 and 0.045, respectively). Overall, the 
results support the second type of the agency theory (Principal-Principal conflict) (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997), as the influence of institutional investors on improving the independence of the 
corporate board and its key subcommittees is more evident in non-family firms. The results 
also emphasised the contingency of ownership structure, which influences the adoption of 
governance practices (Aguilera et al., 2008; Aguilera et al., 2012; Kim and Ozdemir, 2014), 
and highlighted the tendency of foreign institutional investors to improve the governance 
practices in their investee firms due to their independence from the investee firms compared to 
their domestic counterparts (Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Aggarwal et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2016). 
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7.4.3. Board and Key Subcommittees Activity 
This study then continued on to an investigation of whether institutional investors promoted 
the activity of a board and its key subcommittees. Meeting frequency at the board and 
subcommittee levels was used to examine this relationship. Table 7.7 presents the results of a 
firm fixed effect panel regression, which indicated that total, foreign and domestic investors 
had mixed and insignificant relationships with the meeting frequency of corporate boards and 
their compensation and nomination subcommittees (see Table 7.7, Panel A). In contrast, 
institutional investors (total and domestic) had a positive association with the meeting 
frequency of audit committees at 10% and 5% respectively (with coefficient = 0.007 and 0.010, 
p-value = 0.089 and 0.046, and R-Squared value = 0.034 and 0.034, respectively). The results 
contribute to the literature about the tendency of institutional investors to improve the activity 
of the audit committee. Drawing from the agency theory, these results are consistent with 
several studies that argued that the activism of the audit committee leads to higher firm 
performance (Hoque et al., 2013), lower earning management (Xie et al., 2003) and 
employment of an industry-specialist auditor (Abbott et al., 2000). Accordingly, the results 
partially support the agency theory, and they are determined to reject H3a and partially accept 
H3b. 
The study also compared the role of institutional investors in efforts to improve the activity of 
a corporate board and its key subcommittees according to various economic conditions (see 
Table 7.7, Panels B, C and D). The results revealed that during pre-crisis periods, total and 
domestic institutional investors had a negative association with the meeting frequency of a 
corporate board and compensation committee respectively at 1% (with coefficient = -0.029 and 
-0.048, p-value = 0.098 and 0.062, and R-Squared value = 0.171 and 0.058, respectively) 
However, this relationship waned during crisis and post-crisis periods. Furthermore, the 
association between institutional investors and the meeting frequency of key subcommittees 
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was mixed and insignificant in all economic environments. . The results are consistent with 
other scholars who blamed the institutional investors and the corporate board for the occurrence 
of the recent financial crisis (see Conyon et al., 2011; Reisberg, 2015). Consequently, the 
previously mentioned OECD report on governance lessons emphasises that board access to 
information is key, which can primarily be shared via more board meetings (Kirkpatrick, 2009). 
Hahn and Lasfer (2016) also observed that the recent financial crisis did not improve the board 
meetings in UK firms. Following a comparison of this relationship within different legal 
systems, results indicated that domestic and total institutional investors had positive and 
significant associations with the meeting frequency of audit and nomination committees, 
respectively, in common law countries at 10% (with coefficient = 0.010 and 0.012, p-value = 
0.050 and 0.063, and R-Squared value = 0.078 and 0.042, respectively). In civil law countries, 
while foreign institutional investors had positive and significant relationship with the meeting 
frequency of audit committee (with coefficient = 0.012, p-value = 0.058, and R-Squared value 
= 0.068), they had negative and significant association with the meeting frequency of corporate 
board at 10% (with coefficient = -0.020, p-value = 0.077, and R-Squared value = 0.046). 
Results also showed that total institutional investors had negative and significant relationship 
with the activity of the nomination committees at 10% (with coefficient = -0.010, p-value = 
0.092, and R-Squared value = 0.059) (see Table 7.7, Panels E and F). The research then 
examined whether the relationship between institutional investors and the activity of a 
corporate board and its key subcommittees was driven by a company’s ownership structure. 
The results revealed that the association between institutional investors and the activity of a 
corporate board and its key subcommittees was mixed and insignificant in both family- and 
non-family-owned firms (see Table 7.7, Panel G). Finally, the findings showed that total and 
domestic institutions had negative and significant associations in family firms at the 10% 
significance level (with coefficient = – 0.023 and – 0.044, and p-value value = 0.061 and 0.097, 
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respectively). Consistent with the institutional theory, these results complement the other 
studies on the influence of the legal system (Aguilera et al., 2008; Aguilera et al., 2012; Kim 
and Ozdemir, 2014) and ownership structure (Desender et al., 2013; Judge, 2011, 2012; Sure 
et al., 2013) in shaping governance practices by showing that the role of the institutional 
investors in improving the activity of the corporate board and key subcommittees is partially 
explained by the economic conditions and legal system, but not by the ownership structure.
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Table 7.7 Institutional Investors and the Activity of Boards and their Subcommittees 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Board MF AC MF CC MF NC MF 
Panel A:Firm Fixed Effects (All Observations) 
IO TOTAL -0.004   0.007*   -0.001   0.001   
 (0.674)   (0.089)   (0.847)   (0.887)   
IO FOR  -0.008   0.006   -0.001   -0.003  
  (0.354)   (0.205)   (0.875)   (0.508)  
IO DOM   0.012   0.010**   0.003   0.009 
   (0.456)   (0.046)   (0.674)   (0.180) 
N 2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 
R-Squared 0.043 0.043 0.044 0.034 0.033 0.034 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.031 0.031 0.032 
Panel B: Firm Fixed Effects (Pre-Crisis Observations) 
IO_TOTAL -0.029*   0.004   -0.010   -0.003   
 (0.098)   (0.481)   (0.298)   (0.756)   
IO FOR  -0.009   0.009   0.001   -0.010  
  (0.573)   (0.130)   (0.947)   (0.418)  
IO DOM   -0.089   -0.013   -0.048*   0.015 
   (0.197)   (0.412)   (0.062)   (0.594) 
N 551 551 551 551 551 551 551 551 551 551 551 551 
R-Squared 0.171 0.164 0.179 0.081 0.084 0.082 0.040 0.035 0.058 0.040 0.043 0.041 
Panel C: Firm Fixed Effects (Crisis Observations) 
IO_TOTAL -0.011   -0.005   -0.003   -0.008   
 (0.420)   (0.503)   (0.714)   (0.311)   
IO FOR  -0.018   -0.008   -0.005   -0.009  
  (0.206)   (0.306)   (0.544)   (0.306)  
IO DOM   0.009   0.006   0.003   -0.001 
   (0.678)   (0.402)   (0.853)   (0.936) 
N 1047 1047 1047 1047 1047 1047 1047 1047 1047 1047 1047 1047 
R-Squared 0.063 0.065 0.061 0.048 0.049 0.047 0.027 0.027 0.026 0.037 0.037 0.035 
Panel D: Firm Fixed Effects (Post-Crisis  Observations) 
IO_TOTAL 0.030   -0.007   -0.006   0.003   
 (0.190)   (0.613)   (0.627)   (0.819)   
IO FOR  0.017   -0.029   -0.004   -0.008  
  (0.611)   (0.288)   (0.793)   (0.581)  
IO DOM   0.043   0.045   -0.013   0.030 
   (0.499)   (0.251)   (0.614)   (0.242) 
N 430 430 430 430 430 430 430 430 430 430 430 430 
R-Squared 0.051 0.048 0.050 0.074 0.083 0.083 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.060 0.061 0.066 
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Table 7.7 continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Board MF AC MF CC MF NC MF 
Panel E: Firm Fixed Effects (Common Law Observations) 
IO TOTAL 0.007   0.004   0.003   0.012*   
 (0.554)   (0.411)   (0.593)   (0.063)   
IO FOR  0.009   -0.001   0.004   0.004  
  (0.529)   (0.879)   (0.567)   (0.677)  
IO DOM   0.007   0.010*   0.003   0.015 
   (0.687)   (0.050)   (0.695)   (0.111) 
N 939 939 939 939 939 939 939 939 939 939 939 939 
R-Squared 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.075 0.074 0.078 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.042 0.037 0.042 
Panel F: Firm Fixed Effects (Civil Law Observations) 
IO TOTAL -0.017   0.010   -0.007   -0.010*   
 (0.156)   (0.148)   (0.137)   (0.092)   
IO FOR  -0.020*   0.012*   -0.006   -0.007  
  (0.077)   (0.058)   (0.320)   (0.283)  
IO DOM   -0.001   0.004   -0.009   -0.013 
   (0.968)   (0.736)   (0.393)   (0.279) 
N 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 
R-Squared 0.045 0.046 0.042 0.067 0.068 0.063 0.044 0.043 0.042 0.059 0.057 0.057 
Panel G: Interaction Effects (Firm Fixed Effects) 
IO TOTAL * FAMILY -0.023* 0.009 -0.011 -0.006 
 (0.061) (0.193) (0.108) (0.349) 
IO FOR * FAMILY -0.016 0.009 -0.011 -0.009 
 (0.210) (0.104) (0.174) (0.217) 
IO DOM* FAMILY -0.044* 0.016 -0.011 0.007 
 (0.097) (0.380) (0.339) (0.498) 
IO TOTAL * Non-FAMILY 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.003 
 (0.738) (0.218) (0.451) (0.541) 
IO FOR *  Non-FAMILY -0.004 0.004 0.003 -0.001 
 (0.675) (0.437) (0.483) (0.876) 
IO DOM*  Non-FAMILY 0.018 0.008 0.004 0.008 
 (0.233) (0.154) (0.505) (0.242) 
Note:  Regressions also include year dummies and standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering. Robust p-values corrected for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels respectively.  All models include the control variables (coefficient not shown) used in Table 7.4. BOARD MF = Board meeting frequency, AC MF = Audit committee meeting frequency, CC MF = 
Compensation committee meeting frequency, NC MF = Nomination committee meeting frequency, IO TOTAL = Total institutional investors, IO FOR = Foreign institutional investors, IO DOM = Domestic institutional 
investors. 
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7.4.4. Board Entrenchment 
This study also required an examination of whether the presence of institutional investors 
served to reduce board entrenchment. To this end, two measures were used to proxy board 
entrenchment: CEO tenure and board tenure. Table 7.8 presents the results of firm fixed effect 
panel regressions; these regressions indicated that total, foreign and domestic institutional 
investors had a positive but insignificant relationship with CEO tenure (see Table 7.8, Panel 
A). In contrast, institutional investors (total, foreign and domestic) had a negative association 
with board tenure; this association, however, was only significant with domestic institutions at 
the 10% significance level (with coefficient = -0.011, p-value = 0.053, and R-Squared = 0.100). 
Therefore, the findings were determined to partially support H4. Drawing from the theoretical 
framework of agency theory, the results are consistent with those who argued that long-tenured 
directors may become less effective in monitoring the firm, as they are likely to form 
friendships and become closer to the managers (Vafeas, 2003; Barroso et al., 2011). Others 
also argued that firms with long-tenured boards are likely to be more resistant to change 
(Musteen et al., 2006; Jia, 2017). Several studies also demonstrate that boards whose members 
have long tenures are associated with a lower degree of international diversification (Barroso 
et al., 2011), fewer patents and lower research and development (Jia, 2017). More recently, 
Godos-Díez et al. (2018) found that the firms that established a limited tenure for independent 
directors are associated with higher corporate social responsibility engagement. The results 
contribute to the literature by revealing that institutional investors do contribute to controlling 
the length of the directors’ tenure in companies in which they invest. This is also consistent 
with corporate governance recommendations in the UK that also recommend that companies 
limit the period of service for the independent directors to nine years (FRC, 2016). 
The study also compared the role of institutional investors in the reduction of board 
entrenchment according to various economic conditions (see Table 7.8, Panels B, C and D). 
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Results indicated that during pre-crisis periods, institutional investors (total and domestic) had 
positive and significant association with board entrenchment (CEO tenure) (with coefficient 
=0.063 and 0.172, p-value = 0.082, 0.069, and R-Squared value = 0.125 and 0.148, 
respectively); however, this trend waned during crisis and post-crisis periods. In addition, the 
results are consistent with the other studies that blamed corporate boards and the institutional 
investors alike for the occurrence of the recent financial crisis (Conyon et al., 2011; Reisberg, 
2015). The results support Francis et al. (2012), who documented that CEO tenure did not 
contribute to the stock performance during the crisis. 
The results of a comparison of this relationship under different legal systems showed that 
institutional investors had mixed but insignificant associations with board entrenchment 
measures (CEO tenure and board tenure) in common law countries. In civil law countries, 
though, domestic institutional investors had negative and significant associations with board 
tenure at 5% (with coefficient = -0.026, p-value = 0.016, and R-Squared value = 0.133) (see 
Table 7.8, Panels E and F). The results support the institutional theory framework and may be 
explained by institutional investors reducing board tenure as a governance tool in civil law 
countries where the shareholder protections are weak. La Porta et al. (2000) argue that 
corporate governance mechanisms could be utilised by the outside investors to protect their 
wealth against the expropriation of the insiders (controlling shareholders and managers).The 
study then examined whether the relationship between institutional investors and board 
entrenchment was driven by a company’s ownership structure. The results revealed that the 
association between institutional investors and board entrenchment was mixed and 
insignificant in both family-owned and non-family-owned firms (see Table 7.8, Panel G). 
Ultimately, with respect to non-family-owned firms, the findings showed a negative and 
significant relationship between domestic institutions and board tenure at the 10% significance 
level (with coefficient = – 0.010, and p-value = 0.090). The results support the Principal-
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Principal conflict (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) by showing that (domestic) institutional 
investors have the ability to reduce board entrenchment only in non-family-owned firms. The 
results are also consistent with the institutional theory and complement the other studies that 
highlight the importance of the ownership structure in the adoption of governance practices 
(Desender et al., 2013; Judge, 2011, 2012; Sure et al., 2013). 
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Table 7.8 Institutional Investors and Board Entrenchment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CEO TENURE BOARD TENURE 
Panel A:Firm Fixed Effects (All Observations) 
IO TOTAL 0.009   -0.006   
 (0.538)   (0.103)   
IO FOR  0.011   -0.003  
  (0.549)   (0.507)  
IO DOM   0.009   -0.011* 
   (0.631)   (0.053) 
N 2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 
R-Squared 0.050 0.050 0.049 0.099 0.098 0.100 
Panel B: Firm Fixed Effects (Pre-Crisis Observations) 
IO TOTAL 0.063*   -0.005   
 (0.082)   (0.478)   
IO FOR  0.027   -0.003  
  (0.262)   (0.661)  
IO DOM   0.172*   -0.018 
   (0.069)   (0.325) 
N 551 551 551 551 551 551 
R-Squared 0.125 0.091 0.148 0.059 0.057 0.062 
Panel C: Firm Fixed Effects (Crisis Observations) 
IO TOTAL -0.010   0.003   
 (0.668)   (0.565)   
IO FOR  -0.016   0.002  
  (0.588)   (0.791)  
IO DOM   0.011   0.003 
   (0.723)   (0.743) 
N 1047 1047 1047 1047 1047 1047 
R-Squared 0.055 0.056 0.054 0.068 0.068 0.068 
Panel D: Firm Fixed Effects (Post-Crisis Observations) 
IO Total 0.022   0.008   
 (0.567)   (0.437)   
IO FOR  0.070   0.015  
  (0.232)   (0.230)  
IO DOM   -0.000   -0.013 
   (0.865)   (0.438) 
N 430 430 430 430 430 430 
R-Squared 0.053 0.065 0.145 0.101 0.105 0.101 
Panel E: Firm Fixed Effects (Common Law Observations) 
IO TOTAL 0.018   -0.004   
 (0.529)   (0.424)   
IO FOR  0.010   0.000  
  (0.787)   (0.979)  
IO DOM   0.026   -0.009 
   (0.206)   (0.193) 
N 939 939 939 939 939 939 
R-Squared 0.062 0.060 0.063 0.117 0.116 0.119 
Panel F: Firm Fixed Effects (Civil Law Observations) 
IO TOTAL 0.001   -0.007   
 (0.939)   (0.158)   
IO FOR  0.015   -0.003  
  (0.238)   (0.612)  
IO DOM   -0.053   -0.026** 
   (0.210)   (0.016) 
N 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 
R-Squared 0.084 0.087 0.091 0.128 0.126 0.133 
 
IO TOTAL * FAMILY 0.015 -0.003 
 (0.126) (0.481) 
IO FOR * FAMILY 0.011 -0.004 
 (0.319) (0.473) 
IO DOM* FAMILY 0.041 -0.004 
 (0.160) (0.818) 
IO TOTAL * Non-FAMILY 0.006 -0.006 
 (0.736) (0.178) 
IO FOR *  Non-FAMILY 0.010 -0.002 
 (0.674) (0.674) 
IO DOM*  Non-FAMILY 0.003 -0.010* 
 (0.859) (0.090) 
Note:  Regressions also include year dummies and standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering. Robust p-values corrected for firm-level 
clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. All models include the control 
variables (coefficient not shown) used in Table 7.4. CEO TENURE = CEO tenure, BOARD TENURE = Board Tenure, IO TOTAL = Total institutional 
investors, IO FOR = Foreign institutional investors, IO DOM = Domestic institutional investors. 
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7.4.5. Board Busyness 
Finally, the study tested whether institutional investors played a role in the reduction of board 
busyness. Two main variables were used to proxy board busyness: the average number of 
directorships held by INEDs and the percentage of INEDs who were classified as ‘busy’. Panel 
A of Table 7.9 demonstrates that foreign institutional investors had a negative and insignificant 
association with both measures (with coefficient = -0.001 and -0.000, p-value = 0.776 and 
0.554, and R-Squared value = 0.041 and 0.037, respectively), while total and domestic 
institutions had a positive but insignificant association with the same variables. Accordingly, 
these results do not support the agency theory and led to the rejection of H5. The results are 
consistent with those who found that busy directors may be beneficial to the firm, as their 
experience and connection with other firms makes them competent compared to their non-busy 
counterparts on the board. For instance, firms with a busy board have been found to perform 
better (Pombo and Gutiérrez, 2011; Field et al., 2013), bargain better deals and acquisitions of 
other firms (Benson et al., 2015; Harris and Shimizu, 2004), and meet at a higher frequency 
(Baccouche et al., 2014). The results contribute to the literature by revealing that board 
busyness is not within the institutional investors’ agenda for improving the governance 
structure in their investee firms. The results suggest that the policy makers must not limit the 
number of directorships in other firms, as the benefits may outweigh the costs. 
The research then investigated whether this relationship stemmed from the economic 
conditions of the countries in which these companies operated. Ultimately, in terms of board 
busyness, institutional investors were found to behave differently within different economic 
conditions. The study found that while total institutional investors had positive association for 
both measures of board busyness in times of crisis (with coefficient = 0.004 and 0.001, p-value 
= 0.039 and 0.061, and R-Squared value = 0.077 and 0.060, respectively) (see Table 7.9, Panel 
C), this influence was not evident during pre-crisis and post-crisis periods (see Table 7.9, 
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Panels B and D). The results support the institutional theory and are consistent with Francis et 
al. (2012), who argued that, during the crisis, the advising function of the board is more 
important than monitoring. Therefore, these results may imply that, during the crisis period, 
busy directors may bring to the table the knowledge and expertise that they have gained from 
other boards to support the firm through the crisis (Francis et al., 2012). 
Next, the study examined whether the association between institutional investors and board 
busyness was influenced by the legal system of the country in which an companies operated. 
The study found that the tendency of institutional investors to reduce board busyness was 
mixed and insignificant within both legal systems (see Table 7.9, Panels E and F); this result 
did not hold, however, for total institutional investors, who had a negative and significant 
association with busyness in common law countries at 10% (with coefficient = -0.002, p-value 
= 0.081 and R-Squared value = 0.099). The institutional investors’ inability to reduce board 
busyness in civil law countries may be explained by the existence of the ownership 
concentration in civil law countries (La Porta et al., 1999), which results in the Principal-
Principal conflict (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The results are also consistent with Ferris et al. 
(2018), who found that board busyness was less prevalent in common law countries than those 
headquartered in civil law countries, which might be due to the fact that institutional investors 
play a part in reducing board busyness in common law countries. In addition, drawing from the 
institutional theory, the results complement those studies that argued that the legal system of 
the country is an important factor in explaining the adoption of corporate governance (Aguilera 
et al., 2008; Aguilera et al., 2012; Kim and Ozdemir, 2014).The research then moved on to an 
examination of whether the ownership structure of an investee firm had an effect on the ability 
of institutional investors to reduce board busyness. The results revealed that foreign 
institutional investors reduced board busyness in non-family-owned firms; in such firms, the 
relationship with foreign institutions was negative for both measures of board busyness and 
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significant at 10% (with coefficient value = - 0.003 and -0.001, and p-value = 0.064 and 0.057, 
respectively) (see Table 7.9, Panel G). Consistent with the implication of the Principal-
Principal conflict (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), the results indicated that institutional investors 
can influence board busyness in non-family firms only. In addition, the results support the 
institutional theory and complement those who emphasised that the adoption of governance 
practices should be studied in light of the ownership structure (Desender et al., 2013; Judge, 
2011, 2012; Sure et al., 2013).
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Table 7.9 Institutional Investors and Board Busyness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 BUSY BOARD BUSY BOARD % 
Panel A:Firm Fixed Effects (All Observations) 
IO TOTAL 0.000   0.000   
 (0.931)   (0.812)   
IO FOR  -0.001   -0.000  
  (0.776)   (0.544)  
IO_DOM   0.002   0.001 
   (0.400)   (0.117) 
N 2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 
R-Squared 0.041 0.041 0.042 0.036 0.037 0.039 
Panel B: Firm Fixed Effects (Pre-Crisis Observations) 
IO TOTAL -0.001   -0.000   
 (0.592)   (0.786)   
IO_FOR  -0.001   -0.000  
  (0.621)   (0.872)  
IO DOM   0.002   -0.000 
   (0.768)   (0.898) 
N 551 551 551 551 551 551 
R-Squared 0.094 0.094 0.093 0.058 0.058 0.058 
Panel C: Firm Fixed Effects (Crisis Observations) 
IO TOTAL 0.004**   0.001*   
 (0.039)   (0.061)   
IO_FOR  0.003   0.001  
  (0.167)   (0.190)  
IO_DOM   0.004   0.001 
   (0.163)   (0.203) 
N 1047 1047 1047 1047 1047 1047 
R-Squared 0.077 0.073 0.073 0.060 0.057 0.057 
Panel D: Firm Fixed Effects (Post –Crisis  Observations) 
IO TOTAL -0.005   -0.001   
 (0.144)   (0.520)   
IO FOR  -0.003   0.000  
  (0.484)   (0.867)  
IO DOM   -0.009   -0.003 
   (0.100)   (0.203) 
N 430 430 430 430 430 430 
R-Squared 0.119 0.115 0.121 0.065 0.064 0.071 
Panel E: Firm Fixed Effects (Common Law Observations) 
IO TOTAL -0.002*   -0.000   
 (0.081)   (0.757)   
IO FOR  -0.002   -0.001  
  (0.251)   (0.320)  
IO DOM   -0.001   0.000 
   (0.423)   (0.555) 
N 939 939 939 939 939 939 
R-Squared 0.099 0.097 0.095 0.067 0.068 0.067 
Panel F: Firm Fixed Effects (Civil  Law Observations) 
IO TOTAL 0.003   0.000   
 (0.314)   (0.575)   
IO FOR  0.002   0.000  
  (0.623)   (0.854)  
IO DOM   0.012   0.002 
   (0.150)   (0.230) 
N 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 
R-Squared 0.055 0.053 0.059 0.047 0.046 0.050 
Panel G: Interaction Effects (Firm Fixed Effects) 
IO TOTAL * FAMILY 0.007* 0.001 
 (0.094) (0.190) 
IO FOR * FAMILY 0.006 0.002 
 (0.140) (0.149) 
IO DOM* FAMILY 0.012 0.001 
 (0.146) (0.538) 
IO TOTAL * Non-FAMILY -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.202) (0.566) 
IO FOR *  Non-FAMILY -0.003* -0.001* 
 (0.064) (0.057) 
IO DOM*  Non-FAMILY 0.001 0.001 
 (0.796) (0.152) 
Note:  Regressions also include year dummies and standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering. Robust p-values corrected for 
firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. All models 
include the control variables (coefficient not shown) used in Table 7.4. BUSY BOARD = Busy board, BUSY BOARD % = Busy board 
%, IO TOTAL = Total institutional investors, IO FOR = Foreign institutional investors, IO DOM = Domestic institutional investors. 
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7.5. Robustness Tests 
As described in the previous chapter, this study employed several robustness tests to confirm 
the main results. These tests utilised reverse causality, system GMM and alternative measures 
to verify the models and their results. The results of these tests are described in the following 
sections. 
Reverse Causality 
As discussed in Chapter Six, reverse causality might be of concern in this study, as it has the 
potential to lead to ineffective results. To address this issue, change score regressions were 
applied in an effort to determine whether changes in institutional ownership drove changes in 
governance outcomes or whether the reverse held true (Aggarwal et al., 2011). Panel A of Table 
7.10 demonstrates the results of these tests. In these tests, a change in the Board Attributes 
Index (Δ GOV14) from period t-1 to t represented the dependent variable. The main explanatory 
variables were changes in institutional ownership (Δ IO) from period t-2 to t-1. All other 
independent variables were expressed in terms of change; these variables were lagged by one 
period relative to the Board Attributes Index. Panel A of Table 7.10 shows that changes in total 
and foreign institutions drove improved outcomes with respect to board attributes (with 
coefficient = 0.004 and 0.006, p-value = 0.074 and 0.090, and R-Squared value = 0.032 and 
0.033, respectively). The results also indicated an insignificant relationship between the Board 
Attributes Index outcomes and changes in common, civil and domestic institutions.  
Panel B of Table 7.10 demonstrates the results of the reverse relationship analysis, which was 
conducted in an effort to study whether changes in governance outcomes drove changes in 
institutional ownership. In this analysis, the dependent variables were changes in institutional 
ownership (Δ IO) from period t-1 to t. The main explanatory variable was a change in the Board 
Attributes Index (ΔGOV14) from period t-2 to t-1. All other independent variables were 
expressed in terms of change; they were also lagged by one period relative to institutional 
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ownership. Panel B of Table 7.10 shows that most types of institutional investors had negative 
and insignificant associations with governance outcomes. These results were consistent with 
those of Aggarwal et al. (2011) and showed that while changes in institutional investment 
activity drove changes in corporate governance outcomes, the opposite was not true. Therefore, 
these results alleviated concerns that the main results (see Table 7.4 for comparison) were 
driven by the causality between institutional investors and corporate governance structures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.10 Changes in Institutional Ownership and Changes in Board Attributes  
 Δ GOV14  coefficient N R-Squared 
Panel A: Yearly Changes ( Changes in Institutional Ownership and Changes in Corporate Governance) 
Δ IO TOTAL 0.004* 1553 0.032 
 (0.074)   
Δ IO FOR 0.006* 1553 0.033 
 (0.090)   
Δ IO DOM 0.000 1553 0.030 
 (0.990)   
Δ IO COMMON 0.003 1553 0.031 
 (0.480)   
Δ IO CIVIL 0.010 1553 0.032 
 (0.128)   
Panel B:  Yearly Changes (Changes in Corporate Governance and Changes in Institutional Ownership) 
Δ IO TOTAL -0.080 1553 0.031 
 (0.777)   
Δ IO FOR -0.043 1553 0.038 
 (0.864)   
Δ IO DOM -0.011 1553 0.044 
 (0.892)   
Δ IO COMMON 0.002 1553 0.036 
 (0.992)   
Δ IO CIVIL -0.046 1553 0.031 
 (0.751)   
Note:  Regressions also include year, country and industry dummies and standard errors corrected for country-level clustering. Robust p-values 
corrected for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.  All 
models include the control variables (coefficient not shown) used in Table 7.4. GOV14= Board attributes index, IO TOTAL = Total institutional 
investors, IO FOR = Foreign institutional investors, IO DOM = Domestic institutional investors, IO COMMON = Common law institutional 
investors, IO CIVIL = Civil law institutional investors. 
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System GMM  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, this study adopted a system GMM technique as a 
robustness test. To this end, the xtabond2 dynamic panel estimator in STATA 14 was 
considered, and adapted the procedure of Wintoki et al. (2012) to model the association between 
institutional investors and corporate board characteristics (the Board Attributes Index). Table 
7.11 describes the results of this system GMM, which was used to examine the role of 
institutional investors in improving the Board Attributes Index (GOV14). The first test is related 
to second-order serial correlation AR (2), with a P value > 5%. The second test is the Hansen J 
test of over-identification, which is used to determine whether an instrument is uncorrelated 
with the error term in the models, with a P value > 5%. The results, as reported in Table 7.11, 
indicated that there was no serial correlation (with AR (2) ranges from 0.323 to 0.342) and that 
the instruments used in the system GMM were valid and uncorrelated with the error term (with 
the Hansen J test value ranges from 0.182 to 0.208). 
Table 7.11 illustrates that total and foreign institutional investors have a positive and significant 
association with the board attributes index (GOV14) at 1% (with coefficient value = 0.005 and 
0.008, and p-value = 0.007 and 0.000, respectively), which reveals that the results are consistent 
with Table 7.4. However, the only exception is the common and civil law institutional investors, 
who had positive and significant associations with GOV14 at 5% and 1%, respectively (with 
coefficient value = 0.004 and 0.010, and p-value = 0.025 and 0.083, respectively). In the main 
results, the coefficient was positive but insignificant for both common and civil institutions (see 
Table 7.4 for comparison). 
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Table 7.11 Institutional Investors and the Board Attributes Index (System GMM) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 GOV14 
GOV14 0.706
*** 0.698*** 0.709*** 0.706*** 0.711*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IO TOTAL 0.005***     
 (0.007)     
IO FOR  0.008***    
  (0.000)    
IO DOM   -0.001   
   (0.801)   
IO COMMON    0.004**  
    (0.025)  
IO CIVIL     0.010* 
     (0.083) 
FSIZE 0.050 0.037 -0.038 0.010 0.008 
 (0.510) (0.601) (0.592) (0.895) (0.908) 
SGROWTH 0.108 0.098 0.121 0.114 0.115 
 (0.304) (0.350) (0.249) (0.281) (0.274) 
LEV -0.276 -0.258 -0.254 -0.272 -0.251 
 (0.214) (0.249) (0.257) (0.225) (0.254) 
CASH -0.092 -0.140 -0.117 -0.112 -0.074 
 (0.762) (0.645) (0.703) (0.714) (0.808) 
CAPEX -0.510 -0.586 -0.684 -0.582 -0.604 
 (0.574) (0.521) (0.454) (0.524) (0.503) 
MB 0.003 0.002 -0.000 0.001 0.002 
 (0.795) (0.878) (0.978) (0.924) (0.825) 
ROA 0.201 0.209 0.103 0.158 0.143 
 (0.602) (0.585) (0.787) (0.681) (0.707) 
PPE 0.112 0.086 0.139 0.119 0.139 
 (0.542) (0.639) (0.456) (0.523) (0.445) 
ANALYST 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.003 
 (0.526) (0.589) (0.394) (0.462) (0.463) 
ADR 0.007 0.000 0.028 0.014 0.022 
 (0.929) (1.000) (0.727) (0.858) (0.775) 
RULE  -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 -0.007 -0.002 
 (0.845) (0.826) (0.876) (0.812) (0.951) 
CRISIS  0.033 0.050 0.041 0.037 0.035 
 (0.800) (0.696) (0.751) (0.776) (0.789) 
POST-CRISIS 0.012 0.038 0.021 0.016 0.016 
 (0.943) (0.816) (0.898) (0.924) (0.921) 
FAMILY 0.398*** 0.400*** 0.300** 0.337** 0.404*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.030) (0.015) (0.008) 
STATE 0.465*** 0.472*** 0.369** 0.394** 0.497*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.019) (0.013) (0.006) 
WIDELY 0.494*** 0.508*** 0.468*** 0.465*** 0.536*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.323 0.342 0.329 0.327 0.324 
Hansen 0.182 0.186 0.208 0.196 0.192 
N 2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 
Note:  Regressions also include year dummies and standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering. Robust p-values corrected for firm-
level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. GOV14= Board 
attributes index, IO TOTAL = Total institutional investors,  IO FOR = Foreign institutional investors, IO DOM = Domestic institutional 
investors, IO COMMON = Common law institutional investors,  IO CIVIL = Civil law institutional investors,  FSIZE = Firm size,  
SGROWTH = Sales growth,  LEV = Leverage, Cash = Cash,  CAPEX = Capital Expenditure,  MB = Market-to-book value,  ROA = 
Return on Asset,  PPE = Property, plant and equipment, ANALYST = Analyst following,  ADR = Cross listing dummy, Rule = Rule of 
law, CRISIS = Crisis dummy,  POST-CRISIS = Post crisis dummy,  FAMILY = Family controlling at 20%,  STATE = State controlling 
at 20%,  WIDELY = Widely held at 20%. 
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Alternative Measures 
 
The study further tested the robustness of the main findings by considering various items of 
the Board Attributes Index (GOV14) as substitutes for the variables used in the main analysis. 
Table 7.12 presents the probit panel regressions of the role of institutional investors in the 
improvement of several items of the Board Attributes Index (GOV14). These attributes are 
related to corporate board and its key subcommittees composition (items 2, 5, 6 and 7), board 
activity (item 8), board entrenchment (item 9), and board busyness (item 12).  
Table 7.12 demonstrates that total institutional investors have a positive and significant 
association with the independence of the board dummy, the independence of the key 
subcommittees dummies (audit, compensation and nomination) and also with the chairman and 
CEO dummy (with coefficient value = 0.018, 0.019, 0.024, 0.010 and 0.048, and p-value = 
0.075, 0.000, 0.004, 0.049 and 0.054, respectively). On the other hand, the foreign institutions 
were found to be positively associated with only the independence of the board dummy and 
the independence of audit- and compensation-committees dummies (with coefficient value = 
0.030, 0.013 and 0.029, and p-value = 0.008, 0.004 and 0.002, respectively). In addition, Table 
7.12 illustrates that domestic institutional investors have a negative and significant association 
with the independence of the board dummy (with the coefficient value = -0.007, and p-value = 
0.096), and a positive and significant association with the independence of the audit committee 
dummy (with the coefficient value = 0.024, and p-value = 0.082).Collectively, these results 
were consistent with the findings of the main analysis (see Tables 7.6, 7.7, 7.8 and 7.9 for 
comparison). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
241 
 
 
 
 
7.6. Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter outlined the research analysis procedures and findings of the institutional 
investors’ role in the improvement of board attributes, beginning with a descriptive 
examination of the variables used in this study. The chapter then discussed the results of the 
correlation analysis and VIF tests. Next, the chapter outlined the results of the hypothesis tests 
(H1–H5), which were developed in Chapter Five of this thesis. Furthermore, this chapter 
illustrated the results of efforts to test these hypotheses according to various institutional 
settings, to include diverse economic conditions (pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods), legal 
systems and ownership structures. Finally, this chapter concluded with an explanation of the 
results of various robustness tests including reverse causality and system GMM and alternative 
measures. 
 
 
 
Table 7.12 Institutional Investments and Items of the Board Attributes Index 
 IO TOTAL IO FOR IO DOM N 
Panel A: (All Observations) 
INED BOARD Dummy 0.018* 0.030*** -0.007* 1908 
 (0.075) (0.008) (0.096)  
INED AUD  Dummy 0.019*** 0.013*** 0.024* 2028 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.082)  
INED COM Dummy 0.024*** 0.029*** 0.004 2028 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.655)  
INED NOM  Dummy 0.010** 0.010 0.014 1690 
 (0.049) (0.140) (0.113)  
BOARD ATTENDANCE Dummy 0.005 0.011 -0.011 1359 
 (0.539) (0.539) (0.230)  
CHAIRMAN CEO Dummy 0.048* 0.0551 0.0334 1386 
 (0.054) (0.109) (0.533)  
BUSY BOARD Dummy -0.000 -0.001 0.001 2028 
 (0.941) (0.886) (0.881)  
Regressions also include industry, country and year dummies and robust p-values corrected for country-level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, 
**, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. All models include the control variables (coefficient not shown) used in 
Table 7.4. IO TOTAL = Total institutional investors,  IO FOR = Foreign institutional investors, IO DOM = Domestic institutional investors,   INED 
BOARD Dummy =  the board has more than 50% of independent directors (item 2),  INED AUD  Dummy= audit committee composed solely of 
independent directors ( item 5),  INED COM Dummy= compensation committee composed solely of independent directors (item 6),  INED NOM  
Dummy =  the majority members of nomination committee are independent directors (item 7), BOARD ATTENDANCE Dummy = All directors 
attended 75% of the board meeting (item 8), CHAIRMAN CEO Dummy = Chair and CEO positions are separated or there is lead directors (item 9), 
and BUSY BOARD  Dummy =  at least half of the INEDs hold ≤ two directorships in public companies  (item 12). 
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Chapter 8 
8.0 Research Results and Analysis: Institutional Investors and Board Diversity 
8.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides an analysis of the results of the institutional investors’ role in improving 
board diversity. This chapter starts by illustrating the descriptive statistics of the variables used 
to examine the relationship between institutional investors and board diversity. This is followed 
by an examination of the measures used to test the correlations between variables. The 
empirical results are then discussed, and finally, the results of the robustness tests are 
illustrated. 
Accordingly, this chapter is organised as follows: section 8.2 provides a summary of the 
descriptive statistics, section 8.3 describes the correlation analysis, section 8.4 highlights the 
empirical results of the analysis of the institutional investors’ role in the enhancement of board 
diversity characteristics, section 8.5 discusses the robustness tests and section 8.6 offers a 
chapter summary. 
 
8.2. Summary of the Descriptive Statistics 
 
This section illustrates the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables (board diversity), 
independent variables (institutional investors) and control variables (firm and country 
characteristics). Table 8.1 provides the descriptive statistics of the variables used in an effort 
to examine the role of institutional investors in the improvement of board diversity in their 
investee firms. The table mainly reports means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum 
data points and the total observations to describe the descriptive statistics. 
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Table 8.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Variables Mean SD MIN MAX No. of Observations 
Dependent Variables: Board Diversity  
BDI16 10 2 4 16 2,586 
GENDER DIV 14% 12% 0% 60% 2,586 
AGE DIV 13% 4% 3% 36% 2,586 
NATION DIV 25% 23% 0% 100% 2,586 
EDU DIV 51% 21% 0% 100% 2,586 
Independent Variables: Institutional Ownership 
IO TOTAL 36% 23% 1% 99% 2,586 
IO FOR 20% 16% 1% 99% 2,586 
IO DOM 16% 17% 1% 99% 2,586 
IO COMMON 28% 23% 1% 99% 2,586 
IO CIVIL 8% 11% 1% 68% 2,586 
Control Variables: Firm and Country Characteristics 
FSIZE 7.0 0.6 5 8.6 2,586 
SGROWTH 12% 24% -43% 116% 2,586 
LEV 26% 15% 0% 67% 2,586 
CASH 11% 10% 0% 62% 2,586 
CAPEX 6% 5% 0% 26% 2,586 
MB 3.2 3.0 0.30 20.2 2,586 
ROA 11% 7% -9% 36% 2,586 
PPE 35% 24% 1% 90% 2,586 
ANALYST 18 9 0 55 2,586 
ADR 0.19 0.39 0 1 2,586 
RULE 91% 12% 52% 100% 2,586 
Pre-Crisis 0.37 0.48 0 1 2,586 
Crisis 0.45 0.50 0 1 2,586 
Post-Crisis 0.18 0.39 0 1 2,586 
FAMILY 20% 40% 0 1 2,586 
STATE 9% 27% 0 1 2,586 
IO 3% 17% 0 1 2,586 
WIDELY 68% 46% 0 1 2,586 
BDI16 = Board diversity index, GENDER DIV = Board gender diversity, AGE DIV = Board age diversity, Nation DIV = Board nationality 
diversity, EDU DIV = Board education diversity, IO TOTAL = Total institutional investors,  IO FOR = Foreign institutional investors, IO 
DOM = Domestic institutional investors, IO COMMON = Common law institutional investors,  IO CIVIL = Civil law institutional investors,  
FSIZE = Firm size,  SGROWTH = Sales growth,  LEV = Leverage, Cash = Cash,  CAPEX = Capital Expenditure,  MB = Market-to-book 
value,  ROA = Return on Asset,  PPE = Property, plant and equipment, ANALYST = Analyst following,  ADR = Cross listing dummy, Rule 
= Rule of law, CRISIS = Crisis dummy,  POST-CRISIS = Post crisis dummy,  FAMILY = Family controlling at 20%,  STATE = State 
controlling at 20%, IO = Institutional investor controlling at 20%, WIDELY = Widely held at 20%. 
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Table 8.1 demonstrates that the Board Diversity Index (BDI16) ranges from a minimum of 4 to 
a maximum of 16 for the entire sample. Figure 8.1 shows that on average, the countries with 
the highest BDI16 scores in 2012 were France (76.8%), Norway (73.1%), Sweden (70.2%), 
Denmark (69.7%) and the UK (69.2%). Moreover, the countries with the lowest BDI16 scores 
were India (48.9%), Canada (59.0%), Finland (60.7%), Australia (61.0%) and Switzerland 
(61.5%). 
Figure 8.1 Board Diversity Index (BDI16) by Country and Year (2006–2012) 
 
 
Figure 8.2 displays the weighted averages of the BDI16 scores for firms located in civil law 
countries and common law countries; the figure also illustrates that on average, higher levels 
of board diversity were found in civil law countries than in their common law counterparts. 
Notably, variations in board diversity between both legal systems began to grow more apparent 
following the financial crisis of 2007–2008. 
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Figure 8.2 Weighted Averages of the Board Diversity Index (BDI16) 
 
Table 8.1 also presents the statistics of the individual attributes of corporate board diversity: 
gender, age, nationality and education diversity. The table shows that on average, these 
attributes were 14%, 13%, 25% and 51%, respectively. Figure 8.3 describes the weighted 
averages of these attributes and indicates that age, nationality and education diversity remained 
stable throughout the years under study. In contrast, however, gender diversity held constant 
until 2010, at which point it gradually increased until the end of the study period. This might 
be explained by the introduction of gender quotas with regard to corporate boards that were 
initiated in several countries during this period (see Terjesen et al., 2015a). 
Figure 8.3 Weighted Averages of Board Diversity Attributes 
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Table 8.1 further illustrates that for all types, the level of institutional investor presence ranged 
from 1% to 99%. However, civil law institutional investors are an exception, for whom their 
presence ranged from 1% to 68%. The average number of holdings owned by total, foreign, 
domestic, common law and civil law institutional investors in the sample countries were 36%, 
20%, 16%, 28% and 8%, respectively. Figure 8.4 shows that on average, the presence of all 
types of institutional investors rose from 2006 to 2008, at which point their presence began to 
decline (until 2010). This decline could be due to the occurrence of the financial crisis. 
However, this graph shows that after 2010, institutional investors of all types began to reclaim 
their previous levels of investment in the stock markets of the sample countries. 
   Figure 8.4 Weighted Averages of Institutional Ownership 
 
 
Table 8.1 also illustrates the statistics of the control variables. The average firm size was 7, 
with a minimum value of 5 and a maximum value of 8.6. Sales growth ranged from -43% to 
116%, with an average of 12% and a standard deviation of 24%. Table 8.1 shows that leverage, 
cash and capital expenditures had a mean value of 26%, 11% and 6%, respectively. Table 8.1 
also demonstrates that market-to-book value had a mean value of 3.2 and return on assets 
figures ranged from -9% to 36%, while property, plant and equipment scores ranged from 1% 
to 90%. The average level of analyst coverage for the entire sample was 18, with a minimum 
of 0 analysts following and a maximum of 55. In this sample, the average figure for companies 
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with an ADR listing was 19% with a standard deviation of 39%. The rule of law index ranged 
from 52% to 100%, with a minimum value of 52% and a maximum value of 100%. Table 8.1 
also demonstrates that 37% of the total observations were classified as occurring during pre-
crisis periods, 45% occurred during times of crisis and 18% occurred during post-crisis periods. 
With regard to the statistics for the controlling owner, the firms are classified to be controlled 
by institutional investors, state, family or widely held. On average, these types of owners 
controlled 3%, 9%, 20% and 68% in this sample, respectively. 
 
8.3 Correlation Analysis 
 
This section describes Pearson correlation matrix that exists between governance 
characteristics (board diversity), institutional ownership and the control variables. The main 
aim of the correlation matrix is to investigate the possible presence of high correlation among 
the independent variables. When conducting this test, a researcher allocates a single number 
that measures the extent to which any two variables are related; in so doing, the direction of 
this relationship can be illustrated. The problem of collinearity, however, means that two 
variables have a relatively perfect linear correlation, which in turn renders the model estimation 
meaningless and difficult to interpret. Gujarati (2004) argued that if the correlation between 
two variables exceeds 80%, the validity of the results may be threatened. Table 8.2 shows that 
the highest absolute correlation between explanatory variables (IO Total and IO Common) was 
89%—well above the 80% threshold assigned to indicate a multi-collinearity threat (Gujarati, 
2004). However, these two variables were not combined in any of the regressions used in this 
analysis. All correlations between other independent variables fell below this threshold (see 
Table 8.2).  
As discussed in the previous chapter, an alternative measure used to describe the correlation 
issue between independent variables is to calculate the variance inflation factor (VIF). 
According to Studenmund (2001), VIF value should not exceed 5; a higher value may be an 
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indication that multi-collinearity threats exist within the model. In order to calculate the VIF 
value, an OLS model (shown below) was applied using the Board Diversity Index (BDI16) as 
a dependent variable. Table 8.3 provides the results of this test and shows that multi-collinearity 
threats were not a factor in the utilised models, as all values were less than 5. 
 
(𝐵𝐷𝐼16) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐼𝑂 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿(𝑡−1)) +
(
 
 
𝛽2 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸(𝑡−1) + 𝛽3 𝑆𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻(𝑡−1) + 𝛽4 𝐿𝐸𝑉(𝑡−1) + 𝛽5 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻(𝑡−1) + 𝛽6 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋(𝑡−1)
+𝛽7 𝑀𝐵(𝑡−1) +  𝛽8 𝑅𝑂𝐴(𝑡−1) + 𝛽9 𝑃𝑃𝐸(𝑡−1) + 𝛽10 𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑌𝑆𝑇(𝑡−1) + 𝛽11𝐴𝐷𝑅(𝑡−1) +
𝛽12 𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸(𝑡−1)𝛽13 𝑃𝑅𝐸 − 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆(𝑡−1) +  𝛽14 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆(𝑡−1) +  𝛽15 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 − 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆(𝑡−1)
+𝛽16 𝐼𝑂(𝑡−1) + 𝛽17 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸(𝑡−1) +  𝛽18 𝐹𝐴𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑌(𝑡−1) +  𝛽19 𝑊𝐼𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑌(𝑡−1) +
𝜀 )
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Table 8.2 Pearson Correlation Matrix  
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BDI16 1.000                   
GENDER DIV 0.426 1.000                 
AGE  DIV 0.461 0.012 1.000               
NATION DIV 0.337 -0.051 -0.100 1.000             
EDU DIV -0.172 0.153 -0.237 0.220 1.000           
IO TOTAL 0.062 0.070 -0.115 0.006 -0.055 1.000                 
IO FOR 0.069 0.015 -0.015 0.082 -0.012 0.702 1.000               
IO DOM 0.026 0.082 -0.144 -0.066 -0.065 0.732 0.039 1.000             
IO COMMON 0.019 -0.046 -0.136 0.014 -0.149 0.890 0.626 0.661 1.000           
IO CIVIL 0.097 0.251 0.046 -0.014 0.205 0.227 0.162 0.152 -0.236 1.000         
SIZE 0.072 -0.042 -0.079 0.189 0.035 -0.288 -0.272 -0.139 -0.196 -0.190 1.000       
SGROWTH -0.057 -0.109 0.032 -0.032 -0.057 0.008 0.028 -0.017 0.031 -0.047 -0.043 1.000     
LEV 0.063 0.051 0.131 -0.136 -0.174 -0.027 -0.040 0.002 -0.032 0.009 0.116 -0.049 1.000   
CASH 0.002 -0.061 -0.014 0.145 0.069 -0.025 0.062 -0.095 -0.030 0.006 -0.158 0.045 -0.279 1.000 
CAPEX -0.061 -0.014 0.036 -0.095 -0.084 -0.073 -0.055 -0.049 -0.019 -0.107 -0.021 0.095 0.055 -0.082 
MB 0.051 -0.025 0.028 -0.005 -0.008 0.057 0.013 0.065 0.086 -0.063 -0.308 0.106 0.029 0.186 
ROA 0.032 0.052 -0.011 0.023 0.070 -0.014 -0.030 0.012 0.012 -0.050 -0.218 0.113 -0.290 0.129 
PPE -0.103 -0.010 -0.026 -0.143 -0.119 0.000 -0.026 0.031 0.083 -0.169 0.137 0.071 0.175 -0.246 
ANALYST 0.071 0.065 -0.043 0.054 0.132 -0.204 -0.144 -0.142 -0.224 0.050 0.372 -0.078 -0.076 0.080 
ADR -0.025 -0.045 -0.132 0.187 0.042 0.183 0.107 0.154 0.264 -0.172 0.259 0.028 -0.057 -0.052 
RULE 0.246 0.361 -0.099 0.207 0.181 0.312 0.204 0.233 0.205 0.218 -0.061 -0.043 -0.022 -0.041 
PRE-CRISIS -0.068 -0.103 0.027 -0.042 0.000 -0.016 -0.005 -0.020 -0.028 0.019 -0.048 0.177 0.038 -0.028 
CRISIS 0.150 0.067 0.035 0.096 -0.013 0.055 0.054 0.032 0.048 0.020 0.049 -0.171 0.019 0.028 
POST-CRISIS -0.108 0.042 -0.079 -0.071 0.017 -0.051 -0.064 -0.016 -0.027 -0.048 -0.003 -0.001 -0.072 -0.002 
FAMILY 0.134 -0.051 0.287 0.040 -0.112 -0.317 -0.190 -0.257 -0.273 -0.088 -0.027 0.020 0.018 0.002 
STATE -0.017 0.122 0.014 -0.109 0.011 -0.282 -0.193 -0.204 -0.266 -0.028 0.177 -0.017 0.039 -0.061 
IO -0.027 -0.048 0.030 -0.074 0.011 0.037 0.022 0.044 -0.030 0.158 0.035 -0.014 0.090 -0.036 
WIDELY -0.096 -0.011 -0.267 0.057 0.086 0.430 0.273 0.328 0.406 0.036 -0.096 -0.002 -0.071 0.048 
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Table 8.2 continued 
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CASH 1.000               
CAPEX -0.082 1.000                           
MB 0.186 0.030 1.000                         
ROA 0.129 0.180 0.432 1.000                       
PPE -0.246 0.645 -0.103 0.028 1.000                     
ANALYST 0.080 -0.078 0.057 0.132 -0.167 1.000                   
ADR -0.052 0.081 0.026 0.064 0.184 -0.012 1.000                 
RULE -0.041 -0.065 -0.036 -0.037 0.017 -0.268 0.136 1.000               
PRE-
CRISIS 
-0.028 0.045 0.098 0.095 0.005 -0.149 0.012 0.058 1.000             
CRISIS 0.028 -0.170 -0.075 -0.120 -0.127 0.105 -0.044 0.037 -0.690 1.000           
POST-
CRISIS 
-0.002 0.162 -0.026 0.035 0.158 0.050 0.042 -0.121 -0.362 -0.424 1.000         
FAMILY 0.002 0.005 -0.047 -0.019 -0.036 -0.037 -0.152 -0.171 0.009 0.008 -0.021 1.000       
STATE -0.061 0.060 -0.092 -0.007 0.127 0.133 -0.130 -0.168 -0.005 0.005 0.000 -0.152 1.000     
IO -0.036 -0.053 -0.024 -0.027 0.011 0.045 -0.054 -0.013 0.022 0.023 -0.057 -0.085 -0.052 1.000   
WIDELY 0.048 -0.022 0.105 0.030 -0.049 -0.064 0.229 0.253 -0.013 -0.018 0.038 -0.739 -0.451 -0.253 1.000 
The correlation coefficients at 5% are in bold. BDI16 = Board diversity index, GENDER DIV = Board gender diversity, AGE DIV = Board age diversity, Nation DIV = Board nationality diversity, EDU DIV = Board 
education diversity, IO TOTAL = Total institutional investors,  IO FOR = Foreign institutional investors, IO DOM = Domestic institutional investors, IO COMMON = Common law institutional investors,  IO CIVIL 
= Civil law institutional investors,  FSIZE = Firm size,  SGROWTH = Sales growth,  LEV = Leverage, Cash = Cash,  CAPEX = Capital Expenditure,  MB = Market-to-book value,  ROA = Return on Asset,  PPE = 
Property, plant and equipment, ANALYST = Analyst following,  ADR = Cross listing dummy, Rule = Rule of law, PRE-CRISIS= Pre-Crisis Dummy, CRISIS = Crisis dummy,  POST-CRISIS = Post crisis dummy,  
FAMILY = Family controlling at 20%,  STATE = State controlling at 20%, IO = Institutional investor controlling at 20%, WIDELY = Widely held at 20%. 
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8.4 Institutional Investors and Board Diversity: Panel Data Analysis 
 
8.4.1 Board Diversity Index  
 
The first analysis in this chapter investigated the role of institutional ownership in the 
promotion of board diversity (see Table 8.4) using the Board Diversity Index (BDI16)42. The 
findings indicated that there was a positive but insignificant association between the diversity 
index and total, foreign and common institutional investors (with coefficient = 0.002, 0.003 
and 0.004, p-value = 0.653, 0.510 and 0.366, and R-Squared value = 0.062, 0.062 and 0.063, 
respectively). However, the association between domestic and civil institutional investors (with 
coefficient = -0.003 and -0.007, p-value = 0.575 and 0.391, and R-Squared value = 0.062 and 
                                                          
42 It is argued that directors who serve on nomination committees are likely to select directors with similar 
attributes to fill additional board seats (see, for example, Hutchinson et al., 2015). When the empirical analysis of 
diversity models are repeated including various diversity aspects of the nomination committee, including gender, 
age, nationality and education, the study obtained consistent findings.  
Table 8.3 VIF Test 
 VIF 1/VIF 
WIDELY 3.52 0.28 
FAMILY 2.85 0.35 
PPE 2.12 0.47 
CAPEX 1.90 0.52 
ROA 1.52 0.65 
IO TOTAL 1.49 0.66 
MB 1.40 0.71 
IO 1.36 0.73 
ANALYST 1.35 0.74 
LEV 1.33 0.75 
FSIZE 1.30 0.76 
Crisis 1.29 0.77 
RULE 1.24 0.80 
Post-Crisis 1.22 0.81 
CASH 1.21 0.82 
ADR 1.17 0.85 
QUOTA 1.16 0.86 
SGROWTH 1.08 0.92 
Mean VIF 1.58 
IO TOTAL = Total institutional investors, SIZE = Firm size,  SGROWTH = Sales growth,  LEV = 
Leverage, Cash = Cash,  CAPEX = Capital Expenditure,  MB = Market-to-book value,  ROA = Return on 
Asset,  PPE = Property, plant and equipment, ANALYST = Analyst following,  ADR = Cross listing 
dummy, Rule = Rule of law, PRE-CRISIS= Pre-Crisis Dummy, CRISIS = Crisis dummy,  POST-CRISIS 
= Post crisis dummy,  FAMILY = Family controlling at 20%,   QUOTA = Gender Quota, STATE = State 
controlling at 20%, IO = Institutional investor controlling at 20%, WIDELY = Widely held at 20%. 
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0.063, respectively) was negative but insignificant (see Table 8.4, Panel A)43. The results do 
not support the agency and the resource dependence theoretical explanations, and therefore H6 
was rejected. The results indicated that the institutional investors did not improve board 
diversity in their investee firms, which could be due to the cost associated with board diversity. 
Several scholars have argued that board diversity can also have a negative impact on the 
performance of the corporate board (Putnam, 2007; Adams et al., 2015; Estélyi and Nisar, 
2016). It is highlighted by Estélyi and Nisar (2016) that the costs of board diversity may exceed 
its benefits, as there may be a communication breakdown among the directors, which in turn 
makes each director provide a radically different interpretation to a particular problem. This is 
also consistent with the view of Putnam (2007), who argued that directors with different 
personal attributes may create a lack of communication, leading to conflict and factions in the 
team.  
The study then examined whether the role of institutional investors in the improvement of 
board diversity was influenced by various economic conditions (pre-crisis, crisis and non-crisis 
periods). The firm fixed effects regression indicated that the results were mixed but 
insignificant during all three periods (see Table 8.4, Panels B, C and D), though an exception 
was found for foreign institutional investors, who had positive and significant relationships 
with board diversity during pre-crisis periods at 10% (with coefficient = 0.020, p-value = 0.055, 
and R-Squared value = 0.110).  
Next, the study examined the role of institutional investors in the improvement of board 
diversity outcomes according to various ownership structures. This was accomplished by 
considering the interactions between institutional investors and family-owned versus non-
family-controlled firms (see Table 8.4, Panel E). Ultimately, the firm fixed effects regression 
                                                          
43 When the empirical analysis is repeated including the US observations, the study obtained consistent findings.  
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showed that the results were mixed but insignificant for both ownership structures. Overall, the 
results do not support the institutional theory, and they complement those studies that argued 
that economic conditions and ownership structure are important elements to be considered 
when studying board diversity (Ben‐Amar et al., 2013; Nekhili and Gatfaoui, 2013; Ararat et 
al., 2015; Sun et al., 2015; Farag and Mallin, 2016a). In general, the findings contribute to the 
governance literature by illustrating that the ownership structure does not determine the 
association between institutional investors and board diversity; however, institutional investors 
(foreign institutions) were found to promote board diversity only during pre-crises period.  
Table 8.4 Institutional Investors and Board Diversity 
BDI16 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Panel A: Firm Fixed Effects(All Observations) 
IO TOTAL 0.002     
 (0.653)     
IO FOR  0.003    
  (0.510)    
IO DOM   -0.003   
   (0.575)   
IO COMMON    0.004  
    (0.366)  
IO CIVIL     -0.007 
     (0.391) 
FSIZE 0.313 0.312 0.296 0.318 0.286 
 (0.505) (0.504) (0.528) (0.495) (0.542) 
SGROWTH -0.165 -0.164 -0.163 -0.165 -0.162 
 (0.276) (0.278) (0.285) (0.276) (0.286) 
LEV -0.689 -0.678 -0.697 -0.666 -0.683 
 (0.266) (0.272) (0.264) (0.280) (0.275) 
CASH -0.386 -0.386 -0.385 -0.383 -0.380 
 (0.549) (0.549) (0.550) (0.553) (0.556) 
CAPEX 0.367 0.342 0.263 0.388 0.266 
 (0.793) (0.805) (0.852) (0.780) (0.849) 
MB -0.017 -0.017 -0.018 -0.017 -0.018 
 (0.351) (0.358) (0.342) (0.352) (0.326) 
ROA 1.127 1.130 1.070 1.160 1.083 
 (0.244) (0.246) (0.274) (0.233) (0.271) 
PPE 0.139 0.145 0.171 0.153 0.208 
 (0.871) (0.867) (0.844) (0.859) (0.809) 
ANALYST -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.641) (0.638) (0.637) (0.637) (0.635) 
ADR 0.447* 0.441* 0.449* 0.442* 0.453* 
 (0.080) (0.085) (0.079) (0.085) (0.076) 
RULE OF LAW -0.014 -0.015 -0.014 -0.016 -0.016 
 (0.722) (0.712) (0.725) (0.693) (0.684) 
CRISIS  0.170 0.178 0.175 0.172 0.168 
 (0.242) (0.225) (0.217) (0.237) (0.245) 
POST-CRISIS -0.045 -0.034 -0.038 -0.043 -0.051 
 (0.832) (0.871) (0.857) (0.837) (0.810) 
QUOTA 0.411*** 0.410*** 0.406*** 0.410*** 0.403*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
FAMILY 0.301 0.307 0.250 0.298 0.205 
 (0.547) (0.539) (0.616) (0.546) (0.674) 
STATE 0.403 0.408 0.342 0.383 0.259 
 (0.349) (0.344) (0.430) (0.358) (0.517) 
WIDELY 0.071 0.076 0.030 0.063 -0.017 
 (0.818) (0.806) (0.923) (0.835) (0.954) 
N 2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 
R-Squared 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.063 0.063 
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Table 8.4 continued 
 
BDI16 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel B: Firm Fixed Effects (Pre-Crisis Observations) 
IO TOTAL 0.009     
 (0.303)     
IO FOR  0.020*    
  (0.055)    
IO DOM   -0.031   
   (0.197)   
IO COMMON    0.013  
    (0.219)  
IO CIVIL     -0.001 
     (0.976) 
N 551 551 551 551 551 
R-Squared 0.095 0.110 0.101 0.098 0.090 
Panel C: Firm Fixed Effects  (Crisis Observations) 
IO TOTAL -0.005     
 (0.446)     
IO FOR  -0.003    
  (0.677)    
IO DOM   -0.003   
   (0.730)   
IO COMMON    0.000  
    (0.992)  
IO CIVIL     -0.013 
     (0.162) 
N 1047 1047 1047 1047 1047 
R-Squared 0.095 0.094 0.094 0.094 0.096 
Panel D: Firm Fixed Effects  (Post-Crisis Observations) 
IO TOTAL -0.002     
 (0.780)     
IO FOR  0.005    
  (0.673)    
IO DOM   -0.016   
   (0.367)   
IO COMMON    -0.009  
    (0.336)  
IO CIVIL     0.037 
     (0.150) 
N 430 430 430 430 430 
R-Squared 0.124 0.124 0.127 0.126 0.130 
Panel E: Firm Fixed Effects ( Interaction Effects) 
IO TOTAL * FAMILY -0.000 
 (0.987) 
IO FOR * FAMILY -0.000 
 (0.997) 
IO DOM* FAMILY 0.003 
 (0.853) 
IO TOTAL * Non-FAMILY 0.002 
 (0.645) 
IO FOR *  Non-FAMILY 0.004 
 (0.503) 
IO DOM*  Non-FAMILY -0.004 
 (0.534) 
Note:  Regressions also include year dummies and standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering. Robust p-values corrected for firm-level 
clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. BDI16= Board diversity 
index, IO TOTAL = Total institutional investors,  IO FOR = Foreign institutional investors, IO DOM = Domestic institutional investors, IO 
COMMON = Common law institutional investors,  IO CIVIL = Civil law institutional investors,  FSIZE = Firm size,  SGROWTH = Sales 
growth,  LEV = Leverage, Cash = Cash,  CAPEX = Capital Expenditure,  MB = Market-to-book value,  ROA = Return on Asset,  PPE = 
Property, plant and equipment, ANALYST = Analyst following,  ADR = Cross listing dummy, Rule = Rule of law, CRISIS = Crisis dummy,  
POST-CRISIS = Post crisis dummy, QUOTA = Gender Quota,  FAMILY = Family controlling at 20%,  STATE = State controlling at 20%,  
WIDELY = Widely held at 20%. 
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The study then moved to an examination of whether the role of institutional investors in the 
promotion of board diversity was dependent upon the legal system of the country wherein a 
firm operated (civil law versus common law countries). Table 8.5 indicates that institutional 
investors had mixed and insignificant associations with board diversity in both legal systems. 
This finding does not support the institutional theory, whilst it does complement the other 
studies that call for the consideration of the legal system when studying board diversity (see 
Grosvold, 2011; Grosvold and Brammer, 2011). In particular, this study contributes to the 
literature that the legal system does not affect the relationship between institutional investors 
and board diversity. 
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Table 8.5 Institutional Investors and Board Diversity: The Role of Legal Origin 
 
BDI16 
 Civil Law Countries Common Law Countries 
 Panel A: Firm Fixed Effects Panel Panel B: Firm Fixed Effects Panel 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
IO TOTAL 0.002   0.000   
 (0.759)   (0.952)   
IO FOR  0.001   0.004  
  (0.817)   (0.657)  
IO DOM   0.000   -0.007 
   (0.970)   (0.317) 
FSIZE 0.336 0.326 0.324 0.212 0.236 0.227 
 (0.673) (0.681) (0.684) (0.737) (0.708) (0.718) 
SGROWTH -0.338 -0.336 -0.337 0.010 0.006 0.010 
 (0.131) (0.131) (0.135) (0.958) (0.974) (0.958) 
LEV -0.232 -0.225 -0.228 -1.341 -1.304 -1.386 
 (0.800) (0.805) (0.803) (0.190) (0.203) (0.177) 
CASH -0.329 -0.340 -0.335 -0.446 -0.442 -0.415 
 (0.706) (0.697) (0.706) (0.652) (0.656) (0.672) 
CAPEX 0.393 0.368 0.381 0.509 0.561 0.363 
 (0.851) (0.860) (0.859) (0.764) (0.736) (0.830) 
MB -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.017 -0.016 -0.017 
 (0.750) (0.743) (0.742) (0.425) (0.456) (0.446) 
ROA 2.000 1.978 1.977 0.097 0.167 0.064 
 (0.203) (0.213) (0.211) (0.927) (0.876) (0.953) 
PPE 0.393 0.396 0.393 -0.245 -0.275 -0.201 
 (0.791) (0.790) (0.791) (0.790) (0.768) (0.830) 
ANALYST 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.012 -0.012 -0.010 
 (0.828) (0.835) (0.830) (0.483) (0.482) (0.521) 
ADR 0.430 0.432 0.439 0.414 0.408 0.405 
 (0.171) (0.168) (0.157) (0.250) (0.256) (0.260) 
RULE OF LAW -0.122* -0.123* -0.124* 0.036 0.031 0.037 
 (0.059) (0.058) (0.060) (0.587) (0.639) (0.585) 
CRISIS  0.597*** 0.597*** 0.594*** 0.152 0.156 0.158 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.355) (0.347) (0.332) 
POST-CRISIS -0.027 -0.030 -0.035 0.203 0.209 0.232 
 (0.886) (0.876) (0.855) (0.477) (0.467) (0.407) 
QUOTA 0.538*** 0.536*** 0.535*** 0.316* 0.313* 0.314* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.084) (0.086) (0.087) 
FAMILY 0.505 0.490 0.473 0.148 0.158 0.069 
 (0.464) (0.469) (0.484) (0.762) (0.744) (0.889) 
STATE 0.471 0.452 0.433 0.549 0.573 0.495 
 (0.428) (0.434) (0.467) (0.429) (0.405) (0.450) 
WIDELY 0.151 0.137 0.123 -0.009 0.006 -0.055 
 (0.757) (0.773) (0.796) (0.972) (0.982) (0.848) 
N 1089 1089 1089 939 939 939 
R-Squared 0.099 0.099 0.099 0.053 0.054 0.055 
Note:  Regressions also include year dummies and standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering. Robust p-values corrected for firm-
level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. BDI16= Board 
diversity index, IO TOTAL = Total institutional investors,  IO FOR = Foreign institutional investors, IO DOM = Domestic institutional 
investors, FSIZE = Firm size,  SGROWTH = Sales growth,  LEV = Leverage, Cash = Cash,  CAPEX = Capital Expenditure,  MB = 
Market-to-book value,  ROA = Return on Asset,  PPE = Property, plant and equipment, ANALYST = Analyst following,  ADR = Cross 
listing dummy, Rule = Rule of law, CRISIS = Crisis dummy,  POST-CRISIS = Post crisis dummy,  QUOTA = Gender Quota,   FAMILY 
= Family controlling at 20%,  STATE = State controlling at 20%,  WIDELY = Widely held at 20%. 
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8.4.2 Board Gender Diversity 
 
Gender diversity in particular has received much attention in recent years compared to the other 
diversity attributes. This study examined whether the presence of institutional investors 
improved the gender diversity of the board. Gender diversity is measured by the proportion of 
female directors across a corporate board. Table 8.6 presents the firm fixed effects panel 
regression results; according to these results, institutional investors had mixed but insignificant 
relationships with board gender diversity (see Table 8.6, Panel A). The results indicated that 
the association between institutional investors (total, foreign and domestic) is positive but 
insignificant (with coefficient = 0.000, 0.000, 0.000, p-value = 0.316, 0.723 and 0.282, and R-
Squared value = 0.213, 0.212 and 0.213, respectively). Thus, these findings do not support the 
agency, resource dependence and institutional theories and led to the rejection of H7. The 
findings reveal that there is no association between institutional investors and board gender 
diversity. The findings are consistent with the previous studies that argued that the presence of 
women on a corporate board may not necessarily bring a favourable governance outcome. For 
instance, several studies found no or negative association between a gender diverse board and 
firm performance (Rose, 2007; Chapple and Humphrey, 2014), the excess CEO compensation 
(Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Bugeja et al., 2016), equity risk (Sila et al., 2016) and dividend 
payments (Saeed and Sameer, 2017). More recently, Gaitán et al. (2018) found that a higher 
representation of women on a corporate board decreases productivity. Several studies criticised 
the appointment of women on corporate boards as being a response to social and media pressure 
only (see Martín-Ugedo and Minguez-Vera, 2014; Gregorič et al., 2017). Overall, the findings 
contribute to the literature that institutional investors consider the costs of gender diversity to 
outweigh its benefits. These findings have an important implication for policy makers when 
revising their policy towards the enactment of gender quota legislation and whether a country 
has to choose a gender quota binding approach or a ‘comply or explain’ approach. 
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The recent financial crisis is considered an important period of history to many companies, yet 
there is little known about whether the institutional investors promote gender diversity in 
different economic conditions. Therefore, the study also investigated whether the role of 
institutional investors in improving board gender diversity is determined by different economic 
conditions (pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods). The results revealed that institutional 
investors had mixed and insignificant associations with board gender diversity in all three 
economic conditions (see Table 8.6, Panels B, C and D). The results do not support the 
institutional theory and are consistent with Engelen et al. (2012), who found that gender 
diversity did not contribute to better firm performance during the financial crisis. This is also 
consistent with Pathan and Faff (2013), who documented that gender diversity improved the 
performance of financial firms in the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) period (1997–2002); 
however, this positive association disappeared in both the post-SOX (2003–2006) and the 
recent financial crisis periods (2007–2011). 
The study then examined whether the association between institutional investors and gender 
diversity was dependent upon the legal system of the country in which a firm was listed. For 
both legal systems, the associations were mixed and insignificant (see Table 8.6, Panels E and 
F). The study then examined whether this role was driven by a firm’s ownership structure. 
Ultimately, the associations between institutional investors and diversity attributes were mixed 
and insignificant for both family-owned and non-family-owned firms (see Table 8.6, Panel G). 
The results imply that the ownership concentration did not play a part in the institutional 
investors’ role in the improvement of board gender diversity. Overall, the findings do not 
support the institutional theory and complement the other studies that claimed that the 
importance of the legal system (Grosvold, 2011; Grosvold and Brammer, 2011) and ownership 
structure (Ben‐Amar et al., 2013; Nekhili and Gatfaoui, 2013; Ararat et al., 2015; Farag and 
Mallin, 2016a) are significant when studying board diversity. In particular, this study found 
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that these two factors (the legal system and the ownership structure) have no influence over the 
relationship between institutional investors and board gender diversity. 
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Table 8.6 Institutional Investors and Board Gender Diversity 
 (1) (2) (3) 
GENDER DIV 
Panel A:Firm Fixed Effects (All Observations) 
IO TOTAL 0.000   
 (0.316)   
IO_FOR  0.000  
  (0.723)  
IO_DOM   0.000 
   (0.282) 
N 2028 2028 2028 
R-Squared 0.213 0.212 0.213 
Panel B: Firm Fixed Effects (Pre-Crisis Observations) 
IO_TOTAL -0.000   
 (0.895)   
IO_FOR  -0.000  
  (0.580)  
IO_DOM   0.000 
   (0.532) 
N 551 551 551 
R-Squared 0.138 0.139 0.140 
Panel C: Firm Fixed Effects (Crisis Observations) 
IO_TOTAL 0.000   
 (0.229)   
IO_FOR  0.000  
  (0.775)  
IO_DOM   0.001 
   (0.191) 
N 1047 1047 1047 
R-Squared 0.264 0.262 0.265 
Panel D: Firm Fixed Effects (Post-Crisis  Observations) 
IO_TOTAL 0.001   
 (0.161)   
IO_FOR  0.001  
  (0.242)  
IO_DOM   0.000 
   (0.696) 
N 430 430 430 
R-Squared 0.223 0.223 0.218 
Panel E: Firm Fixed Effects (Common Law Observations) 
IO_TOTAL 0.000   
 (0.635)   
IO_FOR  -0.000  
  (0.466)  
IO_DOM   0.000 
   (0.162) 
N 939 939 939 
R-Squared 0.211 0.212 0.214 
Panel F: Firm Fixed Effects (Civil Law Observations) 
IO_TOTAL 0.000   
 (0.990)   
IO_FOR  0.000  
  (0.752)  
IO_DOM   -0.000 
   (0.504) 
N 1089 1089 1089 
R-Squared 0.240 0.240 0.241 
Panel G: Interaction Effects (Firm Fixed Effects) 
IO TOTAL * FAMILY -0.000 
 (0.313) 
IO FOR * FAMILY -0.000 
 (0.345) 
IO DOM* FAMILY -0.001 
 (0.506) 
IO TOTAL * Non-FAMILY 0.000 
 (0.144) 
IO FOR *  Non-FAMILY 0.000 
 (0.437) 
IO DOM*  Non-FAMILY 0.000 
 (0.201) 
Note:  Regressions also include year dummies and standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering. Robust p-
values corrected for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels respectively.  All models include the control variables (coefficient not shown) used in Table 
8.4.GENDER DIV = Board gender diversity, IO TOTAL = Total institutional investors, IO FOR = Foreign 
institutional investors, IO DOM = Domestic institutional investors. 
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8.4.3. Board Age Diversity 
Age diversity is considered as one of the most observable attributes in corporate board 
diversity. This study examined whether the presence of institutional investors served to 
improve age diversity. Age diversity is measured by the coefficient of variation (standard 
deviation/mean) of directors’ ages across the board. Table 8.7 presents the results of firm fixed 
effect panel regressions; these regressions indicated that total and foreign institutional investors 
had a positive but insignificant relationship with an age diverse board (with coefficient = 0.000 
and 0.000, p-value = 0.871 and 0.656, and R-Squared value = 0.039 and 0.040), and domestic 
institutional investors had a negative association (with coefficient = -0.000, p-value = 0.482, 
and R-Squared value = 0.040) (see Table 8.7, Panel A). Therefore, the findings are not 
consistent with the resource dependence theory and led to the rejection of H8. The possible 
explanation for this may be that board age diversity may hinder the decision-making process 
of the corporate board, as the views of the elder and the younger directors cannot be aligned 
and consensus may hardly be reached (Goergen et al., 2015). This is consistent with other 
studies that claimed that an age diverse board is likely to spark intragroup conflicts in the 
decision-making process, leading to lower firm performance (Ali et al., 2014; Talavera et al., 
2018). Furthermore, Boon et al. (2004) found an insignificant relationship between age 
diversity and market-to-book value. Several studies documented that age diverse boards are 
associated with less corporate social-responsibility engagement (see Hafsi and Turgut, 2013; 
Harjoto et al., 2015). The results fill an important gap in corporate governance literature by 
showing that institutional investors consider the costs of age diversity to outweigh its benefits, 
and the implication of the results is important for policy makers when they revise corporate 
governance codes and stewardship codes alike. 
The study then investigated whether the role of institutional investors in improving age 
diversity is determined by economic conditions (see Table 8.7, Panels B, C and D). The results 
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indicated that while domestic institutions had negative and significant relationships with board 
age diversity at 10% during pre-crisis periods (with coefficient = -0.001, p-value = 0.054, and 
R-Squared value = 0.095), total and foreign institutional investors had negative relationships 
with board age diversity at 10% during post-crisis periods (with coefficient = -0.000 and -
0.000, p-value = 0.059 and 0.072, and R-Squared value = 0.065 and 0.066). However, this 
influence was not evident during the financial crisis. The results could be attributed to the fact 
that corporate boards need advising more than monitoring during the crisis time (Francis et al., 
2012). Therefore, the results may imply that an age diverse board may bring to the table 
multiple perspectives and advice (Darmadi, 2011; Ararat et al., 2015) during the time of crisis. 
However, the results are also consistent with Katmon et al. (2017), who found that age diversity 
was negatively associated with corporate social responsibility after the period of the recent 
financial crisis. 
The same relationship was then examined in a different legal system, and the results indicated 
that the association between institutional investors and board age diversity were mixed and 
insignificant (see Table 8.7, Panels E and F). However, domestic institutions were an 
exception; they had a negative and significant association in common law countries at 10% 
(with coefficient = -0.000, p-value = 0.056, and R-Squared value = 0.090). The results indicated 
that the legal system does determine the role of the institutional investors in improving age 
diversity. The study also examined whether the ability of institutional investors in improving 
age diversity is determined by the ownership structure (see Table 8.7, Panel G). The results 
indicated that the associations were mixed and insignificant for both family-owned and non-
family owned firms. The findings are consistent with Kang et al. (2007), who found that 
shareholder concentration is not significantly associated with board age diversity in Australian 
firms. Complementing the studies which emphasised the importance of institutional settings in 
the adoption of board diversity (Grosvold, 2011; Grosvold and Brammer, 2011; Ben‐Amar et 
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al., 2013; Nekhili and Gatfaoui, 2013; Ararat et al., 2015; Sun et al., 2015; Farag and Mallin, 
2016a), this study particularly contributes to the literature by showing that the association 
between institutional investors and board age diversity is determined by the economic 
conditions and the legal system, but not the ownership structure of the investee firms. 
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Table 8.7 Institutional Investors and Board Age Diversity 
 (1) (2) (3) 
AGE DIV 
Panel A:Firm Fixed Effects (All Observations) 
IO TOTAL 0.000   
 (0.871)   
IO_FOR  0.000  
  (0.656)  
IO_DOM   -0.000 
   (0.482) 
N 2028 2028 2028 
R-Squared 0.039 0.040 0.040 
Panel B: Firm Fixed Effects (Pre-Crisis Observations) 
IO_TOTAL 0.000   
 (0.750)   
IO_FOR  0.000  
  (0.205)  
IO_DOM   -0.001* 
   (0.054) 
N 551 551 551 
R-Squared 0.080 0.092 0.095 
Panel C: Firm Fixed Effects (Crisis Observations) 
IO_TOTAL -0.000   
 (0.736)   
IO_FOR  -0.000  
  (0.622)  
IO_DOM   0.000 
   (0.614) 
N 1047 1047 1047 
R-Squared 0.032 0.032 0.032 
Panel D: Firm Fixed Effects (Post-Crisis  Observations) 
IO_TOTAL -0.000*   
 (0.059)   
IO_FOR  -0.000*  
  (0.072)  
IO_DOM   -0.000 
   (0.676) 
N 430 430 430 
R-Squared 0.065 0.066 0.050 
Panel E: Firm Fixed Effects (Common Law Observations) 
IO_TOTAL -0.000   
 (0.706)   
IO_FOR  0.000  
  (0.626)  
IO_DOM   -0.000* 
   (0.056) 
N 939 939 939 
R-Squared 0.084 0.084 0.090 
Panel F: Firm Fixed Effects (Civil Law Observations) 
IO_TOTAL -0.000   
 (0.982)   
IO_FOR  -0.000  
  (0.921)  
IO_DOM   0.000 
   (0.739) 
N 1089 1089 1089 
R-Squared 0.039 0.039 0.040 
Panel G: Interaction Effects (Firm Fixed Effects) 
IO TOTAL * FAMILY 0.000 
 (0.991) 
IO FOR * FAMILY 0.000 
 (0.822) 
IO DOM* FAMILY -0.000 
 (0.774) 
IO TOTAL * Non-FAMILY 0.000 
 (0.865) 
IO FOR *  Non-FAMILY 0.000 
 (0.729) 
IO DOM*  Non-FAMILY -0.000 
 (0.535) 
Note:  Regressions also include year dummies and standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering. Robust p-
values corrected for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels respectively.  All models include the control variables (coefficient not shown) used in Table 
8.4.  AGE DIV = Board age diversity, IO TOTAL = Total institutional investors, IO FOR = Foreign institutional 
investors, IO DOM = Domestic institutional investors. 
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8.4.4. Board Nationality Diversity 
The nationality diversity of corporate boards has also attracted the attention of scholars and 
policy makers. This study investigated whether institutional investors promote the nationality 
diversity of corporate boards (see Table 8.8). Board nationality diversity was measured by the 
proportion of foreign directors across the board. The results revealed that there was a negative 
but insignificant association between total and foreign institutional investors and nationality 
diversity (with coefficient = -0.000 and -0.000, p-value = 0.483 and 0.341, and R-Squared value 
= 0.081 and 0.082, respectively). However, the association between domestic institutional 
investors and board nationality diversity was positive but insignificant (with coefficient = 
0.000, p-value = 0.981, and R-Squared value = 0.081). Therefore, H9 was rejected. The 
findings do not support the resource dependence theory, and they contribute to the literature by 
revealing that institutional investors do not promote nationality diversity of the corporate 
boards of their investee firms. The results could be due to the costs associated with appointing 
foreign directors on the corporate board. Several scholars argued that nationality diversity may 
prevent the board from functioning properly. For instance, Miletkov et al. (2013) asserted that 
directors with a variety of languages and cultural aspects may affect the communication 
opportunities, which adversely affects participation in making effective decisions. This is 
consistent with Piekkari et al. (2015), who demonstrated that board members with different 
languages found it difficult to participate and articulate the decision taken by the board in 
Nordic countries. Hahn and Lasfer (2016) showed that firms with a higher percentage of 
foreign directors sitting on the board experience lower attendance at corporate board meetings, 
leading to less shareholder return and higher compensation for both the CEO and the chairman 
of the firm. Other studies also documented that firms with a higher proportion of foreign 
directors engage in less corporate social responsibility (Katmon et al., 2017), exhibit poor 
performance, lower board meeting attendance, higher CEO compensation packages and greater 
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financial misreporting (Masulis et al., 2012). More recently, Mallin and Farag (2017) reported 
a negative relationship between nationality diversity and financial performance in the UK. The 
implication of these results is important for the policy makers when revising corporate 
governance boards and stewardship codes. 
The study examined whether economic conditions (pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods) 
determine the role of institutional investors in the promotion of nationality diversity (see Table 
8.8, Panels B, C and D). The results were mixed and insignificant in all three periods. The study 
also examined whether the association between institutional investors and nationality diversity 
is determined by the legal system (see Table 8.8, Panels E and F). The results were mixed and 
insignificant. The final investigation in this section was performed to determine whether the 
role of institutional investors in board nationality diversity is driven by the ownership structure. 
Ultimately, the associations between institutional investors and diversity attributes were mixed 
and insignificant for both family-owned and non-family-owned firms, though an exception was 
found for foreign institutional investors, who had negative and significant relationships with 
board nationality diversity in non-family-owned firms at 10% (with coefficient = -0.000 and 
p-value = 0.099) (see Table 8.8, Panel G). The findings complement previous studies that 
claimed institutional settings (economic conditions, legal systems and ownership structure) are 
important when studying corporate board diversity (Grosvold, 2011; Grosvold and Brammer, 
2011; Ben‐Amar et al., 2013; Nekhili and Gatfaoui, 2013; Ararat et al., 2015; Sun et al., 2015; 
Farag and Mallin, 2016a). In particular, this study contributes to the governance literature that 
these institutional settings are found to play no role in institutional investors’ activism towards 
improving board nationality diversity. 
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Table 8.8 Institutional Investors and Board Nationality Diversity 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Nation DIV 
Panel A:Firm Fixed Effects (All Observations) 
IO TOTAL -0.000   
 (0.483)   
IO_FOR  -0.000  
  (0.341)  
IO_DOM   0.000 
   (0.981) 
N 2028 2028 2028 
R-Squared 0.081 0.082 0.081 
Panel B: Firm Fixed Effects (Pre-Crisis Observations) 
IO_TOTAL 0.000   
 (0.778)   
IO_FOR  0.000  
  (0.881)  
IO_DOM   0.001 
   (0.686) 
N 551 551 551 
R-Squared 0.106 0.105 0.107 
Panel C: Firm Fixed Effects (Crisis Observations) 
IO_TOTAL -0.000   
 (0.547)   
IO_FOR  -0.000  
  (0.831)  
IO_DOM   -0.000 
   (0.655) 
N 1047 1047 1047 
R-Squared 0.042 0.041 0.042 
Panel D: Firm Fixed Effects (Post-Crisis  Observations) 
IO_TOTAL -0.001   
 (0.286)   
IO_FOR  -0.001  
  (0.114)  
IO_DOM   0.001 
   (0.462) 
N 430 430 430 
R-Squared 0.128 0.133 0.126 
Panel E: Firm Fixed Effects (Common Law Observations) 
IO_TOTAL -0.000   
 (0.786)   
IO_FOR  -0.000  
  (0.220)  
IO_DOM   0.000 
   (0.627) 
N 939 939 939 
R-Squared 0.095 0.098 0.095 
Panel F: Firm Fixed Effects (Civil Law Observations) 
IO_TOTAL -0.000   
 (0.621)   
IO_FOR  -0.000  
  (0.865)  
IO_DOM   -0.000 
   (0.668) 
N 1089 1089 1089 
R-Squared 0.103 0.102 0.103 
Panel G: Interaction Effects (Firm Fixed Effects) 
IO TOTAL * FAMILY 0.000 
 (0.299) 
IO FOR * FAMILY 0.000 
 (0.225) 
IO DOM* FAMILY 0.000 
 (0.950) 
IO TOTAL * Non-FAMILY -0.000 
 (0.231) 
IO FOR *  Non-FAMILY -0.000* 
 (0.099) 
IO DOM*  Non-FAMILY 0.000 
 (0.999) 
Note:  Regressions also include year dummies and standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering. Robust p-
values corrected for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels respectively.  All models include the control variables (coefficient not shown) used in Table 
8.4.  Nation DIV= Board nationality diversity, IO TOTAL = Total institutional investors, IO FOR = Foreign 
institutional investors, IO DOM = Domestic institutional investors. 
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8.4.5. Board Education Diversity 
This study also examined whether the presence of institutional investors served to enhance 
board education diversity. Education diversity is measured by the percentage of directors with 
postgraduate degrees across the board. Table 8.9 presents the results of firm fixed effect panel 
regressions; these regressions indicated that total and domestic institutional investors had a 
positive but insignificant relationship with board education diversity (with coefficient = 0.000 
and 0.001, p-value = 0.542 and 0.280, and R-Squared value = 0.056 and 0.057). In contrast, 
foreign institutional investors had a negative association with board education diversity (with 
coefficient = -0.000, p-value = 0.823, and R-Squared value = 0.056). Therefore, the findings 
were determined not to support the resource dependence theory, and H10 is rejected. The 
results are consistent with those who find that board diversity may not necessarily bring a 
fruitful outcome to the company. For instance, Rose (2007) finds no association between 
directors’ educational backgrounds and firm performance. Supporting these findings, Chun 
(2006) found that education diversity of the outside directors does not affect IPO firm 
valuation. 
The study compared the association between the institutional investors and board education 
diversity in various economic conditions (pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods). The results 
suggested that total and domestic institutional investors had positive and significant 
associations with education diversity during times of crisis at 1% and 10% respectively (with 
coefficient = 0.001 and 0.002, p-value = 0.067 and 0.001, and R-Squared value = 0.035 and 
0.051). However, this influence was not detected during pre-crisis or post-crisis periods (see 
Table 8.9, Panels B, C and D). The results support the institutional theory and imply that 
institutional investors improved board education diversity during the period of crisis to help 
the company to get rid of the crisis. It is argued by Francis et al. (2012) that during a crisis, 
firms need more advising than monitoring, which indicates that institutional investors enhance 
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board education diversity in order for the firm to benefit from their experience and skills during 
the difficult time of crisis; however, these effects waned during pre- and post-crisis periods. 
The study also examined whether the legal system determines the association between 
institutional investors and education diversity (see Table 8.9, Panels E and F). The results 
indicated that the association is mixed and insignificant for both legal systems (civil law versus 
common law countries). This section concludes with an investigation of whether the role of the 
institutional investors in the promotion of board education diversity is determined by 
ownership structure (see Table 8.9, Panel G). The results were mixed and insignificant for both 
family-owned and non-family owned firms. Overall, the findings do not support the 
institutional theory framework, and they complement studies that emphasised the importance 
of the legal system (Grosvold, 2011; Grosvold and Brammer, 2011) and ownership structure 
(Ben‐Amar et al., 2013; Nekhili and Gatfaoui, 2013; Ararat et al., 2015; Farag and Mallin, 
2016a) in explaining board diversity by showing that these two settings (legal system and 
ownership structure) do not play a part in the relationship between institutional investors and 
board education diversity. 
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Table 8.9 Institutional Investors and Board Education Diversity 
 (1) (2) (3) 
EDU DIV 
Panel A:Firm Fixed Effects (All Observations) 
IO TOTAL 0.000   
 (0.542)   
IO_FOR  -0.000  
  (0.823)  
IO_DOM   0.001 
   (0.280) 
N 2028 2028 2028 
R-Squared 0.056 0.056 0.057 
Panel B: Firm Fixed Effects (Pre-Crisis Observations) 
IO_TOTAL -0.000   
 (0.858)   
IO_FOR  -0.000  
  (0.598)  
IO_DOM   0.001 
   (0.206) 
N 551 551 551 
R-Squared 0.097 0.099 0.102 
Panel C: Firm Fixed Effects (Crisis Observations) 
IO_TOTAL 0.001*   
 (0.067)   
IO_FOR  -0.000  
  (0.762)  
IO_DOM   0.002*** 
   (0.001) 
N 1047 1047 1047 
R-Squared 0.035 0.029 0.051 
Panel D: Firm Fixed Effects (Post-Crisis  Observations) 
IO_TOTAL -0.000   
 (0.978)   
IO_FOR  0.000  
  (0.841)  
IO_DOM   -0.000 
   (0.953) 
N 430 430 430 
R-Squared 0.076 0.076 0.076 
Panel E: Firm Fixed Effects (Common Law Observations) 
IO_TOTAL 0.000   
 (0.438)   
IO_FOR  -0.000  
  (0.529)  
IO_DOM   0.001 
   (0.241) 
N 939 939 939 
R-Squared 0.078 0.078 0.081 
Panel F: Firm Fixed Effects (Civil Law Observations) 
IO_TOTAL -0.000   
 (0.688)   
IO_FOR  -0.000  
  (0.976)  
IO_DOM   -0.001 
   (0.428) 
N 1089 1089 1089 
R-Squared 0.076 0.076 0.077 
Panel G: Interaction Effects (Firm Fixed Effects) 
IO TOTAL * FAMILY -0.000 
 (0.734) 
IO FOR * FAMILY -0.000 
 (0.787) 
IO DOM* FAMILY -0.000 
 (0.845) 
IO TOTAL * Non-FAMILY 0.000 
 (0.365) 
IO FOR *  Non-FAMILY -0.000 
 (0.925) 
IO DOM*  Non-FAMILY 0.001 
 (0.249) 
Note:  Regressions also include year dummies and standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering. Robust p-
values corrected for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels respectively.  All models include the control variables (coefficient not shown) used in Table 
8.4.GENDER DIV = Board gender diversity, IO TOTAL = Total institutional investors, IO FOR = Foreign 
institutional investors, IO DOM = Domestic institutional investors. 
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8.5. Robustness Tests 
As described in chapter six, this study employed several robustness tests to confirm the main 
results. The tests utilised to confirm the results of the role of institutional investors and board 
diversity are reverse causality and system GMM tests. The results of these two tests are 
described in the following sections. 
Reverse Causality 
As discussed in Chapter Six, reverse causality might be of concern in this study, as it has the 
potential to lead to ineffective results. To address this issue, change score regressions were 
applied in an effort to determine whether changes in institutional ownership drove changes in 
board diversity or whether the reverse held true (Aggarwal et al., 2011). Panel A of Table 8.10 
demonstrates the results of these tests. In these tests, a change in the Board Diversity Index (Δ 
BDI16) from period t-1 to t represented the dependent variable. The main explanatory variables 
were changes in institutional ownership (Δ IO) from period t-2 to t-1. All other independent 
variables were expressed in terms of change; these variables were lagged by one period relative 
to the Board Diversity Index. Panel A of Table 8.10 shows that changes in total, foreign, 
domestic, common and civil institutional investors had a mixed and insignificant association 
with the Board Diversity Index (with coefficient value = -0.001, 0.001, -0.004, -0.000 and 
0.001, p-value = 0.790, 0.767, 0.339, 0.906 and 0.848, and R-Squared = 0.033, 0.033, 0.033, 
0.033 and 0.033, respectively).  
Panel B of Table 8.10 demonstrates the results of the reverse relationship analysis, which was 
conducted in an effort to study whether changes in board diversity (BDI16) drove changes in 
institutional ownership. In this analysis, the dependent variables were changes in institutional 
ownership (Δ IO) from period t-1 to t. The main explanatory variable was a change in the Board 
Diversity Index (ΔBDI16) from period t-2 to t-1. All other independent variables were expressed 
in terms of change; they were also lagged by one period relative to institutional ownership. 
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Panel B of Table 8.10 shows that the association between institutional investors (total, foreign, 
domestic, common and civil institutions) and the Board Diversity Index was mixed and 
insignificant (with coefficient value = 0.026, 0.058, -0.041, -0.074 and 0.096, p-value = 0.897, 
0.756, 0.530, 0.671 and 0.336, and R-Squared = 0.033, 0.041, 0.049, 0.040 and 0.033, 
respectively). Ultimately, the results were consistent with the main results of this study (see 
Table 8.4 for comparison). 
 
 
 
 
System GMM  
 
As discussed in chapter six, this study adopted a system GMM technique as a robustness test. 
To this end, the xtabond2 dynamic panel estimator in STATA 14 was considered, and the 
procedure of Wintoki et al. (2012) adapted to model the association between institutional 
investors and board diversity index (BDI16). Table 8.11 presents the results of this GMM, which 
test the role of institutional investors in improving Board Diversity Index (BDI16). When 
Table 8.10 Changes in Institutional Ownership and Changes in Board Diversity 
 Δ BDI16  coefficient N R Squared 
Panel A: Yearly Changes ( Changes in Institutional Ownership and Changes in Board Diversity) 
Δ IO TOTAL -0.001 1553 0.033 
 (0.790)   
Δ IO FOR 0.001 1553 0.033 
 (0.767)   
Δ IO DOM -0.004 1553 0.033 
 (0.339)   
Δ IO COMMON -0.000 1553 0.033 
 (0.906)   
Δ IO CIVIL 0.001 1553 0.033 
 (0.848)   
Panel B:  Yearly Changes (Changes in   Board Diversity and Changes in Institutional Ownership) 
Δ IO TOTAL 0.026 1553 0.033 
 (0.897)   
Δ IO FOR 0.058 1553 0.041 
 (0.756)   
Δ IO DOM -0.041 1553 0.049 
 (0.530)   
Δ IO COMMON -0.074 1553 0.040 
 (0.671)   
Δ IO CIVIL 0.096 1553 0.033 
 (0.336)   
Note:  Regressions also include year, country and industry dummies and standard errors corrected for country-level clustering. Robust p-values 
corrected for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.  All 
models include the control variables (coefficient not shown) used in Table 8.4. BDI16= Board diversity index, IO TOTAL = Total institutional 
investors, IO FOR = Foreign institutional investors, IO DOM = Domestic institutional investors, IO COMMON = Common law institutional 
investors, IO CIVIL = Civil law institutional investors. 
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running a system GMM, two diagnostic tests must be utilised in order to ensure the validity of 
this technique. The first test is related to second-order serial correlation AR (2), with a P value 
> 5%. The second test is the Hansen J test of over-identification, which is used to determine 
whether an instrument is uncorrelated with the error term in the models, with a P value > 5%. 
The results, as reported in Table 8.10, indicated that there was no serial correlation (with AR 
(2) ranges from 0.083 to 0.086), and that the instruments used in the system GMM were valid 
and uncorrelated with the error term (with the Hansen J test value ranges from 0.059 to 0.062). 
Table 8.11 shows that the association between total, foreign and common institutional investors 
and the Board Diversity Index (BDI16) was positive but insignificant (with coefficient value = 
0.002, 0.003 and 0.002, and p-value = 0.347, 0.272 and 0.250, respectively). However, the 
association between domestic and civil institutional investors was negative and insignificant 
(with coefficient value = -0.001 and -0.002, and p-value = 0.728 and 0.672, respectively).this 
result was consistent with the main results presented in Table 8.4. 
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Table 8.11 Institutional Investors and the Board Diversity Index (System GMM) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 BDI16 
BDI16 0.836
*** 0.834*** 0.834*** 0.836*** 0.835*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IO TOTAL 0.002     
 (0.347)     
IO FOR  0.003    
  (0.272)    
IO DOM   -0.001   
   (0.728)   
IO COMMON    0.002  
    (0.250)  
IO CIVIL     -0.002 
     (0.672) 
FSIZE 0.120 0.116 0.088 0.117 0.086 
 (0.156) (0.162) (0.271) (0.155) (0.285) 
SGROWTH 0.119 0.116 0.121 0.119 0.124 
 (0.423) (0.435) (0.412) (0.423) (0.402) 
LEV -0.091 -0.079 -0.078 -0.093 -0.082 
 (0.678) (0.719) (0.726) (0.671) (0.712) 
CASH -0.357 -0.372 -0.368 -0.362 -0.367 
 (0.264) (0.243) (0.249) (0.259) (0.253) 
CAPEX 0.775 0.749 0.710 0.767 0.709 
 (0.381) (0.395) (0.416) (0.385) (0.417) 
MB -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.998) (0.986) (0.936) (0.981) (0.925) 
ROA 0.918* 0.918* 0.881* 0.915* 0.877* 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.072) (0.062) (0.073) 
PPE -0.002 -0.008 0.008 -0.003 0.010 
 (0.993) (0.966) (0.966) (0.987) (0.958) 
ANALYST 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 
 (0.365) (0.375) (0.334) (0.365) (0.332) 
ADR -0.001 -0.004 0.006 -0.002 0.007 
 (0.985) (0.953) (0.928) (0.978) (0.919) 
RULE  -0.065* -0.065* -0.065 -0.066* -0.066* 
 (0.100) (0.098) (0.102) (0.095) (0.098) 
CRISIS  0.204 0.209 0.207 0.205 0.205 
 (0.193) (0.181) (0.187) (0.191) (0.191) 
POST-CRISIS 0.096 0.103 0.101 0.097 0.098 
 (0.617) (0.591) (0.600) (0.612) (0.610) 
FAMILY 0.320 0.322 0.283 0.308 0.271 
 (0.109) (0.108) (0.142) (0.112) (0.188) 
STATE 0.040 0.041 0.003 0.023 -0.013 
 (0.839) (0.835) (0.989) (0.906) (0.951) 
WIDELY 0.082 0.083 0.069 0.071 0.060 
 (0.622) (0.617) (0.677) (0.668) (0.733) 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.086 0.086 0.084 0.085 0.083 
Hansen 0.061 0.061 0.062 0.059 0.061 
N 2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 
Note:  Regressions also include year dummies and standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering. Robust p-values corrected for firm-
level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. BDI16= Board 
diversity index, IO TOTAL = Total institutional investors,  IO FOR = Foreign institutional investors, IO DOM = Domestic institutional 
investors, IO COMMON = Common law institutional investors,  IO CIVIL = Civil law institutional investors,  FSIZE = Firm size,  
SGROWTH = Sales growth,  LEV = Leverage, Cash = Cash,  CAPEX = Capital Expenditure,  MB = Market-to-book value,  ROA = Return 
on Asset,  PPE = Property, plant and equipment, ANALYST = Analyst following,  ADR = Cross listing dummy, Rule = Rule of law, CRISIS 
= Crisis dummy,  POST-CRISIS = Post crisis dummy,  FAMILY = Family controlling at 20%,  STATE = State controlling at 20%,  WIDELY 
= Widely held at 20%. 
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8.6. Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter outlined the research analysis procedures and findings of the institutional 
investors’ role in the improvement of board diversity, beginning with a descriptive examination 
of the variables used in this study. The chapter then discussed the results of the correlation 
analysis and VIF tests. The chapter outlined the results of the hypothesis tests (H6–H10) that 
were developed in Chapter Five of this thesis. Furthermore, this chapter illustrated the results 
of efforts to test these hypotheses according to various institutional settings and to include 
diverse economic conditions (pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods), legal systems and 
ownership structures. Finally, this chapter concluded with an explanation of the results of two 
main robustness tests: reverse causality and system GMM. 
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Chapter 9 
9.0 Summary and Conclusion 
9.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter provides a concise summary of this research study. First, the research objectives 
and questions will be restated, and then the main results and study implications will be 
reviewed. Next, this chapter will describe the contributions of this study and outline its 
limitations; finally, possible avenues for future research will be presented. 
Accordingly, this chapter is organised as follows: section 9.2 reviews the objectives and 
questions of this study, section 9.3 demonstrates the main findings and research implications, 
section 9.4 illustrates the study contributions and section 9.5 identifies the research limitations 
and suggests avenues for future research.  
9.2. Restatement of the Research Objectives and Questions  
 
The main objective of this study was to investigate the role of institutional investors in the 
improvement of corporate governance practices around the world. This was accomplished by 
analysing evidence regarding the various characteristics of numerous boards of directors. These 
characteristics were related to board attributes (composition, activity, entrenchment and 
busyness) and board diversity (gender, age, nationality and education). An additional purpose 
of this study was to examine this relationship within various institutional environments, to 
include multiple economic conditions (pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods), national legal 
systems and ownership structures. To this end, this study aimed to answer six main empirical 
questions: (1) Do institutional investors influence corporate board attributes? (2) Do 
institutional investors influence the characteristics of a board’s key subcommittees? (3) Do 
institutional investors influence board diversity? (4) Do institutional investors play different 
roles within different economic environments (pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods)? (5) Do 
institutional investors play different roles within different legal systems? and (6) Do 
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institutional investors play different roles according to whether they operate within 
concentrated or dispersed ownership structures? 
9.3. Summary of Findings and Research Implications 
This study analysed a sample of companies that were in operation in 15 countries across the 
globe between 2006 and 2012 and found that institutional investors promoted more favourable 
corporate governance outcomes. Interestingly, foreign institutional investors took on a lead role 
in the improvement and convergence of corporate governance practices around the world. The 
results are consistent with the findings of previous studies, which argue that foreign 
institutional investors exert greater influence over the governance structures of their investee 
firms; this is likely because they possess fewer business relationships within their investee 
firms as compared to their counterparts (Aggarwal et al., 2011; Ferreira and Matos, 2008). This 
study also provided evidence that institutional investors promoted better composition of 
corporate boards and of their audit and compensation committees (though not of their 
nomination committees). Moreover, while institutional investors were not found to be 
positively associated with the activity of boards or of compensation and nomination 
committees, they were positively associated with audit committee activity. Results also 
demonstrated that institutional investors reduced board entrenchment, but not board busyness. 
The study also found no evidence that institutional investors promoted board diversity; thus, 
there was arguably no association between institutional ownership and various board diversity 
attributes such as gender, age, nationality and education.  
The findings also revealed that a company’s institutional environment influenced the role of 
institutional investors in corporate governance; such environmental aspects included various 
economic conditions (pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods), legal systems and ownership 
structures. To some extent, this result was found to be more closely related to corporate board 
attributes than to board diversity characteristics. For instance, the findings indicated that 
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institutional investors played a stronger role in the improvement of governance structures 
during crisis and post-crisis periods; their influence during pre-crisis periods, however, was 
less evident. This finding was also applicable to individual board attributes, including the 
independence of audit committees.  
Furthermore, institutional investors were found to increase the independence of a board and its 
key subcommittees (with the exception of nomination committees) in civil law countries, 
though they reduced board busyness in common law countries. However, this study uncovered 
no evidence with respect to institutional investors’ role in reducing board entrenchment within 
either legal system. Overall, this finding is consistent with the work of La Porta et al. (1998), 
who have argued that investors in countries with weak shareholder protections may seek out 
other means of protecting their investments. 
Results also revealed that the presence of institutional investors led to improved governance 
outcomes in non-family-owned firms, but not in family-owned firms. These results may 
explain the importance of considering ownership structures when investigating the adoption of 
corporate governance mechanisms in a particular firm (see Desender et al., 2013; Sure et al., 
2013; Desender et al., 2016). With regard to board diversity, the findings indicated that 
institutional investors were negatively associated with board age diversity during pre-crisis and 
post-crisis periods and positively associated with education diversity during times of crisis. 
Furthermore, while institutional investors demonstrated no influence over board diversity 
outcomes (i.e., gender, age, nationality and education) in civil law countries, they were found 
to be negatively associated with board age diversity in common law countries. The study’s 
results also suggested that the associations between institutional investors and board diversity 
were mixed and insignificant within the various ownership structures (family- and non-family-
owned firms). 
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The implications of this study are particularly meaningful for policymakers. On the one hand, 
these findings suggest that institutional investors play a meaningful and effective role in the 
improvement of governance structures within their investee firms. Thus, policymakers around 
the world are encouraged to continue to issue stewardship and corporate governance codes in 
order to increase awareness and encourage engagement between institutional investors and 
their investee firms. On the other hand, our results highlight the importance of considering a 
company’s institutional environment when studying the ability of institutional investors to 
improve the governance structures of their investee firms. These settings include various 
economic conditions (pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods), legal systems and ownership 
structures. Additionally, this study should draw the attention of policymakers across the globe 
and enlighten them as to the fact that institutional investors do not play a part in the 
improvement of board diversity. Therefore, policymakers are encouraged to increase the 
awareness of institutional investors in this regard and to exhort them to take part in addressing 
this matter of global concern.  
In addition, despite the size of institutional investor groups around the globe, they do not seem 
to be promoting board diversity (gender, age, nationality and education), which could be due 
to the costs of board diversity exceeding its benefits. For instance, several studies have 
criticised the legislation of gender quotas on corporate boards, as it leads to the employment of 
incompetent and less-experienced directors, which negatively influences board and firm 
performance (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Bøhren and Staubo, 2014). 
Several scholars have noted that companies adopt the concept of board diversity by appointing 
ethnic minorities and women on their boards only to enhance their reputations and minimise 
the pressure from the media and stakeholders (Martín-Ugedo and Minguez-Vera, 2014; 
Gregorič et al., 2017). Therefore, the implications of this study are useful for policy makers 
when revising their policies with regard to the enactment of mandatory gender quotas. 
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9.4. Research Contribution 
This research makes several contributions to the corporate governance literature. While the 
majority of previous studies have focused on data taken from one country (mainly the US 
market) (Chung et al., 2002; Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Parriino et al., 2003; Velury et al., 2003; 
Almazan et al., 2005; Brav et al., 2008; Wang, 2010; Hadani et al., 2011; Ruiz-Mallorquí and 
Santana-Martín, 2011; Chhaochharia et al., 2012; Helwege et al., 2012; Muniandy et al., 2016), 
this study utilised an international sample when investigating the role of institutional investors 
in the improvement of corporate governance. In fact, to the best of my knowledge, this study 
is the first to examine the role of institutional investors in the improvement of a wide range of 
corporate board characteristics, to include board attributes (composition, activity, 
entrenchment and busyness) and board diversity (gender, age, nationality and education 
diversity). While institutional investors are found to improve board attributes, their influence 
over board diversity is not evident. This might be due to the fact that the cost of board diversity 
exceeds its benefits. Several studies have reported that board gender diversity may not bring a 
fruitful governance outcome (Rose, 2007; Chapple and Humphrey, 2014; Bugeja et al., 2016; 
Sila et al., 2016; Saeed and Sameer, 2017; Gaitán et al., 2018); this is consistent with other 
studies that have reported similar results with other board diversity attributes, such as age 
(Boon et al., 2004; Hafsi and Turgut, 2013; Ali et al., 2014; Harjoto et al., 2015; Talavera et 
al., 2018), nationality (Masulis et al., 2012; Miletkov et al., 2013; Hahn and Lasfer, 2016; 
Katmon et al., 2017; Mallin and Farag, 2017) and education (Rose, 2007; Chun, 2006). 
Furthermore, this study sheds additional light on the role of institutional investors in efforts to 
improve the composition and activity of a board’s key subcommittees (audit, compensation 
and nomination). While institutional investors were found to promote the composition of the 
board and its key sub-committees (with the exception of nomination committees), they only 
improve the activity of audit committees. 
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This research also serves to complement studies that call for the consideration of national 
institutional settings when examining corporate board attributes (Aguilera et al., 2008; Aguilera 
and Jackson; 2010). Various aspects of such settings include economic conditions (Essen et al., 
2013), legal systems (Aguilera et al., 2008; Aguilera et al., 2012; Kim and Ozdemir, 2014) and 
ownership structures (Desender et al., 2013; Judge, 2011, 2012; Sure et al., 2013). This study 
thus opens a new line of research that might enhance our understanding when studying the role 
of institutional investors in the improvement of their investee firms’ governance structures. 
This study also emphasises that the ability of institutional investors to improve the corporate 
board characteristics of their investee firms is to some extent determined by the firm’s national 
institutional environment, to include its economic condition (whether it exists within a pre-
crisis, crisis or post-crisis period), prevailing legal system and ownership structure. In addition, 
while the institutional settings (economic conditions, legal system and ownership structure) 
have been observed to determine the association between institutional investors and board 
attributes (composition, activity, entrenchment and busyness) to a greater extent, they are less 
evident in determining the relationship between institutional investors and board diversity 
(gender, age, nationality and education diversity). In particular, this study contributes to the 
bundle perspective of comparative corporate governance (Aguilera et al., 2008; Aguilera and 
Jackson, 2010; Judge, 2011, 2012; Aguilera et al., 2012; Desender et al., 2013; Sure et al., 
2013; Kim and Ozdemir, 2014) the information that institutional investors generally improved 
board attributes during and after a financial crisis. While the institutional investors have the 
influence to improve board attributes in common law countries in general, the study also 
demonstrated that institutional investors choose to improve specific board attributes in civil 
law countries (i.e. board composition and board entrenchment). This can be explained as an 
attempt from the institutional investors to mitigate weak shareholder protection in civil law 
countries (La Porta et al., 1998). The study also contributes to the field of corporate governance 
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evidence to support the second type of agency cost, Principal-Principal conflict (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). The findings revealed that the role of institutional investors in improving board 
attributes is determined to some extent by the ownership structure (family-owned vs non-
family-owned firms), with greater improvement of board attributes occurring in non-family 
firms. 
More importantly, following the recent call to broaden the theoretical scope of corporate 
governance studies (see Kumar and Zattoni, 2015; Zattoni and Van Ees; 2012), this research 
contributes to the corporate governance literature by considering multiple theoretical 
perspectives. As discussed in the second chapter of this study, several theories drawn from 
multiple disciplines were utilised to develop a fuller understanding of the role of institutional 
investors in the improvement of corporate governance outcomes around the globe. The findings 
of this study illustrated the applicability of agency theory, stewardship theory, resource 
dependence theory, institutional theory and stakeholder theory to explain the relationship 
between institutional investors and board attributes. However, there was little to no evidence 
that the agency, resource dependence and institutional theories explain the association between 
institutional investors and board diversity. 
This study’s final contribution is related to the insight it offers to policymakers. This study 
demonstrates the importance and ability of stewardship codes to enhance engagement between 
institutional investors and their investee firms. Furthermore, this study implies that in the 
future, policymakers may focus on board diversity when revising corporate governance and 
stewardship codes. Furthermore, this study provides an additional insight that may be useful to 
policymakers; namely, that a firm’s national institutional setting should be considered when 
investigating the role of institutional investors in corporate governance. 
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9.5. Research Limitations and Future Research 
 
Several limitations have been encountered while undertaking this study. One major constraint 
was a lack of time, which limits the study to include only those firms listed in the main indices 
of the sample countries. Therefore, future research should include all firms for whom 
information is available in the databases; this will allow the findings to gain additional 
generalisability.  
Another limitation faced by the study involved a lack of data with respect to emerging and 
developing markets. Future studies should attempt to overcome this limitation as more data for 
such countries becomes available. This will enable future researchers to analyse the role of 
institutional investors in the improvement of corporate governance structures in a variety of 
capital markets. 
Furthermore, future studies might consider cultural variances between countries and firms, as 
the culture of a country (Li and Harrison, 2008; Grosvold and Brammer, 2011) and of a firm 
(Guiso et al., 2015) can influence the level of governance within an investee firm. Such a 
consideration will allow researchers to gain insight into the topic of whether culture serves to 
influence the role of institutional investors in the improvement of corporate governance 
structures. More recently, several studies have argued that stock liquidity can also influence 
the behaviour of institutional investors in terms of whether they adopt the voice or exit strategy 
(McCahery et al., 2016; Edmans et al., 2013; Roosenboom et al., 2013). Therefore, future 
studies are recommended to investigate the role of institutional investors in improving 
corporate governance (e.g., board attributes and board diversity) in light of the stock liquidity 
of the investee firm. 
Finally, while this study investigated the role of institutional investors in the improvement of 
a wide range of corporate board characteristics, future investigations on the topic should 
include additional corporate board characteristics such as experience and ethnicity. 
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Appendix one : List of Firms 
SN Australia 33 LIHIR GOLD 64 ENERPLUS 97 SILVER WHEATON 
1 AGL ENERGY 34 OIL SEARCH 65 FIRST QUANTUM MRLS. 98 BOMBARDIER 'B' 
2 ARISTOCRAT LEISURE 35 ILUKA RESOURCES 66 GILDAN ACTIVEWEAR 99 METRO INC 
3 AMCOR 36 OZ MINERALS 67 GOLDCORP 100 POTASH CORPORATION OF SASKATCHEWAN 
4 ALUMINA 37 TOLL HOLDINGS  68 YAMA GOLD 101 ROGERS COMMS.'B' 
5 BHP BILLITON 38 SONIC HEALTHCARE 69 HUSKY EN. 102 SAPUTO 
6 BORAL 39 TRANSURBAN GROUP 70 KINROSS GOLD 103 SHAW COMMS.'B' 
7 BLUESCOPE STEEL 40 WESFARMERS 71 LOBLAW 104 SHOPPERS DRUG MART 
8 ASCIANO 41 WOODSIDE PETROLEUM 72 MAGNA INTL. 105 TECK RESOURCES 'B' 
9 AURIZON HOLDINGS 42 WOOLWORTHS 73 IMPERIAL OIL 106 IAMGOLD 
10 BRAMBLES Belgium  74 ENBRIDGE 107 ALCAN 
11 CSL 43 AGFA-GEVAERT 75 ARC RESOURCES 108 COTT 
12 COLES GROUP 44 ANHEUSER-BUSCH INBEV 76 BARRICK GOLD 109 COGNOS 
13 FOSTER'S GROUP 45 BEKAERT 77 CENOVUS ENERGY 110 FORDING CDN.COAL TST. UTS. 
14 CROWN RESORTS 46 PROXIMUS 78 FORTIS 111 AIMIA 
15 FORTESCUE METALS GP. 47 COLRUYT 79 BCE 112 INMET MINING 
16 SYDNEY AIRPORT 48 DELHAIZE GROUP 80 TELUS 113 LUNDIN MINING 
17 CONSOLIDATED MEDIA HDG 49 MOBISTAR 81 CRESCENT POINT ENERGY 114 NORDION 
18 INTOLL GROUP 50 OMEGA PHARMA 82 CAMECO 115 NEXEN 
19 CIMIC GROUP 51 UCB 83 CANADIAN OIL SANDS 116 NOVA CHEMICALS 
20 ARRIUM 52 UMICORE 84 CANADIAN NATURAL RESOURCES 117 PETRO CANADA 
21 COCA-COLA AMATIL 53 NYRSTAR 85 CANADIAN PACIFIC RY. 118 TIM HORTONS 
22 COMPUTERSHARE 54 TELENET GROUP HOLDING 86 BLACKBERRY 119 URANIUM ONE 
23 NEWCREST MINING 55 D'IETEREN 87 CANADIAN TIRE 'A' Denmark 
24 ORICA 56 ELIA SYSTEM OPERATOR 88 AGRIUM 120 A P MOLLER - MAERSK 'B' 
25 ORIGIN ENERGY (EX BORAL) 57 SOLVAY 89 TALISMAN EN. 121 BANG & OLUFSEN 'B' 
26 QANTAS AIRWAYS 58 ENGIE 90 THOMSON REUTERS 122 CARLSBERG 'B' 
27 RIO TINTO Ltd Canada 91 TRANSCANADA 123 COLOPLAST 'B' 
28 SANTOS 59 CANADIAN NATIONAL RAILWAY 92 TRANSALTA 124 TORM A 
29 SPARK NEW ZEALAND (ASX) 60 SUNCOR ENERGY 93 WESTON GEORGE 125 DSV 'B' 
30 TABCORP HOLDINGS 61 AGNICO EAGLE MINES 94 VALEANT PHARMS.INTL. 126 DMPKBT.NORDEN 
31 TELSTRA 62 ELDORADO GOLD 95 SNC-LAVALIN GP. 127 FLSMIDTH & CO.'B' 
32 INCITEC PIVOT 63 ENCANA 96 PENN WEST PETROLEUM 128 GN STORE NORD 
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Appendix one continued 
129 CHR HANSEN HOLDING 161 YIT 193 TECHNIP 225 HERO MOTOCORP 
130 H LUNDBECK 162 UPONOR 194 TOTAL 226 COAL INDIA 
131 NOVO NORDISK 'B' 163 TALVIVAARA MNG.CO. 195 VALLOUREC 227 GAIL (INDIA) 
132 NKT France 196 VEOLIA ENVIRONNEMENT 228 MAHINDRA & MAHINDRA 
133 NOVOZYMES 164 VIVENDI 197 VINCI 229 JAIPRAKASH ASSOCIATES 
134 VESTAS WINDSYSTEMS 165 MICHELIN 198 AIR FRANCE-KLM 230 JINDAL STEEL & POWER 
135 WILLIAM DEMANT HLDG. 166 ALCATEL-LUCENT 199 PEUGEOT 231 STERLITE INDS.(INDIA) 
136 PANDORA 167 GEMALTO 200 STMICROELECTRONICS 232 SUN PHARM.INDUSTRIES 
137 TDC 168 ALSTOM 201 TECHNICOLOR Ireland 
Finland 169 ACCOR India 233 AER LINGUS GROUP 
138 AMER SPORTS 170 AIR LIQUIDE 202 ACC 234 C&C GROUP 
139 CARGOTEC 'B' 171 AIRBUS GROUP 203 BAJAJ AUTO 235 CRH (DUB) 
140 ELISA 172 ARCELORMITTAL 204 BHARAT HEAVY ELS. 236 DCC (DUB)  
141 FORTUM 173 RENAULT 205 BHARTI AIRTEL 237 ELAN  
142 KESKO 'B' 174 BOUYGUES 206 GRASIM INDUSTRIES 238 GRAFTON GROUP (DUB)  
143 HUHTAMAKI 175 CAP GEMINI 207 HINDALCO INDUSTRIES 239 GREENCORE GROUP (DUB)  
144 KEMIRA 176 CARREFOUR 208 HINDUSTAN UNILEVER 240 DRAGON OIL  
145 KONE 'B' 177 DANONE 209 INFOSYS (IND) 241 GLANBIA 
146 KONECRANES 178 EDF 210 ITC 242 ARYZTA (DUB) 
147 METSA BOARD 'B' 179 ESSILOR INTL. 211 LARSEN & TOUBRO 243 INDEPENDENT NEWS & MEDIA 
148 METSO 180 GDF SUEZ 212 MARUTI SUZUKI INDIA 244 KERRY GROUP 'A' 
149 NESTE 181 KERING 213 NTPC 245 KINGSPAN GROUP 
150 NOKIA 182 L'OREAL 214 OIL & NATURAL GAS 246 MCINERNEY HOLDINGS 
151 OUTOKUMPU 'A' 183 LAFARGE 215 RANBAXY LABS. 247 PADDY POWER 
152 RAUTARUUKKI 'K'  184 LEGRAND 216 RELIANCE COMMUNICATIONS 248 RYANAIR HOLDINGS 
153 OUTOTEC 185 LVMH 217 RELIANCE INDUSTRIES 249 SMURFIT KAPPA GROUP 
154 SANOMA 186 ORANGE 218 RELIANCE INFRASTRUCTURE 250 IRISH CONT.GP.UNT. 
155 ORION 'B' 187 PERNOD-RICARD 219 SATYAM COMPUTER SERVICES 251 KENMARE RESOURCES 
156 STORA ENSO 'R' 188 PUBLICIS GROUPE 220 TATA CONSULTANCY SVS. 252 PROVIDENCE RES. (ESM) 
157 TELIASONERA (HEL) 189 SAFRAN 221 TATA MOTORS Italy 
158 TIETO OYJ 190 SANOFI 222 TATA STEEL 253 A2A 
159 UPM-KYMMENE 191 SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC 223 TATA POWER 254 AUTOGRILL 
160 WARTSILA 192 SOLVAY 224 WIPRO 255 BULGARI 
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256 ENEL 288 BOSKALIS WESTMINSTER 320 TANDBERG  352 INDITEX 
257 ENI 289 KPN KON 321 TELENOR 353 INDRA SISTEMAS 
258 FIAT CHRYSLER AUTOS. 290 PHILIPS ELTN.KONINKLIJKE 322 TGS-NOPEC GEOPHS. 354 MEDIASET ESPANA COMUNICACION 
259 FASTWEB 291 RELX 323 TOMRA SYSTEMS 355 NH HOTEL GR 
260 ENEL GREEN POWER 292 ROYAL DUTCH SHELL 324 YARA INTERNATIONAL 356 RED ELECTRICA CORPN. 
261 GRUPPO EDIT.L'ESPRESSO 293 RANDSTAD HOLDING 325 SEVAN MARINE 357 REPSOL YPF 
262 LUXOTTICA 294 SBM OFFSHORE 326 SONGA OFFSHORE 358 TELEFONICA 
263 MEDIASET 295 POSTNL 327 STATOIL FUEL & RETAIL 359 UNION FENOSA 
264 ARNOLDO MONDADORI EDI. 296 TOM TOM 328 SCHIBSTED A 360 GRIFOLS ORD CL A 
265 PARMALAT 297 UNILEVER NV 329 ROYAL CRBN.CRUISES (OSL) 361 IBERDROLA RENOVABLES  
266 PIRELLI 298 VEDIOR 330 ALGETA  362 OBRASCON HUARTE LAIN 
267 STMICROELECTRONICS (MIL)  299 WOLTERS KLUWER 331 CERMAQ  363 TECNICAS REUNIDAS 
268 SAIPEM 300 TNT EXPRESS 332 DET NORSKE OLJESELSKAP 364 INTL.CONS.AIRL.GP. (MAD) (CDI) 
269 SNAM 301 USG PEOPLE 333 ELECTROMAG.GEOSVS. 365 VISCOFAN 
270 TELECOM ITALIA 302 AIR FRANCE-KLM 334 QUESTERRE ENERGY (OSL) 366 ARCELORMITTAL (MAD) 
271 SEAT PAGINE GIALLE 303 ARCELORMITTAL 335 NORWEGIAN AIR SHUTTLE 367 EBRO FOODS 
272 TENARIS Norway Spain 368 AMADEUS IT HOLDING 
273 TERNA Spa 304 AKASTOR 336 ABERTIS INFRAESTRUCTURAS 369 DISTRIBUIDORA INTNAC.DE ALIMENTACION 
274 TOD'S 305 DNO 337 ABENGOA Sweden 
275 DAVIDE CAMPARI MILANO 306 FRED OLSEN ENERGY 338 ACCIONA 370 ABB LTD N (OME) 
276 GEOX 307 FRONTLINE 339 ACERINOX 'R' 371 ASSA ABLOY 'B' 
277 SALVATORE FERRAGAMO 308 MARINE HARVEST 340 ACS ACTIV.CONSTR.Y SERV. 372 ALFA LAVAL 
Netherlands 309 GOLDEN OCEAN GROUP 341 AGUAS DE BARCELONA 373 ASTRAZENECA (OME) 
278 AHOLD KON. 310 NORSK HYDRO 342 ALTADIS  374 ATLAS COPCO 'A' 
279 AKZO NOBEL 311 NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER 343 ATRESMEDIA CORP 375 BOLIDEN 
280 ASML HOLDING 312 OCEAN RIG  344 ENAGAS 376 ELECTROLUX 'B' 
281 APERAM 313 ORKLA 345 ENDESA 377 ENIRO 
282 CORPORATE EXPRESS 314 PETROLEUM GEO SERVICES 346 FERROVIAL 378 ERICSSON 'B' 
283 DSM KONINKLIJKE 315 PROSAFE 347 FOMENTO CONSTR.Y CNTR. 379 HENNES & MAURITZ 'B' 
284 BAM GROEP KON. 316 REC SILICON 348 GAMESA CORPN.TEGC. 380 GETINGE 
285 GETRONICS 317 SEADRILL 349 GAS NATURAL SDG 381 LUNDIN PETROLEUM 
286 HAGEMEYER 318 STATOIL 350 IBERDROLA 382 HOLMEN 'B' 
287 HEINEKEN 319 SUBSEA 7 351 IBERIA 383 SKF 'B' 
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384 NOKIA (OME) 415 BHP BILLITON 448 RANDGOLD RESOURCES 481 TESCO 
385 SCANIA 'B'  416 AGGREKO 449 MELROSE INDUSTRIES 482 UNITED UTILITIES GROUP 
386 MODERN TIMES GP.MTG 'B' 417 AMEC 450 PERSIMMON 483 BT GROUP 
387 SANDVIK 418 INTERTEK GROUP 451 INTL.CONS.AIRL.GP.(CDI) 484 CRODA INTERNATIONAL 
388 SSAB 'A' 419 ROYAL DUTCH SHELL A(LON) 452 BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO 485 KAZ MINERALS 
389 SECURITAS 'B' 420 VODAFONE GROUP 453 BAE SYSTEMS 486 ACACIA MINING 
390 SKANSKA 'B' 421 BP 454 ASSOCIATED BRIT.FOODS 487 AUTONOMY CORP 
391 SWEDISH MATCH 422 GLAXOSMITHKLINE 455 ANTOFAGASTA 488 BRITISH AIRWAYS  
392 TELE2 'B' 423 UNILEVER (UK) 456 ANGLO AMERICAN 489 CAIRN ENERGY 
393 TELIASONERA 424 RIO TINTO 457 ARM HOLDINGS 490 COBHAM 
394 VOLVO 'B' 425 ASTRAZENECA 458 BRITISH SKY BCAST.GROUP 491 EURASIAN NATRES.CORP 
Switzerland 426 DIAGEO 459 CAPITA 492 CORUS GROUP 
395 ABB LTD N 427 SABMILLER 460 CARNIVAL 493 DRAX GROUP 
396 ADECCO 'R' 428 BG GROUP 461 CENTRICA 494 DIXONS RETAIL 
397 ACTELION 429 RECKITT BENCKISER GROUP 462 COMPASS GROUP 495 ENTERPRISE INNS 
398 CIBA N 430 IMI 463 CRH PLC 496 ALLIANCE BOOTS 
399 CLARIANT 431 ICTL.HTLS.GP. 464 EXPERIAN 497 EVRAZ 
400 LAFARGEHOLCIM 432 KINGFISHER 465 FRESNILLO 498 FIRST GROUP 
401 LONZA GROUP 433 MEGGITT 466 IMPERIAL TOBACCO GP. 499 HANSON 
402 MERCK SERONO 'B'  434 PETROFAC 467 ITV 500 HOME RETAIL GROUP 
403 NESTLE 'R' 435 SHIRE 468 MARKS & SPENCER GROUP 501 INTERNATIONAL POWER 
404 NOBEL BIOCARE HOLDING 436 TULLOW OIL 469 MORRISON (WM) SPMKTS. 502 LONMIN 
405 NOVARTIS 'R' 437 WEIR GROUP 470 NATIONAL GRID 503 INMARSAT 
406 RICHEMONT N 438 WOLSELEY 471 NEXT 504 INVENSYS 
407 ROCHE HOLDING 439 WHITBREAD 472 PEARSON 505 RENTOKIL INITIAL 
408 SWISSCOM 'R' 440 SSE 473 REED ELSEVIER 506 POLYMETAL INTERNATIONAL 
409 SGS 'N' 441 REXAM 474 ROLLS-ROYCE HOLDINGS 507 SCOTTISH & NEWCASTLE 
410 SYNGENTA 442 BUNZL 475 SAGE GROUP 508 SERCO GROUP 
411 SYNTHES 443 BURBERRY GROUP 476 SAINSBURY (J) 509 SCOTTISH POWER 
412 TRANSOCEAN LTD 444 G4S 477 SEVERN TRENT 510 VEDANTA RESOURCES 
413 GIVAUDAN 'N' 445 GKN 478 SMITH & NEPHEW 511 TAYLOR WIMPEY 
414 GEBERIT 'R' 446 JOHNSON MATTHEY 479 SMITHS GROUP 512 THOMAS COOK GROUP 
United Kingdom 447 BABCOCK INTL. 480 TATE & LYLE 513 TUI TRAVEL 
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514 WPP 546 CONOCOPHILLIPS 579 PROCTER & GAMBLE 612 INTERNATIONAL PAPER 
515 XSTRATA 547 COSTCO WHOLESALE 580 QUALCOMM 613 L BRANDS 
516 HIBU 548 DEVON ENERGY 581 RAYTHEON 'B' 614 MEDIMMUNE  
517 WOOD GROUP (JOHN) 549 DOW CHEMICAL 582 SCHLUMBERGER 615 NATIONAL SEMICON. 
United States 550 E I DU PONT DE NEMOURS 583 SOUTHERN 616 ROCKWELL AUTOMATION 
518 APPLE 551 EMC 584 STARBUCKS 617 HILLSHIRE BRANDS 
519 WALGREEN 552 EMERSON ELECTRIC 585 TARGET 618 TYCO INTERNATIONAL 
520 ANADARKO PETROLEUM 553 EXELON 586 TEXAS INSTS. 619 WILLIAMS 
521 PEPSICO 554 FEDEX 587 TIME WARNER 620 XEROX 
522 FORD MOTOR 555 FREEPORT-MCMOR.CPR.& GD. 588 TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY FOX CL.A 621 WYETH  
523 EXXON MOBIL 556 GENERAL DYMICS 589 UNION PACIFIC 622 GOOGLE 
524 MICROSOFT 557 GILEAD SCIENCES 590 UNITED PARCEL SER.'B' 
525 JOHNSON & JOHNSON 558 HALLIBURTON 591 UNITED TECHNOLOGIES 
526 GENERAL ELECTRIC 559 HEWLETT-PACKARD 592 UNITEDHEALTH GP. 
527 3M 560 HOME DEPOT 593 VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS 
528 AT&T 561 HONEYWELL INTL. 594 WAL MART STORES 
529 AMER.ELEC.PWR. 562 INTEL 595 WALT DISNEY 
530 ABBOTT LABORATORIES 563 INTERNATIONAL BUS.MCHS. 596 EBAY 
531 ALTRIA GROUP 564 ELI LILLY 597 BAKER HUGHES 
532 AMAZON.COM 565 LOCKHEED MARTIN 598 AES 
533 ACCENTURE CLASS A 566 LOWE'S COMPANIES 599 ALCOA 
534 AMGEN 567 MCDONALDS 600 ALLEGHENY TECHS. 
535 APACHE 568 MEDTRONIC 601 AVON PRODUCTS 
536 BAXTER INTL. 569 MERCK & CO. 602 ANHEUSER-BUSCH COS. 
537 BOEING 570 MONDELEZ INTERNATIOL CL.A 603 BLACK & DECKER 
538 BRISTOL MYERS SQUIBB 571 MONSANTO 604 BURL.NTHN.SANTA FE C 
539 CVS CAREMARK 572 NIKE 'B' 605 CAMPBELL SOUP 
540 CISCO SYSTEMS 573 NATIONAL OILWELL VARCO 606 CBS 'B' 
541 COLGATE-PALM. 574 NORFOLK SOUTHERN 607 CIGNA 
542 CATERPILLAR 575 OCCIDENTAL PTL. 608 COVIDIEN 
543 CHEVRON 576 ORACLE 609 DELL  
544 COCA COLA 577 PFIZER 610 COMPUTER SCIS. 
545 COMCAST 'A' 578 PHILIP MORRIS INTL. 611 ENTERGY 
